Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit, California
- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: California
- Jurisdiction: New Mexico
- Jurisdiction: DC Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, Oklahoma
- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, Utah
Jurisdiction: Louisiana Gulf Industries, Inc. v. Boylan, No. 2014 CA 1640 (LACA1st, 6/6/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]; Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.noncompetereport.com/files/2014/07/Gulf-Industries-Inc.-v.-Boylan1.pdf. Holding by the appellate court: . . . . [a]fter a common-sense reading of the employment agreement, we find that its employment period was not extended beyond the original termination date. While Mr. Boylan continued to work for Gulf after July 31, 2010, he no long worked under the terms of the employment agreement and was an at-will employee. When the employment period under the employment agreement terminated on July 31, 2010, Mr. Boylan then became subject to its non-compete clause for two years. The effective period of the non-compete clause ended on July 31, 2012. Break: meal/rest period, applicable law – federal preemption – state law, Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAA) Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit, California Dilts v. Penske Logistics, Inc, et., No. No. 12-55705 (9th Cir., 7/19/14):
California state law is not preempted by federal law, FAAA, governing meals and rest periods. Appellate court staff summary: Federal Preemption The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, based on federal preemption, of claims brought by a certified class of drivers alleging violations of California’s meal and rest break laws. The panel held that California’s meal and rest break laws as applied to the motor carrier defendants were not “related to” defendants’ prices, routes, or services, and therefore they were not preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994. District Judge Zouhary concurred, and wrote separately to emphasize that the defendant failed to carry its burden of proof on its preemption defense. Summary of ruling by the appellate court: Plaintiffs, a certified class of drivers employed by Defendants Penske Logistics, LLC, and Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P., appeal from a judgment dismissing their claims under California’s meal and rest break laws. The district court held on summary judgment that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”) preempts those state laws as applied to motor carriers. Reviewing de novo the interpretation and construction of the FAAAA and the question of federal preemption, Tillison v. Gregoire, 424 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005), we hold that the state laws at issue are not “related to” prices, routes, or services, and therefore are not preempted by the FAAAA. Accordingly, we reverse. Title VII: gender, adverse employment action, retaliation, wage discrimination, summary judgment dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Knitter v. Corvias Military Living, LLC, No. 13-3027 (10th Cir., 7/15/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3027.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The named defendant was neither her prospective employer nor her employer. Summary by the appellate court: Lisa Knitter worked as a “handyman” for Lewis General Contracting, Inc. (“LGC”) from March 2010 to October 2010. During this time, LGC’s sole client was Picerne Military Housing, LLC (“Picerne”), now known as Corvias Military Living, LLC. Ms. Knitter performed handyman services exclusively on Picerne properties. Ms. Knitter sued Picerne under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Ms. Knitter alleged (1) she was paid lower wages than her male counterparts and (2) Picerne effectively fired her in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment and wage discrimination. She also alleged that (3) after she was fired, Picerne denied her application for vendor status in retaliation for her prior complaints of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to Picerne, dismissing Ms. Knitter’s Title VII action because Picerne was not her employer. The district court also dismissed her claim for retaliatory denial of vendor status because Ms. Knitter did not apply for employment with Picerne when she applied to be a vendor. Ms. Knitter now appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. Wage and Hour: commissions, FLSA § 7(i) – exempt – inside sales person, California state law, class action, commissions, inside sales, minimum wage, compensation requirements Jurisdiction: California Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, No. S204804, CASC, 7/14/14):
