Individual Strike Characteristics

The Influence of the Union

Taft and Ross argue that violent labor disputes were the result of the employers’ attempts to break up functioning unions, or the denial of the workers the right to organize. They argue that the odds for violence increased when the employers refused to negotiate with the union. Taft and Ross found that the majority of violence was caused by isolated and unplanned acts on the picket line, during outlawed demonstrations protesting “employer obduracy” or during the attempts by the strikers to prevent strikebreakers from entering the establishment.²³⁵

Union recognition	No	No	Yes
Defense of established union	Yes	No	Yes
Denied Negotiation: Pre-strike	No	Yes	Yes
Denied Negotiation During strike	Yes	Yes	Yes

Homestead

Taft and Ross argue that the Homestead strike was a “contest between the union and Frick”. The workers were aware of Frick’s history of union busting and knew that his refusal to budge during negotiations was an attempt to do break the influence of the AAISW at the mill, which had been recognized by Carnegie since1889. Although it represented only a fraction of the entire workforce, the union had been able to institute a contract that established work rules and wage rates. Frick was able to use a clash over wage reductions and the contract’s expiration as a means of eliminating the union. Furthermore, the management stopped negotiations, and refused to negotiate during the strike.

When Frick began to import strikebreakers and restart operations, the strike committee leader, Hugh O’Donnell wrote a letter to Republican vice-Presidential candidate, Whitelaw Reid for assistance in convincing the company to arbitrate. The letter warned that replacing union workers with new non-union employees would create an “unending internecine strife at Homestead” due to the large amount of workers who owned homes in the area. This could be avoided if the Carnegie Company recognize the union by “re-opening the conference doors”, and that it is not in the workers interest to “stand upon a question of scale, or wages, or hours, or anything else.”²³⁶ Reid appealed to Frick for Carnegie’s address in Scotland, the latter refused. Eventually Reid was able to get into contact with Carnegie, and urged him to make a rapid and amicable agreement. Carnegie responded by ordering Frick to make a settlement. Frick refused, however, declaring that the strikers were “assassins”.²³⁷ Therefore, the Homestead strike could be considered a defensive move in support of an existing and recognized union, and adheres to the theory of Taft and Ross which states that the odds for violence increase with the employers’ denial of arbitration.²³⁸

Pullman

In Pullman, it appears that union related issues were not as important to the workers as the immediate issue of wages and rents. With that said, the refusal of George Pullman to consider the grievances of the committee members, is evidence of his refusal to allow the union to have any role determining company policy. At the national convention on June 21 the ARU voted to give Pullman four days to begin negotiations with its workers. If the company refused, the ARU would refuse to handle Pullman cars. The boycott was aimed at cutting off a major source of revenue for Pullman, which would force the company to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the workers demands; therefore, union recognition at Pullman was not a major strike issue.²³⁹ Following the strike, the U.S. Strike Commission concluded that by refusing to negotiate prior to and during the strike, the company and the General Managers Association²⁴⁰ created a preventable situation:

The Policy of both the Pullman Company and the Railway Managers’ Association in reference to applications to arbitrate closed the door to all attempts at conciliation and settlement of differences. The commission is impressed with the belief, by the evidence and by the attendant circumstances as disclosed, that a different policy would have prevented the loss of life and great loss of property and wages occasioned by the strike.²⁴¹

Mingo County

Following the First World War, the miners fought to maintain the right to organize, which was granted to them by the Washington Agreement in 1917. After the UMWA began a massive organizing drive in May 1920, the mine guards and coal operators responded by assaulting and dismissing anyone connected with the union. The news of such assaults led the miners to respond with armed retaliation and marches. Therefore, the conflict in southern West Virginia was partly the result of the efforts by the non-union miners to gain union recognition, and the union miners to defend the UMWA.

