Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
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Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Zoutomou v. Kennecott Utah Copper, No. 13-4064 (10th Cir., 12/23/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-4064.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. This employee’s technical competence could not make up for his obnoxious personality and deficient interpersonal skills. The employer had a legitimate, valid business reason for terminating his employment. Fraud, Qui Tam: litigation - False Claims Act (FCA), pleading – fraud - particularity, adverse employment action, dismissal Jurisdiction: 1st Circuit U.S. ex rel. Helen Ge, M.D. v. Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Limited, et al., No. 13-1088 (1st Cir., 12/6/13); http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=13-1088P.01A [enhanced lexis.com version]. Briefly, Dr. Ge claimed that Takeda terminated her employment because she complained about improper reporting of “adverse events” related to several drugs that Takeda sold. The federal trial court:
This summary by the appellate court nicely describes the case: LYNCH, Chief Judge. In June 2010 Dr. Helen Ge originally filed these two qui tam actions against her former employer, Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd. and its subsidiary Takeda Pharmaceutical North America, Inc. (collectively, "Takeda"), under the federal False Claims Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., and various analogous state statutes. The two actions concern different drugs. She has since amended each of her complaints twice. The United States has declined to enter the case as a party. In a successful qui tam action, the relator collects a portion of the award to the government regardless of whether the government intervenes. See United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P. ("Duxbury I"), 579 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2009). Dr. Ge has alleged in her second amended complaints that Takeda had failed to disclose adequately the risks associated with four of its drugs and generally that this failure resulted in the submission of false claims by various third-party patients and physicians for government payment through, for example, Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement. On Takeda's motions to dismiss, the district court dismissed both of Dr. Ge's actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) for failure to plead fraud with particularity and, in addition, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. United States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co. Ltd., Nos. 10-11043-FDS, 11-10343-FDS, 2012 WL 5398564 (D. Mass. Nov. 1, 2012). Dr. Ge proposed to amend the second amended complaint yet again, asserting still more theories of FCA liability. The district court declined to allow further amendment. Dr. Ge now appeals, making three levels of arguments: (1) as to the Rule 9(b) dismissal, that her complaints contain sufficient allegations concerning "the who, what, where, and when" of Takeda's misconduct to satisfy Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement, see Duxbury I, 579 F.3d at 30 (quoting Rodi v. S. New Eng. Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation mark omitted), (2) the district court abused its discretion in rejecting without opinion two requests, one pre-judgment and one post-judgment, by Dr. Ge to amend her complaints again, and (3) as to Rule 12(b)(6), that the district court's analysis relies on an overly restrictive conception of FCA liability. This opinion concerns the first two arguments. We affirm the district court on its Rule 9(b) and denial of amendment rulings, and do not reach the 12(b)(6) issue. Wage and Hour: unpaid bonus, oral promises, fraud, promissory fraud, breach of contract, promissory estoppel Jurisdiction: California Moncada et al. v. West Coast Quartz Corp. et al., No. H036728 (Cal.Ct.App.6th, 11/22/13, unpublished); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/H036728.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Plaintiffs alleged they had remained with the employer because shareholders made oral promises to pay a bonus after completion of sale of the company. The bonus was not paid. Litigation:
Summary by the appellate court: This case involves a dispute between former employees of a company and the company’s sole shareholders over a promised retirement bonus that was never paid. Plaintiffs, Irma Moncada, Randy Morris and Everardo Serrano, worked for West Coast Quartz Corporation (West Coast). Defendants Paul Maloney and Nancy Tkalcevic were the owners and sole shareholders of West Coast. Defendants were preparing to sell West Coast, and wanted plaintiffs to continue to work for the company until the sale was complete. To accomplish that end, defendants repeatedly promised plaintiffs that if they continued to work for West Coast until the sale, they would be paid a bonus from the sale proceeds that would be sufficient for them to retire. Plaintiffs remained at West Coast for five years following defendants‟ initial promise of the retirement bonus, rejecting job offers from other companies, and opportunities to move out of the area. When defendants sold West Coast in 2009 for approximately $30 million, they did not pay plaintiffs the promised bonus. Wage and Hour, Litigation: class action – common issues, pre-shift work Jurisdiction: California Jones et al. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, No. B237765 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B237765.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. Class actions need to have common issues of law and fact, and the appellate court found there were in this case. Summary by the appellate court: Kwesi Jones, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated (collectively Plaintiffs), filed a class action complaint against Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) alleging wage and hour violations. Plaintiffs appeal the denial of their motion for class certification and the striking of their amended class certification motion. They contend the trial court erred in concluding that common issues of law or fact do not predominate over individual issues, that class certification would not provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts, and that Jones cannot adequately represent the class. We conclude that common issues do predominate and class certification would provide substantial benefits to litigants and the courts. We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Jones cannot adequately represent the class, and Plaintiffs have shown no prejudicial error in the striking of their amended class certification motion. We therefore will reverse the order denying the class certification motion and remand with directions to (1) allow Plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint naming a suitable class representative, and (2) grant the motion for class certification if the court approves a class representative. We also will affirm the order striking Plaintiffs’ amended class certification motion. ADA, TCHRA: opiate addiction, rehabilitation treatment, current condition, disability, safe harbor – §§ 12114(b)(1) 12114(a), adverse employment action – constructive discharge – resignation requested, wrongful termination, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Jurisdiction: Texas Melendez v. Houston Independent School District, et al., No. 14-12-00946 (14th Cr., 12/5/13):
