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Nationalization of the internet is coming now


Wall Street Journal 6-27-14

[Steve Rosenbush, The Morning Download: Nationalization of Internet Continues as Germany Hangs Up on Verizon, http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2014/06/27/the-morning-download-nationalization-of-internet-continues-as-germany-hangs-up-on-verizon/]


Good morning. The nationalization of the Internet continues apace. The German government said on Thursday it would end a contract with Verizon Communications Inc. because of concerns that the U.S. National Security Agency had access to customer data maintained by U.S. telecommunications firms, the WSJ’s Anton Troianovski reports. Verizon has provided Internet access and other telecom services to government agencies in Germany. Those contracts will be transferred to Deutsche Telekom AG by 2015, the Interior Ministry said.

As the WSJ reports, the move underscores the continuing political headaches for U.S. technology businesses operating abroad, more than a year after former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden started revealing the reach of America’s electronic surveillance programs and the alleged cooperation with some U.S. firms.

CIOs are on the front lines of the dilemma. To the extent that more businesses are pressured to aid in government surveillance, CIOs should at the very least have a say in how those efforts will work. While those decisions will be made at the CEO and board level, the CIO can help frame the issues by engaging directly with a company’s senior leadership. Their perspective is critical in an area where technology, business and global politics converge.


Fears of NSA surveillance is the driving force for nationalizing – only the aff restores US credibility to prevent it


Kehl et al 14

[Danielle Kehl et al, July 2014. Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (OTI); Kevin Bankston is the Policy Director at OTI; Robyn Greene is a Policy Counsel at OTI; and Robert Morgus is a Research Associate at OTI. “Surveillance Costs: The NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity,” http://oti.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Surveilance_Costs_Final.pdf]


Although there were questions from the beginning about whether the United States would hold itself to the same high standards domestically that it holds others to internationally, 178 the American government has successfully built up a policy and programming agenda in the past few years based on promoting an open Internet. 179 These efforts include raising concerns over Internet repression in bilateral dialogues with countries such as Vietnam and China, 180 supporting initiatives including the Freedom Online Coalition, and providing over $120 million in funding for “groups working to advance Internet freedom – supporting counter-censorship and secure communications technology, digital safety training, and policy and research programs for people facing Internet repression.” 181 However, the legitimacy of these efforts has been thrown into question since the NSA disclosures began. “Trust has been the principal casualty in this unfortunate affair,” wrote Ben FitzGerald and Richard Butler in December 2013. “The American public, our nation’s allies, leading businesses and Internet users around the world are losing faith in the U.S. government’s role as the leading proponent of a free, open and integrated global Internet.” 182

Prior to the NSA revelations, the United States was already facing an increasingly challenging political climate as it promoted the Internet Freedom agenda in global Internet governance conversations. At the 2012 World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), the U.S. and diverse group of other countries refused to sign the updated International Telecommunications Regulations based on concerns that the document pushed for greater governmental control of the Internet and would ultimately harm Internet Freedom. 183 Many observers noted that the split hardened the division between two opposing camps in the Internet governance debate: proponents of a status quo multistakeholder Internet governance model, like the United States, who argued that the existing system was the best way to preserve key online freedoms, and those seeking to disrupt or challenge that multistakeholder model for a variety of political and economic reasons, including governments like Russia and China pushing for greater national sovereignty over the Internet. 184 Many of the proposals for more governmental control over the network could be understood as attempts by authoritarian countries to more effectively monitor and censor their citizens, which allowed the U.S. to reasonably maintain some moral high ground as its delegates walked out of the treaty conference. 185 Although few stakeholders seemed particularly pleased by the outcome of the WCIT, reports indicate that by the middle of 2013 the tone had shifted in a more collaborative and positive direction following the meetings of the 2013 World Telecommunications/ICT Policy Forum (WTPF) and the World Summit on Information Society + 10 (WSIS+10) review. 186

