Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs


Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit



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Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
Davis v. Fort Bend County, No. 13-20610 (5th Cir., 8/26/14):

  • http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/13/13-20610-CV0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Ogletree Dekins law firm article at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/what-is-a-sincere-religious-belief-the-fifth-circuit-weighs-in-on-a-religious-discrimination-claim/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=what-is-a-sincere-religious-belief-the-fifth-circuit-weighs-in-on-a-religious-discrimination-claim.

Missing work to attend a groundbreaking ceremony for the new church was not an activity to be elevated to the level of a religious practice. The employee was a critically important member of county’s computer operations team.


Important factors stated by the appellate court:
In March 2011, Fort Bend prepared to install personal computers, network components, and audiovisual equipment into its newly built Fort Bend County Justice Center. All technical support employees, including Davis, were involved in the process. As the Desktop Support Supervisor, Davis and her team were to “assist with the testing of the computers [and] make sure all of the computers had been set up properly.” The installation was scheduled for the weekend of July 4, 2011, and all employees were required to be present.
On June 28, 2011, Davis informed Ford that she would not be available to work the morning of Sunday July 3, 2011, allegedly “due to a previous religious commitment.” Davis testified that “[i]t was a special church service, and that I needed to be off that Sunday[,] . . . but I would be more than willing to come in after church services.” Davis also testified that she had arranged for a replacement during her absence, as she had done in the past. Ford did not approve her absence, stating that it “would be grounds for a write-up or termination.” After Davis attended her church event and did not report to work, Fort Bend terminated Davis’s employment.
NLRB: no strike, lockout, permanent replacements, backpay, promises – materially affect negotiations
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
Teamsters Local Union No. 455 v. National Labor Relations Board, Harborlite Corporation, Intervenor, No. 12-9519 (10th Cir., 8/27/14) [enhanced lexis.com version];
Summary by the appellate court:
What happens when company and union can’t come to terms? Sometimes the union might wish to strike, but sometimes not. What happens then — when the union prefers work to continue? Under Supreme Court precedent employers are often permitted to “lock out” the employees and hire temporary replacement workers until a collective bargaining agreement is reached. But what happens if the employer threatens to hire permanent replacements? Does this violate the law, even if the employer doesn’t carry through on the threat and quickly retreats from it? The National Labor Relations Board thought so. It ordered Harborlite to desist from future threats and to post a notice promising its employees that much. But the Teamsters wanted the Board to go further — to hold not only the threat unlawful but also the entire lockout, and to award the employees backpay. This much the Board declined to do, finding that the company’s short-lived threat didn’t materially affect negotiations during the lockout, which in any case ended with Harborlite retreating. It is this decision the union now asks us to undo, but one we find we cannot.
Independent Contractor: misclassification
Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit
Alexander, et al., v. Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., DBA FedEx Home Delivery, No. 12-17458 (9th Cir., 8/27/14): http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2014/08/27/12-17458.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]
and
Slayman, et al., Fedex Ground Package System, Inc., DBA FedEx Home Delivery, No. 12-35525 (9th Cir., 8/27/14): http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2014/08/27/12-35525.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Check online for subsequent law firm articles – www.elinfonet.com is an excellent resource.
These two cases denied independent contractor classification. Their reasoning might well be adopted by other courts as persuasive on these kinds of facts. The appellate judges examined the nature and extent of control exercised by the employer of the details of the work to be performed, ho, when, wearing what, etc. Considering the large number of cases setting forth the factors for determining independent contractor status, these two 9th Circuit cases are not a surprise.
Summary by the appellate court in Alexander:
As a central part of its business, FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (“FedEx”), contracts with drivers to deliver packages to its customers. The drivers must wear FedEx uniforms, drive FedEx-approved vehicles, and groom themselves according to FedEx’s appearance standards. FedEx tells its drivers what packages to deliver, on what days, and at what times. Although drivers may operate multiple delivery routes and hire third parties to help perform their work, they may do so only with FedEx’s consent.
FedEx contends its drivers are independent contractors under California law. Plaintiffs, a class of FedEx drivers in California, contend they are employees. We agree with plaintiffs.
Summary by the appellate court staff in Slayman:
As a central part of its business, FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (“FedEx”), contracts with drivers to deliver packages to its customers. The drivers must wear FedEx uniforms, drive FedEx-approved vehicles, and groom themselves according to FedEx’s appearance standards. FedEx tells its drivers what packages to deliver, on what days, and at what times. Although drivers may operate multiple delivery routes and hire third parties to help perform work on those routes, they may do so only with FedEx’s consent.
FedEx contends its drivers are independent contractors under Oregon law. Plaintiffs, two classes of FedEx drivers in Oregon, contend they are employees. We agree with plaintiffs.
Litigation: most convenient forum – convenience – forum non conveniens, company headquarters, FLSA collective action
Jurisdictions: Tennessee, New Jersey

Dantes v. Indecomm Holdings, Inc., d/b/a Indecomm Global Services, No. 1:13-CV-1290-JDB-egb (W.D.Tenn., 8/11/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115348.

  • Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4937 .

In the interest of justice and convenience of the parties and witnesses, the trial was transferred from Tennessee to New Jersey, where the company headquarters are located


Litigation: forum, selection clause enforced – properly drafted, transfer denied, franchise – non-compete
Jurisdiction: F\Pennsylvania federal trial court
AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Romano, No. 13-5747 (E. D. Penn. Aug. 21, 2014) [enhanced lexis.com version]. Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.noncompetereport.com/2014/08/27/pennsylvania-court-enforces-forum-selection-clause-in-franchise-non-compete-against-florida-based-defendant-and-his-non-signatory-wife/.
FMLA: notice – proof of delivery and receipt, mailbox rule, interference, retaliation
Jurisdiction: Third Circuit
Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc., No. 13-1843 (3rd Cir., 8/5/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131843p.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/when-it-comes-fmla-notice%E2%80%94-post-office-may-not-deliver-you-third-circu.

In the 3rd Circuit an employer now must prove that it provided the statutorily required FMLA notice of rights to every employee by a method that is traceable – merely showing it was sent by first-class mail is insufficient. Employers will now need to consider methods such as Certified Mail, FedEx, agreed email with Return Receipt option, etc.


The employee denied she had ever received such notice that the employer stated had been sent by First Class Mail.
What is involved here is the “Mailbox Rule”, a common law legal theory that has been around for a very long time. It’s now been reexamined in light of modern realities.
Description by the appellate court:
The presumption of receipt derives from the longstanding common law “mailbox rule.” Under the mailbox rule, if a letter “properly directed is proved to have been either put into the post-office or delivered to the postman, it is presumed . . . that it reached its destination at the regular time, and was received by the person to whom it was addressed.” Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193 (1884); Phila. Marine Trade Ass’n.-Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n Pension Fund v. C.I.R., 523 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2008).
However, this “is not a conclusive presumption of law.” Rosenthal, 111 U.S. at 193-94 (citations omitted). Rather, it is a rebuttable “inference of fact founded on the probability that the officers of the government will do their duty and the usual course of business.” Id. (noting that when the presumption of mailing is “opposed by evidence that the letters never were received,” it must be weighed “by the jury in determining the question whether the letters were actually received or not.”).
Study the entire opinion for a complete analysis of the law, evidence, procedure and facts because this opinion might convince other courts to adopt its reasoning.
Employee Expenses: reimburse, cell phone – required use, Labor Code § 28021
Jurisdiction: California
Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Service, Inc., No. B247160 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist2.Div2., 8/12/14):

  • http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B247160.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Shaw Valenza law firm article at http://shawvalenza.blogspot.com/2014/08/california-court-of-appeal-employers.html.

  • Ballard Rosenberg Golper & Savitt law firm article at http://www.brgslaw.com/compliance_matters/2014_2_Aug/index.html.

  • Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/workplace-policy-update/last-2014-lap-california-legislature.

  • Ford Harrison law firm article at http://www.fordharrison.com/can-you-hear-me-now-employers-in-california-must-reimburse-employees-for-mandatory-work-related-calls-on-personal-cell-phones.

  • Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/employer-required-to-reimburse-employees-for-personal-cell-phone-use-despite-unlimited-minutes-plans/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=employer-required-to-reimburse-employees-for-personal-cell-phone-use-despite-unlimited-minutes-plans.


Summary by the appellate court:
We hold that when employees must use their personal cell phones for work-related calls, Labor Code section 28021 requires the employer to reimburse them. Whether the employees have cell phone plans with unlimited minutes or limited minutes, the reimbursement owed is a reasonable percentage of their cell phone bills. Because the trial court relied on erroneous legal assumptions about the application of section 2802, we must reverse the order denying certification to a class of 1,500 service managers in an action against Schwan’s Home Service, Inc. (Home Service) seeking, inter lia, reimbursement of work-related cell phone expenses. Upon remand, the trial court shall reconsider the motion for class certification in light of our interpretation of section 2802. When reconsidering the motion, it shall apply the principles set forth in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 (Duran) to the degree that the class representative, Colin Cochran (Cochran), proposes to use statistical sampling evidence to establish either liability or damages. The parties shall have the opportunity to revise their papers to address the issues raised herein.
NLRB: retaliation, NLRA § 7, concerted activity – assisting coworker litigation
Jurisdiction: All
Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB No. 12 (8/11/14):

  • http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4581822cf6 [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://www.employmentlawmatters.net/2014/08/articles/nlra/asking-coworkers-for-assistance-in-supporting-legal-claim-may-constitute-concerted-activity-under-the-nlra/.

  • Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/nlrb-expands-reach-nlra-finding-employee-who-sought-help-coworkers-h-0.

In addition to statutory protection in the anti-discrimination acts, NLRA § 7 might also protect against retaliation against employees who assist coworkers in their claims – it is a form of concerted activity relating to terms and conditions of employment.


ADA: essential functions, ADHD, reasonable accommodation, undisclosed diagnosis or prior medications
Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit
Weaving v. City of Hillsboro, No. 12-35726 (9th Cir., 8/15/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2014/08/15/12-35726.pdf.

  • Shaw Valenza law firm article at http://shawvalenza.blogspot.com/2014/08/9th-circuit-cop-with-adhd-has-no.html.

  • Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/no-coverage-cantankerous-ninth-circuit-goes-retro-finding-no-disabilit.


From the appellate court staff summary:
The panel held that as a matter of law the jury could not have found that ADHD substantially limited the officer’s ability to work or to interact with others within the meaning of the ADA. The panel held that given the absence of evidence that the officer’s ADHD affected his ability to work, and in light of the strong evidence of his technical competence as a police officer, a jury could not reasonably have concluded that his ADHD substantially limited his ability to work. The panel also held that the officer’s interpersonal problems did not amount to a substantial impairment of his ability to interact with others. Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could have found the officer disabled under the ADA.
Summary by appellate court:
We must decide whether, consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), an employer properly terminated an employee who had recurring interpersonal problems with his colleagues that were attributable to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). Plaintiff Matthew Weaving worked for the Hillsboro Police Department (“HPD”) in Oregon from 2006 to 2009. HPD terminated Weaving’s employment in 2009 following severe interpersonal problems between Weaving and other HPD employees. Weaving contends that these interpersonal problems resulted from his ADHD. After his discharge, Weaving brought suit under the ADA. He contended that he was disabled because his ADHD substantially limited his ability to engage in two major life activities: working and interacting with others. He claimed that HPD had discharged him because of his disabilities in violation of the ADA.
The jury returned a general verdict for Weaving, finding that he was disabled and that the City of Hillsboro (“the City”) had discharged him because of his disability. The City moved for judgment as a matter of law. It also moved for a new trial on the ground of improper jury instructions. The district court denied both motions, and the City appealed.
We reverse. We hold as a matter of law that the jury could not have found that ADHD substantially limited Weaving’s ability to work or to interact with others within the meaning of the ADA.
FLSA, MW&HL, MWPCL: overtime, misclassification, treble damages, Fair Labor Standards Act, Maryland Wage and Hour Law, Wage Payment and Collection Law
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Treble damages may now be awarded against employers for overtime pay misclassification.
Peters v. Early Healthcare Giver, Inc., No 86 (MDCA, 8/13/14):

  • http://www.mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2014/86a13.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/maryland-employers-can-be-liable-treble-damages-misclassification-over and http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/maryland-employers-can-be-liable-treble-damages-misclassification-over#sthash.ofbOZL4H.dpuf.

This is the states’ highest appellate court. The facts are complex and legislative amendments to the applicable statutes are important, so study the case and articles very carefully.


Their supreme court examined new issues and old precedents:
In this case we are asked to answer three questions concerning the Wage Payment and Collection Law (“WPCL”), Md. Code (1991, 2008 Repl. Vol., 2013 Cum. Supp.), § 3-501 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article (“LE”), a cause of action frequently litigated in the appellate courts. In answering these questions we are treading new ground on some, but not all of them.
At-will: continued employment – no fraud claim
Jurisdiction: Texas, Fifth Circuit
Sawyer, et al. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 12-0626 (TXSC, 4/25/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:

  • https://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/historical/2014/apr/120626.pdf.

  • 430 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. 2014).

  • Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/texas-supreme-court-establishes-that-an-at-will-employee-does-not-have-a-viable-fraud-claim-based-on-continued-employment/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=texas-supreme-court-establishes-that-an-at-will-employee-does-not-have-a-viable-fraud-claim-based-on-continued-employment explains the reasoning and also exceptions to the ruling.