Disability statutory protection depends on current condition and duration of successful recovery. In this case, the duration was only five days. The ADA’s "safe harbor" protection provision does not automatically activate; §§ 12114(b)(1) and 12114(a ) require:
Earline Melendez was asked to resign after her principal learned of her opiate addiction. Melendez sued for disability discrimination, among other things. She admitted addiction since 2009 to pain medication for a back injury, use on some occasions at five times the recommended dosage. Summary by the appellate court: Earline Melendez claims that she was forced to resign because of a disability. She sued her former employer, the Houston Independent School District (“HISD”), complaining of unlawful discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). Melendez also sued Connie Berger, a principal at HISD, alleging causes of action for wrongful termination, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. HISD moved for summary judgment, arguing that Melendez was not disabled under the TCHRA . Berger also moved for summary judgment, asserting various affirmative defenses , including a defense that Melendez had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies . The trial court granted summary judgment to both HISD and Berger. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing Melendez’s claims. Neither the Texas HRA nor the ADA define a “significant period of time”, but the law firm article provides good factors for practitioners to consider when determining whether to take an adverse employment action. Best employment practices are to make an informed decision – usually by getting expert opinions, which are usually less expensive than litigation. ERISA: litigation, limitation of action – timing, “proof of loss”, contractual clause, long-term disability (LTD), administrative remedies – exhaustion Jurisdiction: All Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. No. 12-729 (USSC, 12/16/13):
Syllabus by the clerk: Respondent Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co. (Hartford) is the administrator of Wal-Mart Stores , Inc.’s (Wal-Mart) Group Long Term Disability Plan (Plan), an employee benefit plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The Plan’s insurance policy requires any suit to recover benefits pursuant to the judicial review provision in ERISA §502(a)(1)(B), 29 U. S. C. §1132(a)(1)(B), to be filed within three years after “proof of loss” is due. Petitioner Heimeshoff filed a claim for long-term disability benefits with Hartford. After petitioner exhausted the mandatory administrative review process, Hartford issued its final denial. Almost three years after that final denial but more than three years after proof of loss was due, Heimeshoff filed a claim for judicial review pursuant to ERISA §502(a)(1)(B). Hartford and WalMart moved to dismiss on the ground that the claim was untimely. The District Court granted the motion, recognizing that while ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations, the contractual 3-year limitations period was enforceable under applicable State law and Circuit precedent. The Second Circuit affirmed. Held: The employer’s limitations provision was enforceable because the time period was reasonable as to when an LTD participant could file a lawsuit under the long-term disability policy. FEHA, Title VII: race, discrimination – motive, after-acquired evidence, timing – knowledge Jurisdiction: California Horne v. Int’l Union of Painters and Allied Trades, Dist. Council 16, No. A135470 (Cal.Ct.App.1st, 12/3/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A135470.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. This Fair Employment and Housing Act case might provide persuasive authority in Title VII cases. Briefly, the applicant was not hired as a union organizer. The employer did not know about that at the time it decided not to hire him. He sued for racial discrimination under the FEHA. Subsequent to the decision not to hire him, evidence revealed that he had a prior criminal conviction:
Summary by the appellate court: The trial court granted summary judgment to respondent District Council 16 International Union of Painters and Allied Trades on appellant Raymond E. Horne's employment discrimination action. Horne appeals, contending inter alia that the after-acquired evidence doctrine precluded consideration of evidence of the impact of his prior conviction on the issue of his qualification for a union organizer position. The council seeks sanctions from Horne for filing a frivolous appeal. We deny the request for sanctions and affirm the judgment. Usually, the after-acquired evidence doctrine would bar evidence of the conviction to prove the employer’s motive for refusing to hire the employee. However, not being qualified trumped his claim of evidence of a discriminatory motive. Wage and Hour: litigation, class action – managers – overtime – misclassification Jurisdiction: California Martinez et al. v. Joe’s Crab Shack et al., No. B242807 (Cal.Ct.App.22nd, 12/4/13); http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B242807.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version]. According to this appellate court, “class-wide relief remains the preferred method of resolving wage and hour claims, even those in which the facts appear to present difficult issues of proof.” Its finding was that the trial court erroneously focused on factual issues about how the managers spent their time, rather than on the employer’s policies (which the managers alleged resulted in their misclassification). The appellate court found that the focus of the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to the employees. Summary by the appellate court: Litigation by class action has long been recognized as a superior method of resolving wage and hour claims in California (see Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1033 (Brinker)), including those seeking redress for unpaid overtime wages. Nonetheless, when confronted with the myriad individual facts asserted by employers in support of the executive exemption as a defense to a wage claim, courts at all levels have struggled to answer the question central to certification of a class — that is, “whether the theory of recovery advanced by the proponents of certification is, as an analytical matter, likely to prove amenable to class treatment.” (Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327 (Sav-on); accord, Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1531.) Here, the trial court , after wrestling with the factual issues raised by Defendants Crab Addison, Inc., Ignite Restaurant Group, Inc. and Landry’s Restaurants, Inc., denied class certification to a putative class consisting of managerial employees allegedly misclassified as exempt on the grounds plaintiffs had failed to establish (a) their claims are typical of the class, (b) they can adequately represent the class, or (c) common questions predominate the class claims such that a class action is the superior means of resolving the litigation. (See Brinker, at p. 1021; Code Civ. Proc. § 382.) We reverse and remand for reconsideration in light of our recent decision in Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701 (Benton) and our discussion below. Adverse Employment Action: handbook, misconduct