However, the Internet governance conversation took a dramatic turn after the Snowden disclosures. The annual meeting of the Freedom Online Coalition occurred in Tunis in June 2013, just a few weeks after the initial leaks. Unsurprisingly, surveillance dominated the conference even though the agenda covered a wide range of topics from Internet access and affordability to cybersecurity. 187 Throughout the two-day event, representatives from civil society used the platform to confront and criticize governments about their monitoring practices. 188 NSA surveillance would continue to be the focus of international convenings on Internet Freedom and Internet governance for months to come, making civil society representatives and foreign governments far less willing to embrace the United States’ Internet Freedom agenda or to accept its defense of the multistakeholder model of Internet governance as a anything other than self-serving. “One can come up with all kinds of excuses for why US surveillance is not hypocrisy. For example, one might argue that US policies are more benevolent than those of many other regimes… And one might recognize that in several cases, some branches of government don’t know what other branches are doing… and therefore US policy is not so much hypocritical as it is inadvertently contradictory,” wrote Eli Dourado, a researcher from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University in August 2013. “But the fact is that the NSA is galvanizing opposition to America’s internet freedom agenda.” 189 The scandal revived proposals from both Russia and Brazil for global management of technical standards and domain names, whether through the ITU or other avenues. Even developing countries, many of whom have traditionally aligned with the U.S. and prioritize access and affordability as top issues, “don’t want US assistance because they assume the equipment comes with a backdoor for the NSA. They are walking straight into the arms of Russia, China, and the ITU.” 190

Consequently, NSA surveillance has shifted the dynamics of the Internet governance debate in a potentially destabilizing manner. The Snowden revelations “have also been well-received by those who seek to discredit existing approaches to Internet governance,” wrote the Center for Democracy & Technology’s Matthew Shears. “There has been a long-running antipathy among a number of stakeholders to the United States government’s perceived control of the Internet and the dominance of US Internet companies. There has also been a long-running antipathy, particularly among some governments, to the distributed and open management of the Internet.” 191 Shears points out that evidence of the NSA’s wide-ranging capabilities has fueled general concerns about the current Internet governance system, bolstering the arguments of those calling for a new government-centric governance order. At the UN Human Rights Council in September 2013, the representative from Pakistan—speaking on behalf of Cuba, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia, Iran, and China—explicitly linked the revelations about surveillance programs to the need for reforming Internet governance processes and institutions to give governments a larger role. 192 Surveillance issues continued to dominate the conversation at the 2013 Internet Governance Forum in Bali as well, where “debates on child protection, education and infrastructure were overshadowed by widespread concerns from delegates who said the public’s trust in the internet was being undermined by reports of US and British government surveillance.” 193

Further complicating these conversations is the fact that several of the institutions that govern the technical functions of the Internet are either tied to the American government or are located in the United States. Internet governance scholar Milton Mueller has described how the reaction to the NSA disclosures has become entangled in an already contentious Internet governance landscape. Mueller argues that, in addition to revealing the scale and scope of state surveillance and the preeminent role of the United States and its partners, the NSA disclosures may push other states toward a more nationally partitioned Internet and “threaten… in a very fundamental way the claim that the US had a special status as neutral steward of Internet governance.” 194 These concerns were publicly voiced in October 2013 by the heads of a number of key organizations, including the President of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the chair of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), in the Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation. Their statement expressed “strong concern over the undermining of the trust and confidence of Internet users globally due to recent revelations of pervasive monitoring and surveillance” and “called for accelerating the globalization of ICANN and Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including 22 all governments, participate on an equal footing.” 195 In particular, the process of internationalizing ICANN—which has had a contractual relationship with the Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Association (NTIA) since 1998—has progressed in recent months. 196




Cyber threats are real and happening – government control is key to prevent attacks that could crush the international system


Renda, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2013

[Andrea Renda, Cybersecurity and Internet Governance, May 3, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p32414]


Cybersecurity is now a leading concern for major economies. Reports indicate that hackers can target the U.S. Department of Justice or Iranian nuclear facilities just as easily as they can mine credit card data. Threats have risen as the Internet has become a critical infrastructure for the global economy, with thousands of operations migrating onto it. For example, the innocuous practice of bring-your-own-device to work presents mounting dangers due to malware attacks--software intended to corrupt computers.

Between April and December 2012, the types of threats detected on the Google Android platform increased by more than thirty times from 11,000 to 350,000, and are expected to reach one million in 2003, according to security company Trend Micro (See Figure 1).



