Intervention and Escalation: violence in american labor disputes, a comparative perspective

Download 0.8 Mb.

Page	2/4
Date	02.06.2018
Size	0.8 Mb.
	#52834

1 2 3 4

The Pullman Strike

The boundaries and context of the Homestead strike was fairly straight forward, and the lines of the dispute were relatively well-drawn. Although the union represented only a fraction of the workforce, it had been able to establish a contract and work rules. The failure of the AAISW and Carnegie management to agree to a new contract resulted in a lockout and strike, in a town that was populated by the workers and their families. Essentially, the conflict was one between the town and the company. The case of the Pullman strike is not so “black and white”. The workers went on strike to reverse wage cuts and to protest the living conditions in the “model town”. After joining the embryonic American Railway Union, the shop workers found themselves tied to a nationwide rail boycott, and confronted with military intervention and the power of the Federal judicial system.

To understand the dispute at Pullman, it must be seen as two different spheres of industrial conflict. First is the town of Pullman itself. Here the workers refrained from using violence as a strike tactic, and sought to protect company property from harm. The second sphere involves the American Railway Union and its sympathy boycott. This became a national issue, and the Federal government intervened to end the strike and to protect railroad property from destructive mobs within the Chicago area.

First, I will address the Pullman Palace Car Company and its founder, George Pullman. In the second section the “model town” of Pullman will be examined. The issues that the residents faced-such as extensive rules, high rents, political domination and repression of labor organization - formed the roots of labor’s antagonism against the company. The third section will focus on the various types of wages and workers employed in the Pullman shops. Fourth, I will address the American Railway Union, why the workers looked towards Eugene V. Debs for assistance, and Pullman’s response to worker grievances.

The Industry: George Pullman

Founded in 1867, George Pullman’s Pullman Palace Car Company was the leading manufacturing of luxury train cars in the United States in the late nineteenth-century. In 1867, it possessed assets worth an estimated $10 million dollars. By 1893, this figure had increased to approximately $62 million.^¹⁰⁸ In 1894, its output comprised three-fourths of the sleeper cars used on U.S. rails. Pullman was able to expand his company by absorbing the competition. By 1889, there were only two companies producing train cars nationally; the extent of Pullman’s monopoly of the industry is shown by the fact that in 1894, the company’s sleeping car service covered 125,000 miles, three-fourths of the railroads in the United States.^¹⁰⁹

In order to meet the demand for larger repair and production operations, the company decided to consolidate its major operations at one location. In 1880, the company expanded its production facilities in order to begin manufacturing all types of railroad cars for the general market. The company built new works twelve miles south of Chicago, Illinois.

The dining, parlor and sleeping cars were produced exclusively for use by the company, and the number manufactured annually fluctuated with the business cycle. In 1893, 314 cars were produced, increasing the number of Pullman owned cars to 2,573.^¹¹⁰ By allowing the cars to be used on any line, the Pullman Company required a written contract, under which it obtained the net revenue from the sale of accommodations in the cars. The conductors, porters, cooks and waiters were provided by the Pullman Company. Prior to 1873, the individual railroads were in charge of maintenance; afterward, the Pullman Company began to repair its own product with the agreement that in return for this service, Pullman would receive a two-cent per mileage fee for each ticket sold.^¹¹¹ Contract stipulations controlled the prices charged for berths and other services, and poor economic conditions did not affect the fees Pullman charged. The rates charged by the company and its domination of the market were often challenged. The co-sponsor of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Senator John Sherman stated in 1894: “I regard the Pullman Company and the Sugar Trust^¹¹² as the most outrageous monopolies of the day. They make enormous profits and give their patrons little or nothing in return in proportion.”^¹¹³

In the Pullman shops, 60-70% of its construction work was based on outside contracts. In 1891, for example, 64% of the employees were building cars for the general market. In comparison, only 18% were engaged in repair departments and a similar percentage was involved in the construction of Palace cars. However, once the economic depression hit in 1894, the market for new cars declined and only a small percentage of workers were employed in outside contract work.^¹¹⁴

In case of economic downturns, the Pullman Company maintained a financial reserve, which surpassed $25 million dollars in 1893. With such a reserve, the company was able to fill orders that the railroads were unable to pay for during the depression, giving Pullman an advantage over its competitors. During the economic crisis of the mid-1890s, Pullman’s stock market shares never dropped below $150 per share.^¹¹⁵ The crisis resulted in severe wage reductions, but did not reduce the regular distribution of profits.^¹¹⁶

The Model Town

Since craftsmen comprised three-fifths of his workforce, Pullman sought to attract skilled workers to the new facility which was built in a sparsely populated area.^¹¹⁷ Construction began in 1880, and included gas, water, and sewer lines; as well as streets, homes and public buildings. Most of the buildings and all of the homes were made of brick and had slate roofs. In addition, the town possessed a library, theater, stores, school, church, parks, lumberyard, and dairy farm. The town did not have a hospital or jail due to their availability in the nearby town of Hyde Park.

In 1894, there were 1800 residences of varying size and condition; from two room apartments, to three-story houses, to brickyard shanties without modern sewage facilities or other amenities.^¹¹⁸ Ten large tenement buildings were constructed, each three stories tall and housed between twelve to forty-eight families. The facilities in the tenements were sparse; there was only one water faucet for each group of five families; and one toilet for two or more families. In contrast, there were nine-room houses built for company officials, which contained all of the modern conveniences. The standard home was two stories, five rooms, and included indoor plumbing.