When the UMWA petitioned the operators for recognition, the officials refused to meet with the union in conference and refused to negotiate. Instead, the operators offered wage increases to those who refused to join the union, dismissed the miners who did, and hired the Baldwin-Felts guards to evict the union members from the company houses.²⁴²

The incident that triggered the period of violence in Mingo County was the “Matewan Massacre” of May 19, 1920. It was the result of a coal company’s efforts to repress the union within its mines. The intense violence that ensued led some to nickname the county “Bloody Mingo”.

On May 10, 1920, the Red Jacket Consolidate Coal and Coke Company²⁴³ submitted “yellow-dog” contracts to its employees, and obtained the signatures from 75% of the workforce²⁴⁴ On May 19, the Baldwin-Felts guards evicted the union miners from the Red Jacket housing. Afterwards, while waiting to board a train in the nearby town of Matewan, the agents were confronted by a crowd, which included the town’s mayor and sheriff. Shooting broke out; three townspeople – including the mayor – and seven of the guards were killed.²⁴⁵ Afterwards, the miners in Mingo began to join the union en masse; by the time of the official strike call by the union on July 1, over 90% had become members.²⁴⁶

Union meetings were banned in Mingo County; it was declared that a gathering of two or more men amounted to a union meeting and those involved would be arrested. A miner was arrested for having a copy of the union newspaper in his possession. The militia and state police began to intimidate the strikers by invading the tent colonies, destroying its contents and preventing the families to enter town for provisions. The union headquarters in Williamson was raided, and twelve union officials were arrested and refused the right of habeas corpus. They were released after promising to leave the state.

5. Strike Escalation

In this section I will address the type of violence displayed within the strike. The level of the hostilities and participants varied. To break down the types of violence displayed may appear to be an issue of splitting hairs; however, to separate the forms of hostilities displayed by the strikers raises interesting issues of loyalties and objectives. For example, at the Homestead works, the strikers prevented company property from being destroyed, but participated in a battle against the company’s use of the Pinkertons. While at Mingo, the miners repeatedly destroyed company property in order to prevent the reopening of the mines. Some of the miners did not hesitate to take up arms against the local police forces and company sponsored militias, but refused to fight against the U.S. military at Blair Mountain. Issues such as these deserve further examination by future researchers.

In regards to participation, the workers at Homestead and in Mingo County did partake in the violent confrontations. Meanwhile, the U.S. Strike Commission and the Governor of Illinois found no incidences of violence within Pullman. Witnesses testifying before the commission also reported that the striking workers in both Pullman and Chicago did not participate in the rioting which occurred following the intervention by the U.S. Marshals and military troops. Some reported witnessing some strikers attempting to stop the mobs from destroying property and urged the crowds to go home.²⁴⁷

The forms of violence displayed will be divided into seven categories: 1) against company property; 2) against strikebreakers; 3) against company officials; 4) against the private guards; 5) against local police forces 6) against the State National Guard; and 7) against the U.S. Military.

Company Property	No	No	No	Yes
Strikebreakers	Yes	No	No	Yes
Company officials	No	No	No	Yes
Local police	No	No	No	Yes
Private guards	Yes	No	No	Yes
State Militia	No	No	No	Yes
Federal troops	No	No	No	No

Homestead

After Frick closed the mill on July 1, the union elected an advisory committee to direct operations. Union patrols were stationed at the entrances of the town and river; pickets were positioned around the mill with orders not to destroy property; the union cut down the effigies of company officials, which had been strung up around the town; and the committee urged the saloon operators to prohibit drunkenness. Strikebreakers, the local police, and company officials were prevented from entering company property. In essence, the union gained control of the town.²⁴⁸

The strike turned violent with the arrival of the Pinkertons. On July 6, two barges carrying the detectives and strikebreakers arrived on the banks of the Monongahela River. They were met by strikers and the union committee, who ordered the Pinkertons to leave. It is unknown who fired the first shot, but once that happened, the Pinkertons began to fire from the barges and the strikers responded with rifle fire, dynamite, flaming oil, cannon fire and fireworks. By the end of the day, the Pinkertons had surrendered, several steel workers and Pinkerton detectives were dead, and dozens injured.²⁴⁹ Following the battle, the advisory committee maintained its control of the town; and continued to patrol the streets and the mill. The day after the battle, the strikers returned to the mill to repair any damage it might have sustained during the fighting.

