Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
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Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Lammle v. Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corporation, No. 13-1458 (10th Cir., 9/30/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1458.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case involving two extended leaves of absence due to illness prior to termination of employment primarily involves issues of interest to litigators. ADA: return-to-work (RTW) certificate –“no restrictions”, essential functions, deficient RTW work certification process
Jurisdiction: Third Circuit Budhun v. Reading Hospital and Medical Center, No. 11-4625 (3rd., 8/27/14):
Key factors:
This law firm article provides a good discussion of the situation, especially in its detailed five Insights for Employers. Summary by the appellate court: Vanessa Budhun appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to her employer, The Reading Hospital and Medical Center (“Reading”) on her Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2691, et seq., interference and retaliation claims. She also appeals the District Court’s denial of her motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the judgment of the District Court with respect to her FMLA claims and affirm the District Court’s denial of her motion for leave to amend her complaint. Unemployment Benefits: denied, dishonesty, break times exceeded, time records – false entries, Code of Regulations, title 22, section 1256-34, subdivision (a) Jurisdiction: California Irving v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, No. 243417 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2.Div1., 9/12/14):
‘“Dishonesty’ includes such acts and statements as lying, theft, making false entries on records, and other actions showing a lack of truthfulness and integrity. . . .” Introduction by the appellate court: The real party in interest, the Los Angeles Unified School District (the district), appeals from an order granting a mandate petition filed by plaintiff, Jim L. Irving. Defendant, the California Unemployment Appeals Board (the board), after an administrative hearing, refused to grant plaintiff unemployment compensation benefits pursuant to Unemployment Insurance Code section 1256.1 The trial court issued a writ of mandate directing that plaintiff receive unemployment compensation benefits. We conclude plaintiff’s actions in exceeding his break times on four separate occasions and then falsifying his time sheets constitutes misconduct within the meaning of section 1256. Because he committed misconduct within the meaning of section 1256, he may not receive unemployment compensation benefits. Thus, the judgment issuing the writ of mandate must be reversed. Litigation: dismissal, claim splitting – additional claims not in prior action – employment discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Juarez-Galvan v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 14-3027 (10th Cir., 9/17/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-3027.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. All possible claims must be stated in one action, not raised later in piecemeal litigation. Summary by the appellate court: Gustavo Juarez-Galvan appeals the district court’s order dismissing his claims of employment discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment because they should have been included in a prior action Mr. Juarez-Galvan filed against his employer, see Juarez-Galvan v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 13-3118, 2014 WL 3585735 (10th Cir. July 22, 2014) (unpublished) (Juarez-Galvan I). The district court concluded that Mr. Juarez-Galvan’s attempt to bring additional claims in a second lawsuit was improper claim-splitting. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. Whistleblower: retaliation, extent of protection - Labor Code Section 1102.5(b), evidence – back pay – front pay Jurisdiction: California Hager v. County of Los Angeles, No. B238277 (Cal.Ct.App.Disst2,Div3., 8/19/14):
Summary by the appellate court: In a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit brought under Labor Code section 1102.5, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 1102.5(b)),1 the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The plaintiff must show he engaged in protected activity, his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action, and there is a causal link between the two. If the plaintiff meets his prima facie burden, the defendant has the burden to prove a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for its actions. To prevail, the plaintiff has to show that the explanation is a pretext for the retaliation. (Patten v. Grant Joint Union High School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1384.) In Hager v. County of Los Angeles ((Apr. 22, 2010, B208941) [nonpub. opn.]) (Hager I), we held that plaintiff Darren Hager could pursue his whistleblower retaliation lawsuit against his employers, defendants the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (collectively, County). The County appeals from a judgment entered after a substantial jury verdict in Hager’s favor. Hager appeals from the postjudgment order denying his request for attorney fees. The County’s principal contentions on appeal address two errors with respect to the parties’ burdens of proof. The County contends Hager did not prove that he engaged in a protected activity to establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation (§ 1102.5(b)) because he did not “disclose information,” as that term has been defined in Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Community College Dist. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 832, 858-859 (Mize-Kurzman). The County also contends the trial court erred in relying on the Public All further undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code. Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.) to exclude the County’s evidence of past conduct not included as a basis to terminate Hager during the administrative proceedings but presented in this civil action as additional reasons to support its decision to terminate Hager. The County also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the damages award, raises evidentiary errors, and asserts juror misconduct. We initially affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of past conduct and there was no substantial evidence to support the economic damages awarded to Hager. The County and Hager petitioned for rehearing. The County argued in its petition that we affirmed the exclusion of evidence of its undisclosed reasons to terminate Hager by improperly relying on Evidence Code section 352 without any support in the record that the trial court engaged in balancing the probative value of this evidence against the prejudicial impact. Hager argued in his petition that we omitted key facts that his termination constituted a “blot on his resume” and significantly impaired his future earning capacity, which is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s award of economic damages. We granted the petitions for rehearing to address these issues. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of undisclosed reasons for terminating Hager. The record contains affirmative indications the trial court considered and understood that the introduction of undisclosed reasons for the decision to terminate Hager was not relevant and was prejudicial. We further conclude there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s award of economic damages. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the judgment, but in all other respects we affirm. We also affirm the order denying Hager’s motion for attorney fees. NLRB: bargaining – bad faith – union negotiating costs Jurisdiction: All Hospital of Barstow, Inc. d/b/a Barstow Community Hospital and California Nurses Association/ National Nurses Organizing Committee (CNA/NNOC), AFL–CIO, 361 NLRB No. 34 (8/29/14):
Bargaining in bad faith cost the hospital a ruling requiring it to pay the union’s costs of successfully negotiating a favorable resolution. [Note: This is not an unusual result. Charging cost to an unsuccessful party encourages good faith in litigation and negotiation, and it is part of many court civil procedural rules.] Right-to- Work: continuing litigation – no final answers yet Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit, Indiana Sweeney, et al., v. Pence, No. 13‐1264 (7th Cir., 9/2/14):
This is a hotly contested area of the law and the litigation continues in both federal and state courts. Litigators should study the law firm article any other such resources. Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiff‐Appellants, members and officers of the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL‐CIO (“the Union”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their suit, arguing that the Indiana Right to Work Act violates their rights under the United States Constitution and is preempted by federal labor legislation. Because the legislation is not preempted by the scheme of federal labor law and does not violate any constitutional rights, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the suit. Title VII: discrimination – race, adverse employment action – reduced responsibilities, dismissal – FRCP 12(b)(6) Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit Thompson v. City of Waco, No. 13-50718, (5th Cir., 9/3/14):
Summary by the appellate court: Allen Thompson sued the City of Waco for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The district court dismissed Thompson’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), holding that Thompson failed to allege an adverse employment action. Because Thompson plausibly alleges that he was subject to the equivalent of a demotion, we reverse the district court’s judgment. Thompson is an African American detective in the Waco Police Department. The Department suspended Thompson and two white detectives based on allegations that they had falsified time sheets. After reinstating the three detectives, the Department imposed written restrictions on Thompson that it did not impose on the two white detectives. The restrictions state that Thompson cannot (1) search for evidence without supervision; (2) log evidence; (3) work in an undercover capacity; (4) be an affiant in a criminal case; (5) be the evidence officer at a crime scene; and (6) be a lead investigator on an investigation. According to Thompson, these restrictions have stripped him of the “integral and material responsibilities of a detective,” and constitute a demotion. Thompson alleges that he “no longer functions as a full-fledged detective; he is, effectively, an assistant to other detectives.” He further alleges that his new position has “significantly different and diminished material responsibilities,” is less prestigious, will hinder his opportunities for advancement, and is less interesting. He no longer uses the skills, education, and experience that he had acquired and regularly used as a detective. * * * Because Thompson plausibly alleges an adverse employment action, we REVERSE the district court's judgment and REMAND for further proceedings. Wage and Hour: prevailing wage - Labor Code § 1771, fabrication location, Russ-Will
Summary by the appellate court: California’s prevailing wage law generally requires that workers employed on public works be paid the local prevailing wage for work of a similar character. (Lab. Code,1 § 1771.) The question presented by this appeal is whether the prevailing wage law applies to an employee of a subcontractor who fabricates materials for a public works project at a permanent, offsite manufacturing facility that is not exclusively dedicated to the project. We conclude that California law does not require the prevailing wage to be paid to the employee in this circumstance. ATCA: Alien Tort Claims Act, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Sarei v. Rio Tinto, child slaves – harvest cocoa – Ivory Coast, pleading – state a claim – amendments Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc. et al., (9th Cir.):