Rent in Pullman was 25% higher than in nearby Chicago.^¹¹⁹ The company did not allow its workers to own homes within the town, however, a few employees did own homes outside of Pullman; prior to 1893, only one-sixth of the workers were homeowners.^¹²⁰ Aside from the high rent charges, the Pullman Company did make a profit off the company town, most significantly in the area of utilities. Gas was sold for $2.25 per thousand cubic feet, compared to $1.25 in nearby Chicago. Water, which cost the company four-cents per thousand gallons, was sold to the residents for ten-cents.^¹²¹

The town's population varied in accordance with fluctuations within the industry. Prior to the economic crisis of the 1890s, the population peaked at 12,500; by 1895, it fell to approximately 8,000.^¹²² Moreover, during economic downturns, those residing within the town were given the first priority for work. In 1893, one-half of the workers were residents of Pullman; the following year, the number increased to more than two-thirds.^¹²³ A majority of the residents were foreign-born. In 1884, immigrants comprised 51% of the population; by 1892, the percentage increased to 72% percent. In that year, 23% percent of the population was Scandinavian; 12% British; 12% German; 10% Dutch; and 5% percent Irish.^¹²⁴

The dominance of George Pullman within the town was evident in several areas. However, the town was not an island; rather, it belonged politically to the town of Hyde Park. Although Pullman was a part of a larger political entity, George Pullman's control over the model town was practically absolute. Hyde Park was in charge of taxes, police and wholesale water rates; however, because of his immense wealth and ability to influence local elections, the town’s trustees were restricted by the influence of Pullman.

The employees were pressured to vote for candidates endorsed by Pullman, and political opposition was suppressed when possible. John P Hopkins, a company official and active member of the Democratic Party actively supported the presidential candidacy of the Grover Cleveland, in opposition to and challenging Pullman's support of the Republican presidential candidate. As a result, Hopkins was fired and forced to leave town.^¹²⁵

Pullman also attempted to dominate the souls of his employees. In 1893, there were at least fifteen different religious denominations but only one church. If one wished to provide services to his congregation in the church, they would have to pay rent to do so. The report of the U.S. Strike Commission noted that the church and its parsonage were "very attractive structures", but were often unoccupied because the rent was higher than any church group was willing to pay.^¹²⁶ Those wishing to establish their own church were forbidden from purchasing property in town, and had to rent space in the casino, arcade and market.

The town rules enforced by Pullman were wide ranging, from the banning of chickens to the prohibition of saloons.^¹²⁷ By signing the lease, the renter/worker agreed to follow all rules:

Tenants should always enter or leave the building quietly; always avoid entering the halls with muddy feet; never permit hammering, pounding or splitting of wood upon the floors or in the cellars, or anything which disturbs and annoys those occupying neighboring rooms; avoid the use of musical instruments after bedtime; avoid all loud noises or boisterous conduct that might annoy others or disturb the sick and the weary; avoid loitering in the stairways; avoid smoking in the cellars; always fill and trim lamps in the forenoon;...always leave some ashes in the bottom of the stove...^¹²⁸

In addition, the renter was forbidden from planting gardens, driving tacks or nails,

or altering the premises in any way without the written consent of the town authorities.

The lease was an important tool to stifle the dissent and rid the town of

"undesirables". The renter/worker was obliged to sign the contract which stated that it could be voided within ten days by either party. Although this provision of the lease was rarely used by the company, it provided an effective threat to keep the opposition at bay.^¹²⁹ The watchful eye of the company was ever present in the town. Company "spies" were placed within the town to report on any suspicious activity, and labor organizers and possible "radicals" were banned from using the public halls.

The omnipresent paternalism of George Pullman was a constant source of frustration for the residents, who complained that the town was merely a showplace for visitors, while they had to live in overcrowded tenement blocks, with 300 to 500 persons in each.^¹³⁰Other grievances included political domination, inflated prices, tenant control and the prohibition of private homeownership within the town.

The lack of worker autonomy, surveillance by company officials, tenant restrictions, added to the escalating antagonism towards the company. An investigation into the conditions at Pullman by the Chicago Tribune in 1888 resulted in the paper declaring that the town was a "pent-up Utopia":

There are variety and freedom on the outside. There are monotony and surveillance on the inside. None of the "superior", or "scientific" advantages of the model city will compensate for the restrictions on the freedom of the workmen, the denial of opportunities of ownership, the heedless and vexatious parade of authority, and the sense of injustice arising from the well founded belief that the charges of the company for rent, heat, gas, water, etc., are excessive - if not extortionate...Pullman may appear to be all glitter and glow, all gladness and glory to the casual visitor, but there is the deep, dark background of discontent which it would be idle to deny.^¹³¹
Following the strike, the U.S. Strike Commission found the situation within the town was a major cause of labor tensions which led to the conflict. The report stated that while the aesthetic features of the town were admirable to visitors, it was of little value to the inhabitants, especially when rent was excessively high. The commission disputed the company's claim that the employees were free to live outside of Pullman; the fear of losing work kept the employees in the town. In addition, the Commission admonished the company's policy of reducing wages while maintaining the level of rent. Pullman believed that the two matters were "distinct" and that it was the company's right to hire workers as cheaply as possible, while maintaining rents regardless of the amount paid elsewhere.^¹³²

