Elections Disad – Core – Hoya-Spartan 2012
A2 Escalation/Iran Retaliation
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A2 Escalation/Iran RetaliationIran retaliation will stay limited – multiple factors prevent escalationKroenig, 12 (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran) SETTING THE RIGHT REDLINES The fact that the United States can likely set back or destroy Iran's nuclear program does not necessarily mean that it should. Such an attack could have potentially devastating consequences -- for international security, the global economy, and Iranian domestic politics -- all of which need to be accounted for. To begin with, critics note, U.S. military action could easily spark a full-blown war. Iran might retaliate against U.S. troops or allies, launching missiles at military installations or civilian populations in the Gulf or perhaps even Europe. It could activate its proxies abroad, stirring sectarian tensions in Iraq, disrupting the Arab Spring, and ordering terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States. This could draw Israel or other states into the fighting and compel the United States to escalate the conflict in response. Powerful allies of Iran, including China and Russia, may attempt to economically and diplomatically isolate the United States. In the midst of such spiraling violence, neither side may see a clear path out of the battle, resulting in a long-lasting, devastating war, whose impact may critically damage the United States' standing in the Muslim world. Those wary of a U.S. strike also point out that Iran could retaliate by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow access point to the Persian Gulf through which roughly 20 percent of the world's oil supply travels. And even if Iran did not threaten the strait, speculators, fearing possible supply disruptions, would bid up the price of oil, possibly triggering a wider economic crisis at an already fragile moment. None of these outcomes is predetermined, however; indeed, the United States could do much to mitigate them. Tehran would certainly feel like it needed to respond to a U.S. attack, in order to reestablish deterrence and save face domestically. But it would also likely seek to calibrate its actions to avoid starting a conflict that could lead to the destruction of its military or the regime itself. In all likelihood, the Iranian leadership would resort to its worst forms of retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at southern Europe, only if it felt that its very existence was threatened. A targeted U.S. operation need not threaten Tehran in such a fundamental way. To make sure it doesn't and to reassure the Iranian regime, the United States could first make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government. It could then identify certain forms of retaliation to which it would respond with devastating military action, such as attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, conducting massive and sustained attacks on Gulf states and U.S. troops or ships, or launching terrorist attacks in the United States itself. Washington would then need to clearly articulate these "redlines" to Tehran during and after the attack to ensure that the message was not lost in battle. And it would need to accept the fact that it would have to absorb Iranian responses that fell short of these redlines without escalating the conflict. This might include accepting token missile strikes against U.S. bases and ships in the region -- several salvos over the course of a few days that soon taper off -- or the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels. To avoid the kind of casualties that could compel the White House to escalate the struggle, the United States would need to evacuate nonessential personnel from U.S. bases within range of Iranian missiles and ensure that its troops were safely in bunkers before Iran launched its response. Washington might also need to allow for stepped-up support to Iran's proxies in Afghanistan and Iraq and missile and terrorist attacks against Israel. In doing so, it could induce Iran to follow the path of Iraq and Syria, both of which refrained from starting a war after Israel struck their nuclear reactors in 1981 and 2007, respectively. Even if that fails – US can deescalate quickly and no regional warKroenig, 12 (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran) Even if Tehran did cross Washington's redlines, the United States could still manage the confrontation. At the outset of any such violation, it could target the Iranian weapons that it finds most threatening to prevent Tehran from deploying them. To de-escalate the situation quickly and prevent a wider regional war, the United States could also secure the agreement of its allies to avoid responding to an Iranian attack. This would keep other armies, particularly the Israel Defense Forces, out of the fray. Israel should prove willing to accept such an arrangement in exchange for a U.S. promise to eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat. Indeed, it struck a similar agreement with the United States during the Gulf War, when it refrained from responding to the launching of Scud missiles by Saddam Hussein. Conflict is inevitable, Strikes NOW prevent war – Iran can’t retaliateBabbin, 2006 (Jed, served as a deputy undersecretary of defense in the George H.W. Bush administration “Iran Showdown”, The American Spectator, http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=9310) THE WAR WITH IRAN WILL have to be fought and we will, of course, defend Israel as best we can. But much bloodshed can be avoided, and Iran's nuclear objective put out of reach if we seize the advantage we gave up to Saddam in the UN. Surprise is a strategic advantage we must retain. The alternative to a large war, which no one speaks about, is a surprise attack against Iran mounted before Israel acts, and before the predicted Iranian nuclear test happens. Such an attack would employ several unconventional weapons at once and could -- if managed properly -- be over before Iran knows it has begun. The world must know that we have done it. But after, not before. It may be that Iran's Chinese allies are doing more than helping develop its missiles. It may be that Iran's Russian trading partner is doing more than providing defenses against air attack. But neither is likely to be providing Iran with the means of effectively defending against our other capabilities. It could, and should, be made one dark night. B-2 stealth bombers, each carrying twenty ground-penetrating guided munitions, can destroy much of Iran's nuclear facilities and government centers. Some might carry reported electro-magnetic pulse weapons that can destroy all the electronic circuits that comprise Iranian missiles, key military communications and computer facilities. And it may be that we have the ability to attack Iran's military and financial computer networks with computer viruses and "Trojan horses" that will make it impossible for Iran to function militarily and economically. Our strategy must be implemented before Ahmadinejad can test his nukes. Whether that test can happen next month or next year is immaterial. The