During the strike, assaults against strikebreakers did occur. On two occasions, the residences of the strikebreakers’ were set on fire. Following the defeat of the Pinkertons, Frick requested military aid from the Governor of Pennsylvania and began to import strikebreakers and reopened the mill on July 15. The strikebreakers were often assaulted by angry mobs, but the strikers avoided confrontations with the guardsmen.²⁵⁰ The strikers also avoided attacking the sheriff deputies, who refused to bear arms, interfere with the picketers, intrude on company property, or escort strikebreakers into the mill.²⁵¹

Pullman

A train on the Rock Island Railroad guarded by Company C of the 15th U.S. Infantry, shown at Blue Island, Illinois, during the Pullman Strike, 1894.²⁵²

It is unknown who instigated the violence; the police and railroad officials did not agree whether the responsible parties were striking union members or hooligans who saw an opportunity to plunder.²⁵⁴ Almont Lindsey argues that the arrival of the military “proved an irritant, but more important was the accumulated resentment shared by certain classes of people against the railroad.” He describes these “certain classes” as “hoodlums, tramps, and semi-criminals”, who went to Chicago for the 1893 World’s Columbian Exhibition, and found themselves stranded as a result of the economic depression.²⁵⁵ On par with the theory of relative-deprivation, the panic of 1893 produced unemployment and uncertainty, which could have contributed to the escalation of mob-violence.

The Mayor of Chicago, the Superintendent of Police, and members of the media testified before the Strike Commission that the riots were not caused by the striking ARU members. In addition, two assistant fire marshals in the areas hardest hit by arson, testified that they did not find any evidence to implicate the strikers in the burning of train cars and other railroad property.²⁵⁶ However, the GMA was eager to shift the blame onto the strikers as a way of turning the public against the strikers.

The intervention by the military coincided with an escalation of mob activity; by July 5 there were at least 14,000 Federal and State troops within Chicago.²⁵⁷ On July 4, mobs began to overturn cars and set them aflame; the largest mob was reported to have been as many as 10,000 individuals.²⁵⁸ The next day, the buildings of the World’s Columbian Exposition were set on fire. The fire was believed to have been a result of arson, but there was no evidence that it was related to the dispute. The press, however, reported that it was caused by strike sympathizers. On July 7, mobs continued to set train cars on fire. Members of the state militia who were attempting to move a train were assaulted by a mob of several thousand, who threw rocks and reportedly fired bullets. The troops, deputies and police responded by charging with bayonets, and firing shots into the crowd. In the report by the Strike Commission, the number of people shot and fatally wounded was 12; and 515 people were arrested during the strike in Chicago.²⁵⁹

While riots occurred in Chicago, the residents of Pullman remained calm. The Mayor of Chicago testified before the U.S. Strike Commission that “not a pane of glass had been broken” during the strike and the city did not receive complaints of any kind from the Pullman Company.²⁶⁰ The striking workers held all of their meetings outside of Pullman, and discouraged radicalism, drunkenness and violence. A regiment of the state militia was positioned within the town on July 6, but violence against the soldiers did not occur. The closest incident of violence occurred on July 5 and 6, when a mob from South Chicago and Kensington, blocked the path of trains and destroyed several cars. It was reported that the residents of Pullman did not participate in this episode, or any other disturbance that occurred within Chicago.²⁶¹