The Worker

There does not appear to be a definitive answer as to how many people were working in the Pullman shops, prior; estimates range from 4000, to as high as 5500^¹³³. For the sake of this investigation I will use the research of David Montgomery who estimated between 4400 and 4800 workers in the various departments prior to the onset of the economic crisis in April 1893.^¹³⁴

Within the shops there was a wide array of occupations. When the Pullman workers joined the ARU, there were nineteen locals each based on a separate craft or department.^¹³⁵ Montgomery estimates that craftsmen made up three-fifths of the combined workforce, followed by operatives, who comprised one-fifth of the workers, followed by the laborers who constituted the remaining one-fifth.^¹³⁶ The woodworking craftsmen were the most numerous.^¹³⁷ The truck builders, blacksmiths and machinists who fabricated metal components and tools totaled less than 250 workers.^¹³⁸

The workday within the Pullman shops fluctuated between ten and eleven hours.

When testifying before the U.S. Strike Commission, the Pullman Vice-President Thomas H. Wickes labeled 2,625 of the workers as “journeymen mechanics”, whose pay averaged $2.63 per day in 1893.^¹³⁹ The other workers - numbering 1,808 – averaged $1.67 per day. A union leader, also testifying before the Commission, described 800 of the “other” workers as common laborers. Within the remaining 1000 workers were the assistants and apprentices of the carvers and blacksmiths. Montgomery estimates that this segment constituted approximately one-fifth of the workforce.

Workers were generally paid by the piece. George Pullman declared that piecework was an “educational tool” and that “it offered incentive to the worker to improve his skills”.^¹⁴⁰ Determining whether this was applied to all of the workers is a bit troublesome, because of the arbitrary nature of the wage system at Pullman. The U.S. Strike Commission estimated that 2800 of the employees were paid by the piece at the time of the strike. In other areas, foremen fixed the wage rates and determined how each worker and job should be compensated.^¹⁴¹

An example of the arbitrary character of the wage system was found in the construction of new car bodies. In the car-building department, piecework began as a type of inside contracting; two to five men built the body for a set price, and then divided the sum amongst themselves. The money was distributed among the workers according to the team leaders’ assessment of the other team members’ skills and contributions.

Labor Organization and the American Railway Union

The Chicago-based American Railway Union (ARU) was formed in 1893, by Eugene V. Debs, who hoped to establish an umbrella union – similar to that of the Knight of Labor and the American Federation of Labor– which would unite all railroad unions, and put an end to the splintering of workers into separate and often competing brotherhoods. Debs believed the rail workers to be united by common interests – such as wages, hours, insurance, etc. – and by a common enemy. By forming a union comprised of the various rail occupations, the employers would no longer be able to set one group against another. There were approximately 850,000 rail workers in the United States^¹⁴²; a year after its inception, the ARU represented approximately 150,000 of them.^¹⁴³

The first labor dispute in Pullman occurred in 1882 and involved one thousand workers. At the time, the town was still under construction, and several of the workers commuted daily from Chicago to the plant via the Illinois Central Railroad. Transportation costs – twenty cents per worker – were initially paid for by the Pullman Company. However, after several months, the company changed its policy and paid for only half of the transportation fares. The workers protested the policy and went on strike. The strike was unsuccessful and small scale work stoppages occurred intermittently throughout the next decade but fear of dismissal or eviction from their homes precluded any sustained collective action.^¹⁴⁴ The company addressed the workers’ grievances by replacing the “chronic kickers” with workers brought in from Chicago.

Several Pullman workers turned to the Knights of Labor (KOL); in 1886, membership reached 1400 workers within the plant. The Pullman members joined the union’s national call for the eight hour workday, as well as a 10% increase in pay. When the union presented the demands to George Pullman, he refused to consider them, and declared that the union would never be allowed to dictate company policy. Backed by the union, the workers went on strike. The strike ended ten days later and the shops were reopened under police protection. This early attempt at organizing was crushed, and the workers would not attempt to organize again until the economic crisis hit of the mid-1890s.

Worker Grievances

George Pullman was able to stifle labor conflict within the shops and town during the first years of his experiment. The sporadic instances of expressed frustration notwithstanding, worker dissatisfaction remained passive. The roots of this frustration were found in the paternalism of George Pullman; lack of autonomy, constant surveillance, and tenant restrictions were a constant source of aggravation for the worker/resident. Pullman’s refusal to let the workers own property was one of the main causes of dissatisfaction. The investigation by the U.S. Strike Commission found that this company policy not only increased worker frustration, but was responsible for creating a population “without local attachments or any interested responsibility in the town, its business, tenements, or surroundings.”^¹⁴⁵

While the living and working conditions laid the groundwork for worker frustration, the main issue was the reduction in wages. At the end of the fiscal year of 1894, Pullman saw a profit over $6.5 million. By autumn of the same year, the economic depression hit the company, resulting in the dismissal of hundreds of workers and a wage reduction of approximately 25%. In some departments, this was as high as 41%.^¹⁴⁶ By November 1893, there were less than 1,100 working in the shops. The Detroit branch of the Pullman Company dismissed its entire workforce of 800, and moved its contract and repair business to Pullman.^¹⁴⁷

Pullman could either have closed the construction division or beat the competition by bidding on contracts that were less than the cost of production. The company chose to do the latter and reduced construction prices by 25%. In the seven and a half months prior to the strike the company was able to obtain forty-four contracts, which amounted to $1.5 million.^¹⁴⁸ Pullman was able to keep the construction departments open, and by April 1894, the workforce had increased to approximately 3,300 employees.