time for us to act is now. No counter attack - air strikes and missiles solveRogers, 2006 (Paul Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group “IRAN: CONSEQUENCES OF A WAR”, February) In addition to the substantial programme of air strikes and missile attacks on nuclear, missile and defence facilities, US military operations would also be aimed at pre-empting any immediate Iranian responses. Most significant of these would be any possible retaliatory Iranian action to affect the transport of oil and liquefied natural gas through the Straits of Hormuz. On the assumption that this would be an obvious form of retaliation, it would be necessary to destroy coastal anti-ship missile batteries and Iran’s small force of warships. The main base and dockyard is at Bushehr; the operational headquarters is at Bandar Abbas which is also the base for Iran’s small flotilla of Russian-built Kilo-class submarines, although Chah Bahar is due to become the new base for these three boats. Other bases for light naval forces include Kharg Island at the head of the Gulf and islands in the Abu Musa group south-west of the Straits of Hormuz, these being heavily defended and well supplied.1 The small Iranian Navy suffered severe losses in its exchanges with the US Navy at the end of the “tanker war” in April 1988, and it is probable that the main emphasis will be on fast light forces, including speedboats crewed by those prepared to die. These would be Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRG) forces and they would most likely place the greatest emphasis on attacking tanker traffic rather than US naval units. Operating bases for these forces would be priorities for attack. It would also be assumed that IRG elements would move into some parts of Iraq to link up with sympathetic militia. To demonstrate that any such moves would incite retaliation, it is probable that military action would target forward-based ground force units both of the IRG and of the regular army. Of the numerous Iranian Army bases, those close to the border with Iraq at Abadan, Khorramshahr, Ahvaz, Dezfuland and possibly Mahabad would be the most likely targets, as would major IRG centres. A range of logistical support facilities would be targeted, with this possibly extending to destruction of bridges. Given the porous nature of the border, this latter action would be primarily symbolic. The initial strike would decapitate their militaryGlobal Security.org, 2005 (January 1 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-strikes.htm) One potential military option that would be available to the United States includes the use of air strikes on Iranian weapons of mass destruction and missile facilities. In all, there are perhaps two dozen suspected nuclear facilities in Iran. The 1000-megawatt nuclear plant Bushehr would likely be the target of such strikes. According to the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, the spent fuel from this facility would be capable of producing 50 to 75 bombs. Also, the suspected nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak will likely be targets of an air attack. American air strikes on Iran would vastly exceed the scope of the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osiraq nuclear center in Iraq, and would more resemble the opening days of the 2003 air campaign against Iraq. Using the full force of operational B-2 stealth bombers, staging from Diego Garcia or flying direct from the United States, possibly supplemented by F-117 stealth fighters staging from al Udeid in Qatar or some other location in theater, the two-dozen suspect nuclear sites would be targeted. Military planners could tailor their target list to reflect the preferences of the Administration by having limited air strikes that would target only the most crucial facilities in an effort to delay or obstruct the Iranian program or the United States could opt for a far more comprehensive set of strikes against a comprehensive range of WMD related targets, as well as conventional and unconventional forces that might be used to counterattack against US forces in Iraq. Iran will play the role of the victim to appease other countriesRoberts, 1-17 (Paul Craig, wrote the Kemp-Roth bill and was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. He was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and Contributing Editor of National Review. He is author or coauthor of eight books. He has held numerous academic appointments, including the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He has contributed to numerous scholar journals and testified before Congress on 30 occasions. He has been awarded the U.S. Treasury's Meritorious Service Award and the French Legion of Honor. http://baltimorechronicle.com/2007/011707Roberts.shtml) The former national security official believes that Bush will be able to claim victory over Iran, because Iran will avoid responding militarily. Iran will not use its Russian missiles to sink our aircraft carriers, to shut down oil facilities throughout the Middle East, or to destroy US headquarters in the “green zone” in Baghdad. Instead, Iran will adopt the posture of another Muslim victim of US/Israeli aggression and let the anger seep throughout the Muslim world until no pro-US government is safe in the Middle East. No backlash – naval and airpower checkRogers, 2006 (Paul, Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group “IRAN: CONSEQUENCES OF A WAR”, February) Although the United States has a major problem of overstretch affecting its Army and Marine Corps, an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would be undertaken almost entirely by the Air Force and the Navy. To have the maximum impact, it would be done by surprise, utilising land-based aircraft already in the region, long-range strike aircraft operating from the United States, the UK and Diego Garcia, and naval strike forces involving carrier-borne aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. At any one time, the US Navy keeps one aircraft carrier battle group on station in or near the Persian Gulf. Such groups rotate, and there are periods when two are on station, providing over 150 aircraft, together with several hundred cruise missiles.4 Similar numbers of land-based aircraft could be assembled with little notice, given the range of US bases in the region, and B 1B and B-2 bombers could operate from outside the region. In particular, the specialised facilities required to operate the stealth B-2 aircraft are now available at Fairford air base in Gloucestershire.5 Air strikes on nuclear facilities would involve the destruction of facilities at the Tehran Research Reactor, together with the radioisotope production facility, a range of nuclear-related laboratories and the Kalaye Electric Company, all in Tehran. The Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre would be a major target, including a series of experimental reactors, uranium conversion facilities and a fuel fabrication laboratory. Pilot and full-scale enrichment plants at Natanz would be targeted, as would facilities at Arak (see Appendix 1).6 The new 1,000 MW reactor nearing completion at Bushehr would be targeted, although