WEAK ON DEFENSE KILLS START

WEAK ON DEFENSE KILLS START

AVOIDING PERCEPTION OF BEING SOFT ON DEFENSE KEY TO ARMS CONTROL TREATIES

Krepon, ’91 (Michael, President of Stimson Institute, The Politics of Arms Control)

Presidential standing on arms control issues derives from at least three critical elements. First, the president may enjoy standing owing to a perception that he is a staunch defender of U.S. national security interests (which has been especially true in the periodic confrontations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China that characterized the Cold War). Second, standing can also derive from a perception that the president is knowledgeable about the issues being negotiated and from a reputation that he is a keen observer of international politics. Finally, standing can derive from a president's overall popularity, which can translate into greater clout on substantive issues. Each of these sources of presidential standing have helped immeasurably in facilitating the White House's ability to work effectively with the Senate during the treaty ratification process. Occupants of the White House who have combined staunch national interest or anticommunist credentials with substantive knowledge of the arcane issues of nuclear diplomacy, such as Richard M. Nixon and John F. Kennedy, have been ideally positioned to secure the high ground in ratification debates with treaty opponents. Future presidents who lack both of these qualities will find themselves and their treaties inviting targets on Capitol Hill. On the other hand, presidents perceived as firm defenders of U.S. interests abroad and were popular at home have not needed to be well versed in negotiating history or international diplomacy to fare well in treaty ratification debates. In such circumstances presidents have maintained their standing as long as they were able to rely on trusted, experienced advisers.
WEAK ON DEFENSE IS POLITICAL SUICIDE.

San Francisco Chronicle, ’07 (2/10)

But even with a Democratic Congress, Cohen admits he doesn't expect the Common Sense Budget Act to pass.
"If you talk about reducing the Pentagon budget, you're accused of being weak on defense," Cohen said. "That's political suicide." Pitney agreed. "It's the rare Democrat who really wants to take a meat ax to the Pentagon," he said.
Even if its not actually true – fear of the label chills and demoralizes supporters

Kitfield, ’09 (James, award winning defense and foreign affairs correspondent, National Journal, 5/30)

.Cirincione believes that the disarmament steps Obama has outlined will eventually lead to more cooperation on preventing proliferation, which will increase security, making room for further disarmament and cooperation. "With luck, that coin will just keep flipping over and over, until eventually a lot of things become possible," he said. "My biggest concern, however, is the cynicism that has built up on this issue that tends to disparage the whole nonproliferation agenda. That cynicism chills politicians and officials who are worried about looking weak, and it demoralizes those who fear they are wasting time on a hopeless agenda. That kind of fatalism really is our greatest adversary."
Specifically freezes democrat support

Lewis, ’09 (Matt, Conservative Political Commentator, The Political Machine, 2/26)

Post-9-11, many Democrats put aside partisanship (you could argue whether this was due to patriotism or pragmatism due to Bush -- at the time -- sky-high approval ratings) and voted to authorize George W. Bush to use force in Iraq. The political reason Democrats went along with this was that most of the top-tier Democratic presidential candidates, such as John Kerry, believed it would be political suicide to appear "weak" on national security and foreign policy (this also hurt Hillary Clinton's '08 run).

WEAK ON DEFENSE KILLS ARMS CONTROL

Perception of president as “Soft on defense” kills arms control treaties

Krepon, ’91 (Michael, President of Stimson Institute, The Politics of Arms Control)

As Dan Caldwell's case study of the SALT II Treaty indicates, the Soviet Union's troubling international behavior badly compounded the domestic misgivings that had been fostered about the agreement by the Kremlin's mistreatment of religious and ethnic minorities. President Jimmy Carter was not widely perceived as being "tough" enough in protecting U.S. interests abroad; presidents benefiting from greater standing as staunch defenders of U.S. security have had considerable latitude in dealing with the misbehavior of negotiating partners.

Perception of presidential weakness on defense derail congressional support for arms control

Krepon, ’91 (Michael, President of Stimson Institute, The Politics of Arms Control)

Conversely, a deep knowledge of negotiating issues does not guarantee sufficient presidential standing in the Senate, particularly if the occupant in the White House is not personally popular or is perceived as weak in defending U.S. national interests abroad. No president was better versed in the details of negotiations than Jimmy Carter, but hampered by Soviet adventurism, he fared poorly in his dealings with the Senate. As Dan Caldwell notes, Carter's lack of personal popularity, his reputation as a vacillating figure in dealing with the Kremlin, and a weak congressional relations team handicapped the president's recruitment of undecided senators.

Krepon, ’91 (Michael, President of Stimson Institute, The Politics of Arms Control)

Jimmy Carter's experience suggests that a president lacking in popularity and national security credentials could well find his standing further weakened as a result of arms control treaties completed under his auspices. The contentious ratification of the Panama Canal treaties constituted a Pyrrhic victory, since they weakened the president's stature as a defender of U.S. interests abroad.29 Conservative groups that mobilized during this debate successfully honed their tactics for the SALT controversy to follow, during which Carter's standing was eroded still further by political ferment in Iran. Woodrow Wilson's popularity and stature also suffered as a result of his role in the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson left for Europe as a peacemaker; he returned as a dealmaker who got caught up in Old World intrigues, alienating a number of domestic ethnic groups in the bargain. In contrast, Richard M. Nixon's standing was enhanced by the SALT i accords: his popularity and electoral prospects improved, despite the fact that he was prosecuting an increasingly unpopular war while the Watergate storm front was appearing on the horizon. Similarly, John F. Kennedy's popularity was boosted as a result of the signing and ratification of the LTBT. Where presidential standing is concerned, conservatism on national security issues has, as it does in so many other aspects of politics of treaty ratification, multiple rewards.