Jackson Vanik will pass – bipartisan support of congress and interest groups gives momentum
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- You have to distinguish between rhetoric and actual relations
at: putinPutin won’t be anti west – already shifting from election rhetoricGhitis 3/22 (Frida Ghitis, “World Citizen: Russia's Putin Prepares for Next Act on Global Stage,” 3/22/12) In the run-up to Russia’s March 4 presidential election, with opposition forces staging massive protests, Vladimir Putin sharply escalated the intensity of his anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric. His accusations of U.S. interference in Russian affairs and portrayal of America as an enemy of Russia brought back memories of the Cold War, raising the specter that Moscow would become an unmovable obstacle in the path of many of Washington's foreign policy objectives. The concern carried particular weight at a time when the U.S. and its allies are trying to muster a united front to stop Iran's nuclear program and to bring an end to the massacres of Syrian protesters by forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. That fear turned into reality when Russia -- along with China -- blocked action on Syria at the U.N. Security Council in February. But now that Putin has been re-elected president, Washington, the West and their allies in the Middle East may well rediscover the old Putin, the pragmatist, re-entering the global stage. Less than three weeks after the vote, we are already seeing signs of a more conciliatory foreign policy. Putin's shrill invective against the U.S. was, in large part, political theater. In the end, hewon the presidential election by huge margins in a decisive, if controversial, landslide at the polls. But before that victory, he had been dealt a troubling surprise that caused him to turn up the invective against the West: The size of the protests against his rule came as something of a shock to a man who had been used to enjoying largely unquestioned support from voters. Putin was afraid of a poor showing. Embracing the fiery anti-Western stance, complete with muscle-flexing at the Security Council, was a populist, crowd-pleasing tactic. With the election behind him, Putin is likely to subtly retune his foreign policy. The reversal will not be visibly dramatic. A sharp reversal of his stance on Syria would be too transparent. But there are reasons to expect that Moscow will take a somewhat more cooperative approach, one that will be much less disruptive to the wishes of many Arab countries, in addition to Turkey, the U.S. and its European friends. To be sure, Moscow would like to see Assad survive. After all, he is not only a friend in the crucial Middle East with ports on the Mediterranean, but also a prized customer, spending almost 80 percent of his fast-growing defense budget on Russian weapons. Damascus has engaged in a military shopping spree in Russia, ringing up $1 billion in purchases last year. But Putin, who is at heart a pragmatist, does not want to completely alienate the West or the Arab countries that would like to see the carnage end in Syria. Moscow is likely to try mending fences. For Putin, stimulating economic growth in Russia is a top priority and a key to holding onto power. The turmoil in the Middle East has driven up oil prices, boosting Russia’s export revenues. But the risk of more instability -- including a new war, whether in Syria or Iran -- could bring a costly global economic slowdown. Putin also wants to bolster foreign investment and Western demand for Russian exports. If he is seen as unpredictable and antagonistic, a wildcard in world affairs, the Russian economy could pay the price. Already there have been signs of a softening of Russia's position. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has announced that Russia, which twice blocked U.N. resolutions on Syria, is now prepared to support a Security Council statement in support of former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's mediation mission on behalf of the Arab League and the U.N. Moscow also issued a statement of support for a plan by the International Committee of the Red Cross that would establish a daily two-hour humanitarian ceasefire. Moscow has also suddenly started criticizing Assad, saying the Syrian president committed "many mistakes" that have made a bad situation worse. Russia is still calling for reconciliation rather than regime change. But for the first time, it looks as if Moscow is trying to distance itself from Assad, launching some of its toughest criticism yet since the start of the uprising. On the Iran file, Putin had already showed his pragmatic side. While Moscow has been highly critical of some of the stiffer penalties imposed against the Islamic Republic, it has also shown a remarkable willingness to negotiate on the issue. Russia has provided Iran with nuclear know-how, having built the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, and it would like to hold onto its client and its influence in the Islamic Republic. But it prefers stability in the Middle East, which could be threatened unless the West persuades Iran to stop enriching uranium. Moscow already cancelled the $1 billion sale of anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems to Tehran. And Putin has shown that when it comes to Iran, he is willing to deal with Washington. Russian officials have repeatedly warned against a military strike against Iran's nuclear installations, but Russia has supported a number of sanctions against Iran in exchange for certain benefits from the U.S. With his election to a new term as president now achieved, Putin no longer feels a domestic imperative to rouse nationalist sentiments by taking on the West. That suggests his anti-American stance will ease. But don't expect a very dramatic transformation in short order. Despite Putin’s large margin of victory, opposition to his rule has not disappeared. And if anti-Putin forces give any sign of strengthening at home, he is likely to turn up the volume of his invective against Washington and once again bring back the echoes of the Cold War. Relations will be ok under putin Pifer 3/5 (Steven Pifer, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, “What Putin’s Return to the Presidency Means for U.S.