Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
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Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Barrett v. Salt Lake County, et al., Nos. 13-4084 & 13-4125 (10th Cir., 5/15/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4084.pdf [an enhanced version of this opinion is available to lexis.com subscribers]. Michael Barrett’s fourteen-year record of promotions and positive reviews convinced the courts that he had been retaliated against by his employer for helping a female coworker with her civil rights claim. Concerning litigation, see the discussion of:
Summary by the appellate court: The trouble began when Michael Barrett, a Salt Lake County employee, helped a colleague pursue a sexual harassment complaint against her boss. The complaint was entirely warranted but some in management apparently didn’t like the publicity. According to Mr. Barrett, his superiors thought him a noisy troublemaker and began a campaign to have him discharged or demoted. After he was demoted Mr. Barrett brought this lawsuit, alleging that the county violated Title VII by retaliating against him for helping a coworker vindicate her civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The jury found for Mr. Barrett. At trial the county argued that it disciplined Mr. Barrett because he was a poor worker. But the evidence showed that Mr. Barrett’s fourteen years working for the county were marked only by promotions and positive reviews — that is, until he helped draw attention to his colleague’s plight. Now on appeal, the county asks us to undo the jury’s verdict but we can find no fault in the district court’s careful treatment of the merits and see only a minor aspect of its attorney fees award requiring further attention. NLRB: profanity – “F-bombs”, concerted activity – protected, NLRA § 8(a)(1), Atlantic Steel test Jurisdiction: NLRA, Ninth Circuit Plaza Auto Center, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 117 (5/28/14):
On remand from the 9th Circuit, the NLRB ruled that a heated response by a salesperson to Tony Plaza, the owner, was concerted activity protected by the NLRA.
The four-part Atlantic Steel test, 245 NLRB 814, 816 (1979):
Tenure: adverse employment action, probationary period – tenure denied, documented unprofessional academic performance, mistreating students Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Maranville v. Utah Valley University, et al., No. 13-4129 (10th Cir. 6/16/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4129.pdf [enhanced version]. Tenure was denied to this professor who had previously been tenured at another university. His current misconduct was well documented, e.g., complaints by students that he repeated openly belittled and berated them, among many other things. Summary judgment dismissal affirmed. ERISA: fiduciary duty – breach – liability limited, equitable relief –– surcharge – estoppel – reformation, citations – ERISA § 502(a)(3) – 29 U.S.C. section 1132(a)(3) Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, et al., No. No. 12-35458 (9th Cir., 6/6/14):
Study the articles because this complex area of benefits law is developing slowly, and lower court decisions are instructive. The appellate court ruled:
Summary prepared by the court staff: Employee Retirement Income Security Act The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Alaska Electrical Pension Fund and other defendants on claims (1) that the Fund abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff benefits under the Alaska Electrical Pension Plan and (2) that he was entitled to equitable relief under ERISA. For over three years, the Fund paid the plaintiff monthly pension benefits he had not earned. When it rediscovered an earlier determination that the plaintiff had never met the Plan’s vesting requirements, it terminated his benefits. The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants violated their fiduciary duties under ERISA or the terms of the Plan and that he therefore was entitled to “appropriate equitable relief” under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3). The panel held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an order equitably estopping the Fund from relying on its corrected records that showed his actual years of service because he failed to show that a letter informing him that he would receive a pension was an interpretation of ambiguous language in the Plan, rather than a mere mistake in assessing his entitlement to benefits, and he also failed to show that he was ignorant of the true facts. The panel held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the equitable remedy of reformation based on mistake under trust or contract law principles because he failed to demonstrate that a mistake of fact or law affected the terms of the Plan. He also was not entitled to reformation based on fraud. The panel held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the equitable remedy of surcharge, to receive an amount equal to the benefits he would have received if he had been a participant with the hours erroneously reflected in the Fund’s records when he applied for benefits, because he did not show that the defendants were unjustly enriched by their alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. In addition, the surcharge remedy the plaintiff sought would not restore the trust estate, but rather would wrongfully deplete it by paying benefits he was not eligible to receive under the Plan. The panel also affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants erred in denying him benefits on the ground that he was non-vested. The panel rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Fund waived this rationale for denying him benefits by not timely raising it. FLSA, MCA: Motor Carrier Act, overtime pay, exemption – safety – interstate activities Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit Allen, et al. v. Coil Tubing Services, L.L.C., No. 12-20194 (5th Cir., 6/13/14):
