Explanation of the Disad 2



Download 290.06 Kb.
Page6/9
Date06.05.2017
Size290.06 Kb.
#17359
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9

Affirmative



2ac to Nationalization



1. Nationalization is inevitable


Goldstein, Writer for the Atlantic, 2014

[Gordon M. Goldstein, The End of the Internet?, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/the-end-of-the-internet/372301/]


Some experts anticipate a future with a Brazilian Internet, a European Internet, an Iranian Internet, an Egyptian Internet—all with different content regulations and trade rules, and perhaps with contrasting standards and operational protocols. Eli Noam, a professor of economics and finance at Columbia Business School, believes that such a progressive fracturing of the global Internet is inevitable. “We must get used to the idea that the standardised internet is the past but not the future,” he wrote last fall. “And that the future is a federated internet, not a uniform one.” Noam thinks that can be managed, in part through the development of new intermediary technologies that would essentially allow the different Internets to talk to each other, and allow users to navigate the different legal and regulatory environments.

Perhaps. But at a minimum, this patchwork solution would be disruptive to American companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon, and eBay, which would see their global reach diminished. And it would make international communications and commerce more costly. The U.S. government is resisting this transformation. But the Internet is simply too consequential—socially, politically, and economically—for states to readily forgo control of it, and America, as Marc Andreessen observes, has lost “the moral high ground” in the debate. Perhaps it was never realistic to expect the World Wide Web to last.




2. Not reverse causal – people are pushing for nationalization because of NSA fears – that does NOT mean they will stop if the NSA does the plan.



3. Greed will determine internet decisions


Wagner, Commentator for Information Week, 08

[Mitch Wagner, Should The U.S. Nationalize The Internet?, http://www.informationweek.com/software/information-management/should-the-us-nationalize-the-internet/d/d-id/1069315?]


The Internet faces many problems from companies looking to maximize profits at the expense of the public good. Greedy businesses threaten innovation by trying to put an end to net neutrality, media companies want to control every Internet-connected device in an effort to lock down distribution channels, and spammers and other fraudsters have pretty much taken over e-mail. Now, TechCrunch is reporting that Vint Cerf, the so-called "father of the Internet," says maybe we should think of the Internet as being like the highway system -- a public good that should be nationalized. Erick Schonfeld at TechCrunch writes:

Should the Internet be owned and maintained by the government, just like the highways? Vint Cerf, the "father of the Internet" and Google's Internet evangelist, made this radical suggestion while he was sitting next to me on a panel yesterday about national tech policy at the Personal Democracy Forum. Maybe he was inspired by the presence of one of the other panelists, Claudio Prado, from Brazil's Ministry of Culture, who kept on talking about the importance of embracing Internet "peeracy." (Although, I should note that Mr. Cerf frowned upon that ill-advised coinage). But I think (or hope, rather) that he was really trying to spark a debate about whether the Internet should be treated more like the public resource that it is.

His comment was in the context of a bigger discussion about the threat to net neutrality posed by the cable and phone companies, who are making moves to control the amount and types of bits that can go through their pipes. It was made almost in passing and the discussion quickly moved to other topics.

The case for letting the government run the Internet is tempting. Rather than letting telcos, media companies, and spammers fight to control the Internet, we could just let the government run the pipe to ensure its continued fairness.


4. Timeframe for the disad is long – no idea when nationalized internet control will actually occur – it is decades away before private businesses would be willing to give up control.



5. Government control won’t stop cyber-terror


Holmes, former assistant secretary of state & distinguished fellow at the Heritage Foundation, 2013

[Kim R. Holmes, Washington Times, April 17, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/17/holmes-staying-one-step-ahead-of-cyberattacks/]


Imposing an old-fashioned, top-down regulatory solution as the Obama administration and some in Congress want to do is tempting. After a proposed Senate cybersecurity act failed to pass, the administration issued an executive order that reflects this regulatory approach.

But heavy-handed regulation is a 19th-century solution to a 21st-century problem. Federal regulations are slow to implement, cumbersome to manage and unable to keep up with the rapid advances of hackers and cyberwarriors, who continually change their lines of attack. This approach ushers in a clumsy bureaucratic regime that undoubtedly will become even slower and more cumbersome over time. That is the nature of regulatory bureaucracy.

There is a better way. The rule of thumb for policymakers should be to encourage companies and other entities to find methods to better protect themselves from cyberattacks. They need to be able to share information voluntarily and protect themselves from liabilities associated with doing that, while ensuring that their proprietary information is safeguarded.

Companies sharing information on cyberattacks need to know that they will not be put at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. All shared information should be exempted from Freedom of Information Act requests and regulatory use. Moreover, private-public partnerships should be established so information could be shared fully and in a timely manner.

Developing a cybersecurity liability and insurance system would be another step in the right direction. As explained in the Heritage report, “such a system returns cyber-security liability to those who are largely responsible for cyber-security losses” i.e., not the consumer but the software manufacturers who, through negligence or other reasons, fail to offer safeguards against cyberincursions and companies that do little about security weaknesses in their cybersystems.

