Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: California
- Jurisdiction: All
- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: All, Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit, joining First and Ninth
- Jurisdiction: Colorado
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Jurisdiction: All Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins.et al., No. 12-729, ____ U.S. ____, (USSC, 12/16/13); http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-729_q8l1.pdf;134 S.Ct. 604, 187 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2013) [enhanced lexis.com version]. The insurer’s three-year period within which to file a “proof of loss” statement was unanimously upheld. Syllabus: Respondent Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (Hartford) is the administrator of Wal-Mart Stores , Inc.’s (Wal-Mart) Group Long Term Disability Plan (Plan), an employee benefit plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The Plan’s insurance policy requires any suit to recover benefits pursuant to the judicial review provision in ERISA §502(a)(1)(B), 29 U. S. C. §1132(a)(1)(B), to be filed within three years after “proof of loss” is due. Petitioner Heimeshoff filed a claim for long-term disability benefits with Hartford. After petitioner exhausted the mandatory administrative review process, Hartford issued its final denial. Almost three years after that final denial but more than three years after proof of loss was due, Heimeshoff filed a claim for judicial review pursuant to ERISA §502(a)(1)(B). Hartford and Wal-Mart moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was untimely. The District Court granted the motion, recognizing that while ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations, the contractual 3-year limitations period was enforceable under applicable State law and Circuit precedent. The Second Circuit affirmed. Held: The Plan’s limitations provision is enforceable. Pp. 4–16. FEHA: sexual orientation – perception, hostile work environment – language – joking – teasing, male-on-male Jurisdiction: California Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LLP, No. B241914 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2,Div.6, 1/13/14): http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B241914.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. The key issue was whether male workers frequently making gay jokes about a heterosexual male coworker amounted to a hostile work environment, and the appellate court ruled it could. Summary by the appellate court: In this first impression case, we hold that a defective special verdict form is subject to harmless error analysis. Max Taylor, respondent, filed an action alleging hostile work environment sexual harassment against his former employer, Nabors Drilling USA, L.P., appellant . The action was brought pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). Judgment was entered in respondent's favor after a jury returned a $160,000 special verdict in his favor . The trial court denied appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and awarded respondent attorney fees of $680,520. Appellant argues that the motion for JNOV should have been granted because (1) the evidence is insufficient to show that respondent "was harassed because of his sex and/or perceived sexual orientation," and (2) the special verdict is fatally defective. In addition, appellant challenges an award of $150,000 for past noneconomic damages and an award of $10,000 for past economic damages. Finally, appellant contends that the attorney fee award is excessive. We affirm the denial of the motion for JNOV and the award of attorney fees. We agree with appellant that the evidence is insufficient to support an award of economic damages. Accordingly, we reduce respondent's total recovery from $160,000 to $150,000. We affirm the judgment as modifiedfree speech, working conditions – discussion, code of conduct – overly broad restrictions Jurisdiction: All
On the one hand, the NLRA allows concerted activity to discuss the terms and conditions of employment, safety, etc., but on the other hand, some speech or activities might be held to be an unfair labor practice (ULP). Guidance and examples in this uncertain and evolving area of employment law can be helpful. Whistleblower: internal complaints
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Lykins v. Certainteed Corporation, et al., No 12-3308 (10th Cir., 2/12/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-3308.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The employee saw what he considered to be pollution discharge problems. He complained internally, but he failed to follow company reporting policies. Defendants suppressed testimony during the trail preparation stage. Summary by the court: Mr. Lykins argues that (1) he properly established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge because (a) he did not have to identify any precise statutory violation in his complaints, and (b) he satisfied the higher authority requirement by reporting the violations to the supervisors of those mishandling the waste; and (2) the district court erred in reversing the sanctions award based solely on the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. For the following reasons, we affirm summary judgment on the merits but reverse on sanctions. Background [quoted from the opinion; edited for ease of reading]:
Retaliatory Discharge [quoting from the opinion]: Under Kansas law, in order to establish a retaliatory discharge claim under the whistleblower exception to at-will employment, the employee must first make a prima facie case by clear and convincing evidence that:
Discovery Violation Sanctions:
The appellate court made some modifications to the awards of costs and attorney fees. ACA, Religion: employers, contraceptives – birth control, Hobby Lobby v. Sibelius, federal mandate – enforcement, injunction, §1001(5)
Jurisdiction: All, Tenth Circuit Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., et al. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S, ____ (USSC, 1/24/14):
Justice Sotomayor is the “Circuit Justice” for the 10th Circuit. On 12/31/13 a temporary injunction enjoined imposing the federal health care mandate requiring that certain religious employers to either: (1) provide insurance coverage including birth control to their employees; or (2) sign and execute a form allowing a third party to provide that coverage to their employees. On 1/24/14 the Supreme Court ruled that the injunction would continue pending the federal trial court lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Colorado. Ruling In Chambers by Justice Sotomayor, Circuit Justice: This is an application for an injunction pending appellate review filed with me as Circuit Justice for the Tenth Circuit. The applicants are two closely held for-profit corporations, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby Lobby) and Mardel, Inc. (Mardel), and five family members who indirectly own and control those corporations. Hobby Lobby is an arts and crafts retail chainstore, with more than 13,000 employees in over 500 stores nationwide. Mardel is a chain of Christian-themed bookstores, with 372 full-time employees in 35 stores. Employees of the two corporations and their families receive health insurance from the corporations’ self-insured group health plans. Under §1001(5) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 131, 42 U. S. C. §300gg–13(a), non grandfathered group health plans must cover certain preventive health services without cost-sharing, including various preventive services for women as provided in guidelines issued by the Health Resources Services Administration (HRSA), a component of the Department of Health and Human Services. As relevant here, HRSA’s guidelines for women’s preventive services require coverage for “all Food and Drug Administration . . . approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity as prescribed by a provider.” 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The applicants filed an action in Federal District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq. They allege that under the HRSA guidelines, Hobby Lobby and Mardel will be required, contrary to the applicants’ religious beliefs, to provide insurance coverage for certain drugs and devices that the applicants believe can cause abortions. The applicants simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the contraception-coverage requirement, which is scheduled to take effect with respect to the employee insurance plans of Hobby Lobby and Mardel on January 1, 2013. The District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the applicants’ motion for an injunction pending resolution of the appeal. The only source of authority for this Court to issue an injunction is the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). “We have consistently stated, and our own Rules so require, that such power is to be used sparingly.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 507 U. S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers); see this Court’s Rule 20.1 (“Issuance by the Court of an extraordinary writ authorized by 28 U. S. C. §1651(a) is not a matter of right, but of discretion sparingly exercised”). Unlike a stay of an appeals court decision pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2101(f), a request for an injunction pending appeal “ ‘does not simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts.’ ” Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 562 U. S. ___ (2010) (quoting Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 479 U. S. 1312, 1313 (1986) (S CALIA, J., in chambers)). Accordingly, a Circuit Justice may issue an injunction only when it is “[n]ecessary or appropriate in aid of our jurisdiction” and “the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.” Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 542 U. S. 1305, 1306 (2004) (Rehnquist, C. J., in chambers) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applicants do not satisfy the demanding standard for the extraordinary relief they seek. First, whatever the ultimate merits of the applicants’ claims, their entitlement to relief is not “indisputably clear.” Lux v. Rodrigues, 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (R OBERTS, C. J., in chambers) (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has not previously addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims brought by closely held for-profit corporations and their controlling shareholders alleging that the mandatory provision of certain employee benefits substantially burdens their exercise of religion. Cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252 (1982) (rejecting free exercise claim brought by individual Amish employer who argued that paying Social Security taxes for his employees interfered with his exercise of religion). Moreover, the applicants correctly recognize that lower courts have diverged on whether to grant temporary injunctive relief to similarly situated plaintiffs raising similar claims, Application for Injunction Pending Appellate Review 25–26, and no court has issued a final decision granting permanent relief with respect to such claims. Second, while the applicants allege they will face irreparable harm if they are forced to choose between complying with the contraception-coverage requirement and paying significant fines, they cannot show that an injunction is necessary or appropriate to aid our jurisdiction. Even without an injunction pending appeal, the applicants may continue their challenge to the regulations in the lower courts. Following a final judgment, they may, if necessary, file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. For the foregoing reasons, the application for an injunction pending appellate review is denied. It is so ordered. [Comment: Remand to trial courts allows for extensive consideration of factual issues and applicable legal authorities, which is their primary function. Appellate courts primarily deal with errors in the law; they rarely accept new evidence and rarely weigh evidence unless it is clearly erroneous.] NLRA: clothing – dress code, messages, blanket prohibition – overly restrictive Jurisdiction: All Boch Imports, Inc., NLRB, Case No. 1-CA-83551 (1/13/14):
A blanket prohibition on "message" clothing by the car dealership was found to be overly restrictive and was ruled by the NLRB to violate the NLRA: “pins, insignias, or other message clothing which are not provided to them by the company”. FMLA: leave – geographic area, purpose – last wish – death Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit, joining First and Ninth Ballard v. Chicago Park District: Littler Mendelson FMLA Insights January 2014 article at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/viva-fmla-family-care-leave-las-vegas. Mom was terminally ill with congestive heart failure, and her last wish was to visit Las Vegas, The 7th Circuit ruled that the trip was care for her condition even though no professional medical treatment was involved because FMLA does not limit the provision of protected family care to a particular geographic location. Excerpt from the opinion: There is no question that [Beverly's mom] suffered from a covered "serious health condition," and was unable to care for her own basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or safety. There is also no question that the services [Beverly] provided her mother at home [long list of services] constituted, at the very least, physical care within the meaning of the FMLA. It follows, then, that Ballard also "cared for" her mother during their trip to Las Vegas because her mother's basic medical, hygienic, and nutritional needs did not change while she was there . . . Whistleblower: mold – health and safety
Jurisdiction: Colorado Defazio v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 13-1197 (10th Cir., 2/3/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1197.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This federal opinion involved Colorado state law applicable to employment claims of adverse employment action, firing for reporting a problem with mold. It was in federal court as a diversity of citizenship case, which is allowed when parties of different states have claims alleged to exceed $75,000 [See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diversity_jurisdiction]. Summary by the appellant court: Guy DeFazio used to work for Starwood as a general maintenance engineer at the company’s resort in Steamboat Springs. But eventually the relationship soured and he was let go. He says he company fired him in retaliation for reporting to his bosses a mold problem in the hotel. In this diversity action he seeks damages under Colorado state law for his dismissal. Handbook and promissory estoppel [opinion quotes are in reduce type]:
Public policy: As stated by the appellate court . . . Mr. DeFazio falls short, for he has failed to identify any statute, rule, or public policy implicated by his dismissal. There may be one, a future employee in his shoes may succeed in identifying one, but Mr. DeFazio has not. He did not do so in district court, and he has not done so on appeal even after being put on notice of this shortcoming. [Comment: Note that the company policy probably would be ruled as illusory and unenforceable in some jurisdictions because Starwood’s code expressly reserves the company’s right to “amend, modify or waive any provisions of the Code or our policies in our sole discretion.] Wage and Hour, Successor Liability: defunct establishment, “essentially the same business”, unpaid wages, liability Jurisdiction: Oregon Blachana, LLC, v. Bureau of Labor And Industries, No. SC S060789 (ORSC, 1/16/14):
