Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: New Mexico
- Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit
- Jurisdiction: First Circuit, Massachusetts
Jurisdiction: Tennessee Ferguson v. Middle Tennessee State University, No. M2012-00890-SC-R11-CV (TNSC, 10/29/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
Supreme court summary: A jury found that an employer retaliated against an employee in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) and awarded the employee compensatory damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the award, holding that the employee had failed to prove that his supervisor had knowledge of his protected activity when she took adverse action against him. We hold that the jury’s verdict is supported by material evidence from which the jury could infer that the supervisor knew that the employee had filed a lawsuit for discrimination when she engaged in retaliatory conduct. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, reinstate the jury verdict, and remand to the Court of Appeals for a review of the award of damages. There was significant activity in this case, and the opinion and law firm article provide a wealth of instructive information and analysis. Benefits: civil procedure – interpleader, bankruptcy, medical – disability – long term care – severance - death benefits, premium payment obligations, beneficiaries – heirs, denial of coverage provisions Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit In re: Millennium Multiple Employer Welfare Benefit Plan, et al., v. White, et al., Nos. 14-6006 and 14-6007 (10th Cir., 11/13/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-6006.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This case primarily involves matters of interest to litigators, but benefits practitioners might find instructive information for avoiding claims. Appellate court summary: In this consolidated appeal, Aviva Life & Annuity (Aviva) challenges identical orders of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma sitting in its capacity as a bankruptcy appellate court. The district court entered the orders in two directly related cases brought by Aviva in the nature of interpleader pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22.1 Aviva argues the court erred by limiting the scope of the interpleader relief granted. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), we affirm. [Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpleader.] NLRB: arbitration, class action – waiver, unfair labor practice (ULP), DR Horton – followed Jurisdiction: All Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (10/28/14):
Sheila Hobson signed her employer’s arbitration agreement with this provision: . . . individual and company understand that, absent this agreement, they would have the right to sue each other in court, to initiate or be a party to a group or class action claim, and the right to a jury trial, but, by executing this agreement, both parties give up those rights and agree to have all employment disputes between them resolved by mandatory, final and binding arbitration. Any employment relationship between individual and company is terminable at-will, and no other inference is to be drawn from this agreement. She brought an FLSA collective action in court for herself and on behalf of three other employees. The trial court ordered her to proceed by individual arbitration. She then filed an NLRB charge, and the Board’s General Counsel charged the company with a ULP. That resulted in her having to proceed with the FLSA right of collective action. The current Board decided 3-2 that
NLRB: Facebook – egregious content, concerted activity – not protected Jurisdiction: All Richmond District Neighborhood Center, 361 NLRB No. 74 (10/28/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
There is a limit to the nature and extent of adverse comments that can be made against an employer and qualify for NLRA protection. This Facebook conversation between two employees was found to have exceeded that limit. Read the decision and the article for examples seriously extreme speech and for suggested guidelines for handling it. Wage and Hour: Medicaid pharmacists - NMSA 1978, § 27-2-16(B), fee-for-services payment formula Jurisdiction: New Mexico Starko, Inc., d/b/a Medicine Chest #1, et al., v. New Mexico Human Services Department (NMSC, 8/25/14):
Court summary: {1} In these consolidated appeals, we consider whether pharmacists who dispense prescription drugs to Medicaid recipients must be paid under the formula set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 27-2-16(B) (1984). Section 27-2-16(B) provides that the New Mexico Human Services Department (HSD) pay participating pharmacists the wholesale cost of the generic brand plus a dispensing fee of at least three dollars sixty-five cents ($3.65). Section 27-2-16(B) was enacted when New Mexico only operated under a fee-for-services model. The Legislature created a new, alternative managed care system in 1994 in an effort to rein in the burgeoning costs of medical public assistance. Under the managed care system pharmacists contract with managed care organizations (MCOs), not the State, to provide services, and are compensated directly by the MCOs. {2} The district court and our Court of Appeals held that Section 27-2-16(B) applies in both the fee-for-services context and in managed care settings. We reverse, and hold that Section 27-2-16(B) applies only in the fee-for-services context, which requires HSD to directly reimburse providers. ADA: essential functions, interactive process, reasonable accommodation – wheel chair – job restructuring, undue hardship Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit Kaufmann v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC, No. 13-3661 (7th Cir., 10/16/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