Jurisdiction: Alaska Beach v. Handforth-Kome, No. 6845 (AKSC, 11/29/13); http://www.courtrecords.alaska.gov/webdocs/opinions/ops/sp-6845.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Summary by their Supreme Court: Michele Beach was fired from her job at Iliuliuk Family and Health Services, a health clinic, when the clinic’s executive director concluded that prescription drug records had been systematically falsified and that Beach was responsible. Beach sued the clinic and its executive director, alleging that they had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by conducting an unfair investigation and unlawfully retaliating against Beach for her suggestions about improvements in the clinic’s security systems. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Beach appeals. We affirm. Background and reasoning:
We held in Ramsey, as we have held in other cases, that an employer is not required to provide an employee with procedural protections that conflict with those to which they have agreed; “[t]he covenant of good faith cannot be interpreted to prohibit what is expressly permitted by [the parties’] contract.” In this case, it is undisputed that Handforth-Kome and Dr. Baines conducted a methodical review of the records necessary to allow them to reach a reasonable conclusion about what had happened and who was responsible for it. Once they had discovered grounds for Beach’s immediate dismissal as described in the handbook, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing did not require them to give her additional procedural protections.
The superior court rejected Beach’s retaliation theory on three alternative grounds. It held first that her complaints about security procedures were not protected activity, and second, even if the complaints were protected, that the evidence showed they were well received by her employer, “strongly refuting any causal connection between her proffered protected activity and her termination.” The court further held that even if there were evidence supporting these elements of a prima facie case, the clinic had proffered a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for her discharge — the falsification of drug records — and, with the burden shifting back to her, Beach had failed to offer evidence that this explanation was pretextual. Evidence of indirect discrimination: McDonnell Douglas framework cases are cited in footnote 16. ADA: adverse employment action, motivation – statements, indirect evidence – McDonnell Douglas Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Summary judgment dismissal affirmed for lack of proof of connection (nexus) between alleged discriminatory statements and motivation for alleged adverse employment action. Angell v. Fairmount Fire Protection District, No. 12-1465 (10th Cir., 12/18/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-1465.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Plaintiff Angell raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether the district court erred in holding that Plaintiff’s termination was not on account of his disability; (2) whether Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether the proffered reason for the termination was a pretext for disability discrimination; (3) whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the District on Plaintiff’s state-law claim of unlawful discharge in retaliation for his having filed a worker’s compensation claim; and (4) whether Plaintiff was denied due process in the termination. Indirect proof of discrimination: McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Under this framework, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that he is a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) that he is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) that his employer discriminated against him because of his disability. MacKenzie v. City and County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005). The district judge found that Mr. Angell had satisfied the first two requirements but had failed to produce evidence to show that the Board had discriminated against him because of his disability Rehabilitation Act: FAA air traffic controller, chronic sinusitis, sleeping drug prescription
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Tadlock v. LaHood, No. 13-3116 (10th Cir., 12/5/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-3116.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]. Plaintiff developed a Cerebral Spinal Fluid (CSF) nasal leak. It is treated with a sleeping drug, and that incapacitated as an air traffic controller. Summary by the appellate court: Rodney K. Tadlock, proceeding pro se, appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, on his employment claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”). We affirm. Discrimination: His evidence failed the first step of the McDonnell Douglas circumstantial evidence test – no prima facie case adverse employment action.
Retaliation: No causal connection between his condition and what was known by the person taking the adverse action against him. Arbitration: enforcement, back pay – offset Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, et al., v. BNSF Railway Company (10th Cir., 12/9/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-8025.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version] Summary by the appellate court: BNSF Railway Company appeals the district court’s enforcement of an arbitration order issued by the National Railroad Adjustment Board (“NRAB”). See 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (p). BNSF contends the NRAB’s award was unenforceable due to ambiguity about whether an award of back pay was subject to offset (i.e., reduction for outside compensation received), and thus the district court should have remanded the case to the NR AB for resolution. We perceive no ambiguity and accordingly affirm the district court’s judgment. ERISA: disability insurer, denial of disability benefits
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