-Russia Relations,” 3/5/12) http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0305_russia_pifer.aspx On May 7, Vladimir Putin will be inaugurated as Russia’s president, reclaiming the position that he ceded to Dmitry Medvedev in 2008. That raises questions for Washington, which became comfortably accustomed to dealing with Medvedev. Putin’s return portends a more complicated bilateral relationship, but it should not go over a cliff. Here are five points to consider. A flag, displaying a portrait of Vladimir Putin flies during a rally to support Putin near the Kremlin in central Moscow March 4, 2012. First, although Putin as prime minister was nominally number two to Medvedev, there is no doubt who held real power. As the American Embassy in Moscow reportedly put it, Putin played Batman to Medvedev’s Robin. Batman kept a close watch on things. The New START Treaty, expanded supply routes through Russia for NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Moscow’s support for an arms embargo on Iran would not have happened had Putin opposed them. His return to the presidency should not mean a different strategic approach toward the United States. Second, the tone of bilateral relations—particularly at the highest level—will change. Putin spent his formative years in the 1980s as a KGB officer, when the United States was the “glavniy protivnik,” the main opponent. As his rhetoric during the election campaign made clear, he holds a wary skepticism about U.S. goals and policies. For example, his comments suggest he does not see the upheavals that swept countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Tunisia or Egypt as manifestations of popular discontent but instead believes they were inspired, funded and directed by Washington—and that the ultimate target is Russia. Putin’s experience as president dealing with the Bush administration, moreover, was not a happy one. Putin extended himself early on, supporting U.S. military action against the Taliban and calmly accepting U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but he believes that he received little in return. In his view, Washington made no effort to accommodate Moscow’s concerns on key issues such as strategic arms limits, missile defense deployments, NATO enlargement or graduating Russia from the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The reset, after all, took place during Medvedev’s presidency. Third, Putin faces tough issues at home, both economically and politically. The Russian economy and government revenues remain overly dependent on exports of oil and natural gas. While Medvedev called for economic modernization and diversification, there are few signs of a realistic plan to achieve those aims. And Putin made a number of electoral promises, including higher salaries, rising pensions and greater defense spending, that will need to be funded. Moreover, for the first time in his experience, Putin will have to deal with the outside world without being confident that he has a solid political base at home. It will be interesting to see how that affects his foreign policy. Soviet and Russian leaders in the past resorted to the enemy image to rally domestic support, and one can see aspects of that in Putin’s campaign. But the constituency to whom that appeals is already in Putin’s camp; will the ploy resonate with an increasingly unhappy urban middle class? He may conclude that he can focus better on domestic challenges with a less confrontational relationship with countries such as the United States. Fourth, Putin has shown himself to be realistic, particularly when it comes to money. A major article that he published in the run-up to the election described a large military modernization program designed to reassert parity with the United States. But during his first presidency, when huge energy revenues flowed into the Russian government budget from 2003 to 2007, Putin chose not to significantly increase defense spending. Instead, the extra money—and there was plenty of it—went to build international currency reserves and a “rainy day” fund on which the government drew heavily during the 2008-09 economic crisis. He understands that having a large arsenal of weapons did not save the Soviet Union. If circumstances force Putin to make tough choices, he may prove pragmatic and not necessarily choose guns over butter. Fifth, Putin likely will not fully show his hand regarding the United States until 2013. He expects to be around for another six and possibly twelve years. He may see little harm in waiting six months to learn who will be his opposite number in the White House. The upshot is that Putin’s return could and probably will mean more bumpiness in the U.S.-Russia relationship. He will pursue his view of Russian interests. On certain issues, those will conflict with U.S. interests, and Washington and Moscow will disagree, perhaps heatedly. Putin’s style will differ markedly from Medvedev’s. But he is not likely to seek to turn the relationship upside down or take it back to the grim days of 2008. For all the rhetoric now, we should not rule out that the American president will be able to deal with Putin. You have to distinguish between rhetoric and actual relationsAllison and Blackwill, 11 – * director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School AND ** Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (Graham and Robert, “Russia and U.S. National Interests Why Should Americans Care?”, Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests Report, October, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Russia-and-US-NI_final-web.pdf) Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s emergence as an independent state, Moscow is no longer America’s strategic rival. Yet, while Russia is not our enemy, neither has it become a friend. Washington and Moscow have succeeded in overcoming Cold War confrontation, but have not developed sustainable cooperative relations. A better-managed bilateral relationship is critical for the advancement of America’s vital national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return to the Kremlin as Russia’s President next year does not change U.S. national interests with respect to Russia or, for that matter, Russia’s national interests with respect to the United States. Still, at a minimum, Russia’s rhetoric vis-à-vis America and the West may become tougher under Putin. Under the circumstances, maintaining the proper focus in U.S.-Russian relations will likely require particular care and determination from U.S. policymakers. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.68 Mb. Share with your friends:
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