The 5th Circuit appellate panel certified a legal question to the Texas Supreme Court. This can occur in a civil case in federal court when the federal court needs a clear answer about the status of state law. One question was whether an at-will employee can bring fraud claims against an employer for loss of their employment, and the answer was “no”.


Summary by its supreme court:
Two questions certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ask whether, under Texas law, at-will employees and employees subject to a collective bargaining agreement can sue their corporate employer for fraudulently inducing them to move to a wholly owned subsidiary.1 We conclude that while an employee can sue an employer for fraud in some situations, in the context in which the certified questions arise, the answer to both is no.
At-will: compensation

  • Oral agreements: breach – enforceability, detrimental reliance

  • Benefits:

    • retroactive salary increase,

    • bonus

    • severance payment


Jurisdiction: Texas
Sempra Energy Trading, LLC v. Holmes, No. 14-13-00206-CV (TXCA 14th, 7/14/14):

  • http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=93f54481-1e37-4811-9e3e-4dff411eafc1&coa=coa14&DT=Opinion&MediaID=f421c288-8108-4de2-9388-105f37cfc381 [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Justicia URL http://law.justia.com/cases/texas/fourteenth-court-of-appeals/2014/14-13-00206-cv.html.

  • Ogletree Deakins law firm article at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/lets-shake-on-it-texas-case-exemplifies-the-perils-of-adopting-a-company-wide-practice-of-oral-agreements/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=lets-shake-on-it-texas-case-exemplifies-the-perils-of-adopting-a-company-wide-practice-of-oral-agreements.


Summary by the appellate court:
Sempra Energy Trading, LLC appeals a judgment in favor of appellee Richard Holmes. Sempra contends that the trial court erred in (1) overruling Sempra’s “motions for judgment as a matter of law because there is not an enforceable contract to pay Holmes a $385,000 salary retroactive to January 1, 2008,” and, alternatively, denying Sempra’s motion for new trial because the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s verdict; (2) entering

judgment against Sempra on Holmes’s claim for a 15 percent bonus because the evidence was insufficient to establish that Sempra promised Holmes a 15 percent bonus, and the evidence established a 10 percent bonus “as a matter of law;” (3) “denying Sempra’s motions for judgment as a matter of law on [Holmes’s] severance claim” because Holmes failed to sign Sempra’s customary separation agreement and release; and (4) awarding attorney’s fees to Holmes. We affirm.


FLSA: compensation, attorney fees

  • Compensation:

    • undercompensation

    • class action, collective actions

    • activities: protective gear, doffing, donning

    • meals, breaks

  • Evidence: sufficiency, statistical

  • Attorney fees:

    • time records

    • unsuccessful claims – Fair Labor Standards Act – Kansas Wage Protection Act

    • employees not underpaid

    • lack of proportion to damages award

  • Judgment as a matter of law


Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
Garcia, et al. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 12-3346 (10th Cir., 8/19/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-3346.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
The protective gear consisted of such things as shin guards, mesh aprons, legging aprons, belly guards, knives, mesh gloves, Polar gloves, Polar sleeves, Plexiglas arm guards, mesh sleeves, and knocker vests
The two major FLSA issues were:

  • Did Tyson pay its employees for all of the time they spent at work?

  • If not, how much of that time was spent getting in and out of protective clothing and equipment and walking to and from the work stations?

The list of employees spread over eight pages of single-spaced names, about two names to a line. This case is 27 pages long, 19 of which are opinion on a wide variety of matters complex questions. Litigators will need to study it carefully.


Summary by the appellate court:
A group of employees filed class and collective actions against Tyson Foods, Inc., seeking unpaid wages for time spent on pre- and post-shift activities. After the employees obtained a sizeable verdict and fee award,1 Tyson unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Tyson: (1) challenges the judgment and denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law, and (2) argues that the fee award was excessive. We reject Tyson’s contentions. The Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of undercompensation and the district court acted within its discretion in setting the fee award. Thus, we affirm.
On the FLSA class issue:
We do not know how the jury ultimately decided to find class-wide liability. But we do know that there was a reasonable basis for the jury’s finding of systematic undercompensation. Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the finding of class-wide liability.
FMLA, Pregnancy Act: anticipated restrictions, certified nursing assistant – lifting – shifting, essential functions – reasonable accommodation, limited leave policy – injuries only, adverse employment action, Illinois House Bill 8
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