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YES BLAME FOR AGENCY ACTION
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YES BLAME FOR AGENCY ACTIONAGENCY ACTION IS CONNECTED TO THE PRESIDENT. Cohen and Collier 99 (Jeffrey E. and Ken, professors of political science at Fordham and Kansas, 1999 Presidential Policymaking: An End of Century Assessment, p. 42) In his study of the agenda-setting process, Kingdon finds that respondents cite the president and his administration as perhaps the most important actor with agenda influence. As Kingdon states, "there is little doubt that the president remains a powerful force in agenda setting, particularly compared to other actors." Moreover, the views of department heads and others associated with the administration are usually thought of as the president's or as having the president's stamp of approval. When they speak, it is for the administration and the president. Thus, the president has many "voices". NO POLITICAL COVER – PRESIDENT GETS THE BLAME. Lewis 3 (David E., prof. politics and public affairs @ Princeton, 2003 Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design, p. 4) Agency design determines bureaucratic responsiveness to democratic impulses and pressure, particularly those channeled through elected officials like the president. It can determine the success or failure of modern presidents in meeting constitutional and electoral mandates. One of the central concerns of presidency scholars beginning with Richard Neustadt (1960) has been increasing public expectations of presidents (Lowi 1985; Skowronek 1993). The president is held accountable for the success or failure of the entire government. When the economy is in recession, when an agency blunders, or when some social problem goes unaddressed, it is the president whose reelection and historical legacy are on the line. AGENCY ACTION CAUSES MASSIVE CONGRESSIONAL BACKLASH. MARKEY 90. [Edward, Democratic Congressman from MA, “Congress to Administrative agencies: creater, overseer, and partner” Duke Law journal -- Nov -- lexis] Both the Reagan and Bush administrations have witnessed great confrontations between Congress and administrative agencies. The great battles of this time have been characterized by instances of rigid adherence to an ideological agenda by administrative agencies, which in turn has created countervailing pressures for rigidity by a Congress that views its legal mandates under attack. When Congress is faced with the direct and heavy-handed undermining of its intent -- whether expressed clearly [*982] or ambiguously -- Congress must respond in the strongest fashion possible. Congress has responded with heightened use of the most prominent weapons in the congressional arsenal: oversight hearings, strongly-worded letters, and press conferences. The difficult process of legislation becomes even more hazardous when Congress and the executive branch are controlled by competing parties. NO BLAME FOR AGENCY ACTIONAVOIDS POLITICS – SHIELDS THE LINK. Schoenbrod ’93 (David,- professor of law at NYU “Power Without Responsibility” pg. 95-96) Second, presidents must take personal responsibility for laws embodied in statues that they sign, but they can shift some of the blame for agency laws to the agency. Shifting blame is easy when as independent agency has made the law, because the leaders of such agencies do not serve at the president’s pleasure. Presidents also often avoid substantial political losses they might sustain for the unpopular action of appointees who do serve at the president’s please by taking no position on what the agency has done or even by expressing some disagreement. Indeed, even incumbent presidents try to “run against the government.” President George Bush tried to distance himself from agency laws promulgated during his administration by declaring a ninety-day moratorium on new agency laws before the 1992 elections. Third, delegation enhances the president’s ability to use his staff to do casework. It thereby allows the president as well as legislators to particularize constituents’ perceptions of costs and benefits. President Reagan and Bush made much of separation of powers --- but usually to defend executive powers from congressional encroachment and never to prevent Congress from delegating its legislative power to the executive branch. Delegation does not change the cast of officials who participate in lawmaking: legislators, agency heads, the president, and their staffs. But delegation does allow legislators and the president to shift to the agency blame for the costs of complying with the laws, blame for the failure to deliver promised regulatory benefits, and blame for the delay, complexity, and confusion that the process causes. Delegation also increases the opportunity for legislators and the president to do politically valuable casework. AGENCY ACTION SHIELDS LINK -- DELAYS OPPORTUNITY FOR BLAME. Schoenbrod 93 [David,- professor of law at NYU “Power Without Responsibility” pg. 95] The president, who of course influences the design of legislation through recommendations and vetoes, has different incentives from legislators. When legislators shift blame or credit to an agency, they shift it to presidential appointees. The incentives for legislators to delegate might appear to be disincentives for the president. However, three factors work to attract the president to delegation. First, statues often are structured so that the disappointed expectations of would be beneficiaries and the costs to others are perceived after the next presidential election. For instance, the 1970 Clean Air Act was structured so that the EPA administrator would deal with states’ failures to adopt plans only after the 1972 election. INDEPENDENT AGENCIES PROVIDE POLITICAL COVER FRIEDEN 92. [Jeffry, Economic Integration and the Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States, Occasional Paper Series, 93-2, October 1992, http://www.cappp.ucla.edu/papers/cappp932.txt] For all intents and purposes, Congress virtually neglected monetary and exchange rate policy for nearly forty years after the New Deal reforms.[50] A number of reasons for this might be adduced. One possibility--often mentioned in the analogous literature on trade policy as well as in discussions of central bank autonomy--is that Congress recognized the efficiency gains to be made by delegating responsibility to an independent agency. Not only could the agency pursue welfare-improving policies without having to pay attention to political pressures, but Congress was provided with an ideal scapegoat to avoid direct blame. In this view the Fad was in fact implementing true Congressional preferences, just in a way that protected Congress from responsibility for unpopular monetary policies.[51 Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. 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