Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: California
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Conclusion judgment of the district court is affirmed as to the retaliation claim. The judgment is reversed as to the employment discrimination claim, and that claim is remanded to the district court for further proceedings. FLSA: U.S. Supreme Court rejected two appeals, personal liability, undocumented workers
When an article provides excellent notice and information on an issue, or if my briefing would unnecessarily duplicate that process, I provide the URL link to it. Often, recently, I have offered both because that seems to provide a fuller picture of the issue(s). following Ogletree Deakins law firm article discusses the trial and appellate court facts, reasoning and rulings in extensive detail at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/supreme-court-lets-two-flsa-rulings-stand-yes-personal-liability-undocumented-workers-standing-sue/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=supreme-court-lets-two-flsa-rulings-stand-yes-personal-liability-undocumented-workers-standing-sue.
Haro, et al.City of Los Angeles, Nos. 12-55062, 12-55310 (9th Cir., (3/18/14):
Summary by the appellate court: Affirming the district court’s summary judgment in an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the panel held that City of Los Angeles fire department dispatchers and aeromedical technicians were entitled to standard overtime pay because they did not fall within an exemption for employees “engaged in fire protection.” panel held that these employees were not exempt from standard overtime pay because they did not have the legal authority and responsibility to engage in fire suppression under FLSA §§ 207(k) and 203(y ) . The panel held that the statute of limitations should be extended from two to three years because of the City’s willful violation of the FLSA. It held that liquidated damages should be awarded because the City could not show good faith or reasonable grounds for violating the FLSA. Agreeing with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, and disagreeing with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the panel held offsets for overtime payments the City had already made should be calculated on a week-by-week basis. Independent Contractors: Employment Classification Act (ECA), constitutionality – procedural due process – vagueness Illinois Determining who is an independent contractor can be difficult. The ECA attempted to define and clarify status. However, apparently there were still difficulties and problems until subsequent legislative action seems to have solved them. Bartlow v. Costigan, No. 115152 (ILSC, 02/21/14); http://www.state.il.us/court/OPINIONS/SupremeCourt/2014/115152.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The current version of the ECA was held to be constitutional because:
Litigation: attorney’s fee, costs, frivolous claim Jurisdiction: California Robert v. Stanford Univ., No. H037514 (Cal.Ct.App., 2/25/14); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H037514.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. $100,000 in attorney’s fees awarded at trial was afirmed by the appellate court in this case that was found to be “without merit[,] frivolous and vexatious. . . .” Summary by the appellate court: Francis Robert appeals from the trial court’s order requiring him to pay $100,000 in attorney’s fees to defendant Stanford University (Stanford) after Stanford prevailed in Robert’s action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). He claims that the court failed to make the requisite written findings, failed to consider his financial condition, and abused its discretion in finding that his FEHA cause of action was “without merit[,] frivolous and vexatious.” We affirm. Litigation: choice of forum, removal, statute of limitations – untimely filing, FRCP 15(d) and Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.068 5th Circuit, Texas v. Bailey Tool & Manufacturing, (5th Cir., 3/10/14):
According to the excellent concise explanatory article, Texas employees prefer to avoid federal court. [Comment: Many years ago one of my clients quipped, “I don’t want justice; I want to win.”] Arbitration: agreement enforced, preliminary issues decided BG Group v. Republic of Argentina, , ____ U.S. ____ (USSC, 3/5/14):