The U.S. Strike Commission commented on the non-violent behavior of the Pullman workers during the strike. It reported that the when the workers surrounded the plant, they were actually safeguarding property and not there to prevent entry to strikebreakers. Moreover, the Commission found that there was no violence or destruction of company property by the strikers or sympathizers at Pullman; and no additional protection was needed by the police or military until July 3 due to the escalating violence in the surrounding areas.²⁶² The Commission added further: “Such dignified, manly and conservative conduct in the midst of excitement and threatened starvation is worthy of the highest type of American citizenship…”²⁶³

Mingo County

Following the “Matewan Massacre” the amount of violence within the region was substantial. Martial law was declared three times and Federal troops were repeatedly sent into the region to quell the hostilities.²⁶⁴ The coal operators imported new workers and guards following the official union strike call on July 1. Meanwhile, the miners brought in guns and proceeded to attack the guards and strikebreakers. The miners’ guerilla-style tactics included: ambushing cars and blocking and shooting at trains carrying strikebreakers, and attacking the foremen, superintendents, plant managers and other officials who tried to keep the mines open. In a brutal example of violence, a man handing out anti-union leaflets was castrated and left to die on train tracks.²⁶⁵

The violence of the striking miners escalated into a full-blown battle at the White Star Mining Company at Merrimac, on May 12, 1921. In what became known as the “Three Days Battle of the Tug”. The strikers demolished the company’s power plant, cut down telegraph and telephone lines and opened fire at company officials and strikebreakers. The violence spread to surrounding towns, and within a ten-mile radius, and involved approximately 2,000 strikers and 1,000 deputies and mine guards.²⁶⁶ In the end, at least twenty men were killed.²⁶⁷

The final confrontation at Blair Mountain was instigated by the assassination of two defendants on trial for the Matewan incident. On August 1, the unarmed men were shot on the McDowell County courthouse steps by Baldwin-Felts detectives. In response, almost 5000 miners met at Lens Creek, in Kanawha County on August 20.²⁶⁸ Armed with rifles and a machine gun, the miners declared that they were going to march through Logan County, hang the sheriff for collusion with the operators and blow up the county courthouse, end martial law in Mingo and free those held in the county jails. It is unknown who organized and led the march, because the miners swore an oath of secrecy, used sentries, codes and passwords as a way of fending off possible spies. They were successful; agents from the Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation were unable to infiltrate the meetings.²⁶⁹ The number of participants increased as miners joined along the route; it has been estimated that the between 15,000 and 20,000 miners participated in the march.²⁷⁰ During the march the miners looted company stores for guns, ammunition and provisions.

The Logan County sheriff amassed an army of deputies, mine guards, local businessmen, and state police. The governor requested the aid of Federal troops, and President Harding sent in military officials to survey the situation and meet with union leaders. On August 26, the military warned the union that if the march continued, the miners and the UMWA would be charged with treason. The union urged the miners to go home; some did, but most stayed.

The sheriff’s forces, who were at this point under the command of the state militia, positioned themselves on the crest of Blair Mountain. In the meantime, the miners assembled in the town of Blair, which was located near the bottom of the mountain, and prepared for battle. The miners who had fought in WWI trained the others in tactics and strategy. At the scene of the battle, the miners dug trenches, cut telephone and telegraph lines, and sentries and snipers were positioned along the ridge.

The battle lasted for over a week. Although the miners outnumbered the Logan officials almost 10 to 1,²⁷¹ the latter were better financed and equipped; the guards had machine gun nests on the mountain’s crest, and an almost limitless supply of ammunition, and a small plane used for dropping hand bombs.²⁷² However, the coal companies’ most important advantage was the intervention by the Federal Government.

President Harding took actions to end what he called a “civil war”.²⁷³ On August 30, the President placed the entire state under martial law. He ordered 2,500 federal troops, fourteen bombing planes, with gas and percussion bombs, and machine guns to be sent into the area.²⁷⁴ However, no shots were fired by the military in the battle.²⁷⁵ After the Federal troops arrived on September 3, most of the miners stopped fighting and went home, refusing to take up arms against the United States government. The hostilities ended the following day when the remaining miners surrendered.²⁷⁶

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