Elections Disad – Core – Hoya-Spartan 2012
Strikes Solve – A2 Will block Hormuz
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- Strikes Solve – A2 Underground Bunkers
- Strikes Solve – A2 Iran Air Defense
- Strikes Solve – A2 Air Defense
- Countermeasures will render Iranian air defense irrelevant, and their systems are uncoordinated
- Iran’s air craft will get rocked – counter measures and lack of effective offense and coordination
Strikes Solve – A2 Will block HormuzUS Strikes can stop Iranian control of the straitThe American Thinker, 2006 (“Iran – to bomb or not to bomb?”, http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=5210) First, as Doug Hanson pointed out in his Washington Times piece “The mullahs’ war games,” Iran has fortified the island of Abu Musa in the Straits of Hormuz and possesses the capacity to halt the passage of oil tankers through the straits. This would have an immediate and possibly catastrophic impact on oil supplies, prices and the world economy in general. This being the case, the U.S. would probably flatten Abu Musa as well as any Iranian mainland military facilities having the capability to strike shipping in the Gulf, and do so at the same time we launch strikes against the Iranian nuclear facilities. This seems an absolute necessity. Strikes Solve – A2 Underground BunkersUS Air Force can handle itInbar, 2006 (Efraim, Professor of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University and the Director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies, “THE NEED TO BLOCK A NUCLEAR IRAN” March, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html) While Iran has spread out its nuclear facilities and built a large part of the nuclear complex underground in order to protect it from conventional air strikes, technological advances in penetration of underground facilities and increased precision might allow total destruction. The difficulties in dealing a severe military blow to the Iranian nuclear program are generally exaggerated.[38] A detailed analysis of the military option is beyond the scope of this paper, but the American military definitely has the muscle and the sophistication needed to perform a preemptive strike in accordance with its new strategic doctrine, as well as the capability for a sustained air campaign, if needed to prevent the reparation and reconstruction of the facilities targeted. Strikes Solve – A2 Iran Air DefenseA US air strike against Iran would easily and quickly overwhelm Iranian defenses.Rogers ’06 (Paul,- Professor of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford and Global Security Consultant to Oxford Research Group. Iran: Consequences of a War. http://www.iranbodycount.org/analysis/#pr.) Iran currently has limited air defences and a largely obsolete and small air force. Even so, defence suppression would be a major aspect of military action, primarily to reduce the risk of the killing or capture of US aircrew. It would involve the targeting of radar facilities and command and control centres, as well as Western Command air bases at Tehran, Tabriz, Hamadan, Dezful, Umidiyeh, Shiraz and Isfahan, and Southern Command air bases at Bushehr, Bandar Abbas and Chah Bahar.8 A particular concern for US forces is the continued deployment by Iran of 45 or more of the American F-14A Tomcat interceptors and their long-range AWG-9 radar equipment. 79 planes were originally procured before the fall of the Shah and around 30 are available operationally at any one time out of those still deployed.9 Research, development and production facilities for Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile programme would be priority targets, as would bases at which these mobile missiles are deployed. Because of their mobility, surprise would once again be essential. US forces have already used reconnaissance drones to map Iranian facilities and satellite reconnaissance and a range of forms of electronic surveillance, have provided information on the nuclear infrastructure and more general defence forces. The attacks described so far would involve a strong element of surprise in relation to the core nuclear infrastructure and the air defence system, with these undertaken in a matter of hours. Up to a hundred sorties by strike aircraft, backed up by several hundred additional sorties by aerial refuelling, defence suppression and reconnaissance aircraft would be accompanied by two hundred or more cruise missile sorties. Following immediate bomb damage assessment, major targets would be revisited in the following days in parallel with attacks on less time-urgent targets. For US forces, the main period of intense military activity might extend over 4-5 days but could continue for several days more, depending on Iranian responses. Strikes Solve – A2 Air DefenseIran can’t touch our aircraft – and conventional bunker busters would wreck their facilitiesCordesman and Rodhan ’06 (Anthony,- holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is also a national security analyst for ABC News Khalid,- visiting fellow @ CSIS “Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Options for Sanctions and Military Strikes” http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060830_iranoptionssanctions.pdf) Iran would find it difficult to defend against US forces using cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, stand-off precision weapons, and equipped with a mix of vastly superior air combat assets and the IS&R assets necessary to strike and restrike Iranian targets in near real time. For example, each US B-2A Spirit stealth bomber could carry eight 4,500lb enhanced BLU-28 satellite-guided bunker-busting bombs – potentially enough to take out one hardened Iranian site per sortie. Such bombers could operate from flying from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire and Whiteman USAF base in Missouri.70 The US also has a wide range of other hard target killers, many of which are in development or classified. Systems that are known to be deployed include the BLU-109 Have Void “bunker busters.” a “dumb bomb” with a maximum penetration capability of 4 to 6 feet of reinforced concrete. An aircraft must overfly the target and launch the weapon with great precision to achieve serious penetration capability.71 It can be fitted with precision guidance and converted to a guided glide bomb. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GBU-31 version a nominal range of 15 kilometers with a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 13 meters in the GPS-aided INS modes of operation and 30 meters in the INS-only modes of operation.72 More advanced systems include the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator [AUP],GBU- 24 C/B (USAF), or GBU-24 D/B (Navy) which has about three times the penetration capability of the BLU-109.73 It is not clear whether the US has deployed the AGM-130C with an advanced earth penetrating/hard target kill system. The AGM-130 Surface Attack Guided Munition was developed to be integrated into the F-15E, so it could two such missiles, one on each inboard store station. It is retargetable, precision guided standoff weapon using inertial navigation aided by Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites and has a 15 - 40 NM range.74 It is not clear such weapons could destroy all of Iran’s most hardened underground sites, although it seems likely that the BLU-28 could do serious damage at a minimum. Much depends on the accuracy of reports that Iran has undertaken a massive tunneling project with some 10,000 square meters of underground halls and tunnels branching off for hundreds of meters from each hall. Iran is reported to be drawing on North Korean expertise, and to have created a separate corporation (Shahid Rajaei Company) for such tunneling and hardening efforts under the IRGC, with extensive activity already underway in Natanz and Isfahan. The facilities are said to make extensive use of blastproof doors, extensive divider walls, hardened ceilings, 20 cm-thick concrete walls, and to use double concrete ceilings with earth fill between layers to defeat earth penetrators.75 Such passive defenses could have a major impact, but reports of such activity are often premature, exaggerated, or report far higher construction standards than are actually executed. At the same time, the B-2A could be used to deliver large numbers of precision-guided 500-lb bombs against dispersed surface targets or a mix of light and heavy precision guided weapons. Submarines and surface ships could deliver cruise missiles for such strikes, and conventional strike aircraft and bombers could deliver stand-off weapons against most suspect Iranian facilities without suffering a high risk of serious attrition. The challenge would be to properly determine what targets and aim points were actually valuable, not to inflict high levels of damage. Iran has "quantity," but its air defenses have little "quality." It has assigned some 12,000- 15,000 men in its air force to land-based air defense functions, including at least 8,000 regulars and 4,000 IRGC personnel. It is not possible to distinguish clearly between the major air defense weapons holdings of the regular air force and IRGC, but the air force appeared to operate most major surface-to-air missile systems. Countermeasures will render Iranian air defense irrelevant, and their systems are uncoordinatedCordesman and Rodhan ’06 (Anthony,- holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is also a national security analyst for ABC News Khalid,- visiting fellow @ CSIS “Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Options for Sanctions and Military Strikes” http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060830_iranoptionssanctions.pdf) Although Iran has made some progress in improving and updating its weapons, sensors, and electronic warfare capability, and has learned much from Iraq's efforts to defeat US enforcement of the "no-fly zones" from 1992-2003, its current defenses are outdated and poorly integrated. All of its major systems are based on technology that is now more than 35 years old, and all are vulnerable to US use of active and passive countermeasures. Iran’s air defense forces are too widely spaced to provide more than limited air defense for key bases and facilities, and many lack the missile launcher strength to be fully effective. This is particularly true of Iran’s SA-5 sites, which provide long-range, medium-to-high altitude coverage of key coastal installations. Too few launchers are scattered over too wide an area to prevent relatively rapid suppression. Iran also lacks the low altitude radar coverage, overall radar net, command and control assets, sensors, resistance to sophisticated jamming and electronic countermeasures, and systems integration capability necessary to create an effective air defense net. Its land-based air defenses must operate largely in the point defense mode, and Iran lacks the battle management systems and data links are not fast and effective enough to allow it to take maximum advantage of the overlapping coverage of some of its missile systems— a problem further complicated by the problems in trying to net different systems supplied by Britain, China, Russia, and the US. Iran’s missiles and sensors are most effective at high-to-medium altitudes against aircraft with limited penetrating and jamming capability. Iran’s air craft will get rocked – counter measures and lack of effective offense and coordinationCordesman and Rodhan ’06 (Anthony,- holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is also a national security analyst for ABC News Khalid,- visiting fellow @ CSIS “Iranian Nuclear Weapons? Options for Sanctions and Military Strikes” http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060830_iranoptionssanctions.pdf) Iran's air forces are only marginally better able to survive in air-to-air combat than Iraq's were before 2003. Iran’s command and control system has serious limitations in terms of secure communications, vulnerability to advanced electronic warfare, netting, and digital data transfer. According to the IISS, Iran does still have 5 operational P-3MP Orion and may have made its captured Iraqi IL-76 Candid AEW aircraft operational. These assets would give it airborne warning and command and control capability, but these are obsolescent to obsolete systems and are likely to be highly vulnerable to electronic warfare and countermeasures, and long-range attack, even with Iranian modifications and updates. There are some reports Iran may be seeking make a version of the Russian AN- 140 AEW aircraft but these could not be deployed much before 2015.85 Iran’s air defense aircraft consist of a maximum operational strength of two squadrons of 25 export versions of the MiG-29A and two squadrons of 25-30 F-14As. The export version of the MiG-29A has significant avionics limitations and vulnerability to countermeasures, and it is not clear Iran has any operation Phoenix air-to-air missiles for its F-14As or has successfully modified its IHawk missiles for air-to-air combat. The AWG-9 radar on the F-14 has significant long distance sensor capability in a permissive environment, but is a US-made system in a nearly 30-year old configuration that is now vulnerable to countermeasures. 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