Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
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Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Dalpiaz v. Carbon County, Utah, et al., No. 13-4062 (10th Cir., 7/25/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4062.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Coworkers orally reported physical activity inconsistent with her claimed serious medical condition. The employer requested written statements. Eight reported seeing her doing various physical activities such as:
The employer then requested an IME. There were some scheduling problems with that and ultimately she never attended an IME. Her supervisor ultimately decided to discharge her, and at a meeting with her supervisor and the county attorney, they gave her a Notice of Intent to Discipline for five alleged violations of the county’s policies and procedures:
She was suspended with pay on August 24, 2009. On September 4, 2009, she was discharged for the same five reasons given in the initial notice. Dismissal of her lawsuit by the trial court: In the present case, Plaintiff has not established that the Defendants interfered with her right to take FMLA leave. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot show a causal connection between her application for FMLA and her termination. There is no evidence that the County took any adverse action related to Plaintiff’s attempt to take FMLA leave. As such Plaintiff’s FMLA claims fail as a matter of law. Summary by the appellate court: In September 2009, Plaintiff Bridget Dalpiaz was terminated from her position as the benefits administrator for Carbon County, Utah. In her subsequent federal lawsuit against the county and various county officials, she raised several claims for relief, including one claim of “Violation of the [Family and Medical Leave Act] – Interference with FMLA Rights” against the county. (Appellant’s App. at 25.) The district court granted summary judgment to all Defendants on all claims. On appeal, Plaintiff challenges only the denial of her FMLA claim against Carbon County. Title VII: adverse employment action – fired, non-discriminatory reason – no pretext Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Clark v. Cache Valley Electric Company, No. 13-4119 (10th Cir., 7/25/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4119.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Kenyon Brady Clark filed this action alleging that his employer, Cache Valley Electric Company (“Cache Valley”), unlawfully discriminated against and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Cache Valley. It reasoned (1) Mr. Clark’s discrimination claim was based solely on his supervisor’s alleged voluntary romantic affiliation with a female subordinate, and therefore failed to state a claim for relief under Title VII; and (2) Mr. Clark failed to demonstrate that Cache Valley’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. For the following reasons, we affirm. Title VII. Public Sector: USPS, postmaster
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Green v. Donahue, No. 13-1096 (10th cir., 7/28/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1096.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. As shown by the search tags and the summary, practitioners need to read this complex case for instructive material facts and legal analysis. Summary by the appellate court: Marvin Green, a former postmaster, claims that the U.S. Postal Service retaliated against him after he made employment-discrimination claims. He was investigated, threatened with criminal prosecution, and put on unpaid leave. Shortly after being put on leave, he signed a settlement agreement with the Postal Service that provided him paid leave for three and a half months, after which he could choose either to retire or to work in a position that paid much less and was about 300 miles away. Ultimately, he decided to retire. He then filed a complaint against Defendant Patrick Donahoe, the Postmaster General, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging five retaliatory acts in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.: (1) a letter notifying him to attend an investigative interview; (2) the investigative interview; (3) a threat of criminal charges against him; (4) his constructive discharge; and (5) his placement on unpaid leave (also known as emergency placement). The district court dismissed the first three claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. On the two remaining claims it granted summary judgment for Defendant, ruling that the constructive-discharge claim was untimely and that emergency placement was not a materially adverse action. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the judgment below except for the emergency-placement claim. We agree with Green that the emergency placement was a materially adverse action (being put on unpaid leave would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity), and we remand the claim for further proceedings. Conclusion: We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the claims based on the investigative interview letter, the investigative interview itself, the threat of criminal charges, and the alleged constructive discharge. We REVERSE summary judgment for Defendant on the emergency-placement claim, and we REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. FLSA: workweek – employer defined, collective action Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit Johnson, et al., v. Heckmann Water Resources (CVR), et al., No. 13-40824 (5th Cir., 7/14/14):
The Fair Labor Standards Act allows this employer to use a Monday-through-Sunday “workweek” to calculate overtime pay for employees with work schedules of Thursdays through Wednesdays. Summary by the appellate court: The district court granted Defendants–Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, finding that they did not violate the overtime wage requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) by using a Monday through Sunday workweek to calculate overtime compensation. We affirm. Adverse Employment Action: tort negligence – coworker maligning job performance - discriminatory, not Title VII Jurisdiction: First Circuit, Puerto Rico Velazquez-Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., (1st Cir., 5/23/14):
This case from Puerto Rico is interesting for its reasoning about efforts by a female coworker to get a male coworker fired for rejecting her romantic pursuit. The Title VII claim failed, but the tort claim survived. Read the article for the details and the advice in the article of additional factors for employers to consider when this kind of misconduct was either known or should have been known and resulted in tort liability. That’s an interesting twist. Summary by the appellate court: Under what circumstances, if any, can an employer be held liable for sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it terminates a worker whose job performance has been maligned by a jilted co-worker intent on revenge? We answer that the employer faces liability if: the coworker acted, for discriminatory reasons, with the intent to cause the plaintiff's firing; the co-worker's actions were in fact the proximate cause of the termination; and the employer allowed the co-worker's acts to achieve their desired effect though it knew (or reasonably should have known) of the discriminatory motivation. Based on this answer, and on our consideration of the terminated employee's claims of harassment and retaliation for asserting rights under Title VII, we vacate in part the grant of summary judgment against the employee on his sex discrimination claim, and otherwise affirm the judgment of the district court. Same-sex Marriage: unconstitutional prohibitions, Kitchen v. Herbert controlling precedent Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, Oklahoma Baldwin, et al., v. Barton, et al., Nos. 14-5003 & 14-5006 (10th Cir., 7/18/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-5003.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Same-sex couples cannot be denied marriage rights in Oklahoma. This case follows the 10th circuit ruling in Kitchen v. Herbert, and it is an example of controlling or binding precedent within a jurisdiction [Wikipedia explanation at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binding_precedent]. Summary by the court on the constitutional and statutory issues: Our merits disposition is governed by our ruling in Kitchen v. Herbert, No 13- 4178, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11935 (10th Cir. June 25, 2014). In that companion case, we held that: (1) plaintiffs who wish to marry a partner of the same sex or have such marriages recognized seek to exercise a fundamental right; and (2) state justifications for banning same-sex marriage that turn on the procreative potential of opposite-sex couples do not satisfy the narrow tailoring test applicable to laws that impinge upon fundamental liberties. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and governed by our ruling in Kitchen, we affirm. Title VII: national origin, adverse employment action – promotion denied – failure to promote Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Juarez-Galvan v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 13-3118 (10th Cir., 7/22,14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3118.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary judgment by the trial court was affirmed because the employee to meet his burden of coming forward with direct evidence of discrimination or evidence creating an issue of material fact as to pretext. Order and Judgment of the appellate court: Gustavo Juarez-Galvan sued his employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), claiming he was denied a promotion to the position of full-time driver because he is an immigrant from Mexico. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (making illegal, inter alia, the refusal to promote an individual because of that individual’s “national origin”). Concluding Juarez-Galvan failed to come forward with direct evidence of discrimination or evidence creating an issue of material fact as to pretext, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of UPS. Juarez-Galvan appeals. This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirms. [Comment: There is a difference between “burden of coming forward” and “burden of proof”:
For example:
See http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Burden+of+Going+Forward.] ACA: Affordable Care Act – subsidies – conflicting decisions Jurisdictions: DC Circuit, Fourth Circuit Conflicting opinions from two appellate circuit courts:
Wage and Hour: California Labor Code – § 515, subd. (a), FLSA –28 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, exempt – salary deductions Jurisdiction: California Rhea v. General Atomics, No. D064517 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist1.Div4, 7/21/14):
Summary by the appellate court: This appeals presents a challenge to General Atomics' employment practice of requiring exempt employees to use their annual leave hours when they are absent from work for portions of a day. Although Conley v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 260, 263 (Conley) established that California law does not prohibit an employer "from following the established federal policy permitting employers to deduct from exempt employees' vacation leave, when available, on account of partial-day absences," appellant Lori Rhea contends that Conley was wrongly decided, or in the alternative, that even under Conley, General Atomics is not permitted to deduct from an exempt employee's leave bank when the employee is absent for less than four hours. We conclude that Rhea's contentions are without merit, and accordingly we affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of General Atomics. FMLA, ADA: adverse employment action
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Crowell v. Denver Health and Hospital Authority, No. 13-1355 (10th Cir., 7/22/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1355.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Her claims failed because:
Although Denver Health initially granted Crowell FMLA-approved continuous leave for one month from June 17, 2011, to July 17, 2011, it later determined that continuous leave was not necessary until after Crowell had surgery on her shoulder. It also determined that intermittent leave was not necessary, and that all absences were subject to Denver Health’s attendance policy. Accordingly, Crowell’s June 5-6 absence was not an approved leave of absence and constituted her sixth occurrence in violation of Denver Health’s attendance policy prohibiting six occurrences in a twelve month period.2 Denver Health terminated Crowell effective July 6, 2011.
Order and Judgment by the appellate court: Shanya Crowell appeals from the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) on her Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) claim under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. [Recommendation: This very detailed opinion is an excellent study guide on these two issues. Once again, this case illustrates the importance of fully training everyone in FMLA requirements – it’s less expensive than litigation, even when you win.] Benefits, Public Sector: Illinois, retirees, state-subsidized retiree medical premiums
Jurisdiction: Illinois Kanerva v. Weems, No. 115811 (ILSC, 7/3/14):
For some Illinois public sector employees, state-subsidized retiree medical premiums are a protected benefit under the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution. Supreme court summary: At issue in this appeal is the validity of Public Act 97-695 (eff. July 1, 2012), which amended section 10 of the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971 (Group Insurance Act) (5 ILCS 375/10 (West 2012)) by eliminating the statutory standards for the State’s contributions to health insurance premiums for members of three of the State’s retirement systems. In place of those standards, Public Act 97-695 requires the Director of the Illinois Department of Central Management Services to determine annually the amount of the health insurance premiums that will be charged to the State and to retired public employees. Plaintiffs include members of the State Employees’ Retirement System (SERS), the State Universities Retirement System (SURS), and the Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois (TRS), which are the three state retirement systems that are affected by Public Act 97-695. Plaintiffs brought four putative class actions challenging the constitutionality of Public Act 97-695. Each of the complaints alleged that Public Act 97-695 violates the pension protection clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5). Two of the complaints alleged a violation of the contracts clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16), and one complaint alleged a violation of the separation of powers clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1). In addition, certain plaintiffs sought injunctive relief or damages for common-law claims based on contract and promissory estoppel. On motion of defendants, the circuit court of Sangamon County dismissed all of the complaints, and plaintiffs appealed. This court granted a subsequent motion for direct review, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011)), and ordered that the appeals from the four consolidated cases be transferred to us. We subsequently allowed “certified classes of participants in the City of Chicago’s annuitant healthcare programs” to file a brief as amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and the City of Chicago to file a brief as amicus curiae on behalf of defendants (Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010)). For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. Litigation: New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), discrimination, limitation of actions – statute of limitations, shortened, contract – express written waiver Jurisdiction: New Jersey Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Company, Inc., No. A-4329-12T3, 2014 N.J. Super. LEXIS 88 (NJ.App.Div., 6/19/14):
The contractual waiver was upheld and enforced because the provision:
Summary by the appellate court: The primary issue in this appeal is whether a contractual provision, contained in an employment application, by which the employee waives the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims against the employer and shortens the period for such claims to six months, should be enforceable. The trial court rejected the employee's unconscionability argument. The court found that the provision was clear in its terms, was conspicuously placed in the application form, and was reasonable and not contrary to any public policy. Therefore, the court concluded that the provision was enforceable. In a secondary argument, plaintiff contended that a second application form he completed, in conjunction with a promotion several years after his initial hire, which did not contain the shortened limitation period, constituted a novation and voided the initial contract. The court rejected this argument, noting that a novation is never presumed and finding nothing in the second application or in the circumstances of its completion to suggest any intent to void the provisions of the initial contract. Because plaintiff filed his complaint nine months after his alleged wrongful termination by defendant, the court granted defendant's summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint as time-barred. On appeal, plaintiff makes the same arguments before us as he made in the trial court. We agree with the trial court's analysis and conclusions, and we affirm. Whistleblower, Retaliation: misconduct – adverse employment action, timing, no causal connection, dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Wagner v. Bank of America Corporation, et al., No. 13-1347 (10th Cir., 7/11/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1347.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Significant performance deficiencies and misconduct were the basis for the adverse employment action. The employee’s claim of retaliation for whistleblowing was reject as not temporally connected with her firing. Her prima facie case was based on Colorado law’s four required elements of prima facie case: [1] that the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal act as part of the employee’s work-related duties or prohibited him from performing a public duty or exercising an important job-related right or privilege; [2] that the action directed by the employer would violate a specific statute on the public health, safety or welfare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to the employee’s basic responsibility as a citizen or his right or privilege as a worker; [3] that the employee was terminated as the result of refusing to perform the act directed by the employer, and [4] that the employer was aware or reasonably should have been aware that the employee’s refusal to comply with the employer’s order was based on the employee’s reasonable belief that the action ordered was illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory policy relating to the employee’s duty as a citizen, or violative of the employee’s legal right or privilege as a worker. She failed to meet that burden of proof. Further, the court noted: On appeal, Wagner claims that the causation issue should have been resolved by a jury because “the conduct leading up to her discharge began,” Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1137 (10th Cir. 2013), with the issuance of the final warning from Vescera. We disagree. The final warning issued to Wagner referenced conduct that had previously been the subject of employee reviews, and there is no evidence linking the consistent warnings to Wagner about inappropriate tone to her reports about her fellow appraisers. Wagner also contends that LandSafe personnel intentionally baited her into responding inappropriately to several email communications so that her responses could be used as an excuse for termination. But she does not provide a record citation to support this assertion and our independent review of the record indicates no “specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue for trial.” Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1198 n.6 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Non-compete: duration, trigger, enforce, injunction denied Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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