Within the operating division the effects of the depression were not as drastic.^¹⁴⁹ The division saw a decrease of only seven percent in the number of palace car passengers. The revenue in 1894 was enough to compensate for the losses within the construction department; however, George Pullman believed that the operating division was separate from the construction department, and the profits of one should not be used to cover the losses of another.^¹⁵⁰ He also believed that wage reductions in one division while maintaining wages in others was not practical; therefore he reduced the pay in all departments, including the repair department which was continuing to show a profit.

The workers least affected by the wage decreases as a group were the painters, who saw a reduction of 17.5%; those who saw the biggest reduction in wages were the freight-car builders, whose wages were cut by 41%. The average daily wages for this group of workers fell from $2.61 to $1.54.^¹⁵¹ The situation was worsened by the decreased amount of available work. Some workers reported only working 28 hours per week, while others reported the available hours to have been as low as 10 hours.^¹⁵² As the workers saw their wages slashed, those of the company officials, superintendents and foremen were not affected.^¹⁵³ Pullman defended this policy by arguing that it maintained the official workforce, and prevented resignations.

The company reduced wages, but maintained the high rent levels.^¹⁵⁴ Workers testifying before the Strike Commission reported that during the winter before the strike they often received two weeks worth of wages that were only 4 cents to $1.00 over the amount needed for rent. In some cases, the pay checks were less than the amount of rent.^¹⁵⁵ Working conditions were another point of contention; the workers’ grievances included blacklisting, arbitrary dismissals, nepotism, favoritism, and alleged abuse by the foremen. Dormant worker frustrations were emerging, but the workers did not have an outlet to voice their concerns in fear of being dismissed and blacklisted as an agitator.^¹⁵⁶

The employees began to organize during April 1894, and looked towards the American Railway Union for support. Since the company prohibited all union activity within the Pullman town, recruitment was done in neighboring communities. The membership drive succeeded in establishing nineteen locals representing the various departments, with a total membership of approximately 4000 workers.^¹⁵⁷

A committee representing the locals was formed on May 9 to take their grievances to the Pullman officials. The committee demanded the restoration of the wage scales prior to the cuts, a reduction in rent, and an investigation and correction of workshop abuses. George Pullman argued that it was impossible to raise wages when the company was building cars at a loss. He also refused to address the issue of rent levels, arguing that Pullman the employer was separate from Pullman the landlord.^¹⁵⁸ Pullman assured the committee that none of its members would be dismissed or discriminated against. The following day, however, three of the committee members were fired.

The Pullman workers appealed to the ARU to call for a strike. The union advised the workers to wait until it gained more strength and experience. In addition, high unemployment rates and a depressed economy made it an inopportune time for a walkout.^¹⁵⁹ The policy of the ARU was one of moderation and conciliation, which focused on avoiding strikes and boycotts until all avenues for a peaceful solution had been attempted. The union’s constitution stated that “corporations will not be permitted to treat the organization better than the organization will treat them…all differences may be satisfactory adjusted, that harmonious relations may be established and maintained…that the necessity for strike and lockout, boycott and blacklist, alike disastrous to employer and employee and a perpetual menace to the welfare of the public, will forever disappear.”^¹⁶⁰

The workers disagreed and took the matter into their own hands. Representatives from the nineteen local met in secret on Thursday May 10 and voted unanimously to strike the following Saturday. The company learned of the upcoming strike and decided to declare a lock-out, the following day. The workers learned of the company’s plans, and notified the workers to walk out before the company’s plan could take place. Once the walkout was declared, 2,500 employees left their jobs, and 600 remained until noon. And by evening the entire workforce was off the job.^¹⁶¹

The striking workers demanded the re-employment of the dismissed grievance committee members, the lowering of rent, and the restoration of the wage scale prior to the cuts. The company declared the plant to be shut-down indefinitely.

Mingo County

It can be argued that in comparison with the Homestead and Pullman strikes, the labor conflict within the southern West Virginia coal mines was tantamount to a civil war. Beginning with the Paint Creek-Cabin Creek strike of 1912-1913, the area experienced high levels of conflict between the miners, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) and the coal companies. Between 1912 and 1921, martial law was declared at least four times, and Federal troops occupied the region in order to restore order and protect company property and imported strikebreakers. The explosive nature of the labor conflict came to fruition in 1920-1921 in Mingo County, at the Battle of Blair Mountain. The conflict centered on union organization, the mine guard system, and the “industrial Kaiserism”^¹⁶² existent within the company towns.

A definitive analysis of the conflict is problematic for a number of reasons. First, the conflict encompassed several counties^¹⁶³ and mines, and not just one establishment, as seen in Homestead. Second, the number of participants fluctuated overtime. Finally, the official strike call by the union often came after violent confrontations. While the Homestead and Pullman strikes were comparatively “black and white”, the conflict within southern West Virginia was complex and making a complete account of the conflict beyond the scope of this paper. In order to understand the conflict, I will address the contextual variables which influenced the conflict.

First, I will address the coal industry on the national and state level. Second, the issue of the company town will be examined. Third, I will briefly address the working conditions, in terms of job-type and wages. Since the miners did not strike over issues of mine safety, this area will not be addressed. The fourth section will examine the history of labor organization in the area and the Paint Creek-Cabin Creek strike which laid the foundation for the miners’ tactics and motivations during later strikes and conflict. The fifth section will focus on the grievances that led to the “Matewan Massacre” on May 20, 1920 and the official July 1 strike call in Mingo County.

