Intervention and Escalation: violence in american labor disputes, a comparative perspective

Strike Duration

Snyder and Kelly did not find a distinct relationship between duration and outcome. In their sample, single-day strikes were slightly more likely to fail, but so were the longest strikes in their sample.²⁹⁶ However, the defeat of the Homestead and Pullman strikes can be partly attributed to the hardships the workers faced during an extended strike period.

Homestead

In mid-October, the local newspaper, the Homestead News, which had previously been in support of the strike, began to editorialize that the strike was lost and abandoned. Financial assistance for the strikers was depleted and many were leaving the town to look for new employment. By October 13, the mill had replaced the striking workers with almost 2000 new workers. It became apparent to the strikers that the operation of the mill could be achieved without them. Afraid that their jobs were being taking over by strikebreakers, several of the workers held a meeting and voted to ask for their jobs back. The union members voted to reopen the mill, by a vote of 101 to 91.²⁹⁷

On November 20, the strike was declared over and the workers returned to work without a contract. The intervention by the state and the company forced the union to surrender. From the end of the strike until 1900, steel production in Carnegie’s mills tripled and for all intensive purposes, the union was dead.²⁹⁸ A year after the strike, the AAISW lost 5000 members; 6000 in 1894; and by 1895, union membership was less than half of its pre-strike levels.²⁹⁹ Tonnage rates were slashed, and work hours increased; one-third of the labor force worked twelve-hour shifts. Workers were reassigned at the discretion of management, breaks in the workday were eliminated, and new technology replaced an estimated five hundred jobs in Homestead by the turn of the century.³⁰⁰

Pullman

In Pullman, the workers entered the strike facing dire economic conditions, but as the strike wore on they began to face starvation. The Pullman Company declared on July 19, that the factory would reopen as soon as they had a sufficient amount of workers. On August 1, 800 men had applied for work, 300 of whom were guards who had been protecting company property. Federal troops were able to reopen the Union Pacific tracks and the ARU was forced to end the strike in the west. The railroads dismissed workers who had been active in the strike. Southern Pacific forced its workers to sever their ties to the ARU and agree to yellow dog contracts.

The Pullman strike ended August 2. The company announced it would not rehire any strike committee members; moreover, labor organization was prohibited. The Strike Commission declared that by doing so, the company “secures all the advantage of the concentration of capital, ability, power and control for the company in its labor dealings, and deprives the employees of any such advantage or protection as a labor union might afford. In this respect the Pullman Company is behind the age.”³⁰¹

Although the strike was defeated, the Pullman experiment was nearing its end. Three years following the strike, George Pullman died, as did his dominance over the town. A decision by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1898 condemned paternalism and declared the establishment and operation of the town to be in violation of the corporate privileges of the Pullman charter.³⁰² In 1907, the town was annexed to Chicago.

Mingo County

In the coal fields of Mingo County, the strike was not defeated by time; rather, it was the intervention by the U.S. military at Blair Mountain, which persuaded the workers to go home and back to the mines. By all accounts, it appears that the miners would have continued to fight if the President had not intervened. David Corbin argues that the maintenance of gardens and livestock by the miners relieved some of the economic pressure caused by an extended strike period. In 1924, the West Virginia Coal Operators Association estimated that over 50% of miners planted gardens, and raised cows, pigs and poultry. A 1923 investigation by the Children’s Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor found that over 70% of the miners’ families in Raleigh County kept a garden and livestock.³⁰³

The surrender of the miners at Blair Mountain ended 17 months of intense conflict. At least 21 people were dead, and the West Virginia UMWA was in tatters.³⁰⁴ Its organizing efforts and the strike cost the union $8 million³⁰⁵, and its membership declined drastically. In 1921, the UMWA membership in the state had been approximately 50,000; by 1932, it had fallen to a meager 600.³⁰⁶ During the remainder of the decade, the UMWA experienced a national decline in its membership. The union would not begin to breathe life again until the New Deal of the 1930s.

A Senate investigation found both sides of the conflict guilty of acts of violence. On the miners’ side, the behavior of the union was found “absolutely indefensible”; people were killed, property destroyed, and marches that bordered on “insurrection”.³⁰⁷

The coal companies were admonished for paying off the local police, and preventing the union from entering the area.³⁰⁸

Although they were successful in defeating the union and the strike, the coal operators entered a period of stagnation and decline. As the demand for coal fell, so did the prices. Mines began to close, and the miners suffered wage cuts and layoffs. As the decade dragged on, the once powerful bituminous coal industry joined other labor intensive industries in the South, such as textiles and agriculture, and became one of the nation’s most depressed sectors of the economy.³⁰⁹

7. Conclusion

When comparing the cases an obvious pattern begins to emerge; the violence displayed by the workers was the result of official intervention. The employers’ repeated denial of arbitration; the repressive use of private guards to import strikebreakers and to enforce the policies of intimidation; and the intervention by the State and Federal Government via injunction and the military intensified the conflict, and resulted in the subsequent defeat of the strikes. The government did not enter the fray to arbitrate the disputes in order to establish a peaceful settlement favorable to both sides; instead, it acted in collusion with the employers and sought to defeat the strikes. The following paragraphs will be an overview of the cases and my conclusions.

I discussed several labor conflict theories, which involved the social, economic and institutional aspects found within industrial conflict. The social response theory argues that conflict is a social group’s response to rapid social change. The theory does not take into account the influence of such factors as economic and working conditions, and the level of official repression against the workers. In both Homestead and Pullman, the workers were responding to the immediate threats to their well-being. In Mingo County, the miners were reacting to the dominance of the coal companies and their efforts to repress the union.

In their study of the interindustry propensity to strike, Kerr and Siegel divided the working class into two groups: the “isolated mass” and the “integrated worker”. The industries comprised of the former had the highest propensity for strikes. This group included the maritime and coal mining industry. In this paper, I addressed the miners’ mobility in the region and their ability to find new work when working conditions became unsatisfactory. For this reason, I do not believe that Kerr and Siegel’s theory can be applied to the coal mining region of southern West Virginia. As far as the workers in the “integrated” communities of Pullman and Homestead, Kerr and Siegel ranked the rail and steel industries in the lowest and medium categories respectively.

I also addressed the concept of “relative deprivation” as argued by James C. Davies. I do not believe that the concept can be applied to the strikes in my comparison. The strike at Homestead was in response to proposed wage cuts and the elimination of established work rules and the union. Davis argues that conflict is more likely to occur when an extended period of rising expectations and fulfillment is reversed. If we interpose the word “threatened” for “reversed” than the theory can be applicable. Moreover, when the workers went on strike the proposed cuts had not yet taken effect; therefore, the “expectation-fulfillment gap” was not present at that time. The theory is also not applicable in the case of Mingo County due to the conflicts focus on union related issues and the dominance of the coal operators.