The Heritage report contains another innovative recommendation: Create a nonprofit organization that can assess the surety of an organization’s supply chain, similar to the way Underwriters Laboratories Inc. assesses the safety of various commercial products. Once a company is given a grade, consumers of software and technical equipment can decide for themselves how safe a purchase would be.

Finally, there is the critical issue of cyberattacks by states, terrorists and criminals. A model to pursue is the one used by the former Soviet state of Georgia in response to cyberattacks from Russia in 2012. The Georgian government planted a malware booby trap in a file that Russian intelligence hacked, foiling that attempt at espionage and, more importantly, identifying the perpetrator. U.S. companies should be allowed to execute similar operations, either in cooperation with law enforcement or on their own.



Cybersecurity is a complex problem. That is why a one-size-fits-all, top-down regulatory regime run by the federal government is unwise. To stay a step ahead of hackers, Americans need a system that empowers them to protect themselves.


6. Cyber-terror is all hype


Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy @ Brookings Institute, 2012

[Peter W. Singer, The Cyber Terror Bogeyman, Armed Forces Journal, November 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/11/cyber-terror-singer]


We have let our fears obscure how terrorists really use the Internet.

About 31,300. That is roughly the number of magazine and journal articles written so far that discuss the phenomenon of cyber terrorism.



Zero. That is the number of people that who been hurt or killed by cyber terrorism at the time this went to press.

In many ways, cyber terrorism is like the Discovery Channel’s “Shark Week,” when we obsess about shark attacks despite the fact that you are roughly 15,000 times more likely to be hurt or killed in an accident involving a toilet. But by looking at how terror groups actually use the Internet, rather than fixating on nightmare scenarios, we can properly prioritize and focus our efforts.



Part of the problem is the way we talk about the issue. The FBI defines cyber terrorism as a “premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs and data which results in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” A key word there is “violence,” yet many discussions sweep all sorts of nonviolent online mischief into the “terror” bin. Various reports lump together everything from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent statements that a terror group might launch a “digital Pearl Harbor” to Stuxnet-like sabotage (ahem, committed by state forces) to hacktivism, WikiLeaks and credit card fraud. As one congressional staffer put it, the way we use a term like cyber terrorism “has as much clarity as cybersecurity — that is, none at all.”

Another part of the problem is that we often mix up our fears with the actual state of affairs. Last year, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn, the Pentagon’s lead official for cybersecurity, spoke to the top experts in the field at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. “It is possible for a terrorist group to develop cyber-attack tools on their own or to buy them on the black market,” Lynn warned. “A couple dozen talented programmers wearing flip-flops and drinking Red Bull can do a lot of damage.”

The deputy defense secretary was conflating fear and reality, not just about what stimulant-drinking programmers are actually hired to do, but also what is needed to pull off an attack that causes meaningful violence. The requirements go well beyond finding top cyber experts. Taking down hydroelectric generators, or designing malware like Stuxnet that causes nuclear centrifuges to spin out of sequence doesn’t just require the skills and means to get into a computer system. It’s also knowing what to do once you are in. To cause true damage requires an understanding of the devices themselves and how they run, the engineering and physics behind the target.

The Stuxnet case, for example, involved not just cyber experts well beyond a few wearing flip-flops, but also experts in areas that ranged from intelligence and surveillance to nuclear physics to the engineering of a specific kind of Siemens-brand industrial equipment. It also required expensive tests, not only of the software, but on working versions of the target hardware as well.

As George R. Lucas Jr., a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, put it, conducting a truly mass-scale action using cyber means “simply outstrips the intellectual, organizational and personnel capacities of even the most well-funded and well-organized terrorist organization, as well as those of even the most sophisticated international criminal enterprises.”

Lucas said the threat of cyber terrorism has been vastly overblown.

“To be blunt, neither the 14-year-old hacker in your next-door neighbor’s upstairs bedroom, nor the two- or three-person al-Qaida cell holed up in some apartment in Hamburg are going to bring down the Glen Canyon and Hoover dams,” he said.

We should be crystal clear: This is not to say that terrorist groups are uninterested in using the technology of cyberspace to carry out acts of violence. In 2001, al-Qaida computers seized in Afghanistan were found to contain models of a dam, plus engineering software that simulated the catastrophic failure of controls. Five years later, jihadist websites were urging cyber attacks on the U.S. financial industry to retaliate for abuses at Guantanamo Bay.

Nor does it mean that cyber terrorism, particularly attacks on critical infrastructure, is of no concern. In 2007, Idaho National Lab researchers experimented with cyber attacks on their own facility; they learned that remotely changing the operating cycle of a power generator could make it catch fire. Four years later, the Los Angeles Times reported that white-hat hackers hired by a water provider in California broke into the system in less than a week. Policymakers must worry that real-world versions of such attacks might have a ripple effect that could, for example, knock out parts of the national power grid or shut down a municipal or even regional water supply.

But so far, what terrorists have accomplished in the cyber realm doesn’t match our fears, their dreams or even what they have managed through traditional means.






Download 290.06 Kb.

Share with your friends:
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page