Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: Eighth Circuit
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Jurisdiction: Eighth Circuit Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 53, No. 12-3712 (8th Cir., 5/14/14):
Summary by the appellate court: This appeal presents unusual labor arbitration issues. When an employer and employee enter into a last chance agreement (“LCA”) enforcing the employer’s drug policy without the union’s participation, the employer subsequently invokes the LCA provision mandating discharge in the event of a violation, and the union claims this discipline was contrary to the “just cause” limitation in the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), what is the appropriate standard of review (i) for the arbitrator, and (ii) for this court in reviewing the arbitrator’s award? Here, the employer is Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. (“AECI”), the union is Local 53 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (the “Union”), and the discharged employee is grievant Leo Johnson. The arbitrator upheld the grievance, awarding Johnson reinstatement and back pay, concluding the LCA did not provide Associated just cause to terminate Johnson. The district court vacated the award, concluding that the arbitrator overstepped his authority by refusing to enforce the LCA’s mandatory discharge clause. The Union appeals. We reverse and enforce all but a portion of the award. Arbitration: agreement enforcement, pleading, delay, no surprise – no prejudice Jurisdiction: California Gloster v. Sonic Automotive, Inc., et al., A137081 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist1.Div1., 5/21/14) Courts strongly favor arbitration, and this appellate court decided there was no surprise or prejudice to the litigants. Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff Sean Gloster filed an employment-related lawsuit against his former employer, defendant Melody Toyota (Melody), Melody’s parent corporation, other employees, and a third party. Although Melody and its related defendants warned Gloster prior to his filing of the lawsuit they would insist on arbitration under his employment agreement, the defendants waited until a year after the complaint was filed before petitioning the trial court to compel arbitration, filing a motion for summary judgment along with the petition. The trial court denied both the motion and the petition, reasoning defendants had waived the right to arbitration by their delay and the joinder of the third party created a risk of inconsistent rulings. We conclude the denial of the summary judgment motion is not appealable and dismiss the appeal to the extent it seeks review of this order, but we reverse the trial court’s denial of the petition to compel arbitration. SOX: whistleblower, adverse employment action, retaliation, timing – 20-month gap, not contributing factor, summary judgment dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Fourth Circuit Feldman, et al, v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp.et al., No. 13-1849 (4th Cir., 5/12/14):
Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff Paul Feldman, who asserts that he was unlawfully terminated from his employment in retaliation for protected activity under the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants Anthony Rand, James Lindsay, Joseph Jordan, Paul Briggs, and Law Enforcement Associates Corporation (“LEA”). Because we find that Feldman failed to sufficiently establish that his alleged protected activities were a contributing factor to his termination, we affirm. Wage and Hour: overtime, off-the-clock, constructive knowledge – “should have known” – “could have known”, employer’s policy – Attestation Form for Hourly Managers and Supervisors – Working Off-the-Clock Not Allowed, triable issue, class action denied, dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: California Jong v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., No. A138725 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist1.,Div3., 5/20/14):
An employer need not be omniscient, a mind reader or a super detective about work hours. The appellate court distinguished between the longstanding legal theory of “knew or should have known” and the plaintiff’s proffered theory of “could have known”. This case involves specific facts, so study it carefully. Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff Henry Jong appeals from a summary judgment entered against him in his action for unpaid overtime for alleged “off-the-clock” work as an hourly “Outpatient Pharmacy Manager” (OPM) for Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (collectively, Kaiser). He contends the trial court erroneously held his proffered evidence insufficient to create a triable issue as to whether Kaiser had actual or constructive knowledge that he was working hours in addition to those that he reported. We shall affirm the trial court’s judgment. Public Sector: removal to federal court, adverse employment action, tenure, Oklahoma Open Meetings Act, implied contract of employment, First Amendment – free speech Jurisdiction: Oklahoma law Trant v. State of Oklahoma, et al., No 13-6009 (10th Cir., 5/28/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-6009.pdf [enhanced version]. Summary by the appellate court: Dr. Collie Trant is the former Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Oklahoma. Trant joined the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner at a time the office was recovering from a series of public scandals. But Trant soon lost the confidence of the Oklahoma Board of Medicolegal Investigations, to whom he reported, and was terminated. Trant filed suit in Oklahoma state court alleging a number of claims under federal and state law in connection with his tenure and termination. Oklahoma subsequently consented to removal of the case to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Trant’s First Amendment retaliation claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed for lack of standing Trant’s claim seeking a declaratory judgment the Board violated the Oklahoma Open Meetings Act. The court also dismissed Trant’s breach of implied contract claim for failure to state a claim under Oklahoma law. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on Trant’s First Amendment claims and its dismissal of Trant’s breach of implied contract claim. Title VII: gender, evidence proof – three-step framework – McDonnell Douglas, summary judgment dismissal Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Hamilton v. Oklahoma City University, No. 12-6323 (10th Cir., 5/28/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-6323.pdf [enhanced version]. The trial court and appellate court refused to second-guess the employer’s valid, non-discriminatory reason for hiring the more qualified educator, and Hamilton failed to prove pretext. Summary by the appellate court: Dr. Anna Hamilton was teaching part-time at Oklahoma City University (“OCU”)when a full-time, tenure-track faculty position became available in its philosophy department. She applied, gave several interviews, and made the shortlist of finalists.OCU ultimately hired someone else—a man Hamilton says was unqualified for the job. She sued OCU, alleging the university had discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). OCU defended its hiring decision before the district court, arguing that Jacob Stutzman, the man it hired, was thoroughly qualified and a better fit for the position. Hamilton, in turn, asserted that OCU’s explanation for hiring Stutzman was merely pretextual. OCU sought summary judgment, which the district court granted. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, we affirm. Litigation: termination of business relationship, claims barred by preclusion – conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and alter ego, breach of contract Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Joint Technology, Inc., v. Gary Kent Weaver, Jr., et al., Nos. 13-6070 and 13-6137 (10th Cir., 5/28/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-6070.pdf [enhanced version]. Summary by the appellate court: This diversity case involves two appeals that we consolidate for procedural purposes only. Both stem from the termination of a business relationship In appeal number 13-6070, Joint Technology, Inc. (Joint), a distributor of durable medical equipment, challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Gary Kent Weaver, Jr., on Joint’s breach-of-contract claims (First Lawsuit). In appeal number 13-6157, Joint challenges the district court’s grant of Mr. Weaver’s and Weaver Medical Group, Inc.’s (collectively, Defendants’) motion to dismiss Joint’s complaint alleging conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and alter ego, as barred by claim preclusion (Second Lawsuit). Joint and Joint’s attorney also challenge the district court’s grant of Defendants’ Rule 11 motion for sanctions. See Joint Tech., Inc. v. Weaver, No. CIV-13-89-M, 2013WL 3305202, at (W.D. Okla. June 28, 2013) (sanctioning Joint’s counsel for filing a complaint that contains claims identical to the proposed amended claims denied in the First Lawsuit; namely: conversion, fraud, unjust enrichment, and alter ego). We lack jurisdiction to entertain that portion of Joint and Joint’s attorney’s appeal because the district court has not fixed the amount of fees and costs Joint’s attorney must pay. Am. Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Grp., Inc., 428 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2005). We do, however, have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.§ 1291 to review the district court’s rulings on summary judgment and the motion to dismiss, and we affirm the judgment of the district court in each appeal. Age: discrimination evidence – direct – indirect, adverse employment action reducing hours – force-out, employer’s valid reason, damages – internal grievance procedure – voidable consequences – mitigation of damages Jurisdiction: California Rosenfeld v. Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School, Inc., B239581 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2.Div3., 5/18/14):
The main point of this case is that the employee failed or refused to use her employer’s internal grievance procedure before filing her court action. Though California and federal law differ on terminology, i.e.,