The theory can be applied to the Pullman strike. After the industry began to feel the strain caused by the economic crisis, Pullman imposed drastic wage cuts, while maintaining high housing costs. Although, dormant grievances influenced the dispute, the strike was triggered by the widening of expectation-fulfillment gap.

In the introduction I discussed Snyder’s study of institutions and industrial conflict in Italy, France and the United States. The author argues that economic models of labor conflict do not fully explain labor’s position within the three countries prior to the Second World War. First, employers were unwilling to negotiate with the unions. This was the case in the disputes in my comparison, but management was also unwilling to negotiate when third parties were involved. Second, the theory that strikes are a result of failed contract negotiations can be applied only in the case of Homestead. However, Frick’s determination to oust the union makes the concept of failed contract negotiations carry less weight in explaining why the strike occurred. Since Pullman and the coal miners did not have a working contract prior to the strike the theory is not applicable. However, if we consider the Washington Agreement as a contract, allowing for the right to organize and wartime wage increases, we can consider the conflict in southern West Virginia a result of the companies’ not honoring the agreement.

I addressed Shorter and Tilly’s theory that strikes are a struggle by the workers to gain space within the political power structure. It does not appear the strikes in my comparison were mass mobilizations with the objective of gaining entry into the polity. The strikes at Homestead and Pullman were largely concerned with immediate material issues and in the former, defending the union. A case can be made, however, for the conflict in southern West Virginia. Shorter and Tilly argue that strikes were not tests of economic strength, but were emblematic demonstrations of a groups “political energy and resoluteness” aimed at the political power structure.³¹⁰ The “mine wars” directly challenged the power and authority of the coal companies, and were an attempt by the miners to gain a political voice through joining the union in order to have a say in their working and living conditions.

In their study of strikes in France, Shorter and Tilly found that the larger the strike the better the odds for government intervention as mediators. In all of the cases, the government did not intervene to mediate; rather, it acted as a force to break the strike through military occupation; and through judicial intervention via injunction and indictment.

In the second section I analyzed the contextual variables which surrounded the strikes. The Homestead mill formed part of the Carnegie industrial monopoly. Carnegie supported the union as a means to shut down the competitors who could not pay high labor costs. After this was accomplished, Carnegie used Frick as a way to oust the union. The opportunity came when the union refused to agree to the management’s proposals; Frick saw this as a means to restart production using non-union labor.

At Pullman, the economic crisis of the mid 1890s hit the industry hard, and the company responded by cutting wages and hours. Believing that Pullman the employer and Pullman the landlord were separate entities, the company maintained the high rent levels within the town. Similar to the coal mining company towns, Pullman’s dominance within the town in the form of politics, the denial of the workers’ ability to own property, over-arching rules and the repression of any attempt at organizing was a constant source of tension among the workers. However, it would take the economic crisis to spur the workers to act upon quiescent grievances.

In southern West Virginia, the ever-present tensions between the coal miners and operators came to a fruition following the First World War. The federally mandated Washington Agreement was largely ignored by the coal companies, and the years following the war were fraught with heightened displays of violence between the miners and the operators who sought to repress any union influence upon the industry.

In the third section I used the methodology of Snyder and Kelly to measure the independent strike variables to see what influence size, duration, and type of issues had on labor violence. I found that the three strikes corresponded with the arguments put forth by Shorter and Tilly, and Snyder and Kelly. Both studies found that strikes that were large and long in duration were more prone to violence. In Snyder and Kelly’s sample, the strikes comprised of 1500+ workers were more likely to become violent. In all of the cases in my comparison, each establishment had well over that amount; in Homestead there were approximately 3800 workers on strike; in Pullman there were around 3100, and if we include the boycott, 18,000 rail workers just in the Chicago area; in Mingo County, there was an estimated 11,000 miners involved in the conflict. Therefore, the strikes fit the authors’ theory concerning strike size.

In regards to duration, the theory of Shorter and Tilly, and Snyder and Kelly can be applied to the three strikes as well. Shorter and Tilly found that the median duration of violent French strikes to have been 31 days, versus 6 days for non-violent stoppages. Homestead lasted 141 days; Pullman 83 days; and in Mingo County, the conflict lasted a long 17 months.

Snyder and Kelly found that multiple-issue strikes significantly increased the chances for strike violence. Again, the pattern fits. At Homestead, the workers went on strike over the reduction of prices on which wages were based, the reduction of tonnage rates, and the proposed change of the new contract’s expiration date. It can also be argued that the workers struck to defend the union’s presence at the mill. At Pullman, the workers went on strike to restore wages to the pre-depression wage levels, to reduce the amount charged for rent in the company town, and to demand an investigation into workshop abuses. The strike also involved union related issues, after members of the grievance committee were dismissed by the company. In Mingo County, grievances from past labor disputes were unresolved. When the UMWA made the official strike call, it sought to end the mine guard system and the right to organize. Specific events often spurred work stoppages, such as the “Matewan Massacre”. All of the strikes contained multiple issues and follow the argument of Snyder and Kelly.

I also used the arguments of Taft and Ross concerning the role of the unions, and how union related issues fuelled labor tensions. The influence of the unions on the workforce varied. In Homestead, the AAISW represented only a small portion of the workforce, but for three years prior to the strike it had established work rules and a functioning contract between management and labor. The strike was a result of the breakdown of contract negotiations and Frick’s attempts to oust the union. During the strike the management refused the union’s request for arbitration, and decided to use the courts and military to end the strike.

In Pullman, the company suppressed union organization within the town, and early strike activity in the shops; and the company continuously refused to negotiate with the workers. The workers began to join the ARU after their wages and living conditions began to decline. The union members in the Pullman shops urged the ARU to support a strike, but the ARU cautioned them to wait until it was stronger and the economy improved. After members of the grievance committee were dismissed by Pullman, the workers decided to strike. At the union convention in Chicago the following month, the union voted to initiate a sympathy boycott of Pullman cars if the company did not address the workers grievances. The company refused and the strike became a national issue. As in Homestead, the GMA and Pullman refused to negotiate, and used the injunction, the military and time, to defeat the union.

In Mingo County, the conflict was largely based on the right to organize, and union recognition, which the miners gained through the 1917 Washington Agreement. After the UMWA began a massive organizing drive in the non-union counties of Mingo and Logan, violence exploded in reaction to the guards and the companies’ attempts at repressing union activity. Negotiations between the miners and the companies were non-existent and similar to Homestead and Pullman, the military was used to break the union’s influence in the region.