Considering job restructuring is required by the ADA: http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html. The accommodation at issue was whether having coworkers push customers’ wheelchairs to hairdressing appointments was reasonable. Background:
The appellate court reversed summary judgment and remanded [returned] the case to the trial court for jury trial on the issues of accommodation. Its primary consideration was evidence that the employer had on occasion reassigned duties of wheeling patients to coworkers. Also, the opinion and law firm article provide other useful consideration that employers and human resources practitioners ought to consider in situations such as this. SOX: Sarbanes-Oxley Act , publicly-traded companies, whistleblower protection, Department of Labor – Administrative Review Board (ARB), dismissal - investigatory stage – full evidentiary hearing, 18 U.S.C.A § 1514A – 29 C.F.R. Part 1980 (2013) Jurisdiction: All Fordham v. Fannie Mae, ARB No. 12-061 (10/9/14) [enhanced lexis.com version]: http://www.dol.gov/arb/briefs/12-061/12-061_decision.pdf. Littler Mendelson law firm article at http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/seminal-decision-could-make-it-harder-publicly-traded-employers-defeat. ARB summary: DECISION AND ORDER OF REMAND This case arises under the employee protection provisions of Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, as amended, 18 U.S.C.A § 1514A (Thomson/West Supp. 2014) (SOX), and its implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. Part 1980 (2013). Complainant Edna D. Fordham filed a complaint alleging that Respondent Fannie Mae violated the SOX by retaliating against her in several ways because of several allegedly protected activities. On March 19, 2012, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a Decision and Order dismissing Fordham’s complaint. Fordham appealed the ALJ’s ruling to the Administrative Review Board (ARB). For the following reasons we affirm, in part, and reverse and remand, in part, for further consideration consistent with this Decision and Order of Remand. ADEA: poor work performance, adverse employment action, age consideration, decision-maker, evidence – McDonnell Douglas procedure – pretext, disparate treatment Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Hutchins v. Cessna Aircraft Company, No. 14-3014 (10th Cir., 10/30/14): http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-3014.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The plaintiff’s problem was deficient performance, which can be a valid non-discriminatory reason for an adverse employment action. She failed to carry her burden of proving pretext. A plaintiff always has the burden of proof; in the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary procedure the employer has only a burden of showing, not proving, a non-discriminatory business reason. Appellate court summary: Ms. Kathy Hutchins worked for Cessna Aircraft Company until she was fired at age 53. She attributed the firing to her age and sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Cessna denied age discrimination and moved for summary judgment, insisting that it had fired Ms. Hutchins for poor work performance. In her response to the summary judgment motion, Ms. Hutchins admitted that Cessna’s decision-makers had not considered her age. With this admission, the district court granted summary judgment to Cessna. We affirm. McDonnell Douglas procedure:
Prima facie case elements: To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show:
Pretext: The reason given was pretextual only if Ms. Hutchins shows that age discrimination provided a more likely explanation or that Cessna’s explanation was not credible. * * * To survive a summary judgment motion, Ms. Hutchins had to provide more than mere conjecture regarding Cessna’s underlying motivation. * * * The district court held that Ms. Hutchins could not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext because she admitted that age was not considered in her termination. We agree. Ms. Hutchins admitted that “[a]t the time the decision was made to terminate [her], neither Gifford, Manuel, or Poulson were aware of, nor did they consider, [Ms. Hutchins]’s age.” * * * With this admission, the fact-finder could not reasonably infer any consideration of age in Cessna’s decision to fire Ms. Hutchins. Therefore, Ms. Hutchins cannot prove age discrimination. [Comment: Documenting a sufficient effort of warning, counseling and documenting employment deficiencies is critical to successfully showing evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for adverse employment actions.] Arbitration: award affirmed, trade secrets, falsified evidence, challenge requirement
Jurisdiction: Minnesota Seagate Technology, et al. v. Western Digital Corporation, et al, No. A12-1994 (MNSC, 10/8/14):
Read the opinion and articles for excellent detailed information on Minnesota arbitration law, plus that material also might provide persuasive authority in other jurisdictions. Court syllabus:
Affirmed. Definition: “Vacatur” means a court order vacating a legal proceeding; also spelled vacature. Litigation: FRCP 59, preemption, Title VII, administrative remedies – exhaustion and timeliness, no abuse of discretion, retaliation, affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Goldsby v. James, No. 14-6104 (10th Cir., 10/23/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-6104.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The trial court’s ruling on preemption was not challenged; plaintiff only argues that the district court erred on the issues exhaustion of administrative remedies and timeliness of claim. Appellate court summary: Plaintiff Sherry Goldsby brought this employment discrimination/retaliation action against the Secretary of the Air Force seeking relief under Title VII and other remedial bases. After noting that Title VII preempted the other claims asserted, the district court dismissed the case because (1) some of the Title VII claims had not been exhausted and (2) the remaining claims were untimely. Ms. Goldsby moved for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, which the district court denied. Ms. Goldsby now appeals from the latter ruling. We review the denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion, although we consider any legal questions raised by the motion de novo. See Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 693 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2012). Ms. Goldsby does not challenge the district court’s preemption holding. She argues only that the district court erred with respect to its rulings on exhaustion and timeliness. We review both of those rulings de novo, Dossa v. Wynne, 529 F.3d 911, 913 (10th Cir. 2008) (exhaustion); Jarrett v. US Sprint Commc’ns Co., 22 F.3d 256 258 (10th Cir. 1994) (timeliness), and affirm for the reasons explained below. Reasons:
The district court invoked the now-established rule that “each discrete incident of alleged discrimination or retaliation constitutes its own unlawful employment practice for which administrative remedies must be exhausted,” Green v. Donahoe, 760 F.3d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), and dismissed the omitted claims for failure to exhaust. The district court properly rejected Ms. Goldsby’s inapt reliance on outdated authority permitting pursuit of unexhausted claims when “reasonably related” to those included in an administrative charge. See Eisenhour v. Weber City, 744 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining abrogation of exhaustion exception for reasonably related claims by discrete-incident rule).
. . . [S]he had ninety-three days from July 29, 2012, to file in district court. She filed this action on December 19, 2013. The district court noted that even if she were given the benefit of equitable tolling for all of the time spent pursuing her prior case, this action would still be plainly late— because she inexplicably waited nearly four months to file after the final disposition of her prior case. She contends the ruling in that case, dismissing it without prejudice to refiling, somehow sanctioned or excused her belated initiation of this second action. But all the court did in the prior case was hold that starting afresh with reframed pleadings was more appropriate than reopening the case; it did not extend the time period for filing. And it certainly did not purport to grant a new filing period even longer than the ninety days fixed by Congress in § 2000-e16(c). Accordingly, when presented with the complaint in the instant case, which was untimely under even the most generous equitable-tolling accommodation, the district court properly dismissed it. ADA: Merit System Protection Board (MSPB), adverse employment action – termination, judicial immunity - 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1), untimely claim - 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c), FRCP 29 dismissal, no abuse of discretion – frivolous claim, affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Sumrall v. Merit Systems Protection Board, No. 14-6164 (10th Cir., 1-/23/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-6164.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Appellate court reasoning: * * * The district court thus did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the MSPB and its officers are entitled to absolute immunity from Sumrall’s claims. Sumrall’s claims can alternatively be construed as challenging the adverse decisions MSPB rendered against him in August 2001 and September 2004. But a challenge to the former decision became time barred sixty days after the MSPB rendered its decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1). Because Sumrall appealed the latter decision to the EEOC, a challenge to it became time barred ninety days after the EEOC’s April 2005 decision became final. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). The district court thus did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Sumrall’s claims are untimely and subject to dismissal. FAAAA: Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, independent contractor, Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute, § 148B(a)(2) – preemption Jurisdiction: First Circuit, Massachusetts Massachusetts Delivery Association v. Coakley, No. 13-2307 (1st Cir., 9/3014):
In this second time before the appellate court, the issue was whether the express preemption provision of the FAAAA preempts one element of Chapter 149, § 148B(a)(2) requiring that workers perform a service "outside the usual course of the business of the employer" to be classified as independent contractors. This time the trial court now must sufficiently reexamine the preemption issues. Appellate court summary: The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act ("FAAAA") preempts any state law "related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). In a previous appeal in this case, we held, contrary to the district court, that abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), was not appropriate and remanded. Mass. Delivery Ass'n v. Coakley, 671 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012) (hereinafter, "MDA I"). The question now presented is whether the express preemption provision of the FAAAA preempts one prong of the Massachusetts Independent Contractor Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B(a)(2), which requires that workers perform a service "outside the usual course of the business of the employer" to be classified as independent contractors. The district court held that Section 148B(a)(2) escapes FAAAA preemption. Finding that the district court did not sufficiently credit the broad language and legislative history of the FAAAA's express preemption provision, we reverse and remand. Attorney-client Privilege: Garner Rule fiduciary exception – limited circumstances, proof – showing of good cause, discovery – mandatory production of documents Download 5.55 Mb. Share with your friends:
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