This case was decided by the California Supreme Court pursuant its Rules of Court in response to a statutory certification request from the federal Ninth Circuit court of Appeals on an issue of state wage and hour law. It is a complex matter and studying the Shaw Valenza article will be very helpful to better understanding it. Held: " . . . an employer may not attribute commission wages paid in one pay period to other pay periods in order to satisfy California’s compensation requirements." Supreme court summary and conclusion: Susan Peabody worked for Time Warner Cable, Inc. (Time Warner), as a commissioned salesperson. She received biweekly paychecks, which included hourly wages in every pay period and commission wages approximately every other pay period. After Peabody stopped working for Time Warner, she sued, alleging various wage and hour violations. Time Warner removed the matter to federal court and successfully moved for summary judgment. Peabody appealed. At the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. (9th Cir. 2012) 689 F.3d 1134 (Peabody); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548), we consider whether an employer may attribute commission wages paid in one pay period to other pay periods in order to satisfy California’s compensation requirements. We conclude the answer is no. III. CONCLUSION In response to the Ninth Circuit’s request, we conclude that an employer may not attribute commission wages paid in one pay period to other pay periods in order to satisfy California’s compensation requirements. USERRA: 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4335, Eleventh Amendment – state sovereign immunity defense, federal war powers, certiorari granted Jurisdiction: New Mexico Ramirez v. State of New Mexico ex rel. Children, Youth and Families Department, et al., 2014-NMCA-057, Certiorari Granted, 5/1/14, No. 34,613); http://www.nmbar.org/Attorneys/lawpubs/BB/bb2014/BB071614.pdf. Cases certified to the New Mexico Supreme Court usually are not shown here because they are not final decisions. However, this case involves a major constitutional issue to track to its conclusion. NM practitioners need to stay alert for the final result. For practitioners in other jurisdictions, the result might provide persuasive authority for them. Summary by the appellate court: {1} Plaintiff, a member of the New Mexico National Guard, filed suit pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4335 (1994, as amended through 2011), against his former employer, the New Mexico Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD), following his termination. The issue presented by this appeal is whether CYFD, as an arm of the State, is entitled to constitutional state sovereign immunity in regard to Plaintiff ’s claim. Because we determine that Congress cannot override a state’s sovereign immunity when acting pursuant to its war powers and because the New Mexico Legislature has not waived the State’s sovereign immunity for USERRA suits, we conclude that CYFD is immune from Plaintiff ’s claim and accordingly reverse the district court’s contrary determination. NLRB: Flex Frac Logistics – 358 NLRB 127, adverse employment action, revised result – valid business reason Jurisdiction: All Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 360 NLRB No. 120 (5/30/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
Originally, the NLRB decided that the employee’s employment had been terminated for activities protected by the NLRA [see 358 NLRB No. 127 (2012)], and the 9th Circuit affirmed. However, the case now has a new result: firing the employee for violating the employer’s confidentiality policy did not violate the NLRA because the company had a valid business reason for keeping its client rates confidential in order to:
Wage and Hour: minimum wage exemption, Nevada Constitution Article 15 – Section 16, NRS 608.250 Jurisdiction: Nevada Thomas, et al. v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corporation, et al., No. 61681 (6/26/14): http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=29851 [enhanced lexis.com version]. 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 52 (June 26, 2014). http://www.jacksonlewis.com/media/pnc/0/media.2680.pdf. Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4892. The three constitutional exemptions from minimum wages are the only ones allowed, and the statutory ones are inapplicable. Supreme court summary: Appellant taxicab drivers brought an action in the district court claiming damages for unpaid wages pursuant to Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada Constitution, a constitutional amendment that revised Nevada's then-statutory minimum wage scheme (the Minimum Wage Amendment). The district court held that the Minimum Wage Amendment did not entirely replace the existing statutory minimum wage scheme under NRS 608.250, which in subsection 2 excepts taxicab drivers from its minimum wage provisions. We hold that the district court erred because the text of the Minimum Wage Amendment, by clearly setting out some exceptions to the minimum wage law and not others, supplants the exceptions listed in NRS 608.250(2). Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal order and remand for further proceedings on appellants' minimum wage claims. ERISA, ESOP: “employee stock ownership plan” (ESOP), defined-contribution retirement savings plan, fiduciary duty – prudence standard defined, 29 U. S. C. §1104(a)(1)(B), Jurisdiction: All Fifth Third Bancorp et al. v. Dudenhoeffer, No. 12-751 (USSC, 6/25/14):
ESOP fiduciaries are subject only to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general, and they are not entitled to any special presumption of prudence. Study the opinion and articles for details. Court staff syllabus: Petitioner Fifth Third Bancorp maintains a defined-contribution retirement savings plan for its employees. Plan participants may direct their contributions into any of a number of investment options, including an “employee stock ownership plan” (ESOP), which invests its funds primarily in Fifth Third stock. Respondents, former Fifth Third employees and ESOP participants, filed this lawsuit against petitioners, Fifth Third and several of its officers who are alleged to be fiduciaries of the ESOP. The complaint alleges that petitioners breached the fiduciary duty of prudence imposed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. §1104(a)(1)(B). Specifically, the complaint alleges that petitioners should have known—on the basis of both publicly available information and inside information available to petitioners because they were Fifth Third officers—that Fifth Third stock was overpriced and excessively risky. It further alleges that a prudent fiduciary in petitioners’ position would have responded to this information by selling off the ESOP’s holdings of Fifth Third stock, refraining from purchasing more Fifth Third stock, or disclosing the negative inside information so that the market could correct the stock’s price downward. According to the complaint, petitioners did none of these things, and the price of Fifth Third stock ultimately fell, reducing respondents’ retirement savings. The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the Sixth Circuit reversed. It concluded that ESOP fiduciaries are entitled to a “presumption of prudence” that does not apply to other ERISA fiduciaries but that the presumption is an evidentiary one and therefore does not apply at the pleading stage. The court went on to hold that the complaint stated claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Held: ESOP fiduciaries are not entitled to any special presumption of prudence. Rather, they are subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general . . . Unemployment: California’s Unemployment Insurance Code § 1256, misconduct – single act – no insubordination Jurisdiction: California Paratransit, Inc. v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Medeiros), No. S204221 (CASC, 7/3/14)
Supreme court summary: In this case, an employee refused his employer’s repeated orders to sign a written disciplinary notice, because he disputed the notice’s factual allegations and thought he was entitled to consult with his union representative first. There is no dispute over whether the employer was within its rights to fire the employee for his insubordination. The only question is whether that single act of disobedience constituted misconduct within the meaning of California’s Unemployment Insurance Code. If so, then the employee is disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Based on the undisputed facts in the administrative record, we conclude the employee’s refusal to sign the disciplinary notice was not misconduct but was, at most, a good faith error in judgment that does not disqualify him from unemployment benefits. Attorney-client Privilege: internal investigation, “obtaining or providing legal advice”, “a primary purpose” Jurisdiction: DC Circuit In re: Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., et al., No. 1:05-cv-1276 (D.C. 2014).
Understanding and promptly acting on misconduct, failure to comply with policies, procedures and other requirements is essential to preventing all sorts of problems, as well as maintaining morale and professional behavior in the workplace. Critical factors in this attorney-client privilege case were:
of the investigation. Litigation: tort – personal injury, intentional, workers’ compensation – exclusive remedy Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, Oklahoma Horton v. Holly Corporation, et al., No. 13-5057 (10th Cir., 7/10/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-5057.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Generally, state statutory workers’ compensation acts apply to injuries or death in the workplace and are the exclusive remedy for the employee, and exceptions are rare. Key concepts: . . . Although the OSHA and EPA alerts are important indicators that the company knew substantial risks existed, the “violation of government safety regulations, even if wil[l]ful and knowing, does not rise to the level of an intentional tort or an actual intent to injure.” * * * We applied Oklahoma’s substantial certainty test in Monge v. RG Petro- Machinery (Group) Co. Ltd., 701 F.3d 598 (10th Cir. 2012). That case involved a piece of safety equipment on an oil rig called a “crown saver” that the employer “was aware . . . was not operational.” Id. at 603, 608. Concluding that the employee “may have had a meritorious claim to recover for his tragic injuries outside of workers’ compensation if he were required to show that [the employer] had knowledge of foreseeable risk, high probability, or even substantial likelihood of injury,” we held that “nothing short of [the employer’s] knowledge of the substantial certainty of injury will do under” Oklahoma law. Id. at 608 (quotation and alteration omitted). We must reach the same conclusion in this case. [Comment: For an excellent example of an exception, see Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMSC/2001/2001-NMSC-034.pdf., http://law.justia.com/cases/new-mexico/supreme-court/2001/c58e.html. [enhanced lexis.com version]] Arbitration: class action, waivers, validity Jurisdiction: California Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, No. S204032 (6/23/14): http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S204032A.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Shaw Valenza law firm article at http://shawvalenza.blogspot.com/2014/06/ca-supreme-court-class-action-waivers.html. Littler Mendelson law firm http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/class-action-waivers-good-california-paga-waivers-perhaps.