Put simply, as the global economy relies more on the Internet, the latter becomes increasingly insidious. There is no doubt that the Internet is efficient. But it now needs a more concerted global effort to preserve its best aspects and guard against abuses.

The rise of the digital cold war



Cyber threats and cyberattacks also reveal an escalating digital cold war. For years the United States government has claimed that cyberattacks are mainly state-sponsored, initiated predominantly by China, Iran, and Russia. The penetration of the U.S. Internet technology market by corporations such as Huawei, subsidized by the Chinese government, has led to more fears that sensitive information is vulnerable. After an explicit exchange of views between President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping in February 2013, the United States passed a new spending law that included a cyber espionage review process limiting U.S. government procurement of Chinese hardware.

U.S. suspicions intensified when Mandiant, a private information security firm, released a report detailing cyber espionage by a covert Chinese military unit against 100 U.S. companies and organizations. In March 2013, the U.S. government announced the creation of thirteen new teams of computer experts capable to retaliate if the United States were hit by a major attack.

On the other hand, Chinese experts claim to be the primary target of state-sponsored attacks, largely originating from the United States. But in reality the situation is more complex. Table 1 shows that cyberattacks in March 2013 were most frequently launched from Russia and Germany, followed by Taiwan and the United States.

What is happening to the Internet?



Created as a decentralized network, the Internet has been a difficult place for policymakers seeking to enforce the laws of the real world. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks—consisting of virus infected systems (Botnet) targeting a single website leading to a Denial of Service for the end user—became a harsh reality by 2000, when companies such as Amazon, eBay, and Yahoo! had been affected. These costs stem from the direct financial damage caused by loss of revenue during an attack, disaster recovery costs associated with restoring a company's services, a loss of customers following an attack, and compensation payments to customers in the event of a violation of their service level agreements.

As the Internet permeates everyday life, the stakes are becoming even higher. In a few years, society could delegate every aspect of life to information technology imagine driverless cars, machine-to-machine communications, and other trends that will lead to the interconnection of buildings to trains, and dishwashers to smartphones. This could open up these societies to previously unimaginable disruptive cyber events. What is as concerning is that in cyberspace, attacks seem to have a structural lead over defense capabilities: it can be prohibitively difficult to foresee where, how, and when attackers will strike.

Confronted with this challenge, the global community faces a dilemma. The neutrality of the Internet has proven to be a formidable ally of democracy, but the cost of protecting users' freedom is skyrocketing. Critical services, such as e-commerce or e-health, might never develop if users are not able to operate in a more secure environment. Moreover, some governments simply do not like ideas to circulate freely.

Besides the "giant cage" built by China to insulate its Internet users, countries like Pakistan have created national firewalls to monitor and filter the flow of information on the network. And even the Obama administration, which has most recently championed Internet freedom initiatives abroad, is said to be cooperating with private telecoms operators on Internet surveillance, and Congress is discussing a new law imposing information sharing between companies and government on end-user behavior, which violates user privacy.

The question becomes more urgent every day: Should the Internet remain an end-to-end, neutral environment, or should we sacrifice Internet freedom on the altar of enhanced security? The answer requires a brief explanation of how the Internet is governed, and what might change.

The end of the Web as we know it?

Since its early days, the Internet has been largely unregulated by public authorities, becoming a matter for private self-regulation by engineers and experts, who for years have taken major decisions through unstructured procedures. No doubt, this has worked in the past. But as cyberspace started to expand, the stakes began to rise.

Informal bodies such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)—a private, U.S.-based multi-stakeholder association that rules on domain names and other major aspects of the Internet have been increasingly put under the spotlight. Recent ICANN rulings have exacerbated the debate over the need for more government involvement in Internet governance, either through a dedicated United Nations agency or through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), an existing UN body that ensures international communication and facilitates deployment of telecom infrastructure. But many experts fear that if a multi-stakeholder model is abandoned, the World Wide Web would cease to exist as we know it.

Last year's World Conference on International Telecommunications, held in Dubai, hosted a heated debate on the future of cyberspace. Every stakeholder was looking for a different outcome. The ITU looked to expand its authority over the Internet; European telecoms operators wanted to secure more revenues by changing the rules for exchanging information between networks; China, Russia, and India wanted stronger government control over the Internet; the United States and Europe stood to protect the multi-stakeholder model of ICANN; and a group of smaller countries sought to have Internet access declared a human right.



