Human resources & employment law cumulative case briefs


Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit



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Jurisdiction: 6th Circuit
Rochow v. Life Insurance Company of North America, No. 12-2074 (6th Cir., 12/6/13):

  • http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/13a0338p-06.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Ogletree Deakins article at http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/rochow-v-lina-can-it-really-be-true-that-erisa-benefit-claimants-can-recover-millions-of-dollars-in-disgorged-profits/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=rochow-v-lina-can-it-really-be-true-that-erisa-benefit-claimants-can-recover-millions-of-dollars-in-disgorged-profits.

  • Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) , http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/516/489/case.html [enhanced lexis.com version].

This appears to be a major benefits decision to be aware of and to study.


Summary by the appellate court:
In a previous appeal, this Court held that Defendant-Appellant had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it denied Daniel Rochow ERISA benefits. Following the prior panel’s mandate, the district court commenced proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of benefits and other remedies. Eventually, the district court issued rulings on the calculation of benefits and ordered LINA to disgorge $3.8 million under an equitable theory of unjust enrichment. LINA raises three areas of error on appeal. We affirm.
Public Sector: social media – Facebook, First Amendment, free speech, departmental policies violation – “Supporting Fellow Employees”, “Insubordination”, “Discipline & Accountability”, adverse employment action – termination - retaliation
Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit Northern District trial court
Graziosi v. City of Greenville, No. 4:12-cv-68-MPM-DAS, (N.D. Miss. Dec. 3, 2013):

  • 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172581 [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Young Conway, The Delaware Employment Lawyer, at http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.com/2013/12/facebook-posts-by-police-officer-not-protected-by-the-1st-amendment.html.

Susan Graziosi had been employed by the police department for 26 years. She posted a complaint that the mayor had not attended the funeral service for a fellow officer killed in the line of duty. Though there was no profanity, the tone of the posting was found to be very negative. The chief was concerned about the effect of the posting on his ability to lead the department effectively.


Public employees and First Amendment protection: The initial determination is whether:

  • the speech in question is entitled to constitutional protection and

  • the employee’s free-speech interests outweigh the employer’s interest in maintaining an efficient and effective workplace.

In public safety matters, this is an important factor.
Trial court ruling:

  • her posting was not a matter of general public concern, but rather a personal matter, and

  • the chief’s interest in maintaining his authority and preserving close working relationships in his department outweighed constitutional protection.

The law firm article provides eight related social media resources.


NLRA: resisting organization, Taft-Hartley Act – LMRA § 302, certiorari denied
Jurisdiction: NLRB
UNITE HERE Local 355 v. Mulhall:

  • http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-99.htm.

  • http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/12-99.

  • http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_12_99 [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • http://washingtonexaminer.com/supreme-court-drops-major-labor-organizing-case/article/2540501.

The issue was whether an employer’s actions assisting a union in organizing employees were a violation of section 302 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.


Litigation: forum selection, challenge – waiver, forum non-conveniens doctrine, enforcement
Jurisdiction: All
Atl. Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 12-929 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2013); http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-929_olq2.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
“Forum selection” refers to where a litigant should file suit. Though this case is not about employment law litigation, it is one that likely would provide persuasive authority to lower court about how to resolve issues of forum selection. Often an employment contract will specify where a dispute can be litigated and what laws will apply.
Background:

  • Companies in Texas and Virginia contracted for construction work in Texas.

  • The contract specified that litigation must be conducted in Virginia.

  • A dispute arose and the Texas company filed suit in Texas.

  • On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce the contractual requirement of litigating in Virginia because Texas would be the more convenient forum for the litigation.

  • The United States Supreme Court reversed that ruling because:

    • . . . When the parties have agreed to a valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the forum specified in that clause.

    • Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the parties should a [motion to transfer] be denied . . . and

. . . such contractual requirements “. . . should be given great weight”.
This opinion is twenty pages long, but the three pages of syllabus and summary provide a quick overview of the decision. Litigators may well benefit from studying the full text of the opinion.
Non-compete: agreement inapplicable – startup
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Berk Enterprises, Inc. v. Polivka, 11th Dist. No. 2012-T-0073, 2013-Ohio-4961; http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/11/2013/2013-ohio-4961.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
The non-compete agreement was inapplicable because:

  • though the business was similar,

  • it was in the startup phase and would not begin operations until the one-year competition restriction had elapsed.