In the fourth section, I discussed the types of violence displayed within the individual strikes in order to gauge the levels of hostilities within the disputes. Snyder and Kelly argue that strike violence might occur due to random precipitating events, and the longer the strikes last, the greater the chance for such events. At Homestead, violence was triggered by such an event and duration was not a factor. The battle between the Pinkertons occurred 5 days into the strike. In Mingo County, violence appears to have been an almost constant factor in the regions disputes. Strike duration did not influence the appearance of violence, but may have increased the feeling of animosity between the conflict’s participants. In Mingo County, violence figured almost constantly in the disputes in the region. The July 1 call for a strike by the UMWA came a month after the “Matewan Massacre”. Strike duration did not trigger the violence, but may have increased the level of animosity between the participants in the conflict.

The participants in the violence varied. At both Homestead and Mingo the striking workers took part in acts of violence. In Pullman, the U.S. Strike Commission reported that the Pullman workers were not violent during the strike. However, when considering the situation in nearby Chicago, the situation becomes muddied. It appears that the riots were done by opportunistic “bystanders”. However, Chicago officials and media representatives testifying before the Strike Commission reported not to have seen any railroad workers engaging in the mob violence. Moreover, there were reports that some of the strikers encouraged the mobs not to destroy company property.

The type of violence displayed within the three strikes differed as well. At Homestead the strikers protected and even repaired company property. However, once the Pinkertons arrived to assist the importation of strikebreakers, all bets were off. The violence displayed in the Homestead strike was focused on the Pinkertons and strikebreakers. The strikers did not assault the state militia or company officials. In Mingo County the violence displayed by the miners was directed against company officials, guards, strikebreakers, local police and company sponsored militias. In addition, company property was destroyed when attempts were made to reopen the mines. Violence was not reported in Pullman, but riots did occur in Chicago after the arrival of the military.

In the fifth section I examined how the individual strike variables facilitated the strikes’ defeat. Snyder and Kelly argue that the larger the strike, the greater the chance for official intervention, and this was a consistent pattern within the three strikes. At Homestead, Frick hired the Pinkerton detectives once it became apparent that the union would not agree to management’s proposals. The company was unwilling to sit out a long strike and sought to restart production using new workers. In order to do so, however, Frick believed force was necessary, and hired the agents to protect the strikebreakers. After the Pinkerton’s were ousted from the union controlled town, Frick appealed to the Governor for military assistance, and it facilitated Frick’s efforts to restart production with non-union workers, removing any bargaining position which the union may have possessed. The intervention by the courts also weakened the union, after several members were charged with murder, riot and conspiracy. The final nail in the strike’s coffin, however, was time. When the workers voted to end the strike, they had been out of work for almost 5 months, and the financial assistance was exhausted, and strikers began to leave the town to find work elsewhere.

The Pullman defeat was caused by several factors. First, as a result of the boycott, the General Managers’ Association saw a drastic reduction in the haulage of freight on its rails. In order to get the trains moving and to protect company property, the GMA transformed the conflict from “worker versus employer”, to “worker versus the U.S. Government” in order to break the strike. The Government intervened through the use of the injunction which made the strike illegal, and dispatched military troops to enforce the injunction and protect strikebreakers and company property. The union and strike were weakened after the arrests of the union leaders; and similar to Homestead, the managers were able to resume operations using the military and marshals to protect the strikebreakers.

Also similar to Homestead, the duration of the strike weighed heavily on the workers at Pullman. The workers entered the strike in dire financial conditions, and during the strike received assistance from local charities, but such relief could only go so far. Moreover, Pullman was able to reopen the shops using new workers making the continuance of the strike a wasted effort.

Unlike Homestead and Pullman, duration was not a factor in the outcome of the conflict in Mingo County; rather, it was the intervention of the U.S. military at Blair Mountain which forced the miners to go home and ended the period of conflict. The miners fought with the coal companies for over 17 months. However, the miners equated the conflict as a fight for democracy, and were unwilling to take arms against the government. The miners were able to sustain a protracted period of conflict due to the maintenance of gardens and livestock, and it did not become an urgent economic necessity to return to the mines, as it was for the workers at Pullman and Homestead.

In the three cases the workers entered a strike over different issues, under varied economic conditions within different industries. All of the strikes were large and long in duration, and displayed episodes of violence. By examining the historical background, and the individual strike characteristics, a discernible pattern begins to emerge.

Duration and Size	0	0	0
Economic Conditions	0	1	0
Entry into Polity	0	0	1
Official Intervention	1	1	1

In table 7.1, I have listed the possible explanations for violence within the three strikes. First, I have addressed the issue of strike duration and size. While the variables of size and duration fit the pattern argued by Shorter and Tilly, and Snyder and Kelly, it is not a factor in the evolution of hostilities within the three cases. In the case of Homestead, violence appeared only 5 days into the strike; while in Mingo County, violence appears to have been an almost constant factor. The case of Pullman, however, is challenging when measuring the outbreak of violence and duration. Although it was reported that the Pullman workers and the striking members of the ARU in Chicago did not participate in the riots, for the sake of comparison rioting occurred approximately 50 days after the Pullman workers walked out, and 5 days after the boycott was initiated.

The theory of relative deprivation in response to declining economic conditions is not a viable explanation for the outbreak of violence within the three cases. The Homestead strike occurred prior to the economic depression of 1893-1897, and the coal industry in southern West Virginia was still riding the wave of wartime production and profits. It can be argued, however, that the economic recession of the 1890s did play a role in the spate of violence in Chicago; unemployment and insecurity resulting from the economic crisis may have fueled the tension around the city, as argued by Almont Lindsey.³¹¹

Shorter and Tilly argue that strikes are direct challenges to the political power structure. In France, striking workers sought to contest the allocation of resources and authority within the workplace and national polity. Unions became the avenue for workers to gain a voice in national politics, as was the case in other Western European nations. Although the unions were significant factors within the three strikes, and the workers utilized the unions as a way to achieve their objectives and support during the disputes, the workers were not striking to establish a presence within the political establishment. However, the “mine wars” of southern West Virginia were a fight against the “Kaiserism” displayed by the operators, and the miners sought to end the companies’ dominance in the region and on their lives. The workers saw the UMWA as the only avenue for the miner to gain a voice against state’s economic and political power structure.

In all three cases, the strikers were labeled as “insurgents” fighting for “imaginary rights” with the intent of levying war against the system. Despite the rhetoric of the courts and the company officials, the workers did not use violence to bring down the political status quo. The demands of the workers were focused more on immediate issues, such as wages and the right to organize; therefore, the strikers did not resort to violence to significantly alter the political power structure.

The most significant pattern that exists within the three cases is that violence appeared as a result of company policies and government intervention. The workers at Homestead were aware of Frick’s past use of Pinkerton detectives to break strikes and import new labor. Because of the strikers’ protection of company property during the dispute, it is apparent that the workers were protecting their jobs. Once the Pinkerton’s arrived to protect and import strikebreakers the striking workers resorted to violence to defend their status within the company.

