Cost Control cp



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AT CP Illegitimate




1. Realistic and limited - forcing affs to defend responsible funding is key to limit out contrived affs that fiat “investment” without reference to what that investment IS – allowing these affs promotes a useless model of transportation policy education since it’s divorced from the real world

2. Advocacy Skills- Forcing the aff to defend PIC’s out of the process of the government encourages the development of better researched and planned policies and is vital to being a competent transportation advocate because ideas aren’t enough in congress

3. Vital education- Being a transportation policy maker requires in depth knowledge of HOW to spend the plan’s money



Boehlert et al 2k8 (Congressman Sherwood Boehlert Senator Slade Gorton Congressman Martin Sabo Governor Mark Warner, “Commentary on the Report of the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission (Transportation for Tomorrow),” pg online @ http://financecommission.dot.gov/Documents/Background%20Documents/NTPP%20Commentary%20on%20Policy%20Commission%20Report.pdf //um-ef)

Given the substantial transportation infrastructure investments that will be needed over the next several decades, a major focus of the Commission’s report, and of the current policy debate more generally, is funding. Within this discussion, the question of how to spend transportation money more effectively is as importantand perhaps more important—than the question of where the money will come from. In this context, the Commission’s recommendation that the current system of transportation investment be reformed so that it is “subject to benefit-cost analysis and performance-based outcomes” is extremely valuable and arguably more consequential than its call for a substantial (25–40 cents over 5 years) increase in the federal gas tax3, even though the latter proposal has received far more attention in the press. The current transportation funding structure was designed to support the expansion of the Interstate Highway System. It does not reflect the many changes and new transportation needs that have arisen over the last half century.

4. Reciprocity- they chose the wording and mandates of the plan for strategic reasons such as bigger advantages and solvency --- reciprocity demands they incur the strategic cost of defending against this CP – and reciprocity is the baseline for fair and educational debate

AT: Solvency Deficit




And, Puentes proves that including cost control conditions solves better – It ensures that programs are completed with fewer deficiencies.

And, Postrel proves that including the conditions ensures that we get the technology developed faster and better than the plan.

And, The only way there can be a solvency deficit is if there is a cost overrun – Including the conditions we do ensures that contractors use realistic cost estimates upfront. This prevents the overruns that trigger a breach and lets us get the technology deployed FASTER than the plan.




Accountability is key to stop biased forecasts that result in cost overruns


Flyvbjerg 2k9 (Bent, professor of planning at Aalborg University, Denmark. He is founder and director of the university’s research program on large-scale infrastructure planning, “Survival of the unfittest: why the worst infrastructure gets built—and what we can do about it,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009, pp.344–367, pg online @ http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/centres/bt/Documents/UnfittestOXREPHelm3.4PRINT.pdf //um-ef)

Nevertheless, seemingly rational forecasts that underestimate costs and overestimate benefits have long been an established formula for project approval as we saw above. Forecasting is here mainly another kind of rent-seeking behaviour, resulting in a make-believe world of misrepresentation which makes it extremely difficult to decide which projects deserve undertaking and which do not. The consequence is, as even one of the industry’s own organs, the Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that too many projects proceed that should not. One might add that many projects do not proceed that probably should, had they not lost out to projects with ‘better’ misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). In this situation, the question is not so much what project managers can do to reduce inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what others can do to impose on project managers the checks and balances thatwould givemanagers the incentive to stop producing biased forecasts and begin to work according to their Code of Ethics. The challenge is to change the power relations that govern forecasting and project development. Better forecasting techniques and appeals to ethics will not do here; organizational change with a focus on transparency and accountability is necessary. As argued in Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), two basic types of accountability define liberal democracies: (i) public-sector accountability through transparency and public control; and (ii) private-sector accountability via competition and the market mechanism. Both types of accountability may be effective tools to curb misrepresentation in project management and to promote a culture which acknowledges and deals effectively with risk, especially where large amounts of taxpayers’ money are at stake and for projects with significant social and environmental impacts, as is common with major infrastructure projects.




AT: Delay

Cost overruns lead to even more delay—negotiation process, additional funding process


Flyvbjerg 5, Professor of Major Programme Management at Oxford University's Saïd Business School and is Founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management, winner of the Fulbright Scholarship, (Bent, Policy and planning for large infrastructure : projects problems, causes, and cures, World Bank Publications, January 2005, Google Scholar)//AG

Second, cost overruns of the size described above typically lead to delays, because securing additional funding to cover overruns often takes time. In addition, projects may need to be re-negotiated or re-approved when overruns are large as the data show they often are (Flyvbjerg 2005a). In a separate study, we demonstrated that delays in transportation infrastructure implementation are very costly, increasing the percentage construction cost overrun measured in constant prices by 4.64 percentage points per year of delay incurred after the time of decision to build (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl, 2004). For a project of, say, US$8 billion—that is the size of the channel tunnel and about half the size of Boston’s Big Dig—the expected average cost of delay would be approximately $370 million/year, or about $1 million/day.—Benefit shortfalls are an additional consequence of dealys, because delays result in later opening dates and thus extra months or years without revenues. Because many large infrastructure projects are loan financed and have long construction periods, they are particularly sensitive to delays, as delays result in increased debt, increased interest payments, and longer payback periods.






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