The Industry: Bituminous Coal

In the previous cases, the steel and rail industries were characterized by large corporate monopolies, which dominated the market. In contrast, the bituminous coal industry was extremely fragmented, prone to over-capacity, and immensely competitive. For example, in 1923, there were approximately 9,331 producing mines in the United States. In 1929, the 17 largest firms controlled only 20% of output; the next 70 largest firms controlled 23%.^¹⁶⁴

Between the Civil War and the 1920s, the national bituminous coal industry experienced rapid growth; between 1870 and 1890, bituminous coal production increased from 17 to 111 million tons. The economic crisis of the 1890s did not affect the industry; rather, coal production doubled during this decade, reached 478 million tons in 1913, and hit a peak in 1918, at 579 million tons.^¹⁶⁵

As the demand for coal increased new firms were established and new mines opened. In 1890, Coal production was heavily concentrated in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois; however, increased demand and the expansion of the railroads resulted in a surge of coal mining in the southern Appalachian areas of West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and Alabama.

Following the production boom during WWI, the industry entered a period of stagnation, which can partly be explained by a decrease in the global demand for coal. Prior to 1914, the industry saw an annual increase in coal consumption of 4%; afterwards consumption fell to 0.3% between in 1913 and 1937.^¹⁶⁶ There are several reasons for this decrease; first, the expansion of the heavy industries and transport was slowing. Second, coal was being used more efficiently in industry and the home; and finally, the use of alternative fuels was on the rise.^¹⁶⁷

West Virginia was a prime example of the highly competitive and fractured nature of the coal industry. In 1914, 39 out of 55 counties in the state produced coal, in a region encompassing approximately 9500 square miles.^¹⁶⁸ In 1920, there were roughly 1238 mines owned by 835 different mining companies.^¹⁶⁹ The expansion of the state’s coal industry was extremely rapid. In 1870, output totaled 609,000 tons annually; by 1911, production increased to approximately 70 million tons.^¹⁷⁰ Between 1921 and 1925 annual production increased to over 97 million tons.^¹⁷¹

West Virginia coal has been described as the most fuel-efficient and best coking coal in the nation, and was second to anthracite for home heating. West Virginia coal possessed several economic and geographical advantages which made it a competitive heavyweight. First, the coal was relatively inexpensive to mine. The state had few shaft mines; instead, the hillsides had large, exposed soft seams, which allowed for relatively easy access to the coal.^¹⁷² Second, most mines were above the water level, making water pumping unnecessary. Third, southern West Virginia was forestland, which provided the wood necessary for timbering and the construction of the company towns. Finally, and probably most importantly, the majority of mines were non-union; several of the mines could offer cheaper coal by reducing labor costs.^¹⁷³

During WWI, coal operators across the nation earned massive profits, but in West Virginia, it was dramatic. The price of coal produced in Raleigh County increased from $1.00 per ton in 1915, to $4.96 in 1917. In Logan County, the price increased from $0.82 per ton in 1915, to $4.39 in 1917.^¹⁷⁴ In an effort to stabilize the industry and stem possible wartime profiteering, the U.S. Congress passed the Lever Act in 1917, which placed the price and distribution of coal into the hands of the Fuel Administration. In addition, the Federal Government, in conjunction with the coal industry and the UMWA, created the Washington Agreement, which increased the miners’ wages and gave them the right to organize as long as they did not strike for the duration of the war.^¹⁷⁵

The operators resented Federal intervention, and ignored the new laws and agreements. Fifty-two companies were indicted for profiteering by the U.S. Department of Justice; others were indicted under the Sherman Antitrust Act for restraint of trade and foreign commerce.^¹⁷⁶ The coal companies sought to operate their mines as they saw fit, free of outside influence, including federal regulation and the unions. As a result, the companies created a type of colonial political economy.^¹⁷⁷

The Company Town

Coinciding with the development of the industry was an influx of migrants into the sparsely populated regions of southern West Virginia. During the first decades of the twentieth-century the counties’ populations increased at a rate of 70-155%.^¹⁷⁸ In order to create a labor supply to match the levels of production, the coal companies recruited immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, as well as blacks from the South. The workers were settled in unincorporated company towns located on large tracts of land owned or leased by the companies. It has been estimated that 98% of the miners in southern West Virginia lived within the company owned towns.^¹⁷⁹

There are several theories that attempt to explain the why company towns were necessary. Some view the towns as an attempt by the coal operators to monopolize power, to repress labor organization and to control the workforce. Others regard the towns as a necessity due to the lifespan and remote location of the mines; private housing contractors would not have found it economically advantageous to build in unsettled and remote areas. The theory of “welfare capitalism”, based on the model town movement during the first decades of the twentieth-century, believed that by providing improved housing, stores, post houses, theaters, clubhouses, schools and churches, the company would attract the best workers, improve productivity and reduce the turnover rate.^¹⁸⁰

The conditions of the company towns varied according to where they were constructed and by whom. The U.S. Coal Commission reported that the living conditions within the coal towns of central Appalachia were among the worst in the nation. More than 50% of the towns investigated were located in West Virginia. Of the 713 towns investigated in 1922 and 1923, only 14% of the houses in Virginia, Kentucky and West Virginia had indoor plumbing, in comparison with 90% in the coal towns of Ohio. The report also found that only 2% of the company towns in these states had sewage systems, and as a consequence, several towns were plagued by health and pollution problems.^¹⁸¹

The U.S. Coal Commission reported in 1925 that the leases used by the West Virginia coal operators had several questionable clauses. First, the lease agreement provided for termination of the lease by either party usually within five days notice. This was more restrictive than the usual tenant-landlord lease in the state, which required the notification based on the payment of rent.