Whistleblower: reporting, protection – third party necessary


Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Haynes v. Formac Stables, Inc., No. W2013-00535-COA-R3-CV (TN.Ct.App., 12/4/13); http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/haynescharlesopn.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Under Tennessee law, whistleblower protection applies only if the wrongdoing is reported to a third party, i.e., someone other than the alleged wrongdoer. In this case one of the wrongdoers was the owner of the company.
ADA, FMLA: drugs, alcohol, relapse, rehabilitation, return-to-work agreement (RWA) – “last­-­chance rule” agreement, trucking company, motor carrier safety regulations, strict screening – prohibitions, adequate investigation, adverse employment action – termination, motivation
Jurisdiction: 3rd Circuit

Sources:


  • Ostrowski v. Con-way Freight, Inc., No. 12-3800 (3rd Cir., 10/30/13, unpublished, not precedential), http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/123800np.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Ogletree Deakins law firm instructive article at http://www.employmentlawmatters.net/2013/11/articles/ada/termination-of-employee-for-entering-alcohol-rehab-after-a-last-chance-agreement-not-necessarily-a-violation-of-the-ada/

Return-to-work agreements are not unconditionally or automatically deemed to violate these acts. The key issue is the motivation of the employer.


ADA: Appellate reasoning - RWAs that impose employment conditions and/or standards different from those of other employees can be allowed when they differentiate between:

  • discrimination for a disability and

  • failure to successfully carry out the RWA requirements.

There is a difference between focusing on the condition rather than the misconduct.
FMLA: From the appellate decision:
Ostrowski’s claims under the FMLA fail for much the same reason. Ostrowski alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for his request for medical leave. Even he acknowledges, however, that Con-way terminated his employment because of his breach of the RWA. Ostrowski submits no evidence suggesting that Con-way would not have discharged him had he not requested FMLA-protected leave.
Title VII: hostile work environment, female victim, former prisoner, crude conduct - small work space – close proximity – sniffing – severe – pervasive, retaliation
Jurisdiction: 5th Circuit

Sources:


  • Royal v. CCC&R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., No 12-11022 (5th Cir., 11/21/13), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/12/12-11022-CV0.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Work Matters article by Michael P. Maslanka at http://texaslawyer.typepad.com/work_matters/2013/11/fifth-circuit-gives-plaintiffs-cause-for-thanksgiving.html.

Confrontations were too close for comfort and too often to ignore. This case (and footnotes) and the article warrant close attention to learn how crude conduct can cross the line to create a hostile work environment.


Title VII: gender, summary judgment dismissal affirmed, failure of proof – knew or should have known
Debord v. Mercy Health System of Kansas, Inc., et al., Nos. 12-3072 and 12-3109 (10th Cir., 11/26/13): http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/12/12-3072.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Summary by the appellate court:
Sara Debord filed suit against her employer, Mercy Health Services of Kansas, for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Debord claims Mercy knew or should have known that her supervisor created a hostile workplace through unwanted touching and offensive sexual remarks. She also claims that Mercy did not do enough to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace, and that, when she finally reported the harassment, Mercy retaliated by firing her.
After reviewing the evidence at summary judgment, the district court concluded there was no triable issue of material fact. We agree. The record does not disclose that Mercy knew or should have known about Debord’s allegations of a hostile workplace, and she has not provided a reasonable explanation for the nearly five years she waited to first report the harassment. Nor is there a genuine dispute about whether Mercy honestly held legitimate reasons for terminating Debord based on its conclusion that she was dishonest and disruptive during Mercy’s investigation of allegations about her supervisor’s conduct and claims she improperly received extra pay.
Debord resists these conclusions with myriad arguments, but none is sufficiently developed or supported by the record to merit a trial.
Arbitration, Litigation: pro se, declaratory judgment, failure to vacate award, res judicata, litigation costs

  • Discrimination: gender, race, age, deficient performance, misconduct – integrity, adverse employment action, retaliation

  • Statutes: Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621-634, Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 6-1-101 to -115

  • Common law: independent contractor, breach of contract, wrongful termination, unclean hands, fraud, defamation, economic duress


Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Adams v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., No. 13-1162 (10th Cir., 11/26/13), http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1162.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
Attempting to brief this complex case (as indicated by all of the search tags) might omit important details. Litigators may find it valuable. Basically, all of the issues either had already been arbitrated or could not be litigated at this point in the proceedings, or were insufficiently supported by the plaintiff’s offers of proof.
Medical Care: New Mexico Review Organization Immunity Act (ROIA), adverse employment action

  • attorneys: fees, general

  • constitutional law: due process

  • contracts: implied contract

  • employment law: attorney fees, disciplinary action, employment contract, retaliatory discharge, termination of employment

  • juries: general

  • miscellaneous statutes: review organization immunity act

  • remedies: punitive damages

  • statutes: legislative intent

  • torts: proximate cause


Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Yedidag, M.D., v. Roswell Clinic Corp., et al., No. 31,653 (NMCA, 7/3/13)

  • 2013-NMCA-096; 52-48 SBB 21 (11/2713); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCACurrent.aspx/NMCA/2013/NMCA/2013/NMCA/2013/13ca-096.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]

  • certiorari granted, No. 33,993 (NMSC, 9/27/13); http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMAR.aspx.