When a new treaty was finally put to vote, unsurprisingly, as many as fifty-five countries (including the United States and many EU member states) decided not to sign. Since then, the question on how the Internet will be governed remains unresolved.

Cyber attacks between states results in great power war


GABLE 10 Adjunct Professor of Public International Law, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law [Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, January, 2010, 43 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 57]
Spoofing attacks are concentrated on impersonating a particular user or computer, usually in order to launch other types of attacks. n122 Spoofing is often committed in connection with password sniffing; after obtaining a user's log-in and password, the spoofer will log in to the computer and masquerade as the legitimate user. The cyberterrorist typically does not stop there, instead using that computer as a bridge to another, hopping in this fashion from computer to computer. This process, called "looping," effectively conceals the spoofer's identity, especially because he or she may have jumped back and forth across various national boundaries. n123

Even more disturbing is the possibility of misleading entire governments into believing that another, potentially hostile government is attempting to infiltrate its networks. Imagine that a cyberterrorist perpetrates an attack on the network maintained by the U.S. Treasury and steals millions of dollars, transferring the money to his own account to be used for funding further terrorist activities. n124 He has used the spoofing technique, however, which causes the U.S. government to believe the Russian government to be behind the attack and to accuse them of the attack. The Russian government denies the accusation and is insulted at the seemingly unprovoked hostility. Tensions between the governments escalate and boil over, potentially resulting in war. Though this may be only a hypothetical example, it is frighteningly plausible. In fact, it may have been used in the attacks on U.S. and South Korean websites - the South Korean government initially was so certain that North Korea was behind the attack that it publicly accused the North Korean government, despite already tense relations. n125 Similarly, in the 2007 attack on Estonia, Estonian authorities were so certain that the Russian government was behind the attack that they not only publicly accused them but requested military assistance from NATO in responding to the attack. n126 It was later determined that Russia was not behind the attack and that at least some of the attackers were located in Brazil and Vietnam. n127


Impact Overview




Government control prevents cyber attacks – allows them to create bottlenecks and detection devices that prevent attacks from occurring. And cyber attacks between states risk global nuclear wars – our evidence cites the U.S. and Russia as likely to be attacked and escalate.



A successful attack would take milliseconds, couldn’t be stopped, and escalates.


WALL 11 Senior Associate with Alston & Bird LLP; former senior legal advisor for U.S. Special Operations Command Central [Andru E. Wall, Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action, Harvard National Security Journal]
Cyberwarfare differs from other forms of warfare in that the skills or tools necessary to collect intelligence in cyberspace are often the same skills or tools required to conduct cyber attack. Furthermore, the time lag between collecting information and the need to act upon that information may be compressed to milliseconds. Unlike the traditional warfighting construct where intelligence officers collect and analyze information before passing that information on to military officers who take direct action, cyber attack may require nearly simultaneous collection, analysis, and action. The same government hacker may identify an enemy computer network, [*122] determine its strategic import, and degrade its capabilities all in a matter of seconds.

This is precisely why President Obama put the same man in charge of cyber intelligence activities and military cyber operations. This is also the reason Congress evidenced considerable apprehension and asked many questions about authorities and oversight. After all, congressional oversight retains its antiquated, stovepiped organizational structure and presumes a strict separation between intelligence activities and military operations even when no such separation is legally required.


Cyber apocalypse will happen if the structure of the internet isn’t made safer


Gable, Adjunct Professor of Public International Law, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law, 2010

[Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 43:57]


