Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: Puerto Rico
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Jurisdiction: Puerto Rico Ortiz v. Holsum of Puerto Rico, Inc., 2014 T.S.P.R. 35 (PRSC, 3/7/14, in Spanish):
Read the law firm article for a couple of reasons:
Act 59 is entitled (English version) “Act to Regulate Controlled Substances Detection Tests in the Private Work Sector”. Essentially, urine testing is the norm, and hair samples are allowed only when circumstances demonstrate urine testing is inadequate. Also, the court set forth guidance on when additional drug tests are permissible after the result of the first drug test has been shown to be inconclusive or invalid. [Comment: Puerto Rican law requires “just cause” for termination and does not recognize “at-will”. One value of this case in the U.S. is that generally the prudent human resources practice is to terminate employment only when there is demonstrable good cause. Why? Because at-will termination is hazardous; almost everyone is in a protected class and might claim discrimination. Employers who terminate for good cause, i.e., valid business and nondiscriminatory reason and documented warning and counseling, usually succeed when defending against a discrimination claim.] PR Act 44 (ADA): Law No. 44, 1 L.P.R.A. § 502, disability discrimination, no individual liability, summary judgment Jurisdiction: Puerto Rico Van Praag v. DHL Exp. (USA), Inc., No. 13-1128 (D.P.R., 3/10/14); Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/global-employment-law/puerto-ricos-ada-counterpart-law-44-does-not-provide-individual-liability. Unlike the ADA, Puerto Rico’s Act 44 does not provide for individual liability; it applies only to employers. Independent Contractor:
Jurisdiction: New Mexico Sherman v. Cimarex Energy Co., et al., No. 32,164 (NMCA, 11/25/13, certiorari denied):
Summary by the appellate court: {1} Plaintiff Larry Sherman appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants, which we refer to collectively as Cimarex. Plaintiff was injured when he fell over the handrail of a flight of stairs while working on an oil drilling rig. Plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor hired by Cimarex, sued Cimarex, the owner and operator of the well site. The district court determined that Cimarex owed no duty to Plaintiff to protect against the injury that occurred in this case. We conclude that there are issues of fact as to whether Cimarex had supervisory control over the independent contractor’s operations so as to give rise to a duty to act reasonably in exercising that control. We further determine that there are issues of fact surrounding the questions of whether Cimarex’s actions breached any duty it owed Plaintiff and whether those actions caused Plaintiff ’s injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the district court. NLRB: employee rights - activities, handbook, savings clause Jurisdiction: All First Transit, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 72 (4/2/14):
The controversy was whether the employer’s handbook policy on employee concerted activity violated the NLRA by being too narrow. Though the handbook allowed certain employee activities concerning union organization, the NLRB ruled that was too narrow because certain other activities allowed by the Act were omitted. ADA, State Law: Administrative Code of the City of N.Y. § 8–107), pneumoconiosis, accommodation – reasonable – feasibility – interactive process, summary judgment reversed Jurisdiction: New York Jacobsen v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, No. 1661678 (NYC.Ct.App., 3/27/14):
Summary by the appellate court: The issue before us is whether, on a motion for summary judgment disposing of an employee's disability discrimination claims under the New York City Human Rights Law (see Administrative Code of the City of N.Y. § 8–107) and the New York State Human Rights Law (see Executive Law § 296), an employer's failure to consider the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation for a generally qualified employee's disability via a good faith interactive process precludes the employer from obtaining summary judgment. In resolving this issue, we reiterate that the State Human Rights Law and the City Human Rights Law set forth distinct legal standards for establishing the existence of a covered disability that can be reasonably accommodated. Despite those differing standards, we conclude that both statutes generally preclude summary judgment in favor of an employer where the employer has failed to demonstrate that it responded to a disabled employee's request for a particular accommodation by engaging in a good faith interactive process regarding the feasability of that accommodation. Arbitration: parties must have agreed – unclear, FAA Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit The summary speaks directly, plainly and sensibly on when the FAA preemption applies. Howard, et al., v. Ferrellgas Partners, L.P., et al., No. 13-3061 (10th Cir., 4/8/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3061.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Everyone knows the Federal Arbitration Act favors arbitration. But before the Act’s heavy hand in favor of arbitration swings into play, the parties themselves must agree to have their disputes arbitrated. While Congress has chosen to preempt state laws that aim to channel disputes into litigation rather than arbitration, even under the FAA it remains a “fundamental principle” that “arbitration is a matter of contract,” not something to be foisted on the parties at all costs. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion , 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). What happens when it’s just not clear whether the parties opted for or against arbitration? The FAA tells district courts to “proceed summarily to the trial” of the relevant facts. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Once the facts are clear, courts must then apply state contract formation principles and decide whether or not the parties agreed to arbitrate. Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d 470, 475 (10th Cir. 2006). The object is always to decide quickly — summarily — the proper venue for the case, whether it be the courtroom or the conference room, so the parties can get on with the merits of their dispute. That much didn’t happen here. Conclusion of the court: We appreciate both sides’ evident frustration at how long this case has lingered at the transom without having entered either the door into arbitration or litigation. It’s understandable that everyone might want us to give the case a firm nudge (one way or the other) so the parties’ dispute can finally progress past preliminary venue questions to the merits. But unresolved material disputes of fact block our way — disputes that could and should have been resolved years ago according to the procedures the FAA provides. Summary-judgment-like motions practice may be a permissible and expedient way to resolve arbitrability questions when it’s clear no material disputes of fact exist and only legal questions remain. But when factual disputes may determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, the way to resolve them isn’t by round after round of discovery and motions practice. It is by proceeding summarily to trial. That is the procedure the Act requires and the parties should have undertaken a long time ago — and it is the procedure they must follow now. The district court’s denial of Ferrellgas’s motion to compel arbitration is vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. NLRB: Weingarten, representation, retaliation, veracity of notes Jurisdiction: All Murtis Taylor Human Services Systems, 360 NLRB No. 66 (3/25/14):
The Board affirmed the ALJ’s ruling that the NLRA was violated by:
“Weingarten rights” are aimed at providing due process in hearings, such as knowledge of the nature and extent of the charges, fairness, access to evidence, confronting witnesses, etc., and the right to have a representative at the hearing: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weingarten_Rights. NLRB: handbook, “Values and Standards of Behavior Policy”, protected concerted activities, non-union employer Jurisdiction: All Hills and Dales General Hospital, 360 NLRB No. 70 (4/1/14); http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45816688cc [enhanced lexis.com version]. The contention was that three provisions of the hospital’s policy were “invalid on their face” because its employees reasonably could think they were prohibited from doing certain things, i.e., activities that are protected by the NLRA. That invalidity characterization means a provision is clearly wrong when looked at, as opposed to by implication or how it is applied to a situation. Wage and Hour: California Labor Code section 229, arbitration, FAA applicability, interstate commerce required Jurisdiction: California Lane v. Francis Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. B245661 (Cal.Ct.App.2Dist.Div., 3/11/14)
Held: In order for FAA federal preemption to apply, the employer must establish that the agreement to arbitrate involves a transaction in interstate commerce, otherwise § 229 applies. Employment Contract: express – implied, wrongful discharge – public policy, breach , no evidence – summary judgment dismissal Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Stout v. Gyrodata, Inc., No. 13-1393 (10th Cir., 3/27/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1393.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary conclusion by the appellate court: On appeal, Plaintiff argues the district court erroneously made a factual determination that Gyrodata had not promised him continued employment. We disagree. The district court applied summary judgment standards to rule, correctly, that Plaintiff failed to come forward with any specific evidence creating a genuine issue as to whether Gyrodata created an implied contract of continued employment or made any related promise to, or covenant with, Plaintiff. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (describing summary judgment standards). We find no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Gyrodata on Plaintiff’s contract claims. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Arbitration: compel, agreement enforced, attach FAA rules, provide discovery Jurisdiction: California Lane v. Francis Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. B245661 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2,Div4, 3/11/14):
The arbitration agreement was enforced despite FAA rules not having been attached to the agreement and discovery not expressly provided for in it. Lane alleged eight causes of actions:
Retaliation: adverse employment action, no causation, timing Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Lawrence v. School District No. 1, in the City and County Of Denver, No. 13-1157 (10th Cir., 3/28/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1157.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Juanetta Lawrence used to work as a social worker in the Denver public school system. Each summer she’d receive her assignment for the coming school year, but in the summer of 2009 she received an assignment she didn’t want. And the assignment she did want went to a younger white woman whom Ms. Lawrence, an African-American, thought less qualified. Ms. Lawrence proceeded to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging racial discrimination. But before that claim could be resolved she found herself without any job at all. The school district and board suspended and ultimately fired Ms. Lawrence because, they said, of unsatisfactory job performance. To support their claim they produced a number of negative reviews they had received about Ms. Lawrence’s workplace conduct from a number of different schools, as well as an independent arbitrator’s judgment. Convinced that all this was really retaliation for her decision to file the EEOC complaint, Ms. Lawrence filed this lawsuit against the Denver public school district and its school board. Besides various retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, she brought other federal and state charges. But at oral argument Ms. Lawrence made clear that the only question she wishes us to decide is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the school district and board on her retaliation claims. Her failure of proof was that:
Ms. Lawrence’s complaint makes clear she received her 2009-2010 assignment before she filed her EEOC complaint. Indeed, it was that very assignment and her displeasure with it that prompted Ms. Lawrence’s EEOC complaint in the first place. According to Ms. Lawrence herself, then, it was the unfavorable work assignment that caused her protected activity, not the other way around. ACA, RFRA: Affordable Care Act – contraceptive services, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, regulations – 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) – 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv) – 76 Fed. Reg. 46621 – 46623, injunction denied, judicial economy Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit University of Notre Dame, v. Sebelius, et al., No. 13‐3853 (7th Cir., ) http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2014/D02-21/C:13-3853:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:1295328:S:0 [enhanced lexis.com version] Final paragraphs of dismissal of the appeal by the majority: We have the authority to dismiss an appeal at the appellant’s request. Fed.R.App.P. 42(b); United States v. Hagerman, 549 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2008). But it is authorization, not command. E.g., Albers v. Eli Lilly & Co., 354 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). As in the case just cited, here we have thought it “best ... to carry through so that the investment of public resources already devoted to this litigation will have some return.” So the motion has remained pending, and is now moot in light of our affirming the denial of preliminary relief to Notre Dame. On January 28 the university filed a renewed motion for an injunction pending appeal—it had filed such a motion on December 23, but we had denied that motion a week later when we ordered expedited briefing of the appeal. The sole ground for the renewed motion was the Supreme Court’s order of January 24 in the Little Sisters case. That ground was an odd one for Notre Dame to assert, because the university disagrees with the Court’s order. The Court’s order conditioned the injunction pending appeal in that case on the Little Sisters’ sending a letter to the government declaring its opposition to paying for contraceptive services—and at the oral argument of our case Notre Dame told us that it would consider sending such a letter an infringement of its religious freedom. Another distinction between that case and this one is that unlike Meritain, Little Sisters’ third‐party administrator, Christian Brothers, is a “church plan” administrator and so wouldn’t provide contraceptive services anyway, or be required to do so. We now deny the renewed motion for an injunction pending appeal as moot because the appeal has been resolved. 30 No. 13 ‐ 3853 Chief Judge Simon’s denial of preliminary relief in the district court is AFFIRMED. Arbitration: expired contract, survival clause, rebuttable presumption Jurisdiction: Sixth Circuit Huffman v. The Hilltop Companies, LLC, No. 13-3938 (6th Cir., 3/27/14):
This 6th Circuit case held that under the circumstances and facts of the case even though contract containing the arbitration clause had expired, that clause would be enforced. For cases such as this, reading both the opinion and the law firm article is essential. Summary by the appellate court: This case involves multiple individuals who were once employed by The Hilltop Companies. Each individual executed an employment agreement with Hilltop that contained both an arbitration clause and a survival clause, but the survival clause did not list the arbitration clause. At the heart of this dispute is whether the strong presumption in favor of arbitration controls, or whether the omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause in the agreement constitutes a "clear implication" that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. The district court denied Hilltop's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration on the basis that the strong presumption in favor of arbitration was rebutted. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. [Comment: One of my law professors told us, “After a while all of this will start to make sense, and that is when you need to be concerned.”] ERISA: excessive fees – third-party administrator – revenue-sharing – “properly monitor”, float, breach of fiduciary duties, judgment reduced – 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104 – 1106 – 1109 Jurisdiction: Eighth Circuit Tussey v. ABB, Inc., et al., No. 12-2056, 8th Cir., 3/19/14); http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/14/03/122056P.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The major holding was that ABB failed to heed a consultant’s advice that fees were excessive. Fiduciary diligence is insufficient if advice is not followed. Summary by the appellate court: These consolidated appeals arise from a class action led by Ronald C. Tussey, Charles E. Fisher, and Timothy Pinnell (participants) as representatives of a class of current and former employees of ABB, Inc. (ABB) who participated in two ABB retirement plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq . After a sixteen-day bench trial, the district court entered judgment against the ABB defendants and the Fidelity defendants for breaching their fiduciary duties in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1106, 1109. The ABB fiduciaries and Fidelity appeal the judgment, damages, and attorney fee award. Although the district court’s analysis was sound in many respects, the analysis was not without errors. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Taxes: severance payments, FICA, taxable wages Jurisdiction: All United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., et al. No. 12–1408, ____ U.S. ____ (3/25/14); http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-1408_6468.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Syllabus: Respondent Quality Stores, Inc., and its affiliates (collectively Quality Stores) made severance payments to employees who were involuntarily terminated as part of Quality Stores’ Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Payments—which were made pursuant to plans that did not tie payments to the receipt of state unemployment insurance—varied based on job seniority and time served. Quality Stores paid and withheld, inter alia , taxes required under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), 26 U. S. C. §3101 et seq . Later believing that the payments should not have been taxed as wages under FICA, Quality Stores sought a refund on behalf of itself and about 1,850 former employees. When the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not allow or deny the refund, Quality Stores initiated proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court, which granted summary judgment in its favor. The District Court and Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that severance payments are not wages under FICA. Held : The severance payments at issue are taxable wages for FICA purposes. Pp. 4–15. Arbitration: evidence- exclusion – expert witness, deference to agency Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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