Second, in several mines the leases had an employment-contingency clause. When the worker quit or was fired, the lease was no longer valid. In subsequent legal challenges, the courts upheld the employment-contingency clause citing that the miner-employer relationship was based on employment and housing was part of that relationship. The court citied precedents based on the “master-servant” concept; referring to circumstances where servants resided within the houses they worked.^¹⁸²

The third questionable clause pertained to who could be on the premises. It attempted to guarantee that the tenants and visitors were family, either employed or authorized by the company to be there; and some forbade “objectionable” individuals from entering company property. An example of such a clause was found at the Island Creek Coal Company in Logan County, which gave the operator the right to enter the premises and remove any questionable persons.^¹⁸³

There is some question as to how often the companies evicted the miners. In some cases, residents were allowed to remain in the house during periods of illness or mine shut-downs, with deferred or rebated rental payments. There are other cases where widows or pensioners were allowed to live rent free. However, such instances were contingent on the goodwill between the miner and employer. Price V. Fishback argues that evictions were more commonplace during prolonged strikes, and that it is unclear whether evictions were the norm during routine periods of operation. Whatever the case may be, the possibility of eviction during a strike, is evidence that the contingency clauses of the lease were a powerful tool used by the operator.^¹⁸⁴

The U.S. Coal Commission reported in 1925 that the rent in the company houses was substantially lower than in the state’s capital, but the former offered more modern amenities. For example, in Charleston, a three or four room apartment, equipped with electricity, gas and running water, rented for about $9 to $14 per month. The rent for a four room house with modern conveniences was about $14 to $25 a month. In the New River coal district, a four room house without indoor running water or electricity rented for approximately $8 to $9 per month. In the company houses that were provided with water, it was usually free. When provided, fuel and electricity was offered at a lower cost to the miners, than to other wage earners in the incorporated towns.^¹⁸⁵ The Coal Commission also found that rent accounted for 4.2 to 5.8 percent of the miners’ wages.^¹⁸⁶

David Corbin argues that some miners were paid with company issued “coal scrip”, which could only be used within the company stores. In addition, when independent stores opened within the area, the miners were coerced by the company to trade with only at the company stores.^¹⁸⁷ Thus, the company stores held a monopoly on the goods offered to the mining communities.

While the remote location of the mines may have limited the choices offered to the miners, when one looks at the situation in southern West Virginia during the coal boom, the monopoly theory can be debated. The company stores faced competition from other mines within the area, in so far as the mine operators hired in a competitive labor market. Within the non-union areas, the company store prices were part of an employment package, which also included wages and housing offered to mobile workers in a region with hundreds of mines. As information and transportation improved, employment packages would have had to become more competitive and have fewer opportunities for exploitation as the competition for workers increased.^¹⁸⁸

An investigation by the Immigration Commission in 1908 and the Coal Commission in 1922 reported that the prices within the stores were similar to those offered by the nearby independent merchants. The prices at the more isolated mines were higher due to transportation costs; however, Fishback argues that there is evidence to suggest that the prices were partially counterbalanced by higher wages. Moreover, the use of the “coal scrip”, this was used as a payroll advance. On payday, the miners usually received between thirty to eighty percent of their earnings, after deductions for rent, fuel, doctors, and store transactions.^¹⁸⁹

Typically a function of the county authorities, the maintenance of order fell to the mine operators, who hired private guards and/or subsidized law enforcement officials, several of whom lived within the towns.^¹⁹⁰ Among their duties was to restrict the workers’ contact with outside influences, mainly union organizers; and this task was often performed by using physical force. In addition, the mail through the post office in the company store was often monitored by company representatives.^¹⁹¹ By the start of the First World War, the towns had become what David Corbin calls, “closed martial societies”^¹⁹² The companies’ use of the private guards will be explored further in the section relating to the union and organization.

The Worker

Prior to 1930, coal mining was defined as the “hand-loading” era, and the tasks at the mine were divided into four categories. First, the tonnage men comprised the largest group, and included the pick miners, coal loaders, machine cutters and their assistants. The second group were the inside daymen, who were paid by the hour or by the day. These workers transported the coal and provided other services for the miners and operators. This group included the drivers, trackmen, timbermen, and motormen. The third group, were the outside daymen, who prepared the coal for the market, and cleaned and repaired coal cars. This group also included skilled workers, such as blacksmiths, carpenters and engineers. The last category was the managers. This group made the site assignments for the tonnage men and daily tasks for the outside men, but performed little direct supervision.^¹⁹³

The coal operators paid two types of wages, piece rates and time rates, and which type the miners received depended largely on the presence of the union. Most workers were paid by the piece for removing coal from the seam and loading it into the cars. In the union districts, the loaders and pick miners were paid by the ton; in the non-union mines, the pick miners were generally paid by car. Disputes often occurred regarding the quality of the coal. To prevent the loading of “dirty coal”, most operators implemented an often punitive dockage system. In the non-union mines, the worker could lose credit for an entire car if it was found that it contained too much slate. In several union mines, the miners were fined, or if the violations continued, he would face suspension or dismissal.^¹⁹⁴

Another point of dispute in the mines was the weighing of the coal. The UMWA typically demanded a checkweighmen to stand watch over the scales. In the non-union mines, this was relatively uncommon. West Virginia mining law required the coal operators to have one at the tipple, and permitted the miners to hire their own checkweighmen. However, in some cases the miners did not vote for a checkweighmen in fear that the operators would consider it a vote to advance unionization.^¹⁹⁵

Another point of contention was the issue of “cribbing”. Each mine car was designed to hold a specific amount of coal, generally 2,000 pounds. In some mines, cars were altered to hold more coal than original amount. Miners were sometimes paid for 2,000 pounds, when they actually mined 2,500 pounds.