Usually, when one business takes over a former one it is not liable for debts or other obligations of the previous business – this is predecessor- successor liability law. However, results vary depending on a variety and totality of circumstances. This somewhat surprising case held that the employer that acquired the assets of a defunct bar and restaurant in Portland was liable for unpaid wages because of these and other factors:
Summary: In this wage claim case, the issue is whether the Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) correctly determined that a business entity, Blachana, LLC, is a “successor” employer and must, therefore, reimburse BOLI for wages paid from the Wage Security Fund on behalf of four wage claimants. The employees had worked for NW Sportsbar Inc. (NW Sportsbar) before that corporation went out of business and surrendered its property and the business to Blachana. On judicial review of BOLI’s final order assigning liability to Blachana, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Blachana was not a “successor to the business” of NW Sportsbar, as that phrase is used in the wage claim statute, ORS 652.310(1). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that BOLI did not err in deciding that an entity is a successor to a business if it “conducts essentially the same business as conducted by the predecessor” or in applying that test in this case. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Defamation: TSA report, immunity exception – actual malice, pilot – outburst – gun – FFDO – anger issues Jurisdiction: All Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, No. 12-315, ____ U.S. ____ (USSC, 1/27/14); http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-315_6537.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Air Wisconsin was sued for defamation for reporting to the TSA that one of its pilots had made an outburst after failing required training. In addition, he was an FFDO authorized to carry a gun onboard. The Supreme Court reversed the $1.2M Colorado state court verdict. Syllabus: Respondent Hoeper was a pilot for petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. When Air Wisconsin stopped flying from Hoeper’s home base on aircraft that he was certified to fly, he needed to become certified on a different type of aircraft to keep his job. After Hoeper failed in his first three attempts to gain certification, Air Wisconsin agreed to give him a fourth and final chance. But he performed poorly during a required training session in a simulator. Hoeper responded angrily to this failure—raising his voice, tossing his headset, using profanity, and accusing the instructor of “railroading the situation.” The instructor called an Air Wisconsin manager, who booked Hoeper on a flight from the test location to Hoeper’s home in Denver. Several hours later, the manager discussed Hoeper’s behavior with other airline officials. The officials discussed Hoeper’s outburst, his impending termination, the history of assaults by disgruntled airline employees, and the chance that—because Hoeper was a Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO), permitted “to carry a firearm while engaged in providing air transportation,” 49 U. S. C. §44921(f)(1)—he might be armed. At the end of the meeting, an airline executive made the decision to notify the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of the situation. The manager who had received the initial report from Hoeper’s instructor made the call to the TSA. During that call, according to the jury, he made two statements: first, that Hoeper “was an FFDO who may be armed” and that the airline was “concerned about his mental stability and the whereabouts of his firearm”; and second, that an “[u]nstable pilot in [the] FFDO program was terminated today.” In response, the TSA removed Hoeper from his plane, searched him, and questioned him about the location of his gun. Hoeper eventually boarded a later flight to Denver, and Air Wisconsin fired him the next day. Hoeper sued for defamation in Colorado state court. Air Wisconsin moved for summary judgment and later for a directed verdict, relying on the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), which grants airlines and their employees immunity against civil liability for reporting suspicious behavior, 49 U. S. C. §44941(a), except where such disclosure is “made with actual knowledge that the disclosure was false, inaccurate, or misleading” or “made with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of that disclosure,” §44941(b). The trial court denied the motions and submitted the ATSA immunity question to the jury. The jury found for Hoeper on the defamation claim. The State Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the trial court erred in submitting the immunity question to the jury but that the error was harmless. Laboring under the assumption that even true statements do not qualify for ATSA immunity if they are made recklessly, the court held that Air Wisconsin was not entitled to immunity because its statements to the TSA were made with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Held: ATSA immunity may not be denied to materially true statements. Pp. 7–11. * * * FLSA: backpay – collective action, changing clothes – protective gear – donning and doffing, de minimis doctrine, union, collective bargaining agreement – CBA - 29 U. S. C. §203(o) Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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