Summary by the appellate court: Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged that they worked more than forty hours a week, and that their employer, Defendant-Appellee Coil Tubing Services, L.L.C. (“CTS”), wrongfully denied them overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). The district court held, among other things, that the Motor Carrier Act (“MCA”) exempted certain CTS employees from the overtime pay requirements of the FLSA based, in part, on the percentage of safety affecting interstate activities these employees engaged in company-wide. Undertaking a limited interlocutory review, we AFFIRM. NLRB: non-solicitation policy, concerted activity – instant messages - work areas – non-working time Jurisdiction: All Food Services of America, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 123 (5/30/14):
The employer’s policy at issue stated: Solicitation discussions of a non-commercial nature, by Associates, are limited to the non-working hours of the solicitor as well as the person being solicited and in non-work areas. (Working hours do not include meal breaks or designated break periods). The two majority panel members ruled that violate concerted activity protections of the NLRA, Section 7, discussing terms and conditions of employment. The decision noted that “absent special circumstances not present here, employers may ban solicitation in working areas during working time but may not extend such bans to working areas during nonworking time.” NLRA: employment agreement – confidentiality rule, intentional violation, adverse employment action Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit, all Flex Frac Logistics, 360 NLRB No. 120 (3/30/14):
The employer was attempting to protect critical confidential information about the rates it charges customers, and prohibited employees from disclosing that. The Board ruled the prohibition was overly broad because it could be interpreted to prohibit employees from discussing wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment. Read the law firm article for the history in the 5th Circuit, 746 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2014), and the Boards subsequent ruling. ERISA: disability insurance – coverage denied – not eligible Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Nelson v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, et al., No. 13-5073 (10th Cir., 6/18/14) [enhanced version]; Pending an updated URL, http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/clerk/opinions/daily, but searchable at http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinion/search until updated.] The denial was based on the terms of the Plan policy, which defines disability for STD benefits and the first eighteen months of LTD benefits as being unable to perform all the material and substantial duties of a claimant’s particular occupation. After eighteen months, the Plan pays LTD benefits only if an injury or disease prevents a claimant from working at any reasonable occupation. She did not meet that definition. Summary by the appellate court, and its ruling: Gina M. Nelson appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of her request for benefits under disability insurance policies governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. * * * In sum, the administrative record shows that Aetna “diligently endeavored to discover the nature of [Ms. Nelson’s] ailments,” Holcomb, 578 F.3d at 1193, and Ms. Nelson has not demonstrated that the reports prepared by the five independent specialists did not provide a reasonable basis for Aetna’s denial of STD benefits beyond April 20, 2009. Because Aetna’s denial of LTD benefits was based solely on Ms. Nelson’s failure to satisfy the elimination period, and Ms. Nelson has raised no other challenge to that decision other than her unsuccessful attack on the denial of STD benefits, she has also failed to show that the denial of LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Litigation: statute of limitations, time-barred, no extension, no tolling, separate laws – different remedies, Castagna – Luceno – Majestic Kitchens Jurisdiction: Second Circuit, New York Castagna, et al. v. Luceno, et al., No. 13-0796 (2nd Cir., 3/5/14) [enhanced version]:
Under federal judicial law, filing an EEOC claim does not toll the statute of limitation for state claims Summary by the appellate court: Patricia Castagna, a former employee of Majestic Kitchens, Inc., appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cathy Seibel, Judge) dismissing Castagna's state-law tort claims as time-barred. Castagna contends that the statute of limitations applicable to her tort claims against both Majestic and her former boss, Bill Luceno, was tolled by her filing of a charge of discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Our Court has not previously determined whether filing an EEOC charge tolls the statute of limitations for state tort claims arising from the same nucleus of facts as underlie the EEOC charge. We now join the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in holding as a matter of federal law that filing an EEOC charge does not toll the limitations period for state-law tort claims, even if those claims arise out of the same factual circumstances as the discrimination alleged in the EEOC charge. We accordingly affirm the district court's dismissal of Castagna's tort claims. Wage and Hour, FLSA: travel time – overtime, commuting, Portal-to-Portal Pay Act – Employee Commuting Flexibility Act Jurisdiction: Connecticut Sarrazin v. Coastal, Inc., 311 Conn. 581 (2014):
This decision aligns state law with federal law:
Benefits: Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), multiemployer pension plan - unionized workers – workers of other employers, withdrawal liability, citations: 29 U.S.C. § 1383 – 29 U.S.C. § 1387 – 29 C.F.R. §§ 4207.1-.11, arbitration, summary judgment affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Trustees of the Utah Carpenters’ and Cement Masons’ Pension Trust, et al., v. Loveridge, Nos. 13-4025 & 13-4120 (10th Cir., 6/10/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4025.pdf [enhanced version]. Perry Olsen Drywall, Inc., was the company in question, and the appellate court’ summary explains the situation quite well: Perry Olsen argues it never withdrew from a multiemployer pension plan established for the benefit of its unionized workers and those of other employers. An arbitrator found otherwise. The district court did too. Perry Olsen says all this was error, but we cannot see how. Whatever may be in dispute (and there is much in dispute between these parties), one thing isn’t. On June 30, 2003, Perry Olsen’s collective bargaining agreement expired and at that moment the company ceased having any obligation to contribute to the multiemployer pension fund. It is undisputed, too, that under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), withdrawal liability is imposed whenever an employer “ceases to have an obligation to contribute under the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1383. To be sure, an employer can reenter a plan and effectively undo its withdrawal liability. 