It is difficult to determine wages, because each company paid different piece-rates. Also, the number of available work hours determined the miners’ earnings. The West Virginia coal operators argued that their miners were the highest paid in the nation. Meanwhile, the UMWA asserted that the region paid the lowest wages in the country.^¹⁹⁶ Corbin argues that while the wage in West Virginia may have been the lowest in the U.S., the greater frequency of available work, the softer coal and larger veins allowed the miners to mine more coal in less time.^¹⁹⁷

The miners’ hourly earnings were significantly higher than in the manufacturing industries until the late 1920s. However, the miners worked less hours, therefore their annual earnings were similar, or a bit lower.^¹⁹⁸ As the demand for labor fluctuated in conjunction with prices, the coal operators were forced to offer wages similar to those in manufacturing in order to attract workers. The coal miners saw a long-term rise in their annual and hourly earnings; although it was not a steady growth, Fishback estimates that the real hourly earnings increased by 169% between 1890 and 1923.^¹⁹⁹

During the production boom of the First World War, the miners worked between 200 to 220 days per year, peaking above 240 days in 1917 and 1918. However, the average amount of available work days decreased dramatically to less than 150 in 1921 and 1922.^²⁰⁰ Between 1890 and 1940, the manufacturing worker worked an average of 270 to 300 days a year.^²⁰¹ In comparison the coal miner worked an average of 200 to 220, due to overcapacity, seasonal fluctuations and transportation problems.^²⁰²

Labor Organization: The United Mine Workers of America

The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) has been the dominant coal mining union in the U.S. since its inception in 1890. The UMWA began with a membership of 17,000 to 20,000, out of a total of 255,244 bituminous and anthracite miners.^²⁰³ By 1902, the UMWA represented 50% of the national mining workforce, and this percentage remained relatively steady throughout the First World War.^²⁰⁴ During the war, 60% of the miners were union members. National membership hit an all time peak in December 1922 at 75%, amounting to about 484,468 members.^²⁰⁵

The UMWA was the strongest in the states included in the Central Competitive Field, and in parts of the western and southwestern states. The union’s Achilles Heel, however, were the southern mines. From 1900 until the early 1920s, union membership represented approximately one-third of the miners in Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia; and the amount was even smaller in the states of West Virginia, Maryland and Alabama.^²⁰⁶ In the non-union mines, the UMWA was met with strong opposition by the coal operators, who forced the miners to sign nonunion pledges - also known as “yellow-dog” contracts – as a requirement for employment. Organizers were prevented from entering the mining towns by the company police, and workers who were believed to be labor “agitators” were often evicted from the towns and blacklisted from the mines.^²⁰⁷

West Virginia was a critical area for the UMWA, because the state was quickly becoming the one of the leaders of bituminous coal mining, and its competition within the national market threatened union activity in the organized mines. For example, when the non-union miners refused to join the general strike of 1897, West Virginia coal flooded the national market, and helped break the strike. For this reason, the UMWA viewed West Virginia as a threat, and its organization imperative.

By 1912, the union was able to organize only a small portion of the workforce.^²⁰⁸

There are several possible reasons why the miners resisted the early organizing efforts. First, the region experienced an influx of migrant workers, which increased the pool of available labor, making it risky for the miners to join if they could be easily replaced. Second, some miners believed the union to be in collusion with the coal industry. Union radicals accused the coal operators of having lobbyists within the UMWA national headquarters. On the national and local levels, some UMWA officials did leave the union for positions in the coal mining lobbies of southern West Virginia. For example, the former president of the UMWA, T.L. Lewis, left the union to become secretary of the New River Coal Operators’ Association, and the former president of the UMWA District 17, became commissioner of the Kanawha County Coal Operators’ Association.^²⁰⁹ Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, declared that the “coal operators and the Government [of West Virginia] have been one and the same…King Coal and his barons have ruled in and by means of the institutions of society; they own absolutely and control agents and agencies apparently of the people.”^²¹⁰

The miners’ mobility is another factor, as was argued in the introduction of this paper. The mobility of miners was addressed by the US Coal Commission, which found that of the 33 coalfields in the US, the 5 coalfields in southern West Virginia ranked first, second, fourth, fifth and sixth, in the coalfields with the highest turnover rates.^²¹¹ A U.S. Children’s Bureau study of Raleigh County, West Virginia in 1920 discovered that almost 60% of the families interviewed had lived in the same community for three years or less.^²¹² If a miner was dissatisfied with his situation at a certain mine, he was able to find new work with relative ease.

The fourth factor influencing the miners’ reluctance to join the union was the intimidation factor found in the presence and actions of the Baldwin-Felts mine guards.

