Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
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- Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit, N.D. Cal.
- Jurisdiction: California
- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, New Mexico
- Jurisdiction: Fourth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: New Jersey
- Jurisdiction: Sixth Circuit
- Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: All Sandifer,et al., v. United States Steel Corp., No. 12–417, ____ U.S. ____ (USSC, 1/27/14); http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-417_9okb.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the 7th Circuit. Syllabus: Petitioner Sandifer and others filed a putative collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, seeking backpay for time spent donning and doffing pieces of protective gear that they assert respondent United States Steel Corp oration requires workers to wear because of hazards at its steel plants. U. S. Steel contends that this donning-and-doffing time, which would otherwise be compensable under the Act, is noncompensable under a provision of its collective bargaining agreement with petitioners’ union. That provision’s validity depends on 29 U. S. C. §203(o), which allows parties to collectively bargain over whether “time spent in changing clothes . . . at the beginning or end of each workday” must be compensated. The District Court granted U. S. Steel summary judgment in pertinent part, holding that petitioners’ donning and doffing constituted “changing clothes” under §203(o). It also assumed that any time spent donning and doffing items that were not “clothes” was “de minimis” and hence noncompensable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trade Secrets: criminal misappropriation, corporate recruiter Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit, N.D. Cal. USA v. Nosal, CR08-0237EMC (N.D.Cal, 4/8/13), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50438 [enhanced lexis.com version]:
This collection of cases primarily concentrates on civil matters, but occasionally a criminal case warrants notice and attention so that employers can better protect themselves. A corporate recruiter was convicted for conspiring with other employees to steal trade secrets. Using other employees’ access credentials, he searched his employer’s computers for confidential information to use in a new, competing business he intended to start once he left the company. Constructive Discharge: adverse employment action – resignation, reimbursement denied, conditions – intolerable – aggravated. Intentional infliction of emotional distress; public policy Jurisdiction: California Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc., No. B245735 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist.2.Div.4, 12/31/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B245735.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Appellant Jorge L. Vasquez contends the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining respondent Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc.’s demurrers to appellant’s claims for constructive discharge in violation of public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court found appellant’s allegation that respondent violated the Labor Code by assigning appellant tasks that required extensive use of his vehicle and refusing to reimburse him for mileage did not support either claim. The issue presented is whether the facts alleged supported claims for constructive discharge in violation of public policy or intentional infliction of emotional distress, or could be amended based on factual contentions made by appellant to state such causes of action. We agree with the trial court that appellant did not assert facts sufficient to support the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. However, we conclude appellant should have been permitted leave to amend his claim of constructive discharge in violation of public policy and therefore reverse the judgment. Title VII: national origin, hostile work environment, wrongful, misconduct, summary judgment dismissal, adverse employment action – prima facie case – legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Zamora v. Board of Education of the Las Cruces Public Schools, No. 13-2097 (1/24/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2097.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Dennis Zamora appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of the Board of Education for the Las Cruces Public Schools (the “Board”). * * * The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Held: Summary judgment dismissal was properly ordered because:
ERISA, ADEA: trade secrets, unfair competition – non-compete, adverse employment action, benefits, retaliation Jurisdiction: Fifth Circuit Wall v. Alcon Laboratories Incorporated, et al., No. 13-10117 (5th Cir., 1/10/14, unpublished):
Disloyalty defeated this executive’s claims. The Littler article provides an excellent discussion of the applicable facts and law. Summary by the appellate court: George Wall worked for Alcon Laboratories Inc. (“Alcon”), a major pharmaceutical company, from 1988 until resigning in 2010. He asked for, but was denied, a series of retirement and incentive-based benefits before he left Alcon to join another company. He sued Alcon and its benefit plans, seeking those benefits as well as damages stemming from alleged age discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Wall appeals, and we affirm. The major factor in this litigation was the binding effect of the “Alcon Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan”, or “ASERP,” that was covered by ERISA. It contained a number of strict provisions, or contractual covenants, and the appellate court focused on two of them:
[A]s a condition to receipt of ASERP Benefits, for a period of five (5) years following termination of employment, each Participant will not . . . carry on any business of, or be engaged in, consult or advise, . . . or permit his name or any part thereof to be used by, any person or entity engaged in or concerned with or interested in any business carried on, anywhere in which the Alcon Affiliated Companies carry on their business, which competes with the products manufactured and sold or services provided by the Alcon Affiliated Companies (the “Business”). If the Participant violates the Covenant Not to Compete set forth herein, he or she shall forfeit all ASERP Benefits. He resigned in 2010 and began work as the Vice President of Product Development with Otonomy, a pharmaceutical company working clinically on diseases of the inner and middle ear. This new employer contracted for, among other things:
Alcon refused his request for benefits because it believed his new employment breached the ASERP. Many factors were considered by the appellate court, including the grammar of the ASERP, but most significant was the observation of the appellate that if he didn’t think he was competing, then the $50K protection clause seemed irrelevant. One amusing comment by the district court about a different issue was quoted by the appellate court: The district court’s pithy reply sums up the amount of attention this argument is due: The Court: Is that what you’re relying on? [Wall’s Counsel]: Correct, Your Honor. The Court: My goodness. You can do better than that. Arbitration: federal law – New Mexico law – preemption, Federal Arbitration Act – FAA, unconscionable term Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit, New Mexico THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, LLC, et al., v. Patton, No. 13-2012 (10th Cir., 1/28/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-2012.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Under New Mexico law a compulsory-arbitration provision in a contract may be unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, if it applies only, or primarily, to claims that just one party to the contract is likely to bring. The question before us is whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts this state law for contracts governed by the FAA. We hold that New Mexico law is preempted in this case and the arbitration clause must be enforced. This was not an employment law case. However, the principle announced is generally applicable – arbitration is not inferior to judicial proceedings as a valid means of resolving disputes. ADA, ADAAA: disability – severe temporary impairment, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i) - 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(5), dismissal – Rule 12(b)(6) Jurisdiction: Fourth Circuit Summers v. Altarum Institute Corp., No. 13-1645 (4th Cir. Jan. 23, 2014) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
The ADAAA significantly broadened disability definitions, as well as essentially interlocking the FMLA and ADA. In this brain-injury case, the appellate court ruled that a temporary impairment might be covered by the ADA as a disability. This is a new extension of disability law, and the explanatory article cited is worth study for its explanation of the case and suggestions of factors to consider. Summary by the appellate court: Pursuant to recent amendments to t he Americans with Disabilities Act, a sufficiently severe temporary impairment may constitute a disability. Because the district court held to the contrary, we reverse and remand. The trial court’s dismissal was reversed and the case was returned to the trial court for further proceedings based on the new issues of whether there was a disability as defined by the amendments to the ADA by the ADAAA and under the updated regulations. Title VII, Public Sector – First Amendment: race, free speech, retaliation, disparate impact, adverse employment action – performance problems – “articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons” – no pretext Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Richardson v. Gallagher, et al., No. 12-1410 (10th Cir., 1/1/29); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-1410.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Though he had favorable past performance evaluations, his performance came to warrant being placed on an n improvement plan, which he failed to meet. Specific facts in this case might provide valuable examples or analogies to other public sector employers with difficult and/or failing employees. Summary by the appellate court: … [W]e agree with the district court that Mr. Richardson failed to carry his burden of demonstrating Appellees’ articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for his placement on the performance improvement plan and termination were false or pretext for retaliation. Because Mr. Richardson failed to demonstrate triable claims against any of the individual Appellees, we also agree the district court did not need to address his contentions the City and County of Denver shared municipal liability for unlawful actions committed by those individuals. IV. Conclusion For the reasons cited herein, as well as the reasons provided in the district court’s Opinion and Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment dated September 24, 2012, we AFFIRM its grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. FELA: carpal tunnel, compensation claim, limitation of action – statute of limitations Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Robinson v. BNSF Railway Company, No. 12-3292 (10th Cir., 1/29/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-3292.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by the appellate court: Darren Robinson filed this action against BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), seeking compensation for carpal tunnel injuries he sustained while working for BNSF as a boilermaker. The district court granted BNSF summary judgment, concluding that Mr. Robinson’s claim is barred by FELA’s three-year statute of limitations. Wage and Hour: overtime – daily rule, collective bargaining agreement – CBA, Labor Code §§ 510 – 511 – 514, summary judgment reversed Jurisdiction: California Vranish v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. B243443 (Cal.Ct.App.Dist.2Div.2, 1/22/14): http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B243443.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Jackson Lewis law firm article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4735. Summary by the appellate court: Labor Code section 514 provides, in relevant part: “Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.” Data: whistleblower, crime – second-degree official misconduct – third-degree theft of movable property, litigation – criminal – civil – timing Jurisdiction: New Jersey State v. Saavedra, No. A-1449-12T4 (App.Div., 12/24/13) [enhanced lexis.com version]:
The state criminal trial was allowed to precede the civil trial:
Title VII: race, sex, age, color, religion, national origin, and retaliation – previous protected activity, summary judgment dismissal affirmed Jurisdiction: Tenth Circuit Agrawal v. Foxx, No. 13-6085 (10th Cir., 1/30/14); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-6085.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version] Summary by the appellate court: Vimala Agrawal is a long-time employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) at the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. In 2007, she applied for seven different supervisory engineer positions with the FAA, but was not selected for any of the positions. She subsequently filed a complaint against the Department of Transportation alleging that the FAA discriminated against her on the basis of race, sex, age, color, religion, national origin, and retaliation fo r previous protected activity. Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. Because Ms. Agrawal had not presented any direct evidence of discrimination, the court considered her claims applying the traditional burden-shifting analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). The district court assumed for the purposes of its decision that Ms. Agrawal could establish prima facie cases of discrimination for each of her claims. The court found, however, that defendant had met its burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for not selecting Ms. Agrawal for any of the positions. The court further found that Ms. Agrawal had not submitted any evidence to create a genuine issue as to whether defendant’s explanation for not selecting Ms. Agrawal was pretextual. Title VII: discrimination – age – race - national origin, return to work (RTW), adverse employment action – termination of employment, lateral transfer – previously requested position Jurisdiction: Sixth Circuit Deleon v. Kalamazoo County Road Commission, No. 12-2377 (6th Cir., 1/14/14); http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/14a0012p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Did lateral involuntary transfer to a position previously voluntarily requested by the employee amount to an adverse employment action? Deleon held a desk job, had been off on medical leave, and returned after another eight months. In the interest of moves favorable to career advancement, he applied for Equipment and Facilities Superintendent, an outside job:
These events spanned a period of about nine months . At this time, there was also an internal reorganization. Deleon sued for age, race, and national origin discrimination. Summary judgment dismissal had been granted by the trial court, but the appellate court ruled that under certain circumstances, an involuntary lateral transfer to a previously voluntary or requested transfer might establish an adverse employment action. He had to prove indirect discrimination, part of which in this instance required establishing a prima facie case that he had suffered an “adverse employment action.” An adverse employment action typically is defined as a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment.” According to the appellate court, a lateral transfer may constitute an adverse action, even absent showing of a demotion or other negative consequence, “so long as the particular circumstances present give rise to some level of objective intolerability.” That then became an issue for a jury to decide, and it probably will be important for jurors to decide of there had been a significant change in the totality of circumstances between the initial voluntary request for transfer and the subsequent involuntary transfer. [Comment: It is an open question whether other jurisdiction may choose to follow this reasoning.] ADA: night shift – narcolepsy, accommodation- interactive process, summary judgment reversed FMLA: notice – insufficient, summary judgment dismissal Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit Spurling v. C&M Fine Pack, Inc., No. 13-1708 (7th Cir., 1/13/14); http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/13-1708/13-1708-2014-01-13.pdf; 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 660 [enhanced lexis.com version]. ADAAA amendments to the ADA and broadening of FMLA regulations now combine to pretty much to make it better practice assume that the two acts will apply unless there is strong evidence to the contrary. Goldberg Segalla law firm article at http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/resources/news-and-updates/seventh-circuit-reverses-summary-judgment-ruling-narcoleptic-night-shift- : This appeal follows the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of C&M Fine Pack, Inc., (“C&M”) regarding its termination of Kimberly Spurling. Spurling alleged that C&M discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended (“ADA”), as well as the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. * * * Spurling established disputed issues of material facts as to whether C&M failed to properly engage in the interactive process as required by the ADA, but did not provide sufficient notice to establish a claim under the FMLA. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the entry of summary judgment for C&M on the FMLA claim, REVERSE the entry of summary judgment in favor of C&M on Spurling’s ADA claim and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ADA: Kimberly Spurling was a factory inspector/packer who suffered from narcolepsy that caused decreasing alertness on the job.
FMLA: Issue of sufficiency of notice by the employee
[Comment: Considering the expense of litigation, perhaps the better approach might have been to investigate and inquire further, and have at least waited for the results of further testing.]
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