VI. CONCLUSION

Cyberterrorism poses perhaps the greatest threat to national and international security since the creation of weapons of mass destruction. As states and their economies become increasingly intertwined, largely due to the Internet and the international financial system of global trade, the effects of a cyberterrorist attack will be greater. Similarly, as cyberterrorists gain experience in disrupting national governments and shutting down critical infrastructure, their attacks likely will become increasingly successful. Although states, private industry, and international organizations have made significant efforts to increase international cooperation, much more needs to be done. In taking action, however, it must be understood that, due to the fundamental weakness of the structure of the Internet, those additional efforts will not completely prevent cyberterrorism. As a result, further efforts at international cooperation and international standards must be part of a layered approach to cyberterrorism that also includes deterrence. As a result of the realities inherent to cyberspace, the most feasible way to deter cyberterrorism is through the international law principle of universal jurisdiction. This is not to say that territorial jurisdiction (or nationality, passive personality, or protective jurisdiction) could not be used to prosecute cyberterrorists, should there be sufficient information and state willingness to exercise other forms of jurisdiction. It is merely to say that universal jurisdiction is likely to be the most feasible manner of prosecution and, therefore, deterrence. A layered approach of mitigation and deterrence can reduce the threat of cyberterrorism substantially. Unless and until states are willing to exercise universal jurisdiction over cyberterrorist acts as part of that layered approach, however, it is only a matter of time before cyberterrorists are able to unleash a cyber-apocalypse.

Cyber war causes extinction.


Rothkopf 11 (David, Visiting Scholar at Carnegie, “Where Fukushima meets Stuxnet: The growing threat of cyber war”, 3/17/11, http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/17/where_fukushima_meets_stuxnet_the_growing_threat_of_cyber_war)
The Japanese nuclear crisis, though still unfolding, may, in a way, already be yesterday's news. For a peek at tomorrow's, review the testimony of General Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command. Testifying before Congress this week and seeking support to pump up his agency budget, the general argued that all future conflicts would involve cyber warfare tactics and that the U.S. was ill-equipped to defend itself against them.

Alexander said, "We are finding that we do not have the capacity to do everything we need to accomplish. To put it bluntly, we are very thin, and a crisis would quickly stress our cyber forces. ... This is not a hypothetical danger."

The way to look at this story is to link in your mind the Stuxnet revelations about the reportedly U.S. and Israeli-led cyber attacks on the Iranian nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz and the calamities at the Fukushima power facilities over the past week. While seemingly unconnected, the stories together speak to the before and after of what cyber conflict may look like. Enemies will be able to target one another's critical infrastructure as was done by the U.S. and Israeli team (likely working with British and German assistance) targeting the Iranian program and burrowing into their operating systems, they will seek to produce malfunctions that bring economies to their knees, put societies in the dark, or undercut national defenses.

Those infrastructures might well be nuclear power systems and the results could be akin to what we are seeing in Japan. (Although one power company executive yesterday joked to me that many plants in the U.S. would be safe because the technology they use is so old that software hardly plays any role in it at all. This hints at a bit of a blessing and a curse in the fractured U.S. power system: it's decentralized which makes it hard to target overall but security is left to many power companies that lack the sophistication or resources to anticipate, prepare for or manage the growing threats.)

Importantly, not only does the apparent success of the Stuxnet worm demonstrate that such approaches are now in play but it may just be the tip of the iceberg. I remember over a decade ago speaking to one of the top U.S. cyber defenders who noted that even during the late 90s banks were losing millions and millions every year to cyber theft -- only they didn't want to report it because they felt it would spook customers. (Yes.) Recently, we have seen significant market glitches worldwide that could easily have been caused by interventions rather than just malfunctions. A couple years back I participated in a scenario at Davos in which just such a manipulation of market data was simulated and the conclusion was it wouldn't take much to undermine confidence in the markets and perhaps even force traders to move to paper trading or other venues until it was restored. It wouldn't even have to be a real cyber intrusion -- just the perception that one might have happened.



What makes the nuclear threat so unsettling to many is that it is invisible. It shares this with the cyber threat. But the cyber attacks have other dimensions that suggest that General Alexander is not just trying to beef up his agency's bank accounts with his description of how future warfare will always involve a cyber component. Not only are they invisible but it is hard to detect who has launched them, so hard, in fact, that one can imagine future tense international relationships in which opposing sides were constantly, quietly, engaging in an undeclared but damaging "non-war," something cooler than a Cold War because it is stripped of rhetoric and cloaked in deniability, but which might be much more damaging. While there is still ongoing debate about the exact definition of cyber warfare there is a growing consensus that the threats posed by both state-sponsored and non-state actors to power grids, telecom systems, water supplies, transport systems and computer networks are reaching critical levels. This is the deeply unsettling situation effectively framed by General Alexander in his testimony and rather than having been obscured by this week's news it should only have been amplified by it.



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