The violence in Mingo County was a direct result of the coal operators’ policy of using private guards to repress union activity and to maintain control over the lives of the workers. Both sides of the dispute engaged in violent activities; the coal operators sought to maintain their position in a highly competitive market threatened by outside influences in the form of the UMWA and Federal regulation. The miners sought to maintain their right to organize as established by the Washington Agreement, and end the company- enforced mine guard system, and dominance within the towns. The violence displayed by the miners was in reaction to the aggressive policies of the coal companies and can be considered a case of self-defense. The pattern continues in the case of the Pullman strike; violence erupted after the State and Federal authorities intervened at the request of the General Managers’ Association. The appearance of troops heightened tensions within Chicago resulting in mob activities.

Had the State and Federal Government chose to intervene as arbitrators instead of strikebreakers, perhaps the violence could have been averted. Within the three cases, the government consistently sided with the powerful and influential employers. Unlike their Western European counterparts, the American working class did not have significant allies within the political power structure. The economic model of liberal capitalism that defined the “Gilded Age” and the corporate magnates that fostered the system precluded any serious attempt by labor to establish a viable base of support within the government at that time.

The attitude of the government towards labor did not relent until the passing of the National Labor Relations Act in 1933. Otherwise known as the Wagner Act, it was a step by the Federal Government to reverse its historical opposition to organized labor; it guaranteed the workers the right to organize and collective bargaining. The act also created the National Labor Relations Board to arbitrate labor-management disputes and to penalize unfair labor practices by employers.

In this paper I have compared three episodes of strike activity in the annals of American labor. All of the strikes were examples of anti-worker campaigns instigated by a capitalist system that went to extreme measures to repress a working class willing to take up arms to defend its right and general welfare. The denial of union recognition and arbitration by the companies and governmental authorities made the worker nothing more than replaceable cogs in the machine.

County Map of West Virginia

Bibliography

Bemis, Edward. W. “The Homestead Strike”. The Journal of Political Economy. Vol.2, No. 3. (June 1894), pp.369-396

Brandes, Stuart. American Welfare Capitalism. The University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 1976
Brody, David. Steelworkers in America. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1960
Corbin, David. Life, Work and Rebellion in the Coal Fields, the Southern West Virginia Miners 1880-1922. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1981
Davies, James C. “The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions and a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Small Rebellion”. Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. Ed. Graham, Hugh D. and Gurr, Ted R. The New American Library: New York, 1969

---“The J-Curve and Power Struggle Theories of Collective Violence”. American Sociological Review, Vol. 39, No. 4. (August 1974), pp.607-610

Feierabend, Ivo, et al. “Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns”, Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. The New American Library; New York, 1969, pp. 606-668.
Fish, Peter G., “Red Jacket Revisited: The Case that Unraveled John J. Parker’s Supreme Court Appointment”. Law and History Review, Vol. 5, No. 1. (Spring 1987), pp.51-104
Fishback, Price V. Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of the Bituminous Coal Miners, 1890-1930. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992

---“The Economics of Company Housing: Historical Perspectives from the Coal Fields”, The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April 1992), pp. 346-365

Friedman, Gerald, “Strike Success and Union Ideology: The United States and France: 1880-1914. The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 38, No 1 (March 1988), pp. 1-25
Gurr, Ted R. “A Comparative Study of Civil Strife” Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. The New American Library; New York, 1969
Grant, Don S. and Wallace, Michael, “Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?” The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 96, No. 5. (March 1991), pp. 1117-1150
Laurie, Clayton D., “The United States Army and the Return to Normalcy in Labor Dispute Interventions: The Case of the Coal Mine Wars, 1920-1921”. West Virginia History, Vol. 50 (1991). West Virginia Division of Culture and History. http://www.wvculture.org/history/journal_wvh/wvh50-1.html
Lewis H.G. Unionism and Relative Wages in the United States. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1973.
Lewis, Ronald L. Black Coal Miners in America: Race, Class and Community Conflict, 1780-1980. University Press of Kentucky: Lexington, 1987
Lindsey, Almont. “Paternalism and the Pullman Strike”. The American History Review, Vol. 44, No.2. (January, 1939), pp.272-289.

---The Pullman Strike, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1942

Lynch, Lawrence R. “The West Virginia Coal Strike”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 29, No 4 (December 1914) pp. 626-663
Mahoney, James and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich “Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas”, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003
Montgomery, David. The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1987.
Nelson, Daniel. Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory System in the United States, 1880-1920. University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 1975
Rees, Albert. Real Wages in Manufacturing, 1890-1914, National Bureau of Economic Research, No. 70 Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1961
Skocpol, Theda. “Doubly Engaged Social Science: The Promise of Comparative Historical Analysis”. Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003
Shorter, Edward and Tilly, Charles. “The Shape of Strikes in France”. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 1971), pp. 60-86

--- Strikes in France, 1830-1968. Cambridge University Press: London, 1974

Snyder, David. “Institutional Setting and Industrial Conflict: Comparative Analyses of France, Italy, and the United States”. American Sociological Review, Vol. 40, No.3 (June 1975), pp. 259-278.
Snyder, David, Kelly, William R. “Industrial Violence in Italy, 1878-1903”, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No.1 (July 1976), pp.131-162
Supple, Barry. “The Political Economy of Demoralization: The State and the Coal Mining Industry in America and Britain between the Wars.” The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 41, No. 4 (November, 1988), pp.566-591
Taft, Philip and Ross, Philip. “American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character and Outcome”. Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives. The New American Library: New York, 1969, pp. 270-376
U.S. Census Bureau, 62nd Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1940. United States Coal Production, 1821-1939, No. 791, p.784
Warne, Colston E., editor. The Pullman Boycott of 1894, the Problem of Federal Intervention. D.C. Heath and Company: Boston, 1955
Weiss, Robert P., “Private Detective Agencies and Labour Discipline in the United States, 1855-1946”, The Historical Journal, Vol. 29, No.1. (March 1986), pp. 87-107
West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training. State of West Virginia Website. http://www.state.wv.us/mhst/results.cfm
Wheeler, Hoyt. “Mountaineer Mine Wars: An Analysis of the West Virginia Mine Wars of 1912-1913 and 1920-1921”, The Business History Review, Vol. 50, No. 1. (Spring, 1976), pp. 69-91
Wolff, Leon. Lockout, the Story of the Homestead Strike of 1892: a study of Violence, Unionism and the Carnegie Steel Empire. Harper and Row: New York, 1965.
Wright, Carol D. “The National Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, 1892-1901” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, no. 1 (November 1901), pp.37-68.
Yellen, Samuel. American Labor Struggles. Harcourt, Brace and Company: New York, 1936.