Martindale article at http://www.martindale.com/securities-law/article_Burr-Forman-LLP_2168728.htm [enhanced lexis.com version] The National Law Review article at http://www.natlawreview.com/article/alabama-signals-possible-expansion-exemption-professionals-non-compete-restrictions. Alabama law excludes professionals, such as physicians, lawyers, and accountants. This appellate court case expanded the exclusion to a securities broker who was sued by his former employer on allegations of breaching a non-solicitation agreement. Marriage: same-sex, valid, Fourteenth Amendment – equal protection Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, Utah Same-sex marriage is valid in the State of Utah; to deny it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Kitchen, et al., v. Herbert, et al., No. 13-4178 (10th Cir., 6/25/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4178.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Extortion: not protected speech, SLAPP suit Jurisdiction: California Stenehjem v. Sareen, No. H038342 (Cal.Ct.App., 6/13/14): http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H038342.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Jackson Lewis Workplace Resource Center article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4877. The employee attempted to resolve his defamation claim by sending an e-mail threatening to report his employer to the U.S. Attorney and file an action under the federal False Claims Act unless the employer agreed to settle. The appellate court ruled as a matter of law that this was extortion and was not protected free speech. Public Sector: First Amendment – free speech, public employee - truthful subpoenaed testimony Jurisdiction: All The employee's sworn testimony outside the scope of his ordinary job duties, in judicial proceedings, was entitled to First Amendment protection because witnesses have sworn to tell the truth. Lane v. Franks, No. 13-483 (USSC, 6/26/14): http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-483_9o6b.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/supreme-court-rules-public-employees-sworn-testimony-protected/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=supreme-court-rules-public-employees-sworn-testimony-protected. Franczek Radelet law firm article at http://www.franczek.com/frontcenter-Lane_Franks_First_Amendment.html. Court syllabus: 1. Lane’s sworn testimony outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is entitled to First Amendment protection. Pp. 6–13. (a) Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568, requires balancing “the interests of the[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”Under the first step of the Pickering analysis, if the speech is made pursuant to the employee’s ordinary job duties, then the employee is not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes, and the inquiry ends. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421. But if the “employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern,” the inquiry turns to “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.” Id., at 418. Pp. 6–8. (b) Lane’s testimony is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Pp. 8–12. (1) Sworn testimony in judicial proceedings is a quintessential example of citizen speech for the simple reason that anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and society at large, to tell the truth. That obligation is distinct and independent from any separate obligations a testifying public employee might have to his employer. The Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far too broadly in holding that Lane did not speak as a citizen when he testified simply because he learned of the subject matter of that testimony in the course of his employment. Garcetti said nothing about speech that relates to public employment or concerns information learned in the course of that employment. The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties. Indeed, speech by public employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their employment. Pp. 9–11. (2) Whether speech is a matter of public concern turns on the “content, form, and context” of the speech. Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 147–148. Here, corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds obviously involve matters of significant public concern. See Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 425. And the form and context of the speech—sworn testimony in a judicial proceeding—fortify that conclusion. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 11–12. (c) Turning to Pickering’s second step, the employer’s side of the scale is entirely empty. Respondents do not assert, and cannot demonstrate, any government interest that tips the balance in their favor—for instance, evidence that Lane’s testimony was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed sensitive, confidential, or privileged information while testifying. Pp. 12–13. 2. Franks is entitled to qualified immunity for the claims against him in his individual capacity. The question here is whether Franks reasonably could have believed that, when he fired Lane, a government employer could fire an employee because of testimony the employee gave, under oath and outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___. At the relevant time, Eleventh Circuit precedent did not preclude Franks from holding that belief, and no decision of this Court was sufficiently clear to cast doubt on controlling Circuit precedent. Any discrepancies in Eleventh Circuit precedent only serve to highlight the dispositive point that the question was not beyond debate at the time Franks acted. Pp. 13–17. 3. The Eleventh Circuit declined to consider the District Court’s dismissal of the claims against respondent Burrow in her official capacity as CACC’s acting president, and the parties have not asked this Court to consider them here. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit as to those claims is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. P. 17. 523 Fed. Appx. 709, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. NLRB: recess appointments - defined Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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