File Title space weaponization good 2
SMIL Bad --- Russia Weaponization 1NC
Download 1.17 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Russian nuclear upgrades cause nuke war
SMIL Bad --- Russia Weaponization 1NCRussia hates US space militarization and will respond to it – ground ballistic missile defense provesChristy 6 – Donald P. Christy, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air Force, U.S. Army War College, March 15th, 2006, "UNITED STATES POLICY ON WEAPONS IN SPACE," www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil307.pdf The Potential Adversaries Are space weapons necessary to counter adversaries? The environment in which the United States might choose to develop and deploy space-based weapons is complex. In making the decision, policy makers must take into account the reaction and response of potential adversaries with a wide array of capabilities with the ultimate goal of increasing national security. At one end of the spectrum lies Russia, with its large and diverse, if somewhat decaying, strategic arsenal and significant space capabilities. One-step below is China, with less capable and stationary strategic forces, but growing space capabilities. At the bottom tier are the so-called rogue states such as North Korea and Iran, with limited, but growing missile and nuclear forces and virtually non-existent space capabilities. Finally, the United States must also consider the impact on the Global War on Terrorism. This section examines the dynamic of space weapons on these potential or existing adversaries. Russia is clearly concerned about the potential pursuit of space weapons by the United States. As previously mentioned, Russia is leading the charge in the United Nations to prevent the weaponization of space. Despite their concern, Russia has perhaps the least to worry about if the United States develops and deploys these weapons. 56 It is possible that even with a small space based defensive combined with ground-based defenses that are currently under development and deployment, it would not upset the strategic deterrence balance between the United States and Russia. 57 Undoubtedly, however, they would be compelled to respond. Flush with revenues from crude oil sales, Russia has embarked on a program to upgrade its strategic deterrence capabilities. In a direct response to American ground based missile defense activities, Russia is developing maneuverable re-entry vehicles for its nuclear arsenal designed to foil these ground-based systems. 58 This is clearly a defensive posture designed to preserve the perceived balance of deterrence. In reaction to a space-based component of missile defense, Russia would evaluate the threat and again, likely respond in some manner. How that response would manifest itself is unknown. Russia could respond in kind with their own space-based systems, they could develop anti-satellite capabilities to attack opposing space systems or they could further increase the capabilities of their strategic forces in an effort to overwhelm the system. Alternatively, Russia or any other potential adversary, might publicly link the use of space-based weapons to the first use of nuclear weapons in the same way that the United States and others have lumped chemical, biological and nuclear weapons into the category of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 59 If that categorization took root internationally, it could have the effect of significantly raising the stakes for using the weapons rendering a space weapons as politically impotent as our stockpile of chemical weapons. Russian nuclear upgrades cause nuke warLambert and Miller 97 [Stephen and David, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, “Russia’s Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control” April, http://fas.org/irp/threat/ocp12.htm] Nuclear Dependency in the Face of Conventional Contingencies. Concerns regarding Russia's nuclear policies have been deepened by Russia's increasing reliance on its nuclear forces in the face of dramatically reduced conventional force quality and readiness. Igor Khripunov, a former Soviet diplomat and expert on security affairs, recently noted that some Russian military analysts "make a strong case for maintaining and improving nuclear weapons, air-based weapons in particular, without which Russia cannot adequately protect its security in the current geostrategic situation." It seems to be clear that "the demise of the Red Army that formerly protected Russia shifted the burden of security onto nuclear forces. Russia's new military doctrine abandons its former pledge of no-first-use of nuclear arms, and widens the conditions under which it might use them. By increasing its reliance on these weapons, Russia also magnifies the significance of its nuclear strategy." In order to operationalize this new reliance on nuclear weapons, Russian officials have chosen to emphasize the value and role of tactical nuclear weapons. They understand that posturing with strategic nuclear systems is practically useless, since they perceive there is a very basic state of strategic equilibrium between the United States, Russia, and China. Therefore, the solution to making the nuclear threat more credible is to articulate a greater role for tactical nuclear weapons since these weapons are viewed as "war fighting weapons." In fact, there has been evidence that some Russian officials have not ruled out redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in forward locations (such as land-based systems in Belarus and Kaliningrad and sea-based systems on the ships of the Baltic fleet). Sergei Kortunov, a member of the Russian security council and the deputy director of the Analytic Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation, recently warned that in the face of a mounting unfavorable balance in the correlation of forces, Russia might resolve to re-evaluate the 1991 unilateral tactical nuclear weapons initiatives. Other Russian officials have also alluded to potential initiatives regarding tactical nuclear systems. Major General Belous has stated that "there is no doubt that in the present geopolitical situation a number of Russian TNW [theater nuclear weapons], particularly air-based ones, should be retained...." Belous regards tactical nuclear weapons as "the equalizer which would deprive NATO of its new-found military superiority." He mentions the possibility that Russia may choose to "carry out a 'demonstration' TNW detonation to prove to an aggressor our resolve to use nuclear weapons," and concludes that, "faced with an economic crisis and a rather modest ability to equip its army and navy, for the foreseeable future Russia will be forced to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.17 Mb. Share with your friends:
|