Gonzaga Debate Institute 2011 Mercury China Coop Aff
Coop Good – Chinese Militarization
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- Coop Good – Solves Trust
Coop Good – Chinese MilitarizationChina’s ASAT deterrence is based on a perceived US threat in the region – cooperation with China allows further US-Sino cooperation Hitchens and Chen 8 (Theresa, Center for Defense Information, World Security Institute and David, CENTRA Technology, Inc, “Forging a Sino-US ‘‘grand bargain’’ in space” Space Policy 24 (2008) pg. 128–131, Available Online at Sciencedirect.com, Accessed June 28, 2011, EJONES) China’s incentive to develop anti-satellite weapons results largely from the US military presence in the western Pacific and the US military’s reliance on satellites for its doctrine of net-centric warfare. As Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has argued, ‘‘The near-term objective of preventing what Beijing would call Taiwanese secession from the mainland—and defeating any US expeditionary forces that may be committed in support—remains the dominant consideration for China’s military modernization’’ [2]. To wit, the Pentagon has noted China’s diversified portfolio of anti-satellite technologies, including ‘‘kinetic energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons for counterspace application’’ [3]. Some US researchers studying Chinese military doctrine have written that counter-space operations are seen as an increasingly necessary component of China’s military concept of ‘‘future ‘informationalized’ warfare’’, including hacking into satellite systems and other electronic attacks [4]. The logic of China’s investment in counter-space operations follows from what it sees as a regional security environment that, in the foreseeable future, will be dominated by an asymmetric balance of power vis-a` -vis the USA. Unless altered by domestic political will from the highest echelons of leadership, anti-satellite technologies will probably remain a part of its larger access denial strategy against the USA. Add to that a bilateral relationship peppered with crisis incidents, and often fueled by mutual misunderstanding, and the potential for a crisis situation to spiral out of control should give pause to any responsible leader. Since the Reagan era, US interest in on-orbit and anti-satellite weapons has stemmed from three intertwining strategic concerns: the threat of ballistic missile strike, protecting the space systems upon which the US military depends, and preventing an adversary from using space in the same way as the US military does to enhance its conventional military prowess. After President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, ‘‘China began a program to modernize its strategic missile forces because of doubts about the survivability of its small nuclear deterrent’’ [5]. The Pentagon notes that the Chinese Navy is developing the necessary technologies to field a nuclear submarine fleet, a key to increasing the survivability of China’s nuclear deterrent in the face of a second-strike-nullifying ballistic missile shield [6]. The current US strategic policy of ‘‘space dominance’’ aims at ensuring US freedom of action in space, as well as the ability to deny the use of space to adversaries [7]. China, with some good reason, sees itself as particularly vulnerable to such space doctrine, and in response may feel compelled to develop countervailing measures, in order to counteract the proscriptions of US policy. The USA cannot reasonably be expected to abandon its space capabilities, but a more constructive modus vivendi can surely be found by demonstrating that both the USA and China are ‘‘responsible stakeholders’’ in the realm of space. Coop Good – Solves TrustUS-Sino cooperation is key to better mutual cultural understanding that prevents a space arms race Caldararo et al., graduate student University of Nebraska at Omaha studying Public Administration, 08 (Kevin E Williams Deputy Director, Studies and Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned U.S. Air Force approved Michael, Jason Cantone graduated from the University of Nebraska College of Law with his J.D. and M.A. in Psychology and is currently a doctoral student in Law and Psychology. MEd Jonathan Cowin a senior at Creighton University, specializing in economics. Rachel Huggins junior at Creighton University studying political science and business administration. Hailey Rademacher junior at Creighton University, studying international relations and French Drew Sendelbach currently enrolled in the International Relations program to earn a Master of Arts degree from Creighton University “Global Innovation and Strategy Center Chinese Counterspace Intentions Fall 2008 – Project 08-05 December 2008, pg45-46 accessed:6-30-11, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA499438.) TJL Such views of the potential U.S. threat exacerbate already present fears, which serve to create a circular argument reminiscent of the violence escalation cycle discussed in psychological research. Any event could start the violence escalation sequence (e.g., the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007 and the Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade), which would then cause the U.S. to perceive China as a threat to international space cooperation, while at the same time China would see the U.S. as a similar threat and seek to challenge its hegemony. Both sides have merit to their arguments, as access to space and dualuse technologies for both civilian and military organizations understandably cause insecurity. Accordingly, China’s label of the U.S. as a hegemon that seeks to threaten or contain China could be seen as an appropriate response to U.S. policies and Congressional acts seeking to isolate China and prevent it from obtaining space technologies. While some progress has been made following the Cold War, many Chinese analysts remain highly critical of U.S policies and see the U.S. as actively seeking to manipulate China and subvert its return to power.174 In turn, the Chinese government’s response often fuels the U.S. perception that China must be isolated and prevented from acquiring space technology. Constant suspicion likely results in continued mistrust between states, allowing the escalation cycle to continue. For international progress to be made, the escalation cycle must be broken before a space arms race emerges. This break can also emerge through reciprocal understanding of different cultures. China can learn much from the economic and diplomatic actions of global powers and the U.S. can strive to better comprehend Chinese culture and interpersonal relations. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.99 Mb. Share with your friends:
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