this could be problematic once the reactor is fully fuelled and goes critical some time in 2006. Once that has happened, any destruction of the containment structure could lead to serious problems of radioactive dispersal affecting not just the Iranian Gulf coast, but west Gulf seaboards in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. As well as the direct human effects, since these comprise the world’s most substantial concentration of oil production facilities, the consequences could be severe.7 All of the initial attacks would be undertaken more or less simultaneously, in order to kill as many of the technically competent staff as possible, therefore doing the greatest damage to longer-term prospects. This would be a necessary part of any military action and would probably extend to the destruction of university laboratories and technology centres that indirectly support the Iranian nuclear scientific and technical infrastructure. Such an aspect of the attack is not widely recognised outside of military planning circles but would be an essential component of the operation. Given that the aim is to set back Iranian nuclear potential for as long as possible, it would be essential to go well beyond the destruction of physical facilities that could be replaced quite rapidly. The killing of those with technical expertise would have a much more substantial impact on any efforts to redevelop nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, since such expertise is known to include foreign nationals, the killing of such people already working in the country would serve as a deterrent to the involvement of others in the future. Iran currently has limited air defences and a largely obsolete and small air force. Even so, defence suppression would be a major aspect of military action, primarily to reduce the risk of the killing or capture of US aircrew. It would involve the targeting of radar facilities and command and control centres, as well as Western Command air bases at Tehran, Tabriz, Hamadan, Dezful, Umidiyeh, Shiraz and Isfahan, and Southern Command air bases at Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar.8 A particular concern for US forces is the continued deployment by Iran of 45 or more of the American F-14A Tomcat interceptors and their long-range AWG-9 radar equipment. 79 planes were originally procured before the fall of the Shah and around 30 are available operationally at any one time out of those still deployed.9 Research, development and production facilities for Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile programme would be priority targets, as would bases at which these mobile missiles are deployed. Because of their mobility, surprise would once again be essential. US forces have already used reconnaissance drones to map Iranian facilities and these, combined with satellite reconnaissance and a range of forms of electronic surveillance, have provided considerable information on the nuclear infrastructure and more general defence forces. A2: Backlash Turns – AllUS can minimize political fallout and avoid international crisisKroenig, 12 (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran) Washington could also reduce the political fallout of military action by building global support for it in advance. Many countries may still criticize the United States for using force, but some -- the Arab states in particular -- would privately thank Washington for eliminating the Iranian threat. By building such a consensus in the lead-up to an attack and taking the outlined steps to mitigate it once it began, the United States could avoid an international crisis and limit the scope of the conflict. A2 OverstretchWon’t Cause Overstretch – Your Evidence Only Assumes Ground ForcesINW, ’06 (Iran Nuclear Watch, 10/18, http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com/2006/10/cacnp-briefing-on-us-policy-options.html) This is the second favorite approach of American Neoconservatives. Many mistakenly believe that the U.S. is too tied down in Iraq to carry out a successful military strike against Iran. While our ground forces may be overextended, our Navy and Air Force would have no problem carrying out this operation. A2 Civilian CasualtiesCivilian casualities will be limitedKroenig, 12 (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran) Washington would also be able to limit civilian casualties in any campaign. Iran built its most critical nuclear plants, such as the one in Natanz, away from heavily populated areas. For those less important facilities that exist near civilian centers, such as the centrifuge-manufacturing sites, U.S. precision-guided missiles could pinpoint specific buildings while leaving their surroundings unscathed. The United States could reduce the collateral damage even further by striking at night or simply leaving those less important plants off its target list at little cost to the overall success of the mission. Although Iran would undoubtedly publicize any human suffering in the wake of a military action, the majority of the victims would be the military personnel, engineers, scientists, and technicians working at the facilities The alternative to strikes is prolif or strikes later, comparatively worse optionsBeres ‘07 (Louis Rene, professor @ the University of Purdue, May 8, pg. http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20070508/cm_csm/yberes) A more important reservation about preemption involves tactical difficulties. Due to delays, the success of strikes against certain key Iranian targets may already be in doubt. Worse, such strikes would probably entail high civilian casualties because Iran has deliberately placed sensitive military assets amid civilian populations – an international crime called "perfidy." But further delay will only multiply the number of casualties from any future operation, or – in the worst-case scenario – allow Iran to become fully nuclear. A2: Oil ShocksNo economic crisis or oil shockKroenig, 12 (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran) SETTING THE RIGHT REDLINES The fact that the United States can likely set back or destroy Iran's nuclear program does not necessarily mean that it should. Such an attack could have potentially devastating consequences -- for international security, the global economy, and Iranian domestic politics -- all of which need to be accounted for. To begin with, critics note, U.S. military action could easily spark a full-blown war. Iran might retaliate against U.S. troops or allies, launching missiles at military installations or civilian populations in the Gulf or perhaps even Europe. It could activate its proxies abroad, stirring sectarian tensions in Iraq, disrupting the Arab Spring, and ordering terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States. This could draw Israel or other states into the fighting and compel the United States to escalate the conflict in response. Powerful allies of Iran, including China and Russia, may attempt to economically and diplomatically isolate the United States. In the midst of such spiraling violence, neither side may see a clear path out of the battle, resulting in a long-lasting, devastating war, whose impact