Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: California
- Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit, Texas
Jurisdiction: Tennessee Ram Tool & Supply Co., Inc. v. HD Supply Construction Supply, Ltd., No. (TNCA, 8/19/14):
The state appellate court became the first state court to adopt the reasoning in the federal court opinion of Hauck Manufacturing Co. v. ASTEC Industries, Inc., 375 F.Supp.2d 649 (ED.TN S2004) [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: The parties in this case are competitors. The defendant company opened a branch in Nashville and began competing with the plaintiff; the defendant company hired employees away from the plaintiff and it allegedly worked with a now-former employee of the plaintiff to obtain plaintiff’s confidential information. The plaintiff filed suit alleging, among other things, breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty by unlawfully recruiting, aiding and abetting such breach, and conspiracy to unlawfully recruit. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding the plaintiff’s claims preempted by the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”). We affirm in part and reverse in part and we remand for further proceedings. Specifically, we find preempted by TUTSA, Ram Tool’s common law breach of fiduciary duty/loyalty claim–and its derivative claims–insofar as they are based upon the misappropriation of trade secrets. However, we find Ram Tool’s common law breach of fiduciary duty/loyalty claim–and its derivative claims–insofar as they are not grounded in the misappropriation of trade secrets, are not preempted by TUTSA; summary judgment was improperly granted as to these claims. Title VII: sex discrimination, adverse employment actions – promotions, disparate impact, disparate treatment, class action – similarly situated, statistical evidence – expert testimony, summary judgment dismissal Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Tabor, et al. v. Hilti, Inc., et al., No. (10th Cir., 9/2/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-5114.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case provides a good examination of a number of factors considered by the trial and appellate courts in concluding that the claims of the two female employees failed for lack of sufficient evidence showing discrimination and/or proof of it. Issues [from the opinion – edited for ease of reading]:
Summary by the appellate court: Ronica R. Tabor and Dacia S. Gray filed claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging sex discrimination by Hilti, Inc. and Hilti of America, Inc. (collectively, Hilti). Ms. Tabor appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of Hilti, following separate bench and jury trials on her claims asserting disparate impact and disparate treatment. Ms. Gray appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Hilti on her disparate impact claim. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. ADA: Section III
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Is a popular national clothing retailer subject to the public access provisions of the Act? Though not an employment law case, it might be of interest to employers on related issues of disability discrimination. Summary by the appellate court: Defendants–Appellants Abercrombie & Fitch Co., Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., and J.M. Hollister LLC, d/b/a Hollister Co. (collectively, Abercrombie)1 appeal from several orders by the district court holding that Hollister clothing stores violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). First, Abercrombie challenges the district court’s holding that the Plaintiffs have Article III standing. See Colo. Cross-Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 957 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1277 (D. Colo. 2013). Second, it challenges the court’s certification of a nationwide class of disabled persons who shop at Hollister stores. See Colo. Cross-Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 09-cv-02757, 2012 WL 1378531 (D. Colo. 2012). Third, it challenges the court’s holding that entrances at many Hollister stores violate Title III of the ADA. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1283. Finally, it challenges the court’s entry of a permanent injunction remedying those violations. See Colo. Cross-Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 09-cv-02757, 2013 WL 6050011 (D. Colo. 2013). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. Arbitration: class action decision – arbitrator decides Jurisdiction: California Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., No. B244412 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2.Div7, 7/22/14): http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B244412.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/california-court-determines-arbitrator-must-decide-whether-class-claims-are-subject-to-arbitration-agreement/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=california-court-determines-arbitrator-must-decide-whether-class-claims-are-subject-to-arbitration-agreement. The employee signed an arbitration agreement. He sued alleging individual claims as well as class action claims. The trial court ordered him to take his individual claims to arbitration, and the arbitrator was to decide if the class claims were also to be arbitrated. Summary by the appellate court: In this class action, plaintiff Timothy Sandquist purports to appeal from the trial court’s August 14, 2012 order granting defendants’ motion to compel him to arbitrate his individual claims, as well as defendants’ motion to dismiss all class claims without prejudice. Although this order is not appealable, we liberally construe Sandquist’s notice of appeal to include the trial court’s October 5, 2012 order dismissing his class claims with prejudice, which is appealable under the death knell doctrine. Limiting our review to Sandquist’s challenges to the order dismissing the class claims, we agree with Sandquist that the trial court erred by deciding the issue whether the parties agreed to class arbitration, and that the court should have submitted the issue to the arbitrator. Therefore, we reverse. Non-Competition: enforcement, continued employment – insufficient consideration Jurisdiction: Kentucky Creech, Inc. v. Brown, No. 2012-SC-000651-DG (KYSC, 6/19/14):
Continued employment alone is insufficient consideration to support an agreement not to compete. The employee had been with the company 18 years. Important factors:
Public Sector, Civil Rights: 42 U.S.C. § 1983, adverse employment action – demotion, procedural due process, personally responsible, statute of limitations, summary judgment dismissal, state law claims – continuing jurisdiction denied Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Robbin v. City of Santa Fe, et al., No. 13-2030 (10th Cir., 9/3/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2030.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, with related state law claims, brought by former Police Captain Anthony Robbin, who claims that his constitutional procedural due process rights were violated when he was demoted from the rank of captain at the Santa Fe, New Mexico Police Department without proper procedural protections. We agree with the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of then-Acting City Manager Galen Buller. Mr. Robbin did not state a §1983 claim against Mr. Buller because he did not show that Mr. Buller was personally responsible for Mr. Robbin’s deprivation, and alternatively, the statute of limitations had run on Mr. Robbin’s claims against Mr. Buller. We uphold the district court’s grant of summary judgment for then-Interim Police Chief Ray Rael, on the grounds of qualified immunity, because a reasonable official could have concluded that Mr. Robbin was an exempt officer without the procedural protections Mr. Robbin claims he was due, and because Mr. Robbin forfeited his argument that Defendant Rael acted without the authority under municipal law to demote exempt employees. We thus AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to these two defendants, and given that conclusion, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision not to retain jurisdiction over Mr. Robbin’s state law claims. Intentional infliction of Emotional Distress: workers’ compensation – preemption Jurisdiction: California Yau v. Santa Margarita Ford, Inc., et al., G048013 consol. w/G048343 (Cal.Ct.Dist4,Div3, 8/26/14):
This opinion affirmed in part and reversed in part judgments of the Superior Court of Orange County, and remanded [returned] the case for further proceeding. The important factor here that no cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is available separate from the wrongful termination claim. California workers’ compensation law covers physical and emotional injuries sustained in the course and scope of employment, which means that law generally preempts such independent causes of action. From the opinion [edited for ease of reading]: EDDIE Yau filed a complaint against his former employer, Santa Margarita Ford, alleging a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Yau alleged he was terminated after complaining to Santa Margarita Ford’s management about fraudulent warranty repair claims being submitted to Ford Motor Company (Ford). Yau also alleged an intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action against individual defendants who were his coworkers and supervisors, and the owner of Santa Margarita Ford. The trial court sustained demurrers without leave to amend and dismissed the action, entering separate judgments for Santa Margarita Ford and the individual defendants. We conclude Yau adequately pleaded his wrongful termination cause of action and therefore the judgment in favor of Santa Margarita Ford must be reversed and the matter remanded as to that cause of action. We conclude the trial court correctly dismissed the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, and the judgment in favor of the individual defendants is affirmed. Non-compete, Confidentiality: entirely superseding – subsequent agreement –prior term, mutual mistake rejected Jurisdiction: Georgia Mapei Corporation v. Prosser, A14A0368 (Ga.Ct.App.Div2, 7/9/14):
The subsequent agreement omitted the covenant not to compete, and thus the employer’s claim failed. Summary by the appellate court: MAPEI Corporation sued former employee Stephen Prosser for violation of a contractual non-compete covenant. Finding that the agreement containing that noncompete covenant had been superseded by a subsequent agreement which covered substantially the same subject matter, contained a superseding-agreement clause, but omitted the non-compete covenant, the trial court granted summary judgment to Prosser. MAPEI appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the agreement omitting the non-compete covenant superseded the agreement containing that covenant. Specifically MAPEI argues that the agreement containing the noncompete covenant was revived by Prosser’s subsequent conduct: by his delivery to MAPEI’s representative of the previously-executed agreement containing the non compete covenant or by his acceptance of compensation. Alternatively MAPEI invokes the doctrine of mutual mistake. And it argues that, even if most of the agreement containing the non-compete covenant is superceded, the non-compete covenant itself survives. We are not persuaded. We find this case to be controlled by the fundamental principle that a contract is formed upon the parties’ assent to its terms. OCGA §§ 13-3-1, 13-3-2. We agree with the trial court that Prosser’s execution of the agreement omitting the non-compete covenant created a contract entirely superseding the one containing that covenant, and we therefore affirm. FEHBA: Federal Employees Health Benefits Act – 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914, lack of jurisdiction Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Porta v. United States Office Of Personnel Management, No. 13-2207 (10th Cir., 9/4/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]; Factors involved:
Summary judgment dismissal affirmed. FMLA: attendance policy, adverse employment action, rights – interference, retaliation
Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Group, No. No. 13-3391 (7th Cir., 8/18/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
If an employee’s condition is questionable, uncertain, or may be changing significantly, prudent employers proceed cautiously. The FMLA allows recertification. Read this case and the articles for good pointers and considerations when FMLA status and rights are uncertain or ambiguous. Summary by the appellate court: James Hansen sued his former employer, Marinette Marine Corporation, and its parent company, Fincantieri Marine Group, LLC (collectively FMG) in federal district court in Wisconsin, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA or Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654. He claims that FMG interfered with his rights under the FMLA and terminated his employment in retaliation for his exercise of rights under the Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of FMG. The court ruled that without expert testimony Hansen could not show that his serious health condition rendered him unable to work (i.e., perform one or more of the essential functions of his position) during the absences for which he claims he was entitled to FMLA leave and for which he was terminated, and Hansen had no such testimony. Because the law does not require a plaintiff to present expert testimony as to his incapacity, and Hansen's evidence has raised a genuine issue of material fact for trial, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Negligence: company email – death threats, failure to monitor usage Jurisdiction: Illinois Regions Bank v. Joyce Meyer Ministries, Inc., No. 5-13-0193 (ILCA5th, 08/12/14):
An employee had been posting death threats to his family from his work computer. The appellate court ordered the employer to stand trial on wrongful death claims alleging inadequate monitoring of employees’ usage the employer’s equipment and systems. [Comment: In addition to this set of facts, monitoring usage can turn up harassment, disclosure of trade secrets, viewing pornography, etc. Monitoring needs to be disclosed, and developing a policy needs to be done with competent legal technological and assistance. Also keep in mind recent NLRB rulings in NLRA § 7 rights.] NLRB: threats, inconsistent - adverse employment action – discipline, disparate impact, timing, unfair labor practice (ULP) charge Jurisdiction: All Nichols Aluminum, LLC and Teamsters Local Union No. 371, NLRB
If an employee made a throat slashing motion to a coworker, could that be the basis for terminating employment? The facts are complex and need to be studied carefully. The keys to the decision were:
This case also is a clear example of the ramifications of inconsistently applying company policies. Had the Company been more consistent in its application of the zero tolerance policy, the Board would not have been able to point to it as evidence of disparate treatment in Bandy’s situation. Wage and Hour: class action collective action – denied, meal breaks – short, skipped, late, insufficient evidence Jurisdiction: California Ordonez v. RadioShack, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-07060-CAS(JCGx) (USDCCent, 8/15/14):
This is the second denial. The first was based on lack of evidence on the critical liability question of why breaks were skipped, late or short and should be considered on class-wide basis. The law firm article provides a comprehensive discussion of the issues, and the trial court’s introduction covers statutory provisions involved. Introduction by the trial court: On May 26, 2010, plaintiff Daniel Ordonez filed this putative class action in Los Angeles County Superior Court against defendant RadioShack, Inc. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated current and former non-exempt employees of defendant, seeks to recover wages and penalties resulting from various violations of the California Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code. Defendant removed this action to federal court on September 22, 2010. Dkt. #1. The operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges the following claims: (1) failure to provide required meal periods in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 226.7 and IWC Order 4-2001(11); (2) failure to provide required rest periods in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 226.7 and IWC Order 4-2001(12); (3) failure to pay overtime compensation in violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 226, 510, 1194, 1197 and IWC Order 4; (4) failure to pay minimum wages in violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 226, 510, 1194, 1197 and IWC Order 4; (5) failure to maintain required records in violation of Cal. Labor Code § 1174, 1174.5 and IWC Order 4-2001(7); (6) failure to pay all wages due to discharged or quitting employees in violation of Cal. Labor Code §§ 201, 202, 203; (7) unlawful collection or receipt of wages previously paid and failure to indemnify for expenditures in discharge of duties, pursuant to Cal. Labor Code §§ 221 and 2802 and Wage Order 7-2001; (8) unfair business practices pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq.; and (9) representative action for civil penalties pursuant to Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698-2699.5. FLSA: collective action, overtime, arbitration agreement, coerced, unconscionable, unenforceable, court decides Jurisdiction: Eleventh Circuit Billingsley, et al. v Citi Trends, Inc., No. 13-12561 (11th Cir., 3/25/14):
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the arbitration agreement had been coerced and was thus unenforceable. Litigation: removal – federal court, proper pleading Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit, Texas Davoodi v. Austin Independent School District, No. 13-50824 (6/16/14):
By attaching the EEOC claim form to the plaintiff’s complaint and fully incorporating it therein, the appellate court ruled that sufficient grounds for removal to federal trial court had been pled. The law firm article explains why the appellate court so ruled and details why proper pleading is so very important in the State of Texas. Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff-Appellant Mostafa Davoodi appeals the removal of his lawsuit from Texas state court and the dismissal of his entire lawsuit by the district court. We hold that removal from Texas state court was proper. But because the district court gave no notice to Davoodi before its sua sponte dismissal of his state law discriminatory termination claim, we VACATE the dismissal of that claim and REMAND. Title VII, FMLA: religion, practice defined, no retaliation Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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