1 Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, p19

2 Skocpol 2003, p415

3 Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003, p13

4 Tilly 1969, pp. 9-10

5 The authors used man-days lost due to strikes and lock-outs as a gauge of strike propensity. The nations included in their study included: Australia, the former Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the United States. Kerr and Siegel 1954, p189

6 Kerr and Siegel 1954, p191

7 Kerr and Siegel 1954, p191-93

8 Kerr and Siegel 1954, p193

9 Kerr and Siegel 1954, p194

10 Kerr and Siegel 1954, p194

11 Kerr and Siegel 1954, p195

12 Kerr and Siegel 1954, p196

13 Southern Appalachia is defined as West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Maryland, and Alabama.

14 Fishback 1992 pp.152-153

15 The report calculated the turnover rate as the total amount of separations divided by the average number of workers on the payroll during the year. Also measured was a stable force rate, the percentage of workers on the payroll throughout the year. Fishback 1992, p28

16 During the First World War, the turnover rate for all industries was 180 percent for all firms and 221 percent for smaller firms. Price V. Fishback argues that the evidence suggests that during WWI, the coal mining turnover rate was probably higher. U.S. Coal Commission Report, as cited in Fishback 1992, p28

17 Fishback 1992, p28

18 Fishback 1992, p30

19 Fishback 1992, p31

20 Marx, Karl. “Wage Labor and Capital” (1847). http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/wage-labour/ch06.htm

21 Davies 1969, p371

22 Davies 1974, p609

23 The economic indicators included caloric intake, infant mortality, national income, urbanization, education levels, etc.

24 Feierabend et al 1969, pp. 606-668

25 Gurr, Ted 1969, p573

26 Kerr 1960, as cited in Shorter and Tilly 1974, p6

27 Snyder 1975, p260

28 Snyder 1975, p265

29 Snyder 1975, p265

30 Rees 1952, p218

31 Rees 1952, p219

32 Rees 1952, p219

33 Snyder 1975, p265

34 Snyder 1975, p265

35 Snyder 1975, p265

36 Especially the communist labor unions.

37 Snyder 1975, p264

38 Snyder 1975, p267

39 Snyder 1975, p267

40 The authors do acknowledge that short-term deprivation may trigger collective action. For this to happen, two conditions must be present: 1) the group must be well-organized for collective action and have become accustomed to utilizing strikes, and 2) when it follows a period of economic growth or well-being. Long-term deprivation, they argue, is antithetical fro effective mobilization. Shorter and Tilly 1974, p336

41 Shorter and Tilly 1974, p340

42 Shorter and Tilly 1974, p343

43 Shorter and Tilly 1974, p74-75

44 Friedman 1988, p7

45 Friedman 1988, p7

46 Friedman 1988, p9

47 Shorter and Tilly 1974, p75

48 Shorter and Tilly 1974, p343

49 Shorter and Tilly 1971a, pp.67-72

50 Snyder and Kelly 1976, p132; Taft and Ross 1969, p360-61

51 Snyder and Kelly 1976, p134

52 “Le Déclin de la grève violente en France de 1890 à 1935”, Shorter and Tilly 1971b, as cited in Grant and Wallace 1991, p1122

53 Taft and Ross 1969, p360

54 Snyder and Kelly 1976, pp143-144

55 Snyder and Kelly 1976, p141

56 Snyder and Kelly 1976, p141

57 Taft and Ross 1969, p365

58 Taft and Ross 1969, p271

59 See Snyder and Kelly 1976, table 2, pp145-146

60 They argue that a violent strike entails more organization and coordination among the workers, but does not necessarily mean that the strikers are highly structured or disciplined. “Le Déclin de la grève violente en France de 1890 à 1935”, Shorter and Tilly 1971, pp. 111-112 as cited in Snyder and Kelly 1976, p148

61 “Le Déclin de la grève violente en France de 1890 à 1935”Shorter and Tilly 1971, pp. 112, as cited in Snyder and Kelly 1976, p148

62 The authors argue that length has little significance and only reveals the initial psychological states of the parties involved in the strikes. Snyder and Kelly 1976, p149

63 In their study, Snyder and Kelly found that an objective drop in worker welfare did not influence the chances for violence. Snyder and Kelly 1976, p149

64 The authors state that the category differences in their sample were negligible, and argue that their results “challenge well-established, yet empirically untested, conflict theory which assumes that conflicts over ‘ideological’ issues are more intense than those concerning ‘material’ ones.” The authors admit that not all union-related strikes are solely based on ideology. However, union-related strikes in their sample had a greater ideological element than those over wages and hours. Snyder and Kelly 1976, p150

65 Snyder and Kelly hypothesize that there is not a strong connection between grievance intensity and the number of issues. If this hypothesis is correct, the authors argue that more issues/demands may reduce the “legitimacy or realism of the strikers’ position” as seen by the employers and non-striking workers, and in turn increase the conflict. Snyder and Kelly 1976, p150

66 http://www.epodunk.com/cgi-bin/genInfo.php?locIndex=14143

67 Brody 1960, p2-3

68 Brody 1960, p4

69 Bemis 1894, p369

70 Brody 1960, p5

71 Wolff 1965, p29

72 Wolff 1965, p30

73 As cited in Wolff 1965, pp.30-31

74 Bemis 1894, p372

75 A billet is a metal bar or block

76 Yellen 1936, p73

77 Wolff defines the skilled technicians as the rollers, the heaters, tablemen and shearmen., Wolff 1965, p39

78 Wolff 1965, p39

79 Wolff 1965, p32

80 Of the various types of workers in the mills, those working the blast furnace, Bessemer and open hearth departments were injured more often and more severely than the workers in fabricating, mechanical and yard department. Nelson 1975, p30

81 Wolff used article from contemporary newspapers to make his estimations, Wolff 1965, p34

82 Except for a few isolated incidents, Carnegie did not pay workers’ compensation for injuries. When the families sued Carnegie, the company rarely lost due to narrow legal definition of employer responsibility, and the powerful insurance firms hired by the company. The workers often took out their own insurance policies, costing about one dollar a week. Wolff 1975, pp.38-39

83 Brody 1960, p33

84 Wolff 1965, p36

85 These three organizations included: The United Son’s of Vulcan, the Associated Brotherhood of Iron and Steel Heaters’, Rollers and Roughers of the United States, the Iron and Steel Roll Hands Union. All were separate entities prior to the consolidation and represented different jobs. The oldest of the three was the United Sons’ of Vulcan was established in 1858 in Pittsburgh, as the Iron City Forge. Wright 1901, p37

86 Wright 1901, p38

87 Bemis 1894, p370

88 Montgomery 1987, p36

89 Wright 1901, p42

90 Brody 1960, p52

91The union did not want to give any manufacturer an advantage over another, unless the producer had improved machinery Bemis 1894, p375