To the UMWA, the state became known as the “Black Belt”, due to the guards’ repression of unionists and organizers.^²¹³ Ironically, the guards would have a positive effect on unionizing; they were an issue around which the miners could rally. The growth of the miners’ hostility towards the guards increased the awareness of the need for collective security and collective action.

The Lessons of Paint Creek-Cabin Creek

The coal industries desire to stifle the union’s influence was strengthened by the Paint Creek-Cabin Creek strike of 1912-1913. Although it was recognized in a few mines within Kanawha County since 1902, by 1912, the union’s control was slipping. That same year, the organized miners on Paint Creek in Kanawha County demanded wages on par with those of other organized mines. The operators refused and restored non-union wages and conditions. On April 18, the miners stopped working, and ushered in a protracted period of conflict and violence between the miners and the coal companies.

The non-union miners of Cabin Creek joined the Paint Creek strikers and made several demands which included: the right to organize; the end of blacklisting; the end of the mine guard system; the prohibition of cribbing; and the right to hire their own checkweighmen.^²¹⁴ The UMWA jumped at the chance to organize; it pledged its full support of the strike, raised money to finance it, and sent in its top officials.^²¹⁵

As the strike worn on, both sides of the conflict were guilty of violent acts. One of the most egregious incidences was a train called “Bull Moose Special”, which was customized with iron-plated siding and machine guns. Operated by the local police, several mine guards, and a coal official, the train traveled through a tent colony of miners and opened fire, killing one resident.^²¹⁶ The miners responded by attacking a mine guard camp at Mucklow. Over the course of several hours, an estimated 3000 shots were exchanged, and 16 people were killed.^²¹⁷

Upon the local sheriff’s request, the Governor ordered the state militia into the area to stop the violence. The miners hoped that the military would help bring a peaceful end to the strike.^²¹⁸ However, it soon became apparent that the state militia was there to break it. The military arrested at least 200 miners and their leaders without warrants and suspended the right of habeas corpus; military tribunals were created in its place, resulting in the court-martial of over one-hundred miners.^²¹⁹

The UMWA and the governor attempted to reach a compromise between the strikers and operators; however, the proposed agreement did not address what the miners felt were the key demands: the full recognition of the union and the end of the mine guard system. The miners were unwilling to accept the agreement. The governor gave the miners a thirty-six hour ultimatum: go back to work or face deportation from the state. Soldiers were sent into the fields to escort the miners back to work, and the latter were forced to accept the terms.

The use of martial law prompted an investigation by the United States Senate, which ultimately censured the Governor, military authorities and the coal operators for refusing the miners their Constitutional right of due process. The Senate investigation did not end the strike; the miners rejected the union agreement and renewed their efforts by means of wildcat strikes, resumed their battles with the mine guards, and destruction of mine property.^²²⁰

With the Senate investigation unfolding, the operators knew that martial law was no longer an option. As a result, the miners’ original demands were granted, and the union was given recognition. In the end, the strike lasted fourteen months and at least 17 people died. The miners learned that collective action brought results, and that violence was a justified and necessary tool that could be utilized to have their demands met.^²²¹

During WWI, the coal fields were relatively calm due to such federal mediation efforts such as the Washington Agreement of 1917, which gave the miners an increase in wages and the right to organize.^²²² Some coal operators refused to grant the Federally mandated wartime wage agreements; others granted the increase, but counterbalanced the loss by increasing the prices in the company stores. The coal operators’ program of “Work or Fight” was another point of contention. If a company thought a miner was objectionable, the miner’s draft deferment could be revoked. The companies continued to fire, evict and blacklist union members, and prohibited union meetings in company towns. The miners began to equate “Kaiserism” with that of the companies and to equate the fight for the unions with the fight for democracy abroad.^²²³

At the time of the Armistice in November 1918, 50% of the mines in West Virginia were organized; however, most were located in the northern part of the state.^²²⁴ Local leaders began a new recruiting drive within the two bastions of anti-unionism, Mingo and Logan counties. The union organizers were assaulted and evicted from company property by the sheriff of Logan County, Don Chafin. In response, District 17 -the state’s main arm of the UMWA - organized a march of 2,000-5,000 miners to march to Logan County to unseat the sheriff. The wartime provisions were still in affect, however, and Governor John J. Cornwell appealed to the federal government to send in troops to stop the march. Sixteen hundred troops were sent into the area, and the marchers went home.^²²⁵

In the spring of 1920, the union felt it was strong enough in Mingo County to compel the operators recognize the union. The operators offered wage increases for the miners who chose not to join the union, locked out those who did and used the Baldwin-Felts Guards to evict union miners.^²²⁶

Directory: bitstream
bitstream -> How to organise your body 101: postfeminism and the (re)construction of the female body through How to Look Good Naked
bitstream -> College day annual report
bitstream -> A mathematical theory of communication
bitstream -> Images of Fairfax in Modern Literature and Film Andrew Hopper
bitstream -> Amphitheater High School’s Outdoor Classroom: a study in the Application of Design
bitstream -> Ethics of Climate Change: Adopting an Empirical Approach to Moral Concern
bitstream -> The Age of Revolution in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and South China Sea: a maritime Perspective
bitstream -> Methodism and Culture
bitstream -> Review of coastal ecosystem management to improve the health and resilience of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area
bitstream -> Present state of the area

Download 0.8 Mb.

Share with your friends:

1 2 3 4