Arbitration is favored, and not only was the arbitration of a treaty dispute upheld, the Supreme Court enlarged the authority of the arbitrator(s) to hear and decide preliminary arbitration agreement issues. Syllabus: An investment treaty (Treaty) between the United Kingdom and Argentina authorizes a party to submit a dispute “to the decision of the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made,” i.e. , a local court, Art. 8(1); and permits arbitration, as relevant here, “where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from the moment when the dispute was submitted to [that] tribunal . . . , the said tribunal has not given its final decision,” Art. 8(2)(a)(i). Petitioner BG Group plc, a British firm, belonged to a consortium with a majority interest in MetroGAS, an Argentine entity awarded an exclusive license to distribute natural gas in Buenos Aires. At the time of BG Group’s investment, Argentine law provided that gas “tariffs” would be calculated in U. S. dollars and would be set at levels sufficient to assure gas distribution firms a reasonable return. But Argentina later amended the law, changing (among other things) the calculation basis to pesos. MetroGAS’ profits soon became losses. Invoking Article 8, BG Group sought arbitration, which the parties sited in Washington, D. C. BG Group claimed that Argentina’s new laws and practices violated the Treaty, which forbids the “expropriation” of investments and requires ea ch nation to give “fair and equitable treatment” to investors from the other. Argentina denied those claims, but also argued that the arbitrators lacked “jurisdiction” to hear the dispute because, as relevant here, BG Group had not com plied with Article 8’s local litigation requirement. The arbitration panel concluded that it had jurisdiction, finding, among other things, that Argentina’s conduct (such as also enacting new laws that hindered recourse to its judiciary by firms in BG Group’s situation) had excused BG Group’s failure to comply with Article 8’s requirement. On the merits, the panel found that Argentina had not expropriated BG Group’s investment but had denied BG Group “fair and equitable treatment.” It awarded damages to BG Group. Both sides sought review in federal district court: BG Group to confirm the award under the New York Convention and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and Argentina to vacate the award, in part on the ground that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction under the FAA. The District Court confirmed the award, but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated. It found that the interpretation and application of Article 8’s requirement were matters for courts to decide de novo, i.e., without deference to the arbitrators’ views; that the circumstances did not excuse BG Group’ s failure to comply with the requirement; and that BG Group had to commence a lawsuit in Argentina’s courts and wait 18 months before seeking arbitration. Thus, the court held, the arbitrators lacked authority to decide the dispute. Pertinent portion of the ruling: 2. While Argentina is entitled to court review (under a properly deferential standard) of the arbitrators’ decision to excuse BG Group’s noncompliance with the litigation requirement, that review shows that the arbitrators’ determinations were lawful. Their conclusion that the litigation provision cannot be construed as an absolute impediment to arbitration, in all cases, lies well within their interpretative authority. Their factual findings that Argentina passed laws hindering recourse to the local judiciary by firms similar to BG Group are undisputed by Argentina and are accepted as valid. And their conclusion that Argentina’s actions made it “absurd and unreasonable” to read Article 8 to require an investor in BG Group’s position to bring its grievance in a domestic court, before arbitrating, is not barred by the Treaty. Pp. 17–19. Held: 665 F. 3d 1363, reversed. Trade Secrets: use – non-use, damages, $2.92M jury verdict affirmed Jurisdiction: Utah (federal civil action involving state law) Storagecraft Technology Corporation v. Kirby, o. 12-4182 (10th Cir., 3/11/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-4182.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Damages awarded at trial were affirmed in this Utah trade secrets theft case, and the following defenses or considerations were irrelevant:
because theft in and of itself was sufficient to support a damage award. Summary by the appellate court: James Kirby says the jury’s award against him is too much. True, he helped start and served as a director of StorageCraft, a computer software company. True, after a falling out with his colleagues he stole the computer source code on which the company’s products depend. True, he shared the source code with NetJapan, a rival company that quickly produced a competing software product much like StorageCraft’s. But the jury’s $2.92 million trade secret misappropriation award is still too much. Too much, Mr. Kirby says, because he never used the secret for his own personal profit. And too much because StorageCraft never sought to prove at trial that NetJapan made commercial use of its trade secret either. Maybe he was angry about how his former colleagues had treated him, maybe he disclosed the trade secret to a rival out of vengeance. But without firmer proof that someone profited from his misdeed Mr. Kirby insists the jury’s verdict should be overturned. The trouble is Utah law doesn’t distinguish between a misappropriator’s venial motives. When someone steals a trade secret and discloses it to a competitor he effectively assumes for himself an unrestricted license in the trade secret. And that bears its costs. After all, what value does a trade secret hold when it’s no longer a secret from the trade? The misappropriator may act with a wish to line his pockets or satisfy a vendetta or for some other purpose still. All the same Utah’s trade secret statute holds him to account for the full value of the license he arrogated to himself. Just as the district court held. Benefits: public sector, retirement annual cost-of- living adjustment (COLA)