may critically damage the United States' standing in the Muslim world. Those wary of a U.S. strike also point out that Iran could retaliate by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow access point to the Persian Gulf through which roughly 20 percent of the world's oil supply travels. And even if Iran did not threaten the strait, speculators, fearing possible supply disruptions, would bid up the price of oil, possibly triggering a wider economic crisis at an already fragile moment. Cont… Finally, the U.S. government could blunt the economic consequences of a strike. For example, it could offset any disruption of oil supplies by opening its Strategic Petroleum Reserve and quietly encouraging some Gulf states to increase their production in the run-up to the attack. Given that many oil-producing nations in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, have urged the United States to attack Iran, they would likely cooperate. No impact - US and Europe strategic reserves checkAkleh, 2006 (Dr. Elias, Arab writer from a Palestinian descent) “Iran is The Next Battle Field”, March 5, http://www.amin.org/eng/uncat/2006/mar/mar5-0.html) The US expects this invasion to take less than 100 days. To avoid the expected oil crisis due to the shut-off of Iranian oil the American administration is planning to use its strategic petroleum reserve that has a supply of oil equals to about 175 days worth of Iranian production. Europe will also use its own strategic oil reserve. These reserves would be replenished with fresh oil after controlling Khuzestan. This war would give US total control of the largest three oil resources of the world; Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. The Dollar’s global hegemony would be restored, and participating European countries would have some share of the cake. Iran wont shut down oil facilitiesRoberts, 1-17 (Paul Craig, wrote the Kemp-Roth bill and was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. He was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and Contributing Editor of National Review. He is author or coauthor of eight books. He has held numerous academic appointments, including the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He has contributed to numerous scholar journals and testified before Congress on 30 occasions. He has been awarded the U.S. Treasury's Meritorious Service Award and the French Legion of Honor. http://baltimorechronicle.com/2007/011707Roberts.shtml) The former national security official believes that Bush will be able to claim victory over Iran, because Iran will avoid responding militarily. Iran will not use its Russian missiles to sink our aircraft carriers, to shut down oil facilities throughout the Middle East, or to destroy US headquarters in the “green zone” in Baghdad. Instead, Iran will adopt the posture of another Muslim victim of US/Israeli aggression and let the anger seep throughout the Muslim world until no pro-US government is safe in the Middle East. A2: Straits of HormuzIran won’t close the straits – economic suicideSchake ’07 (Kori,- research fellow at the Hoover Institution “Dealing with A Nuclear Iran” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/6848072.html) Iran could also disrupt the flow of oil by closing the Straits of Hormuz or attacking Gulf platforms or shipping. As Edward Luttwak points out, “all of the offshore oil- and gas-production platforms in the gulf, all the traffic of oil and gas tankers originating from the jetties of the Arabian peninsula and Iraq, are within easy reach of the Iranian coast.” However, this, too, seems improbable beyond a short duration, since oil accounts for 80 percent of the Iranian economy. Attacks on gcc oil facilities are a greater likelihood, since they would increase the value of Iranian oil, but if gcc states were not involved in or supporting the strikes against Iran, such attacks would have long-term detrimental consequences for Iran’s relations with the gcc states. Iran Won't Shut Off Strait Of Hormuz -That'd Guarantee The Demise Of The RegimeBergman 5/19/2006 (Ilan, author, "Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States," and vice president of the America Foreign Policy Council, Defense Forum Foundation Luncheon Presentation: "Taking on Tehran: America's Options," Federal News Service, l/n) I'll give you an example. Iran has the ability to shut off the flow of oil from the Strait of Hormuz through the Strait of Hormuz from the Persian Gulf. That's two-fifths of world energy traffic on any given day. That would obviously cause prices to spike through the roof, but it's also the quickest, easiest, and most efficient way to make India, Japan, the European Union, Russia, and China regime changers, because if that happens the first logical assumption that businessmen in all those places will make is this regime in its current form cannot be trusted to control oil, even if this crisis subsides. And unlike us, the Russians and the Chinese have no problem with dealing forcefully with economic meddlers. So I don't necessarily think that that's a threat. What I do think that the Iranians are gaming very well is our degree of aversion to rising prices. I think they know that if they rattle that energy saber pretty heftily, and often, and do war games, and test Russian equipment off of freighters and things like that, we get very nervous and we begin to deter ourselves from having these discussions. So like you said, there's not a lot of discussion about that, and that's precisely what they want. More evHassett ’06 (Kevin A,- scholar @ American Enterprise Institute “World Economy Would Be Casualty of Mideast War” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24663,filter.all/pub_detail.asp) While this scenario is sobering, it remains unlikely, at least based on the economics. Oil accounts for about 10 percent of Iran's gross domestic product and comprises 80 percent of that country's exports. Take away the oil revenue in war time, and the economy would almost grind to a halt and certainly be unable to sustain a prolonged conflict. Only suicidal leaders would allow themselves to fight with Israel under such circumstances. A2: Strikes => FundamentalismStrikes are worth the riskKittrie, 2004 (Orde, The Arizona Republic.) December 5 2004 Several factors, including Iran’s history of threats and attacks against the United States, provide strong support for the legality under international law of a preemptive strike focused on neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program. The risk of such an attack inciting the “Arab street” or insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan would be well worth taking — for an Iranian nuclear program is an existential threat and insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere are not. The impact will be minimal – little support for religious warfareGerecht ’06 (Reuel Marc,- resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute April 14th “To Bomb, or Not to Bomb” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24230,filter.all/pub_detail.asp) And as explained above, anger at the United States is likely to be double-edged, cutting toward the ruling clergy as well as us. We shouldn't become paralyzed from fear of Shiite death-wish believers coming at us again. It's possible. What makes a terrorist Muslim holy warrior is usually complex and personal, and an American airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities might provide that special explosive ingredient to some. However, it's not likely, and it's especially not likely that the clerical regime would be able to produce and export these holy warriors as an automotive company does cars. The Islamic Republic ceased to produce holy warriors by the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. (The death of Khomeini in 1989 also stole a charismatic element from the brew that had produced an amazing number of young men who lived to die.) Even in Lebanon, where Hezbollah is just across the border from Israel, Shiite holy warriors have receded--at least those who want to immolate themselves and others for the cause. This disease is obviously alive among the Sunnis, but it seems extinguished among the Shiites. Blame Khomeini, the Iran-Iraq war, and nationalism. The type of millenarian hope that many faithful Iranian men had at the beginning of the revolution died out in the war and in the unjust and increasingly corrupt society the mullahs built. Millenarian despair--the recognition that God's perfect society isn't accessible on earth but just might be accessible through a gloriously violent and fraternal death--also burned itself out in the unending, pointless slaughter of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war and the increasing pettiness and deceit of an aging Islamic Republic. There are certainly diehard true believers in Iran--Ahmadinejad appears to be one--but the internal chemistry of Iranian society doesn't produce many anymore among men under 25, the key age group for marrying a killer faith with testosterone. The potential for chiliastic rapture--the fraternity of death that young men can have most easily in brutal combat--has just dried up. Something so secular and adventitious as an American airstrike on a nuclear facility is very unlikely to bring back that magic, that love of God and man, that can send young boys across minefields on motorcycles. The rise of a less religious nationalism in Iran is a sign of declining jihadism. Nationalism in the Sunni radical world has been in retreat (even if it still often defines the contours of "globalized" radical Islamic thought) as holy warriorism has been increasing. An offended God is a vastly more important element in jihadism than an offended nation-state. If Ahmadinejad declares that thousands of young men will sign up to become martyrs in terrorist attacks upon Americans if the United States bombs Iran, don't believe him. He's dreaming. He's having a flashback. If opponents of preventive bombing conjure up illusions of Sunni militants--or just the "one billion plus Muslims worldwide"--outraged at American actions against the Islamic Republic, then one should remind them of the Arab and Muslim streets that were supposed to rise in jihad a half dozen times against Westerners since 1914 but didn't. Imagining Arab and non-Arab Sunnis, particularly the truly violent Wahhabi set, who hate Shiites almost as much as they hate Americans, going on the warpath on behalf of a nuclear-defanged Shiite Iran is numbingly hard, though obviously not impossible for those who believe the Islamic Republic is only a menace because America--especially President Bush--is determined to demonize it. A2: Strikes => Nationalism/Empower HardlinersHardliners already have absolute control, strikes empower dissidents and there’s no impactKroenig, 12 (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran) Yet another argument against military action against Iran is that it would embolden the hard-liners within Iran's government, helping them rally the population around the regime and eliminate any remaining reformists. This critique ignores the fact that the hard-liners are already firmly in control. The ruling regime has become so extreme that it has sidelined even those leaders once considered to be right-wingers, such as former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, for their perceived softness. And Rafsanjani or the former presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi would likely continue the nuclear program if he assumed power. An attack might actually create more openings for dissidents in the long term (after temporarily uniting Iran behind Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), giving them grounds for criticizing a government that invited disaster. Even if a strike would strengthen Iran's hard-liners, the United States must not prioritize the outcomes of Iran's domestic political tussles over its vital national security interest in preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. Strikes make the regime look weak –increases opposition. Anti-American / nationalist sentiment is not unique and will be short lived anywaysGerecht ’06 (Reuel Marc,- resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute April 14th “To Bomb, or Not to Bomb” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24230,filter.all/pub_detail.asp) It's much more reasonable to assume that the Islamic Republic's loss to America--and having your nuclear facilities destroyed would be hard to depict as a victory--would actually accelerate internal debate and soul-searching. It's unlikely that many Iranians would feel any affection for an American attack--we would certainly see rampant nationalist and Muslim indignation from many quarters--but the discussion would be much more complicated than just anti-Americanism. It would be, as it was during and after the Iran-Iraq war, double-edged, and probably painful for the ruling clergy, who have not been beloved for a very long time. And the reasons they are not liked are felt each day. This would not change with an American attack against nuclear facilities. Iranians' growing criticisms of their own society, especially those criticisms advanced by folks who were, or still are, loyal to the revolution--most famously Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri, the "defrocked" onetime successor to Khomeini--simply cannot be blown away by foreigners' actions, any more than, in an American context, left-wing intellectuals' concern about social justice, or American blacks' revulsion at the indignities of state-sanctioned racism, could have been stopped by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. It's likely that an American attack on the clerical regime's nuclear facilities would, within a short period of time, produce burning criticism of the ruling mullahs, as hot for them as it would be for us. This is not to say that American attacks would produce a counterrevolution. Not at all. It's just to say that such attacks would not make most Iranians love the mullahs more. An attack would surely introduce uncertainties into Iranian politics, something the clerical dictatorship has tried to avoid. It's worthwhile to remember what happened after the USS Vincennes accidentally shot down a civilian Iranian airliner in 1988. Iranians appeared furious. Even among those who hated the clerical regime--even among Iranian expatriates who'd been driven from their homeland by Ayatollah Khomeini and loved the United States profoundly--vengeful wishes were common. (More than a few astute folks in America's counterterrorist community have long believed that Pan Am 103's destruction above Scotland in 1989 had its origins in a clerical decision to strike back for the Vincennes action. Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, who had his own desire for vengeance against the Americans, entered the picture later.) Yet within a fairly short time, you could see that many Iranians had flipped: They were almost thankful. Most seemed to assume America had blown the airplane from the sky intentionally, yet they were now giving credit to America for helping to break Khomeini's will to continue the war against Saddam Hussein. America had chosen sides--in most Iranian eyes, atrociously in favor of the Butcher of Baghdad--but the war had been stopped. The detested war-loving mullahs had been broken. Mutatis mutandis, the emotions surrounding an American strike against the regime's nuclear facilities would be complicated. With or without an American strike on the clerics' nuclear sites, the advance of democracy in Iran will likely have many anti-American overtones (less perhaps than elsewhere in the Muslim Middle East, since theocracy has improved America's image in Iran enormously as the mullahs have failed to fulfill the promises of the Islamic revolution). A surge in anti-Americanism, even if it lasted long, would not save the regime from the intellectual aftershocks of a U.S. attack on its nuclear-weapons facilities. Iran's political and democratic dissidents, especially among the clergy and the left-wing lay crowd, have often been very anti-American. They would no doubt remain so even as they found themselves questioning whether the regime had lost its mind getting into a war with the world's only superpower. And the impact to Iranian opposition is minimal – demo won’t solve prolif anywaysGerecht ’06 (Reuel Marc,- resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute April 14th “To Bomb, or Not to Bomb” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24230,filter.all/pub_detail.asp) If we bomb, we will kill off the internal Iranian opposition. This is perhaps the weakest argument against a preventive strike. Although it would be nice to have Iranian society evolve quickly into something more democratic than theocracy, the odds of this happening before the regime gets a nuke aren't good. It could be decades before this happens; preventive military strikes would have the immediate benefit of delaying Iran's possession of nuclear arms for a few, perhaps several, years. In any case, it is highly unlikely that an American strike would arrest Iran's intellectual progress away from theocracy. This process has been going on since the 1980s--Iran's loss to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war was an important catalyst to questioning and dissent. A2: Strikes => RadiationUS Can strike without releasing radiationEisenstadt ‘04 (MICHAEL,- senior fellow at The Washington Institute) “CHECKING IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS” January While it would be preferable to target these prior to start-up to avoid exposing civilians downwind to fallout, there may be ways to disrupt operations or destroy the reactors after start-up without releasing radioactive material into the environment and creating a downwind hazard. A2: US-EU RelationsIraq disproves your impact – relations will recoverGerecht ’06 (Reuel Marc,- resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute April 14th “To Bomb, or Not to Bomb” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24230,filter.all/pub_detail.asp) The real question remains, Is a nuclear weapon under the control of Ali Khamenei "unacceptable"? If it is, then enduring the heat of hostile European opinion ought to be sustainable. Living through the Iraq war has been an unhappy experience--for those who see the world first and foremost through a transatlantic lens, downright nerve-wracking. But the sky has not fallen. It would probably not fall--at least not in Europe--if we attacked the clerics' atomic-weapons programs. EU is down for strikesEngdahl ’06 (F William,- author of A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order) “A high-risk game of nuclear chicken”, 31 January, http://www.sibernews.com/the-news/world-news/a-high%11risk-game-of-nuclear-chicken-200601313615/) That statement led to a sharp acceleration of EU diplomatic efforts, led by Britain, Germany and France, the so-called EU-3, to avoid a war. The three told Washington they were opposed to a military solution. Since then we are told by German magazine Der Spiegel and others the EU view has changed, to appear to come closer to the position of the Bush administration. A2: EscalationLarge powers will back downBabbin, 2006 (Jed, served as a deputy undersecretary of defense in the George H.W. Bush administration “Iran Showdown”, The American Spectator, http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=9310) THE WAR WITH IRAN WILL have to be fought and we will, of course, defend Israel as best we can. But much bloodshed can be avoided, and Iran's nuclear objective put out of reach if we seize the advantage we gave up to Saddam in the UN. Surprise is a strategic advantage we must retain. The alternative to a large war, which no one speaks about, is a surprise attack against Iran mounted before Israel acts, and before the predicted Iranian nuclear test happens. Such an attack would employ several unconventional weapons at once and could -- if managed properly -- be over before Iran knows it has begun. The world must know that we have done it. But after, not before. It may be that Iran's Chinese allies are doing more than helping develop its missiles. It may be that Iran's Russian trading partner is doing more than providing defenses against air attack. But neither is likely to be providing Iran with the means of effectively defending against our other capabilities. It could, and should, be made one dark night. B-2 stealth bombers, each carrying twenty ground-penetrating guided munitions, can destroy much of Iran's nuclear facilities and government centers. Some might carry reported electro-magnetic pulse weapons that can destroy all the electronic circuits that comprise Iranian missiles, key military communications and computer facilities. And it may be that we have the ability to attack Iran's military and financial computer networks with computer viruses and "Trojan horses" that will make it impossible for Iran to function militarily and economically. Our strategy must be implemented before Ahmadinejad can test his nukes. Whether that test can happen next month or next year is immaterial. The time for us to act is now. A2: IraqIran will play the role of the victim to appease other countriesRoberts, -07 (Paul Craig, wrote the Kemp-Roth bill and was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury in the Reagan administration. He was Associate Editor of the Wall Street Journal editorial page and Contributing Editor of National Review. He is author or coauthor of eight books. He has held numerous academic appointments, including the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He has contributed to numerous scholar journals and testified before Congress on 30 occasions. He has been awarded the U.S. Treasury's Meritorious Service Award and the French Legion of Honor. http://baltimorechronicle.com/2007/011707Roberts.shtml) The former national security official believes that Bush will be able to claim victory over Iran, because Iran will avoid responding militarily. Iran will not use its Russian missiles to sink our aircraft carriers, to shut down oil facilities throughout the Middle East, or to destroy US headquarters in the “green zone” in Baghdad. Instead, Iran will adopt the posture of another Muslim victim of US/Israeli aggression and let the anger seep throughout the Muslim world until no pro-US government is safe in the Middle East. A2: Iraq / Pakistan / Afghan InstabilityWrong – three reasonsSchake ’07 (Kori,- research fellow at the Hoover Institution “Dealing with A Nuclear Iran” http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/6848072.html) A second potential Iranian retaliation would be fomenting further violence in Iraq and Afghanistan and attempting to destabilize pro-American governments in Pakistan. There are three reasonably strong arguments against Iran taking this approach, however. First, Iran would be incurring the enmity not just of the U.S., but also of neighbors at a time when Iran’s military ability to protect itself was being substantially reduced. A denuded Iran may pause before tangling with a nuclear-armed Pakistan that also has the ability to fight back conventionally or asymmetrically. S sectarian violence in Iraq will have political consequences of long duration for Iran, which currently has the potential for a Shi’ite ally as the Iraqi political landscape solidifies. Such outcomes are not in American interests either, I hasten to add. Countries whose help we have been cajoling in the war against terrorism and whose hearts and minds we are attempting to win will resent having to deal with a belligerent Iran, especially over an issue on which they were not principal adversaries before our military strikes. But the examples highlight that Iran, too, has second-order effects to its choices, and setting aflame neighboring countries creates its own problems for Iran. The second argument against Iran retaliating by funding and inciting violence in countries important to the U.S. is that the logic that discouraged Iranian support for terrorism in the past eight years or so will still prevail. As long as Iran is seeking international acceptance, foreign investment, and “normalization” in the international community, support for terrorism — even if justified as retaliation for a preemptive strike — will be delegitimizing. The third argument is that Iran itself is not immune to ethnic and sectarian divisions that could be exploited. Kurdish, Arab, and Azeri Iranians might be less amenable to Persian nationalism or Islamic solidarity than the government believes; likewise for Sunnis denied the religious practice of their choice. As revolutionary fervor wanes and the Ahmadinejad government continues struggling to deliver on its domestic promises, Iran could also be susceptible to the turmoil it might seek to produce elsewhere. Iran does not have the resources to cause meaningful damageGerecht ’06 (Reuel Marc,- resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute April 14th “To Bomb, or Not to Bomb” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24230,filter.all/pub_detail.asp) Using its Revolutionary Guard and intelligence-ministry forces, the Islamic Republic could strike us in both countries. You don't need to imagine reborn Iranian Shiite holy warriors running amok to see cause for concern. If you had to pick one reason that the Bush administration would not strike the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities, this would probably be it. It's impossible to overestimate the Iraq fatigue that now afflicts the administration. The American military is stressed out. Although it's difficult to say what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's view is--his entire civilian staff seems to have recused itself from giving a forceful opinion on the Iranian nuclear issue--the military brass will likely fight any preventive military strike against Iran for fear of the repercussions in Iraq. Their views may be unfounded, but it seems likely President Bush would hesitate to dismiss these concerns. Ultimately, the clerical regime itself will determine whether the United States strikes its nuclear facilities. If it acts in a rash manner, deploying frightening language and new ballistic hardware, if it gets caught engaging in serious nastiness in Iraq or terrorism abroad before it has enough centrifuges up and running, then it's certainly possible to imagine the president, even the senior officers of the U.S. Army, deciding America has no choice. As we get closer to the "red line" for Iran's atomic-weapons programs, it's not at all unlikely we will concentrate on Iran's threat independent of Iraq. Viewed calmly, Afghanistan and Iraq shouldn't make or break the decision on whether to strike Iran's facilities. In both countries, the Iranians are only as good as their proxies. It seems highly unlikely that the clerical regime would try to deploy large numbers of Revolutionary Guards and intelligence officers in open combat in either place. The Iranians would be operating without benefit of cover. (They stick out like sore thumbs in both countries.) They would be inviting U.S. attacks on Iran--and not on nuclear facilities, but on Revolutionary Guards Corps camps, military installations, and intelligence facilities. Such things are critical to the regime's survival. The regime certainly remembers that the U.S. Navy essentially annihilated the Iranian regular and Revolutionary Guard navy in one day at the end of the Iran-Iraq war. It's doubtful the clerical regime would like to repeat the experience. Indirect terrorism is the clerical way, and that's what one would expect in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The mullahs could certainly find Iraqi and Afghan recruits to help, but whether these attacks could reach and maintain an amplitude sufficient to change the political or military fate of either country is open to question. Terrorism against Americans in either place is likely to kill the natives as well, perhaps lots of them. If the Iraqi Shia discovered that the Iranians were blowing up their women and children, there would be hell to pay for those Iranians so unfortunate as to be working in or visiting Iraq. An Iranian offensive in Iraq would certainly stress the entire Shiite community. If the Americans were to alienate seriously the Shiites--something we have not yet done--then we could be in serious trouble. If the young radical Moktada al-Sadr were forced from the political process (there was a time for this, but that time is now past), we might see him take up arms for Iran. If he remains inside the political system, then it's unlikely he will destroy the system in which he's a player. There just isn't