This case has been submitted to the NM Supreme Court for review. It is noted here to alert litigators and practitioners of the issues that are involved and pending final decision.


Summary by the NM Court of Appeals:
{1} Plaintiff-Appellee Dr. Emre Yedidag was terminated from his position as a general surgeon by his employer Defendants- Appellants Roswell Clinic Corporation and Roswell Hospital Corporation d/b/a Eastern New Mexico Medical Center (collectively, Eastern). Dr. Yedidag’s termination occurred within days after he participated in an internal hospital surgical peer review meeting that included review of surgical care provided by one of Dr. Yedidag’s colleagues at Eastern. Following the peer review meeting, two Eastern employees who were present at the meeting disclosed to Eastern administrators their belief that Dr. Yedidag had engaged in unprofessional and aggressive behavior at the peer review meeting. Dr. Yedidag filed suit against Eastern following his termination, alleging that he was fired as a result of his participation in the peer review meeting. The jury determined that Eastern violated the New Mexico Review Organization Immunity Act (the ROIA), NMSA 1978, §§ 41-9-1 to -7 (1979, as amended through 2011), and breached an implied promise in Dr. Yedidag’s employment agreement that he would not face adverse employment consequences as a result of his participation in the hospital’s peer review process.
{2} Eastern’s primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred in allowing Dr. Yedidag to bring a private cause of action under the ROIA. Eastern also raises arguments regarding the propriety of the implied promise contractual cause of action, the jury’s award of punitive damages, the jury polling process, the admission of medical evidence at trial, and the award of attorney fees. As a matter of first impression, we hold that a member of a peer review organization can bring a private cause of action for an alleged violation of the ROIA’s confidentiality provision, Section 41-9-5. We also conclude that the district court did not err with respect to Eastern’s remaining arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the jury verdict.
Drugs: testing, county probation department, independent contractor laboratory – professionally accepted testing standards, negligence, litigation
Jurisdiction: New York
Sources:

  • Landon v. Kroll Laboratory Specialists Inc., No. 6597 (NYCA, 10/10/13, slip opinion *); http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps/Decisions/2013/Oct13/142opn13-Decision.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Jackson Lewis extensive and valuable discussion article at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources.php?NewsID=4657.

The New York Court of Appeals decided in a 4-3 split decision to allow a convicted county probationer to sue for negligence in the testing process. This is important if methods other than urine specimens are used:



  • The county used an oral swab that was reported as positive for THC.

  • The probationer went on the same day to another lab and gave a urine test that was negative for THC.

Read the law firm article as a study guide for suggestions on how to handle such situations.


[* Slip opinion definition from Your Dictionary: http://www.yourdictionary.com/slip-opinion.]
Arbitration: compel; illusory, unconscionable, FAA rules
Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit, California law
Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Company, No. 11-56673 (9th Cir., 11/28/13); http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/10/28/11-56673.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].
This arbitration case deals with federal and state arbitration law.
Summary by the appellate court:
The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of defendant grocery company’s motion to compel arbitration in an action asserting claims under California labor law on behalf of the plaintiff and a proposed class of other grocery employees.
The grocery company sought to compel arbitration of the plaintiff’s individual claim pursuant to its arbitration policy, to which all employees acceded upon submitting applications for employment.
The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that the arbitration policy was unconscionable under California contract law and therefore unenforceable. The panel held that the policy was procedurally unconscionable because it was a condition of applying for employment and was presented on a “ take it or leave it” basis. In addition, its terms were not provided to the plaintiff until three weeks after she had agreed to be bound by it.
The panel held that the arbitration policy was substantively unconscionable because it was unjustifiably one-sided to such an extent that it “shocked the conscience.” Specifically, the policy’s arbitrator selection process would always produce an arbitrator proposed by the defendant in employee-initiated arbitration proceedings; the policy precluded institutional arbitration administrators, which have established rules and procedures to select a neutral arbitrator; and the policy’s arbitrator-fee-apportionment provision would have the effect of pricing employees out of the dispute resolution process. The panel distinguished Kilgore v. KeyBank National Ass’n, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (holding that mere risk that plaintiff will face prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify invalidating arbitration agreement), on the basis that the defendant’s policy’s fee provision stood by other unconscionable terms and was not speculative.
The panel held that the state law supporting the unconscionability holding was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act because it applied to contracts generally and did not in practice impact arbitration agreements disproportionately . The panel held that the Supreme Court’s decision in American Express Corp. v. Italian Colors Restaurant , 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013) (upholding arbitration policy with class waiver provision on basis that expense of proving statutory remedy did not eliminate right to pursue that remedy), did not preclude it from considering the cost that the defendant’ s arbitration agreement imposed on employees in order for them to bring a claim.
The panel affirmed the decision of the district court denying the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Title VII:

Discrimination: race, retaliation, adverse employment action, union seniority, testing, safety violations,

Evidence: pattern and practice, unqualified, McDonnell Douglas evidence test – no pretext, summary dismissal
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Jeffrey v. C. P. Kelco U.S., Inc., No. 13-7005 (10th Cir., 11/14/13); www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-7005.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version].

The applicant failed to prove he was qualified for promotion to the position which, together with his misconduct, was sufficient evidence of the employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory business decision not to promote him.


Unfair Competition, Trade Secrets: breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, interference with business relations, conversion
Jurisdiction: California
Angelica Textile Servs., Inc. v. Park et al., No. D062405 (Cal.App.4th Dist.@@Div, 10/29/13 and amended on 11/15/13); sources:

  • http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D062405M.PDF and correction at http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D062405N.PDF [enhanced lexis.com version].

  • Littler Mendelson law firm explanatory article at http://www.littler.com/unfair-competition-trade-secrets-counsel/california-appellate-court-clarifies-scope-utsa-preemption#sthash.e8xPDY45.dpuf.

those state common law [i.e., non-statutory] legal theories are preempted by California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA).
ERISA: long-term disability (LTD), short-term disability (STD), denial of benefits
Jurisdiction: 10th Circuit
Hart v. Capgemini U.S. LLC Welfare Benefit Plan Administration Document, No. 13-1001 (10th Cir, 11/15/13); http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/13/13-1001.pdf [enhanced lexis.com version]
Hart’s appeal, contended that :

  • the state court improperly vacated the default judgment;

  • the district court applied an incorrect standard of review of Capgemini’s denial of benefits;

  • he is entitled to a jury trial; and

  • the district court erred in disposing of the case after briefing on the administrative record.

Summary by the appellate court:


Plaintiff Scott Hart appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of defendant Capgemini U.S. LLC Welfare Benefit Plan Administration Document (Capgemini), denying him long-term disability (LTD) benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. § 1291, we affirm.
Reasoning: The state court’s actions were proper [paraphrasing the decision].

  • Default judgment: It was properly set aside because of faulty service of process on the defendant.

  • Jury trial demand: Seventh Amendment does not guarantee a right to a jury trial in an action for benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) because the relief is equitable rather than legal.

  • Evidence: A plaintiff seeking review of an ERISA benefit denial is not entitled to present evidence outside the administrative record to prove his or her claim. On the contrary, in reviewing a plan administrator’s decision for abuse of discretion, “federal courts are limited to the administrative record – the materials compiled by the administrator in the course of making his decision.”

ERISA: plan – amendments – enhancements, timing, statutory protection – anti-cutback rules – 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1)


Jurisdiction: 1st Circuit
Bonneau v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 51 Pension Trust Fund, No. 13-1515 (1st Cir., 11/15/13); http://media.ca1.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/getopn.pl?OPINION=13-1515P.01A [enhanced lexis.com version].
Timing:

  • if the benefit enhancement is adopted while the employees are still employed, the resulting benefits are protected, but

  • if they are adopted after retirement or termination of employment, they are not protected by ERISA.

Summary by the appellate court:


This is a dispute between a group of now-retired union employees over certain "banked hour" benefits which their union Pension Trust wants to eliminate, and the Trust, which is in distress and trying to find sources of funding to meet its obligations to its larger group of plan participants. The Trustees agreed not to impose the cuts until a court had finally determined whether these cuts, effectuated through Plan Amendment Nine, violated the anti-cutback provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., which protects "accrued benefits" against reduction by amendment. Id. § 1054(g)(1).
This case raises a question of first impression in this circuit as to whether a retroactively conferred benefit during the course of employment constitutes a "benefit attributable to service" and so an "accrued benefit" for purposes of ERISA's anti-cutback rule. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs. While the Trustees' arguments to the contrary are far from frivolous, we find the plaintiffs' benefits are in fact "accrued" and that Amendment Nine would violate the anti-cutback provisions. We affirm the district court on this basis.
Title VII: race, retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17, performance deficiencies – Performance Improvement Plan (PIP), McDonnell Douglas, summary judgment dismissal
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