Jurisdiction: New Mexico Bartlett, et al., v. Cameron, et al., 2014-NMSC-002 (NMSC, 12/19/13); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2014/14sc-002.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Bosson, Justice: {1} Petitioners are retired teachers, professors and other public education employees (collectively, Retirees) who seek a writ of mandamus against the New Mexico Education Retirement Board (ERB), which administers their retirement plan under the Educational Retirement Act (ERA). See NMSA 1978, § 22-11-6 (2011) (describing the powers and duties of the ERB); see also NMSA 1978, §§ 22-11-11 to -15 (2011) (describing the educational retirement fund). Retirees seek to compel the ERB to pay them an annual cost-of- living adjustment (COLA) to their retirement benefits, calculated according to the statutes “ in effect at the time of Petitioners’ date of maturity of their rights ,” instead of the current statutes as recently modified by our Legislature. {2} In requesting this writ, Retirees challenge the constitutionality of a recent legislative amendment that reduces the future amounts all educational retirees might receive as a COLA. See NMSA 1978, § 22-11-31 (2013). Essentially, the narrow question before this Court is whether the New Mexico Constitution grants Retirees a right to an annual cost-of-living adjustment to their retirement benefit, based on the COLA formula in effect on the date of their retirement, for the entirety of their retirement. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the New Mexico Constitution affords Retirees no such right, and accordingly we deny the writ of mandamus. Constitutional Law: due process – adverse employment action
Jurisdiction: New Mexico Victor v. New Mexico Department of Health, et al., No. 31,497 (NMCA, 10/3/13); http://www.nmbar.org/Attorneys/lawpubs/BB/bb2014/BB022614.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. 53.9 SBB 32 (NMCA, 2.26.14); 2014-NMCA-012. Summary by the appellate court: {1} Appellant Patricia Victor appeals the district court’s order affirming a decision of the secretary of the New Mexico Department of Health (the Department) finding that, in her capacity as a certified nurse aide, Appellant abused residents of a health care facility. The finding led to the permanent placement of Appellant’s name on a nurse aide registry, thereby effectively ending her ability to find employment as a certified nurse aide. Appellant claims that her right to procedural due process was violated. We disagree and affirm the district court’s order. Retaliatory Discharge: adverse employment action, negligent infliction of emotional distress evidence, expert witness Jurisdiction: Tennessee Coleman v. Humane Society of Memphis and Shelby County, No. W2012-02687-COA-R9-CV, (Ct.App.TN, 2/1414); http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/colemanrebeccaopn.pdf; 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 77 [enhanced lexis.com version]. Expert testimony is required in Tennessee for causation and damages issues when negligent infliction of emotional distress is the sole claim. However, the Coleman case involved issues of both retaliation and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
FCA: Fraudulent Claims Act, whistleblower, retaliation, damages Jurisdiction: Fourth Circuit Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, No. 12-1417 (4th Cir., 1/8/14); http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-ca4-12-01417/pdf/USCOURTS-ca4-12-01417-0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. What is the appropriate award of damages in a fraud claim action? This is a complex question, and it is explored in detail in this article by Chris V. Anderson and Margaret H. Campbell of Ogletree Deakins at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/entirely-comfortable-monster-striking-decision-unlikely-source-excessive-fines-false-claims-act/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=entirely-comfortable-monster-striking-decision-unlikely-source-excessive-fines-false-claims-act. Staffing: poison, liability – imputed – vicarious, individual misconduct Jurisdiction: California
A nurse poisoned by coworker after two minor disagreements sued the staffing agency that placed her in the medical facility, alleging:
[Vicarious or imputed liability means that that there was a special relationship between the wrongdoer and the person harmed, such as employer and employee: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Vicarious+liability.] The appellate court reversed the trial court on the ground that under the facts of this case, the relationship was insufficient to hold the staffing company liable. ADEA: litigation, 12(b)(6) – failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Eleventh Amendment immunity, 56(d) – summary judgment Coats v. State of Utah, Department of Workforce Services, No. 13-4078 (10th Cir., 3/4/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4078.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Entire text: Becky Coats works for the Utah Department of Workforce Services as an unemployment insurance eligibility specialist, but she’s long hoped for another job. In fact, since 2000 she’s applied for no fewer than 40 other positions within the Department, only to be turned down each time. She alleges that’s not because there have been better available applicants but because of age discrimination, and she charges the Department with violating the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. On the recommendation of a magistrate judge, however, the district court dismissed Ms. Coats’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, noting that the Department had never waived and Congress had never abrogated its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Coats appeal s this disposition, but we can find no fault with it. The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation carefully analyzed the relevant authorities and addressed Ms. Coats’s arguments and we affirm for substantially the reasons offered there. As to Ms. Coats’ argument she was entitled to discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), we note that rule pertains to summary judgment proceedings. This case was not decided on summary judgment but at the motion to dismiss stage.Coats’ contention that the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 56(d) motion is therefore without merit. Affirmed. SOX: Sarbanes-Oxley – §1514A(a), whistleblower, applicability – extended, litigation – 12(b)(6) Jurisdiction: All Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3, ____ U.S. ____ (USSC, 3/4/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
Whistle blower protection now extends beyond the employees of regulated public companies now to cover the employees of contractors and subcontractors of those companies. Syllabus: To safeguard investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial markets following the collapse of Enron Corporation, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. One of the Act’s provisions protects whistleblowers; at the time relevant here, that provision instructed: “No [public] company . . ., or any . . . contractor [or] subcontractor . . . of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or . . . discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of [whistleblowing activity].” 18 U. S. 1514A(a). Plaintiffs below, petitioners here, are former employees of respondents (collectively FMR), private companies that contract to advise or manage mutual funds. As is common in the industry, the mutual funds served by FMR are public companies with no employees. Both plaintiffs allege that they blew the whistle on putative fraud relating to the mutual funds and, as a consequence, suffered retaliation by FMR. Each commenced suit in federal court. Moving to dismiss the suits, FMR argued that the plaintiffs could state no claim under §1514A, for that provision protects only employees of public companies, and not employees of private companies that contract with public companies. On interlocutory appeal from the District Court’s denial of FMR’s motion to dismiss, the First Circuit reversed, concluding that the term “an employee” in §1514A(a) refers only to employees of public companies. Held: The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded. 670 F. 3d 61, reversed and remanded. OSHA: Multi-Employer Citation Policies (MEP), Utah – rejected Jurisdiction: Utah Hughes General Contractors, Inc. v. Utah Labor Commission, No. 20120426 (UTSC, 1/31/14):
Summary by the Utah Supreme Court: ¶1 In this case we are asked to determine the viability of the so-called multi-employer worksite doctrine under the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act (UOSHA). The doctrine makes a general contractor responsible for the occupational safety of all workers on a worksite — even those who are not the contractor‘s employees. Federal OSHA regulations adopt this doctrine, and federal courts have upheld it as consistent with the governing federal statute. But for us this is a matter of first impression. ¶2 We reject the multi-employer worksite doctrine as incompatible with the governing Utah statute, Utah Code section 34A-6-201(1). Specifically, we hold that the responsibility for ensuring occupational safety under the governing statute is limited to an employer‘s responsibility to its employees. And because the cited contractor in this case was not an employer of the workers in question, we reverse the citation and penalty at issue. USERRA: comparable leave – comparable treatment Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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