the common sense legal theory is very similar – a plaintiff must take reasonable steps to lessen potential harm and damages by either avoiding a problem or decreasing its impact. Both the opinion and the article are helpful guides on that, and they good reviews of other relate legal theories and reasoning. Summary by the appellate court: In this age discrimination case, plaintiff and appellant Ruth Rosenfeld (Rosenfeld) appeals a judgment following a defense verdict in favor of her former employer, defendant and respondent Abraham Joshua Heschel Day School, Inc. (Heschel).Rosenfeld alleged Heschel repeatedly reduced her teaching hours “in an effort to force her out of her position because of her age.” Heschel attributed the reduction in Rosenfeld’s hours to a decline in student enrollment. Rosenfeld does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Her contentions relate to various evidentiary, instructional and other rulings. We affirm. At the commencement of trial, Rosenfeld filed a trial brief indicating she would be proceeding on a disparate impact theory of age discrimination, in addition to a disparate treatment theory. We hold the trial court properly precluded Rosenfeld from pursuing a disparate impact theory at trial. Disparate impact and disparate treatment are different theories of employment discrimination with different elements. Rosenfeld’s pleadings solely alleged a theory of disparate treatment, based upon intentional discrimination. Her papers were insufficient to put Heschel on notice that she intended to pursue a disparate impact theory at trial. We also conclude the trial court properly allowed Heschel to present evidence that Rosenfeld failed to pursue Heschel’s internal grievance procedure before filing suit; the evidence was relevant to mitigation of damages. It is established the “avoidable consequences doctrine applies to damage claims under the [Fair Employment and Housing Act], and that under that doctrine a plaintiff’s recoverable damages do not include those damages that the plaintiff could have avoided with reasonable effort and without undue risk, expense, or humiliation.” (State Department of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1034.) Thus, the avoidable consequences doctrine enables an employer to show that reasonable use of its internal procedures would have prevented at least some of the harm the employee suffered. (Id. at p. 1044.) Rehabilitation Act: disability, leave – duration, essential functions – unable to perform, reasonable accommodation, retaliation, 12(b)(6) – failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Hwang v. Kansas State University, No. 13-3070 (10th Cir., 5/29/14):
Dismissal affirmed. Summary by the appellate court: Must an employer allow employees more than six months’ sick leave or face liability under the Rehabilitation Act? Unsurprisingly, the answer is almost always no. * * * When it comes to satisfying her elemental obligations, Ms. Hwang’s complaint fails early on. There’s no question she’s a capable teacher, no question she’s disabled within the meaning of the Act. But there’s also no question she wasn’t able to perform the essential functions of her job even with a reasonable accommodation. By her own admission, she couldn’t work at any point or in any manner for a period spanning more than six months. It perhaps goes without saying that an employee who isn’t capable of working for so long isn’t an employee capable of performing a job’s essential functions — and that requiring an employer to keep a job open for so long doesn’t qualify as a reasonable accommodation. Adverse employment action, misconduct – assisting a hostile take-over of the company, breach of fiduciary duties, enforce arbitration, partial affirmance and dismissal Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Genberg v. Porter, et al., No. 13-1140 (10th Cir., 5/12/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1140.pdf [enhanced version] Summary by the appellate court: According to Mr. Genberg’s complaint, the trouble began when he came to suspect that Ceragenix broke the law by failing to hold required shareholder meetings. Mr. Genberg asked his friend, Joseph Salamon, to send a letter to the board of directors raising the issue. Mr. Salamon agreed and Mr. Genberg drafted an email that Mr. Salamon then sent under his name. After Ceragenix’s board received the email, the directors hired an outside attorney, Marc Redlich, to lead an internal investigation into the allegations. During his investigation, Mr. Redlich discovered that it was Mr. Genberg who ghost-wrote the letter. Mr. Redlich concluded that in doing so Mr. Genberg violated his fiduciary duties to the company, and when Mr. Redlich reported this to the board of directors it voted to terminate his employment. Of course, the board of directors offers a very different account of the relevant events, suggesting it fired Mr. Genberg only after it discovered he was assisting a hostile take-over of the company. In any event, Mr. Genberg, a lawyer re presenting himself, filed this wrongful termination lawsuit against individual members of the board of directors; Mr. Redlich; Steven Porter, the company’s Chief Executive Officer; and Jeffrey Sperber, its Chief Financial Officer. Shortly, Mr. Genberg followed up with a motion to compel arbitration on his just-filed claims, a motion aimed at all of the defendants except Mr. Redlich. Mr. Genberg filed, as well, a separate motion seeking partial summary judgment against Mr. Porter and the other members of the board. For their part, the defendants replied with motions to dismiss. In a lengthy order, the district court disposed of all these various motions. The court rejected Mr. Genberg’s argument that the individual defendants were parties to his employment agreement and so bound by its arbitration clause to take their dispute to an arbitrator rather than a court. The court then proceeded to dismiss Mr. Genberg’s claims