Elections Disad – Core – Hoya-Spartan 2012
Download 2.41 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Strikes Solve – A2 No long term/They Rebuild
- Strikes solves kill key scientists and fear of another attack prevents future prolif
- Iran has only a few scientists who are crucial to its entire program – they could be removed easily
- Strikes cause Iran to reconsider
Ext: Solve in HoursWe could disable iran’s nuclear weapons program in a matter of hoursSynovitz ‘06 (Ron, January 18, pg. http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2006/060118-iran-military-options.htm) Pike is also confident of the efficacy of air strikes. He believes U.S. or Israeli forces could destroy all of Iran's main nuclear facilities within a matter of hours: "There are about half a dozen major nuclear facilities in Iran. They have the uranium facility at Isfahan, the uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, the plutonium production facility at Arak, possibly a nuclear weapons assembly facility at Parchin. There may be a dozen, or a dozen and a half other smaller facilities. All of these facilities are vulnerable to air strikes. Stealth bombers and other [U.S.] bombers staging from Diego Garcia [an island in the Indian Ocean] would basically be able to destroy all of these within a few hours of the air strikes beginning." Strikes Solve – A2 No long term/They RebuildIran can’t and won’t rebuild nuclear program after strikesKroenig, 12 (Matthew, professor of Government at Georgetown University and a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136917/matthew-kroenig/time-to-attack-iran) ANY TIME IS GOOD TIME Critics have another objection: even if the United States managed to eliminate Iran's nuclear facilities and mitigate the consequences, the effects might not last long. Sure enough, there is no guarantee that an assault would deter Iran from attempting to rebuild its plants; it may even harden Iran's resolve to acquire nuclear technology as a means of retaliating or protecting itself in the future. The United States might not have the wherewithal or the political capital to launch another raid, forcing it to rely on the same ineffective tools that it now uses to restrain Iran's nuclear drive. If that happens, U.S. action will have only delayed the inevitable. Yet according to the IAEA, Iran already appears fully committed to developing a nuclear weapons program and needs no further motivation from the United States. And it will not be able to simply resume its progress after its entire nuclear infrastructure is reduced to rubble. Indeed, such a devastating offensive could well force Iran to quit the nuclear game altogether, as Iraq did after its nuclear program was destroyed in the Gulf War and as Syria did after the 2007 Israeli strike. And even if Iran did try to reconstitute its nuclear program, it would be forced to contend with continued international pressure, greater difficulty in securing necessary nuclear materials on the international market, and the lurking possibility of subsequent attacks. Military action could, therefore, delay Iran's nuclear program by anywhere from a few years to a decade, and perhaps even indefinitely. Skeptics might still counter that at best a strike would only buy time. But time is a valuable commodity. Countries often hope to delay worst-case scenarios as far into the future as possible in the hope that this might eliminate the threat altogether. Those countries whose nuclear facilities have been attacked -- most recently Iraq and Syria -- have proved unwilling or unable to restart their programs. Thus, what appears to be only a temporary setback to Iran could eventually become a game changer. Strikes solves kill key scientists and fear of another attack prevents future prolifRogers, 2006 (Paul, Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group “IRAN: CONSEQUENCES OF A WAR”, February) Although the United States has a major problem of overstretch affecting its Army and Marine Corps, an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would be undertaken almost entirely by the Air Force and the Navy. To have the maximum impact, it would be done by surprise, utilising land-based aircraft already in the region, long-range strike aircraft operating from the United States, the UK and Diego Garcia, and naval strike forces involving carrier-borne aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. At any one time, the US Navy keeps one aircraft carrier battle group on station in or near the Persian Gulf. Such groups rotate, and there are periods when two are on station, providing over 150 aircraft, together with several hundred cruise missiles.4 Similar numbers of land-based aircraft could be assembled with little notice, given the range of US bases in the region, and B 1B and B-2 bombers could operate from outside the region. In particular, the specialised facilities required to operate the stealth B-2 aircraft are now available at Fairford air base in Gloucestershire.5 Air strikes on nuclear facilities would involve the destruction of facilities at the Tehran Research Reactor, together with the radioisotope production facility, a range of nuclear-related laboratories and the Kalaye Electric Company, all in Tehran. The Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre would be a major target, including a series of experimental reactors, uranium conversion facilities and a fuel fabrication laboratory. Pilot and full-scale enrichment plants at Natanz would be targeted, as would facilities at Arak (see Appendix 1).6 The new 1,000 MW reactor nearing completion at Bushehr would be targeted, although this could be problematic once the reactor is fully fuelled and goes critical some time in 2006. Once that has happened, any destruction of the containment structure could lead to serious problems of radioactive dispersal affecting not just the Iranian Gulf coast, but west Gulf seaboards in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. As well as the direct human effects, since these comprise the world’s most substantial concentration of oil production facilities, the consequences could be severe.7 All of the initial attacks would be undertaken more or less simultaneously, in order to kill as many of the technically competent staff as possible, therefore doing the greatest damage to longer-term prospects. This would be a necessary part of any military action and would probably extend to the destruction of university laboratories and technology centres that indirectly support the Iranian nuclear scientific and technical infrastructure. Such an aspect of the attack is not widely recognised outside of military planning circles but would be an essential component of the operation. Given that the aim is to set back Iranian nuclear potential for as long as possible, it would be essential to go well beyond the destruction of physical facilities that could be replaced quite rapidly. The killing of those with technical expertise would have a much more substantial impact on any efforts to redevelop nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, since such expertise is known to include foreign nationals, the killing of such people already working in the country would serve as a deterrent to the involvement of others in the future. Iran currently has limited air defences and a largely obsolete and small air force. Even so, defence suppression would be a major aspect of military action, primarily to reduce the risk of the killing or capture of US aircrew. It would involve the targeting of radar facilities and command and control centres, as well as Western Command air bases at Tehran, Tabriz, Hamadan, Dezful, Umidiyeh, Shiraz and Isfahan, and Southern Command air bases at Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar.8 A particular concern for US forces is the continued deployment by Iran of 45 or more of the American F-14A Tomcat interceptors and their long-range AWG-9 radar equipment. 79 planes were originally procured before the fall of the Shah and around 30 are available operationally at any one time out of those still deployed.9 Research, development and production facilities for Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile programme would be priority targets, as would bases at which these mobile missiles are deployed. Because of their mobility, surprise would once again be essential. US forces have already used reconnaissance drones to map Iranian facilities and these, combined with satellite reconnaissance and a range of forms of electronic surveillance, have provided considerable information on the nuclear infrastructure and more general defence forces. Iran has only a few scientists who are crucial to its entire program – they could be removed easilyInbar, 2006 (Efraim, Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, “THE NEED TO BLOCK A NUCLEAR IRAN” March, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html) One variant of covert operations is to focus on the highly skilled elements of those working for the Iranian program. The Iranian nuclear program has a limited number of scientists whose contribution is critical to its successful completion. The interested intelligence services have probably already identified the key scientists who keep it moving. Removing these scientists would also affect the possibility of renewing the nuclear efforts in case a freeze of the Iranian program were to take place. Therefore, serious offers of refuge and a professional career in the West should be extended to these scientists. Alternatively, they should be intimidated from further cooperation with the Iranian nuclear program. It would not be impossible to organize a well-orchestrated campaign to do so against those who prefer the patriotic option of continuing to serve their state. In fact, the mere beginning of such a campaign of carrots and sticks may deter others from cooperating with the Iranian nuclear program and hasten their exit from Iran. Strikes cause Iran to reconsiderPeter Brooks (a senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, is the author of “A Devil’s Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States”, June 8, 2006) http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed012306a.cfm What about U.S. airstrikes? These could take a range of forms, depending on policymakers' desires. Surgical strikes might limit their targets to Iran's air defenses (for access) and key nuclear sites (e.g., Bushehr, Nantanz, Arak). Or an escalated attack could nail all suspected nuke facilities — plus forces Tehran might use in a counterattack, such as its ballistic missiles and conventional forces. Depending on the strike's objective, think Operation Iraqi Freedom: B-2 stealth bombers carrying bunker-busters, F-117 stealth fighters and other Navy/Air Force strike assets from carriers and theater bases — plus Navy destroyers and subs loosing cruise missiles on Iranian targets. But could a raid destroy all sites? Thanks to the covert nature of the Iranian program, that's not clear. It's highly likely, though, that striking key facilities would set the program back, possibly causing Tehran to reconsider the folly of its proliferation perfidy. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 2.41 Mb. Share with your friends:
|