Japan Aff Michigan 2010 / ccgjp lab – 7wks
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- Exts: Japan Rearm Good - China
- Exts: Japan Rearm Good – Asian Stability
Exts: Japan Rearm – FastJapan will rearm as soon as they end their security dependence upon the US Kang, 03- Professor of Government, Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business, Research Director of the Center for International Business (Spring 2003, David C, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need For New Analytical Frameworks,” JSTOR, CJC) For example, in his most recent book, John Mearsheimer argues that although Japan (and Germany) have "the potential in terms of population and wealth to become great powers ... they depend on the United States for their security, and are effectively semi-sovereign states, not great powers."22 This begs a number of questions: For instance, why define Japan, which has the second largest economy in the world, as "semi-sovereign"? Indeed why would such an economically advanced state ever allow itself to remain "semi- sovereign"? Mearsheimer's book is focused on building a theory of offensive realism, but the logic of offensive realism would lead to the conclusion that Japan should have rearmed long ago. The onus is on those predicting an increase in power politics in Asia to state clearly what evidence would falsify their arguments or challenge their assumptions, not to explain away objections or ignore contradictory evidence. A clearer explication of their hypotheses and the refutable propositions would be a genuine contribution to the field. Exts: Japan Rearm Good - ChinaJapanese rearm curbs Chinese hegemony in AsiaCarpenter, 10- vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute ( 4/7/2010, Ted Galen, “Tokyo Rising,” http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11665, CJC)Even in those countries, though, the intensity of the opposition to Japan becoming a normal great power and playing a more serious security role is waning. And in the rest of the region, the response to that prospect ranges from receptive to enthusiastic. That emerging realism is encouraging. The alternative to Japan and India (and possibly other actors, such as Indonesia and Vietnam) becoming strategic counterweights to a rising China ought to be worrisome. Given America's gradually waning hegemony, a failure by other major countries to step up and be significant security players would lead to a troubling power vacuum in the region. A vacuum that China would be well-positioned to fill. If China does not succumb to internal weaknesses (which are not trivial), it will almost certainly be the most prominent power in East Asia in the coming decades, gradually displacing the United States. But there is a big difference between being the leading power and being a hegemon. The latter is a result that Americans cannot welcome. The emergence of a multipolar power system in East Asia is the best outcome both for the United States and China's neighbors. It is gratifying that nations in the region seem to be reaching that conclusion. Australia and New Zealand may be a little ahead of the curve in that process, but the attitude in those countries about the desirability of Japan and India adopting more active security roles is not unique. Washington should embrace a similar view. Exts: Japan Rearm Good – Asian StabilityJapanese prolif is key to Asian stabilityWhite, 2008 [Hugh, Visiting Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy and Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University; “Why Japan might have to go nuclear,” July 16, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2008/07/16/Why-Japan-might-have-to-go-nuclear.aspx]I should have known Sam would not let me get away with the rather provocative comment in my post last week about Japan and nuclear weapons without a more detailed explanation. So here it is. The idea I touched on is that the establishment of a stable new order in Asia that accommodates China’s growing power may require Japan to become more strategically independent of the US, and that this may require Japan to develop its own nuclear capability. In other words, I am exploring the idea that we may find that a nuclear-armed Japan is the price we have to pay for a stable new order in Asia. To see why this might be so, we have to look at Japan’s situation. For decades, Japan has accepted its place as America’s strategic client. That has paid big dividends for Japan and for the rest of us, but it has also entailed some costs and risks for Japan. Those risks have been acceptable as long as Japan has been confident that the US would put Japan ahead of any potential adversary if it came to a crunch. But it has meant that Japan has always been anxious that a shift in US priorities could raise the risks that, if forced to choose, the US would not back Japan against an adversary. Hence Japan’s nervousness whenever US-China relations have seemed likely to eclipse US-Japan relations. China’s rise sharpens these concerns. Japan has good reason to fear that as China’s influence in Asia grows, it will use that influence to marginalise and eventually try to dominate Japan. As long as Japan depends on the US for its security, its only defence against China’s growing power is to rely on, and encourage, the US to contest and contain China’s growing influence. Behind the diplomacy, that is what we have been seeing in recent years. The problem for all of us, including Japan, is that a peaceful future in Asia is going to depend on the US and China getting on well. That will mean, among other things, as China’s power grows the US will have to accord China a greater place in Asia’s power structure – in other words, it will have to treat China as an equal. So Japan faces a really tough dilemma. As long as it relies on the US for its security, Japan will understandably feel threatened if the US accords more weight to China. But if the US does not do this, US-China relations will deteriorate, which would likewise be a disaster for Japan, as well as for the rest of us. The only way out seems to be for Japan to cease to rely on the US for its security, and to become itself an equal partner in a concert of great powers in Asia. Only in such a structure can Japan feel comfortable with a closer US-China relationship in which the US concedes strategic space to China’s growing power. And only if that happens can we look forward to a peaceful future in Asia. The heart of Japan’s strategic dependence on the US is its reliance on US extended deterrence against nuclear threats. And for the Japanese, nuclear threats are not hypothetical: they have three nuclear-armed close neighbours. So for Japan to establish the kind of strategic independence of the US which seems to be required to build a stable order in Asia in coming decades, it needs to ease its dependence on US extended deterrence. Unfortunately there is no easy or incremental way to do that: either Japan is a nuclear power or it is not. Hence we may find that a nuclear-armed Japan is a necessary condition for a stable and sustainable US-China relationship, and hence for a stable Asian region. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.59 Mb. Share with your friends:
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