against all the defendants save Mr. Porter. With respect to Mr. Porter the court rejected Mr. Genberg’s motion for summary judgment, finding that triable questions of fact existed. Title VII, ADEA: race, age, adverse employment action – refusal to hire, summary judgment – dismissed, abuse of process – multiple pro se filings - sanctions Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Leo v. Garmin International, Inc., No. 14-3010 (10th Cir., 5/13/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-3010.pdf [enhanced version]. This pro se claimant had previously filed several actions and appeals on claims that were dismissed as without merit, so this citation is provided primarily as information for litigators. Working Conditions: class action, collective action, certification, cash registers – checkout counters, seats - seating Jurisdiction: California Hall v. Rite Aid Corporation, D062909 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist4.Div1., 5/2/14): http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D062909.PDF [enhanced version]. Summary by the appellate court: Kristin Hall filed this action, on behalf of herself and similarly situated persons, alleging defendant Rite Aid Corporation did not provide seats to employees while the employees were operating cash registers at Rite Aid check-out counters in violation of section 14 of Wage Order 7-2001 (section 14) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070(14)), promulgated by California's Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC). Section 14 requires an employer to provide employees with suitable seats" when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §11070(14)(A).) The trial court initially granted Hall's motion for class certification. However, Rite Aid subsequently moved for decertification, citing additional evidence as well as decisions by other courts. The trial court granted Rite Aid's motion for decertification, and denied Hall's cross-motion to permit the action to proceed as a representative non class action under Labor Code section 2698 et seq. Hall appeals, contending (1) Rite Aid's decertification motion should have been denied because it was unsupported by an adequate showing of "changed circumstances"; (2) the trial court applied the wrong analytical approach and standards when it reevaluated the propriety of permitting Hall's action to proceed as a class action; (3) the trial court's order decertifying the class was based on an erroneous interpretation of section14; and (4) the court erred when it denied Hall's cross-motion to permit the action to proceed as a representative non class action under the California Labor Code Private Attorney s General Act of 2004 (PAGA ), codified in Labor Code section 2698 et seq. We conclude that, under the analytic framework promulgated by Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 ( Brinker ), the trial court erred when it decertified the class action because its decertification order was based on an assessment of the merits of Hall's theory rather than on whether the theory was amenable to class treatment. Arbitration: enforcement, Jurisdiction: California Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc., A136675 (Cal.Ct.App.Div1, Dist4., 5/15/14);
Arbitration was enforced because the parties to the agreement expressly delegated authority to the arbitrator to decide enforceability, even on the issue of whether the agreement was unconscionable. Summary by the appellate court: Several years after she was hired, Lourdes Tiri signed an agreement with her employer, Lucky Chances, Inc., requiring disputes between them to be resolved by arbitration. In one of the provisions, the parties agreed to delegate questions about the enforceability of the agreement to the arbitrator, instead of a court. Tiri was subsequently fired, and she filed a complaint in superior court for wrongful discharge. Lucky Chances petitioned to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the petition on the basis that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. Lucky Chances appeals the court’s order denying arbitration. We hold that the trial court lacked the authority to rule on the enforceability of the agreement because the parties’ delegation of this authority to the arbitrator was clear and is not revocable under state law. Accordingly, we reverse. Title VII: sex, race, third-party harasser, hostile work environment, employer liability issue, reasonable corrective action; constructive discharge, common law obstruction of justice Jurisdiction: Fourth Circuit Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corporation, (4th Cir., 5/1/14):
Summary by the appellate court: Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Lori Freeman appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Dal-Tile Corporation, on her claims of racial and sexual hostile work environment, constructive discharge , and common law obstruction of justice . For the reasons discussed more fully below, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on the hostile work environment claims and remand them for further consideration. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the claims of constructive discharge and common la w obstruction of justice. Wage and Hour, Arbitration: unconscionable, unenforceable, not translated – predominantly Hispanic workforce Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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