92 Bemis 1894, p375

93However, this was more an issue of the union’s indifference over the matter and less a conciliatory move. When the AFL took up the issue of the eight hour day, the AAISW did so reluctantly, believing that it was not an issue over which to enter conflict to obtain. Brody 1960, p52

94 Carnegie, Andrew, “An Employer’s View of the Labor Question”, Forum, April 1886. As quoted in Yellen 1932, p74.

95 Carnegie, Andrew, “Results of the Labor Struggle”. Forum, August 1886. As quoted in Yellen, p75.

96 Wolff 1965. p24

97 Yellen, 1936, p73; Beginning in the mid-1800s, companies often hired private detective firms to police property and workers. The repeated monitoring of labor was almost the main duty of private detectives until the First World War. Weiss 1986, p88

98 Weiss 1986, p92

99 Yellen 1936, pp75-76.

100 Brody 1960, p53

101 Brody, p54

102 Homestead marked one of the first times that American workers collectively attempted to stop deskilling. Weiss 1986, p93

103 The union opposed changing the contract’s expiration date, believing it was a ploy by the company to prevent the possibility for strikes, seeing as December is a less desirable time for striking than the month of June. Yellen 1932, p77

104 Yellen 1932, p78

105 Brody 1960, p54; A report by the Congressional investigation following the strike agreed with the workers. They found the workers “very intelligent and highly skilled” and that the work was so harsh that it impaired the workers’ health and shortened their lives; therefore a wage reduction of eighteen to twenty-six percent should be scrutinized. Yellen 1932, p80

106Bemis 1894 p373

107 Wolff 1965, p91

108 Lindsey 1939, p272

109Pullman’s reach extended across the Atlantic; in 1873, England’s Midland Railway Company adopted the company’s sleeper cars. Six years later, Pullman cars were running on three English and several Scottish rails. In 1875, the company established a shop in Italy for the construction of cars on the Italian railroads. Lindsey 1942, p22

110 “Annual Report of the Pullman Company”, October 21, 1893, p4, as cited in Lindsey 1942, p25

111 Lindsey 1942, p25

112 The Sugar trust was a loose network of sugar companies under the control of American Sugar, a monopoly which controlled 98% of the U.S. production in 1907.

113 New York Times, July 1, 1894, p9 as cited in Lindsey 1942, p26.

114 Lindsey 1942, p26

115 Lindsey 1942, p27

116 In the fiscal year of 1893, dividends reached $2.5 million, and wages $7.2 million. The next year, dividends increased by $360,000 in total, but wages saw a reduction of $2.7 in the sum total paid. Lindsey 1942, p27

117 It is possible that George Pullman modeled his company town after a British example of corporate paternalism. The town of Saltaire was founded by Sir Titus Salt, a manufacturer of alpaca woolens. After his enterprise experienced rapid growth in 1853, Salt constructed a town to house his employees. Salt focused on aesthetics, and built homes made of stone, surrounded by gardens. The town possessed parks, cricket and croquet grounds, and bathing facilities. Schools and churches were founded; sanitation was reportedly first-rate, and facilities for the aged and invalid were established. The town was controlled by Salt and he retained ownership of all the buildings and homes. However, Salt, unlike Pullman, allowed his workers to buy property so they could construct their own homes. Lindsey 1942, p34

118 Pullman denied this area was a part of the town.

119 U.S. Strike Commission Report, Senate Executive Commission Report, Senate Executive Document No. 7, 53d Congress, 3d session, pp. xxxii-xxxix. As cited in Warne, p20. Initially, rent was deducted from the workers wages; however, the company was later forced by law to pay wages in full. The company got around this by issuing two paychecks, one that was in the amount of rent and the other in the remaining wages. The worker was to sign the former over to the Pullman Bank once the checks were issued.

120 Lindsey 1939, p280

121 Lindsey 1939, p280

122 Yellen 1936, p102; Lindsey 1939, p276

123 Yellen 1936, p102

124 Lindsey 1942, p50

125 Hopkins later became mayor of Chicago and was so during the time of the strike. His accounting firm donated financial aid to the strikers, and he made attempts at arbitration. Lindsey 1936, p278; Lindsey 1942, pp80-81

126 U.S. Strike Commission xxii-xxiii, as cited in Warne 1955, p9

127 Alcohol was available at the town's hotel, but it was expensive. It could also be obtained in nearby Hyde Park

128 Chicago Herald, February, 7, 1886, p2. As cited in Lindsey 1942, p87

129Lindsey 1942, p70

130Yellen 1936, p102

131 Chicago Tribune, September 21, 1888, p9. As cited in Lindsey 1942, p91

132 U.S. Strike Commission pp. xxxii-xxxix, as cited in Warne, p20

133 Warne estimated the workforce to have been 4000, Warne 1955 introduction; Yellen estimated 5000, Yellen 1936, p109; while Lindsey estimated the highest amount at 5500, Lindsey 1942, p24

134 Montgomery 1986, p127

135 Montgomery 1987, pp126-127

136 Montgomery 1987, pp127

137 These included the car builders, cabinet makers and painters. Freight cars were not made out of pressed steel until 1897

138 There are no definite figures for how many women were employed at Pullman. Testifying before the Strike Commission, Pullman Vice-President Thomas H. Wickes identified the departments in which the female employees worked as the carpet, upholstery, linen, glass-embossing and the laundry. The combined payroll for these departments was 239 people. Montgomery suggests that in four other departments - mills, wood machine, tinners and streetcar - the wages of the non-journeymen was on average less than $1.40 per day, suggesting that women occupied at least some of these jobs. Their combined non-journeyman force was approximately 176 women. Montgomery estimates that the number of women in could possibly have been as low as 250, and as high as 590.Montgomery 1987, p127

139 Carpenters made $2.06 per day. Carvers made $3.30. Montgomery 1987, p127

140 Montgomery 1987, p129

141 Montgomery 1987, p129

142 U.S. Strike Commission Report, pp. xxiii-xxvii, as cited in Warne

143 However, white parentage was a prerequisite of membership. Yellen 1932, p109

144 Lindsey 1942, pp29-30

145 U.S. Strike Commission Report, pp. xxi-xxiii, as cited in Warne, pp. 9-10

146 The construction division was hit the hardest, because this department employed the majority of the workers; orders were cancelled and new contracts were not forthcoming. Lindsey 1939 p285-286

147 The repair department was the only division that continued to show a profit.

148 However, they lost 39 other contracts which amounted to just as much. Lindsey 1942, p96.

149 The operating division included the repair department

150 Lindsey 1942, p97

151 This decrease occurred between April 1893 and April 1894. According to the company’s statistics, that for all categories of journeymen mechanics, the decline in average daily wages during this year was $2.63 to $2.03; Lindsey 1942 p99