This is a complex and evolving area of the law. ATCA litigators and practitioners should study the cases and article. Summary by the appellate court staff: Alien Tort Statute The panel withdrew its order filed December 19, 2013, and appearing at 738 F.3d 1048, and replaced the order with an opinion reversing and vacating the district court’s dismissal of an action under the Alien Tort Statute. The action was brought by former child slaves who were forced to harvest cocoa in the Ivory Coast. They alleged that the defendant corporations aided and abetted child slavery by providing assistance to Ivorian farmers. Reaffirming the corporate liability analysis reached by an en banc court in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds by 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013), the panel held that there is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or liability. Rather, for each ATS claim asserted by the plaintiffs, a court should look to international law and determine whether corporations are subject to the norms underlying that claim. The panel held that the prohibition against slavery was universal and could be asserted against the corporate defendants in this case. The panel held that determining when a corporation can be held liable requires a court to apply customary international law to determine the nature and scope of the norm underlying the plaintiffs’ claim, and domestic tort law to determine whether recovery from the corporation is permissible. The panel left domestic law issues related to corporate liability to be addressed by the district court in the first instance. The panel next addressed the issue whether the complaint alleged the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slavery. Applying customary international law, the panel declined to decide whether the required mens rea was knowledge, or whether an ATS defendant must act with the purpose of facilitating the criminal act. The panel concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations satisfied the more stringent “purpose” standard by suggesting that a myopic focus on profit over human welfare drove the defendants to act with the purpose of obtaining the cheapest cocoa possible, even if it meant facilitating child slavery. The panel held that the actus reus of aiding and abetting was providing assistance or other forms of support to the commission of a crime, and that international law further required that the assistance offered must be substantial. The panel declined to decide whether the assistance must also be specifically directed towards the commission of the crime. Instead, it remanded to the district court with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of recent decisions of international criminal tribunals addressing the “specific direction” requirement. The panel also declined to decide whether the plaintiffs’ ATS claim sought an extraterritorial application of federal law that was barred by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). The panel remanded to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of Kiobel. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Rawlinson wrote that she did not object to remanding to allow the plaintiffs to further amend their complaint in an attempt to state a cause of action under the ATS, as recently interpreted by the Supreme Court in Kiobel. She also agreed that corporations are not per se excluded from liability under the ATS. Unlike the majority, Judge Rawlinson, agreeing with the Second and Fourth Circuits, would definitely and unequivocally decide that the purpose standard applies to the pleading of aiding and abetting liability under the ATS. She dissented from any holding that the plaintiffs had adequately stated a claim under the ATS. Religion: First Amendment – immunity from suit – church autonomy doctrine, Celnik v. Congregation B’Nai Israel, NMRA 1-012(B)(6) – failure to state a claim, Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., rooted in religious belief Jurisdiction: New Mexico Reeve, et al., v. Texico Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists, No. 32,625 (NMCA, 5/28/14);
Claims of constitutional protections of religion must be rooted in religious belief. Summary by the appellate court: {1} Melissa Galetti (Plaintiff) appeals from the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 1-012(B) (6) NMRA. The district court dismissed Plaintiff ’s complaint against the Texico Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists (the Conference), Derral W. Reeve, Kim Gillen, and Brenda Conyne because it concluded that Defendants are immune from suit pursuant to the church autonomy doctrine, which is based on the First Amendment. See Celnik v. Congregation B’Nai Israel, 2006-NMCA-039, ¶¶ 10-11, 139 N.M. 252, 131 P.3d 102. We conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff ’s complaint. The First Amendment does not immunize every legal claim against a religious institution or its members, but only those claims that are rooted in religious belief. See id.; see also Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648, 657 (10th Cir. 2002). As pled, Plaintiff ’s claims are not rooted in religious belief and thus do not implicate the First Amendment as a matter of law. We reverse the dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint and remand for further proceedings. Workplace Safety: OSHA – preemption, California Unfair Competition Law – Business and Professions Code § 17200 Jurisdiction: California Solus Industrial Innovations LLC v. Superior Court, No. G047661(Cal.Ct.App.Dist4.Div3., 9/22/14):
As broad as the UCL is, if a plaintiff can prove unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent acts were committed, then injunctive relief and restitution are available. However, in this case the appellate found that OSHA preempted California law. Summary by the appellate court: In this case we are called on to determine whether federal law preempts the effort by a district attorney to recover civil penalties under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) based on an employer’s alleged violation of workplace safety standards. Petitioners Solus Industrial Innovations, Emerson Power Transmission Corp., and Emerson Electric Co. (collectively Solus) contend the trial court erred by overruling their demurrer to two causes of action filed against them by Respondent, the Orange County District Attorney, alleging a right to recover such penalties. Solus argues that federal workplace safety law (Fed/OSHA) preempts any state law workplace safety enforcement mechanism which has not been specifically incorporated into the state workplace safety plan approved by the U.S. Secretary of Labor (the Secretary). Ruling of the appellate court: In light of our determination that state regulation of workplace safety standards is explicitly preempted by federal law under the OSH Act, and that consequently California is entitled to exercise its regulatory power only in accordance with the terms of its federally approved workplace safety plan, we conclude the district attorney cannot presently rely on the UCL to provide an additional means of penalizing an employer for its violation of workplace safety standards. As can be seen from the these two excerpts, practitioners and litigators need to study the case and the law firm article for a detailed explanation of how the appellate court analyzed the intricacies of California law in reaching its decision. Title VII, ADEA, EPA: adverse employment action, litigation issues
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