29 U.S.C. § 1387; 29 C.F.R. §§ 4207.1-.11. But Perry Olsen didn’t follow these procedures either. It withdrew, stopped paying for a period, and never (lawfully) reentered. Given these facts, it is beyond serious dispute that Perry Olsen incurred withdrawal liability under the terms of MPPAA. The rest of the opinion explains the reasoning in detail. Title VII: race, retaliation, litigation, deficient performance, adverse employment action, contract renewal, summary judgment dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Townsend-Johnson v. Rio Rancho Public Schools, et al., No. 13-2133 (10th Cir., 6/11/14): http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2133.pdf [enhanced version]. Linda Townsend-Johnson failed to meet her professional growth plan requirements. Summary by the appellate court: The Rio Rancho Public Schools entered into a contract for Ms. Linda Townsend-Johnson, an African-American, to serve as the principal for an elementary school. School officials later determined that Ms. Townsend-Johnson had failed to meet her growth plans, and the superintendent (Ms. Sue Cleveland) decided not to renew the contract. Ms. Townsend-Johnson responded by suing for race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and for retaliation under Title VII. The defendants requested summary judgment on these claims, relying on evidence that Ms. Cleveland had declined to renew the contract based on Ms. Townsend-Johnson’s failure to satisfy her growth plans. Under federal law, Ms. Townsend-Johnson bore the burden to prove pretext on her race-discrimination and retaliation claims. She failed to present such evidence, and the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. We affirm. Wage and Hour, Class Action: outside sales, statistics – small random sample, flawed implementation – extrapolation, expert input, Labor Code § 1171 Jurisdiction: California Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association, No. S200923 (5/29/14);
This is a complicated case, as one can infer from the search tags, so study the article with its ten categories of analysis and commentary and study the entire opinion. As the article notes, the opinion seems to raise more questions than it answers. Introduction by the California Supreme Court: We encounter here an exceedingly rare beast: a wage and hour class action that proceeded through trial to verdict. Loan officers for U.S. Bank National Association (USB) sued for unpaid overtime, claiming they had been misclassified as exempt employees under the outside salesperson exemption. (Lab. Code, § 1171.) This exemption applies to employees who spend more than 50 percent of the workday engaged in sales activities outside the office. (Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785 (Ramirez).) After certifying a class of 260 plaintiffs, the trial court devised a plan to determine the extent of USB‘s liability to all class members by extrapolating from a random sample. In the first phase of trial, the court heard testimony about the work habits of 21 plaintiffs. USB was not permitted to introduce evidence about the work habits of any plaintiff outside this sample. Nevertheless, based on testimony from the small sample group, the trial court found that the entire class had been misclassified. After the second phase of trial, which focused on testimony from statisticians, the court extrapolated the average amount of overtime reported by the sample group to the class as a whole, resulting in a verdict of approximately $15 million and an average recovery of over $57,000 per person. As even the plaintiffs recognize, this result cannot stand. The judgment must be reversed because the trial court‘s flawed implementation of sampling prevented USB from showing that some class m embers were exempt and entitled to no recovery. A trial plan that relies on statistical sampling must be developed with expert input and must afford the defendant an opportunity to impeach the model or otherwise show its liability is reduced. Statistical sampling may provide an appropriate means of proving liability and damages in some wage and hour class actions. However, as outlined below, the trial court‘s particular approach to sampling here was profoundly flawed. Class Action: Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(f) class certification, commonality of issues Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit Stockwell v. City of San Francisco, 12-15070 (9th Cir. 5/24/14):
Court staff unofficial summary: Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(f) Class Certification The panel in an interlocutory appeal reversed the district court’s denial for want of commonality of a request under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(f) for certification of a class composed of certain San Francisco Police Department officers. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in denying class certification because of its legal error of evaluating merits questions, rather than focusing on whether the questions presented, whether meritorious or not, were common to the members of the putative class. The panel held that given the interlocutory nature of the appeal, and its consequent limitation to class certification factors only, the panel could not consider the merits questions, even as an alternative ground for affirmance. The panel remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance whether the putative class satisfied the strictures of Rule 23(b)(3), as well as the other prerequisites for class certification. Arbitration: drug policy – “last chance agreement” (LCA) – mandatory discharge, no union participation, adverse employment action, collective bargaining agreement (CBA) – just cause, standard of review – arbitrator – judicial, award – reinstatement – back pay Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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