152 Lindsey 1942, p99

153 U.S. Strike Commission Report, pp. xxxii-xxxix. As cited in Warne, p20

154 Despite the fact that the rent level in Pullman was 20-25% higher than in surrounding communities, Pullman ignored the complaints, arguing that since rentals yielded less than 4% on its initial housing investment, the rent was, if anything, too low. Lindsey 1942, p92

155Yellen 1932 pp. 104-105; Lindsey 1942, p94; the rent issue cannot be overstated. At the time of the strike, the amount of overdue rent amounted to approximately seventy thousand dollars, and eventually reached one hundred thousand dollars. Pullman’s argument that the residents were free to leave the town was untenable. In the fall of 1893, the foremen of the shops instructed the workers to remain in the town if they wanted to retain their positions. It should be remembered that prior to the depression, only one-half of the workers lived in Pullman; by April 1894, however, more than two-thirds of the employees were living within the town. Lindsey 1942, p93

156 A December 1893 strike by the steamfitters led the Pullman shop manager to comprise a blacklist of forty-one names, which read: “In connection with the recent trouble we have had with steam fitters both in the construction and repair department, I give below the names of the men who have left our employ, and I hereby instruct that none on these men be employed in these works.” In their testimony before the Senate, some witnesses reported that the lists were also sent to the local railroad companies. Lindsey 1942, p95

157 U.S. Strike Commission Report, pp. xxiii-xxvii, 6-7, 417 as cited in Warne; Yellen 1932, p108

158 Yellen 1932, p107

159 Yellen 1932, p110

160 U.S. Strike Commission p. xxiv, as cited in Yellen 1932, p112

161 Yellen 1932,, p110

162 Montgomery 1987, p397

163 See map, p. 83

164 Supple 1988, p569

165 Fishback 1992, pp19-20

166 Supple 1988 p567

167 During WWI, bituminous coal represented 68.7% of the U.S. energy needs; by 1936-1940, this percentage decreased to 43.8%.Supple 1988 p568

168 Lynch 1914 p626

169 West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety and Training, State of West Virginia website, http://www.state.wv.us/mhst/results.cfm

170 Lynch 1914, p626

171 U.S. Census Bureau, 62nd Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1940. United States Coal Production, 1821-1939, No. 791, p.784

172 Corbin 1981, p5

173 The cost of labor in bituminous coal mining was between 60-70%. Supple 1988, p570

174 Corbin 1981, p183

175 The agreement also imposed a $1 daily fine for any worker who went on strike.

176 Corbin 1981, p185

177 Fish 1987, p53-54

178 Fish 1987, p54

179 In the Midwest, this amount was significantly lower – at twenty percent – due to the already established self-governing agricultural towns with comparatively better transportation. Magnussen 1920, as cited in Fishback 1992a p153; Fishback 1992b, p347

180 Fishback 1992b, p346-347, 353

181 Lewis 1987, p146-147

182Fishback 1992b, p348

183 Fishback 1992b, p348

184During strikes, the issue was not based upon non-payment of rent; rather, it was a question if the striking worker was still an employee, and entitled to the house. Fishback 1992b, p349

185 Fishback 1992a, p168 n.21

186 United States Coal Commission 1925, “The Bituminous mine Workers and their Homes”, Report of the United States Coal Commission, Part 3, 68^th Congress, 2^nd Session, Washington D.C. as cited in Fishback 1992b, p350

187 Corbin 1981, p10

188 Fishback 1992a, p147

189 Fishback 1992a, p147

190 Fish 1987, p54

191 Fish 1987, p55

192 Corbin 1981, p117

193 Fishback 1992, p42

194 The “dirty coal” was coal which was loaded with slate dust or chunks of slate. Fishback 1992, p66

195 Often, the checkweighmen were the miners’ ombudsmen. Fishback 1992, p67

196 Corbin 1981, p31

197 Corbin 1981, p31

198 Fishback 1992, p79

199 Fishback 1992, p88

200 Fishback 1992, p21-22

201 Rees 1961, p.33

202 Fishback 1992, p84

203 Fishback 1992, p23

204 Lewis G. 1973, pp. 73-75

205 Fishback 1992, p23

206 In the late-nineteenth century, there were labor associations which attempted to organize the mines, such as the National protective Union, the Miners’ and Laborers’ Benevolent Association, the National Federal of Miners, and the Knights of Labor. These groups were successful in attracting a few thousand miners, and several of the mining districts in Kanawha County succeeded in obtaining recognition of the UMWA and biennial contract negotiations in 1902; however, the vast majority of miners were not organized. Lynch 1914, p628

207 Fishback 1992, p23

208 Corbin 1981, p25

209 Corbin p27

210 Gompers, Samuel, “Russianized West Virginia,” American Federationist 20 (October 1913): 826. as cited in Corbin 1981, p26

211 Corbin p41

212 Fishback 1992 p30

213 Corbin 1981, p51

214 West Virginia State Division of Culture and History: http://www.wvculture.org/hiStory/minewars.html

215 Corbin 1981 p87

216 Corbin 1981 p88

217 Corbin 1981, p80; Fagge 1993, pp.1-18

218 Lynch 1914 p635

219 Corbin 1981 p95

220 Corbin 1981, p99

221 Corbin 1981, p99

222 Laurie 1991, pp. 1-24

223 Montgomery 1987, p387

224 Laurie 1991, p. 1-24

225 Laurie 1991, p1-24

226 Corbin p200

227 Snyder and Kelly 1976, p159

228 Shorter and Tilly 1971, as cited in Grant and Wallace 1991, p1122

229 Yellen 1936, p81

230 Statement by the Pullman Company to U.S. Strike Commission, pp. 578-581, as cited in Warne, p14. The figure may be higher when considering that the number provided by the company were those who were still able to find work in the shops. It does not include the number of people who had been laid-off due to low production.

231 Lindsey 1942, p134. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in depth the level of conflict that occurred nationally due to the boycott. In this comparison, I will only focus mainly on the events in Chicago during the strike, but it is important to keep in mind how the participation by the national ARU influenced the response of the GMA and the federal government.

232 Lewis 1987, pp.157-158

233 Lindsey 1942, p103

234 The members of the national ARU had their own grievances which made the workers more willing to enter the Pullman dispute. Since September 1893, the railroads throughout the nation systematically reduced wages, blacklisted workers, imposed long hours, treated the workers arbitrarily, and discriminated against union members. Lindsey 1942, pp132-133

235 Taft and Ross 1969, p364

236 Bemis 1894, p384-85

237 Frick’s obstinacy was buttressed by an attempt on his life by the anarchist Alexander Berkman. The strikers attempted to distance themselves with the radicals by arresting anarchists distributing leaflets.