that level of affection, certainly not fealty, between him, his men, and the Iranians. A2: US-Russian RelationsStrikes won’t hurt US-Russian relationsSokov ’06 (Nikolai,- Senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation studies, he worked at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and later Russia, and participated in START I negotiations “The Prospects of Russian Mediation of the Iranian Nuclear Crisis” http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/060217.htm If the United States undertakes a military action against Iran, Russia will most likely remain on the sidelines much as it did during the 2003 war in Iraq: it will not support Iran in any way, but will not support the United States either. Instead, it will try to deny the United States the sanction of the UN Security Council and will strongly condemn US actions. The impact of such an operation on US-Russian relations - barring the above-mentioned appearance of US bases in the South Caucasus - will be short-lived, however, and, as before, Russia will rather quickly return to the status quo ante in its attitude toward the United States. US-Iran policy is not important to Russia – strikes won’t collapse relationsYaphe and Lutes ’05 (Judith S.,- is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, specializes in political analysis and strategic planning on Iran, Colonel Charles D,- USAF, is a senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, where he focuses on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, military strategy, and strategic concept development) That is not to say that Russia is cavalier about Iranian intentions. Moscow continues to monitor Tehran’s behavior for signs of greater ambition and possible mischief. Generally, though, while Russia might object to solutions that rely on the use of force, it is unlikely to become a true obstacle to U.S. policy in the region. Russia also is unlikely ever to become a major player in dealing with an Iranian nuclear program and would probably be more reactive than proactive. Russia could play a useful role in the general framework of the international community’s response to the crisis. In doing so, Russia is more likely to use the international legal framework than to adopt a position that could leave senior policymakers vulnerable to domestic charges of caving in to U.S. pressure. For example, Russia’s agreement with Iran on spent nuclear fuel ran against U.S. policy preferences but emphasized compliance with Russian obligations under the NPT. Perhaps one collateral benefit of the agreement is that it underscores the point that Iran does not need to develop its own full nuclear fuel cycle. Russian behavior in the runup to Operation Iraqi Freedom could be indicative of its reaction to a future crisis involving Iran. Unwilling to jeopardize its bilateral relations with the United States or Europe, Russia would probably adopt a “wait-and-see” attitude and watch the debate unfold among allies on both sides of the Atlantic. Russia would likely shy away from a leadership position in that debate, insisting instead on keeping the issue confined to the UN–NPT framework. This would give Moscow a major decisionmaking role, shield its equities vis-à-vis the United States and Europe, maximize its leverage on Iran, and neutralize domestic anti-American sentiments. A2: US-Sino RelationsChina won’t break US-Sino relation in response to any Iran crisisYaphe and Lutes ’05 (Judith S.,- is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, specializes in political analysis and strategic planning on Iran, Colonel Charles D,- USAF, is a senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, where he focuses on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, military strategy, and strategic concept development) China is another great power with growing interest in Iran and the Gulf. Its reactions to a nuclear-armed Iran are likely to be similar to Chinese responses in other post–Cold War international crises, such as the Gulf War, Kosovo, the Korean nuclear crisis, and the Iraq war. China would seek to protect its equities in the crisis region, emphasize international procedures that give it a veto or a strong voice, support peaceful diplomatic resolution of the crisis, and oppose any use of force against Iran. In our judgment, China’s focus would remain on protecting its national sovereignty, avoiding negative precedents, and preserving regional stability in order to maintain favorable conditions for Chinese economic development. If possible, China would pursue these objectives while maintaining good relations with the United States and other major powers. A2: US-Arab RelationsStrikes won’t deck US-Arab relations, they will side with usYaphe and Lutes ’05 (Judith S.,- is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, specializes in political analysis and strategic planning on Iran, Colonel Charles D,- USAF, is a senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, where he focuses on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, military strategy, and strategic concept development) Gulf Arab leaders say they are more worried that the United States is determined to pursue military confrontation with Iran, which would pose an increasing danger to their security and well being. They worry about the risk of a region-wide war between the United States, their security partner and guarantor, and Iran, their largest and most powerful neighbor. If this occurred, it would be the fourth major regional conflict since 1980, when Baghdad invaded Iran.33 They profess not to be worried about “democracy” in Iraq or a nuclear-armed Iran, and they urge Washington to open a dialogue with Iran, not rush to create democracy in Iraq, and to consult with their leaders. Gulf elites acknowledge that they are consumers rather than providers of security and that in the event the United States were to go to war with Iran, they would have no choice but to side with it. There is no apparent public debate on this issue. Arab states will value cooperation with the US more than differences over Iran, plus they fear a nuclear IranYaphe and Lutes ’05 (Judith S.,- is a senior fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, specializes in political analysis and strategic planning on Iran, Colonel Charles D,- USAF, is a senior military fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, where he focuses on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, military strategy, and strategic concept development) In the end, the GC states believe they need a protector from outside the region to survive. They believe that their only strategic option is to side with the United States. Despite a professed dislike of the Bush administration, unease with Iraq, and unhappiness with the direction of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, there is consensus among these Gulf Arabs that only the United States can be counted on to protect them, and that Iran—with or without nuclear weapons—is and will always be a constant strategic worry. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 2.41 Mb. Share with your friends:
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