238 Taft and Ross 1969, p284

239 Lindsey 1942, p131

240 The General Managers Association was formed in 1886, as a regional association of railroad managers in response to the rise of labor disputes within the industry. At the time of the strike, the GMA represented twenty-four railroads emanating out of Chicago, controlling over 40,000 miles of tracks, 220,000 employees and two billion dollars in capital. Lindsey 1942, p114

241 U.S. Strike Commission Report, Senate Executive Document No. 7, 53^rd Congress, 3^rd session, pp. xxxix-xlvi, as cited in Warne 1955, p24

242 Corbin 1981, p200

243 Red Jacket owned 3,000 to 4,000 acres of coal land in Mingo, McDowell and Wayne Counties. It operated 5 mines, with each employing from 73 to 293 miners in 1927. In all, the mines produced one million tons annually. Fish 1987, p60

244 Fish 1987, p60

245 Fish 1987, pp.61-63

246 Corbin 1981, p202

247 Lindsey 1942, p219

248 Montgomery 1987, p37 Bemis writes that the strikers guarded the works from damage. A leaky gas valve was repaired at the insistence of the strikers, Bemis 1894, p380.

249 In historical accounts of the conflict, the number of fatalities is varied. Wolff cites 9 steelworker deaths and 3 Pinkertons, while Taft and Ross say 2 workers and 2 Pinkertons died. Yellen, meanwhile, said 3 Pinkertons and “several” workers.

250 Wolff 1965, p169

251 Wolff 1965, p97

252 Copyright holder unknown. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C. 20540. http://historyproject.ucdavis.edu/imageapp.php?Major=LB&Minor=E

253 Lindsey 1942, p203

254 Taft and Ross 1969, pp.286-287

255 Lindsey 1942, p205

256 Lindsey 1942, p205

257 Yellen 1936, p122

258The strikers denied burning the cars, and instead accused agents hired by the railroads to sway public opinion against the striking workers. Lindsey 1942, p207

259 The number of arrests does not include those arrested for violating the injunction. U.S. Strike Commission Report, pp. xviii-xix, as cited in Warne, p7

260 Lindsey 1942, p233

261 Lindsey 1942, p233

262 U.S. Strike Commission Report, pp. xxxii-xxxix, as found in Warne p21.

263 Ibid

264 Federal troops were used because West Virginia suspended its state militia following WWI.

265 Corbin p203

266 Wheeler 1976, p79

267 Corbin p205

268 Fish 1987, p62

269 Corbin p218

270 Laurie 1991, pp1-24

271 Lewis 1987, p162

272 Lewis 1987, p162

273 Corbin 1981, p223

274 Corbin 1981, p224

275 Laurie 1991, pp.1-24

276 It is unknown how many people died at Blair Mountain; estimates ranged from 4 to 100. Corbin 1981, p235 n.141

277 Snyder and Kelly 1976, p155

278 Montgomery 1987, p38

279 Montgomery 1987, p38

280 Although no one was found guilty of either treason or rioting, a leader of the Knights of Labor was found guilty of conspiring to poison strikebreakers, and sentenced to seven years in prison. Bemis 1894, p388

281 Montgomery 1987, p39

282 Yellen 1932, p118

283 As cited in Yellen 1932, p116

284 Lindsey 1942, p182

285 Lindsey 1942, p182

286 As a pretense for building a case for military intervention, the GMA hoped to establish the failure of the local government to end the disturbance during its early days. Because Hopkins was a former employee of Pullman and sympathized with the strikers, the GMA argued that the mayor willingly neglected to use the police force to its fullest extent.

287 In a letter to Cleveland, Altgeld wrote that federal troops were unneeded and that the federal government was appealed to by “men who had political and selfish motives for wanting to ignore the State government.” The governor added that the newspapers have printed “fabrications” or exaggerations; that the situation fell under the banner of a States’ responsibility under the Constitution, and asked for the immediate withdraw of the troops. When trains were obstructed within the state, Governor Altgeld did not hesitate to send in the state militia. For example, when trains in Danville were forcibly detained, and the local sheriff was unable to relieve the situation, Altgeld sent in two hundred and twenty state troops. The press admonished the governor for rebuking the President, and titled him the “champion of anarchy”.

Yellen 1932, p120; Lindsey 1942, p182

288 Yellen 1932, p122

289 On June 30, Edwin Walker was appointed by Olney as special council for the government during the boycott. However, this appointment is evidence of the rail industries’ influence within the federal power structure; since 1870, Walker had been an attorney for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad, a firm involved in the strike. Olney was not a stranger to the rail interests either, as a legal advisor and director of several corporations, including the Chicago, the Burlington, and New York Central.

290 In the injunction twenty-two railroads were cited as needing protection.

291 Lindsey 1942, p161

292 Lindsey 1942, p161

293 As cited in Lindsey 1942, p162

294 Yellen 1932, p127

295 Yellen 1932, p128

296 Strikes lasting one day had roughly the same success rate as those which lasted fifty-plus days. Snyder and Kelly 1976, p155

297 Yellen 1936, p97

298 In 1892, production was at 878,000 tons; in 1900, it increased to 2,870,000. In 1892, the net profit was $4 million, in 1899, it had increased to $21 million, and $40 million the next year. In 1899, the total output of Carnegie’s Monongahela Valley plants surpassed Great Britain’s 1885 record by 35%. Montgomery 1987, p40-41

299 Wolff 1965, p229

300 Montgomery 1987, p41

301 As cited in Yellen, p133

302 Lindsey 1939, p289

303 Corbin 1981, p33

304 Taft and Ross 1969, p322

305 Lewis 1987, p163

306 Laurie 1991, pp1-24

307 West Virginia Coal Fields. Hearings before U.S. Committee on Education and Labor, 67^th Congress, 1st session, pp. 7, 52, 873; as cited in Taft and Ross 1969, p322

308 Ibid.

309 Fish 1987, p63

310 Shorter and Tilly 1974, p343

311 Lindsey 1942, p205

Directory: bitstream
bitstream -> How to organise your body 101: postfeminism and the (re)construction of the female body through How to Look Good Naked
bitstream -> College day annual report
bitstream -> A mathematical theory of communication
bitstream -> Images of Fairfax in Modern Literature and Film Andrew Hopper
bitstream -> Amphitheater High School’s Outdoor Classroom: a study in the Application of Design
bitstream -> Ethics of Climate Change: Adopting an Empirical Approach to Moral Concern
bitstream -> The Age of Revolution in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and South China Sea: a maritime Perspective
bitstream -> Methodism and Culture
bitstream -> Review of coastal ecosystem management to improve the health and resilience of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area
bitstream -> Present state of the area

Download 0.8 Mb.

Share with your friends: