The sphere of policy was the primary area to be examined in the Europeanization research. Europeanization of policy can have various forms and can affect all the elements of policy – actors, sources and instruments. The style of policy can be affected by making it more or less conflict, corporative or regulative. The effect of Europeanization can for example be convergence, direct or indirect transfer of Brussels models and essential effect of European regulations on national policies of economic competition (Radaelli 2003: 36).
Nevertheless, despite the advanced research in this area, there are still questions emerging that need to be answered, like what is the influence of Europeanization on interests and opinions of the actors, on processes in policy area, how the actors adapt and shape the European regulations, why in one sector convergence occurs, while in the other it does not etc.
For a better understanding of the process of Europeanization in the policy dimension we can use Ch. Knill and D. Lehmkuhl’s work who defined mechanisms of Europeanization of policies as follows (Knill, Lehmkuhl 2002: 256):
- Institutional adoption;
- Change of structure of domestic opportunities which means change in distribution of power and resources;
- Changes in framework of expectations of domestic policies, i. e. indirect Europeanization – new framework of expectation forces the actors to behave in a certain way.
A number of the European policies present a combination of different mechanisms of Europeanization because of the hierarchic interconnection of these mechanisms. Though, setting of a new institutional model influences the structure of domestic opportunities and framework of expectations of the domestic actors (Knill, Lehmkuhl 2002: 257).
To comprehend the influence of Europeanization on national policies Bulmer and Radaelli (2005: 342-345) suggest to look at four different modes of EU policy-making while identifying four characteristic patterns of governance in the EU, each associated with a particular type of policy.
The first one is governance by negotiation, where the potential for Europeanization of national policy is the highest in areas, where the national governments are able to make a consensus. The typical form that Europeanization takes at this stage is the “uploading”.
Governance by hierarchy is connected to situations in which a number of competences are taken over by supranational institutions. The concrete character of mechanisms and explaining of Europeanization dynamics depends then on positive and negative integration – positive integration requires implying of an active national policy and the agreed policies have to be “downloaded” to a national level. This case presents the most distinct form of Europeanization using the mechanism of institutional adaption (Knill, Lehmkuhl 2002: 258). Negative integration is related to areas where removing of barriers is sufficient for creating the common policy and usually new national legislative is not required, the reason for Europeanization is the competition among the rules or socio-economic actors rather than the need of national policy adapting to EU policies. The final outcome depends on the propensity and capacity of governments to engage in regulatory competition. It is not at all a matter of fit or misfit (Radaelli 2004: 12).
The last type of governance is facilitated coordination which refers to areas of policies where national governments are the key actors, EU functions like an arena for exchange of ideas and the decisions are adopted by unanimous vote.
Apparently, most of the research on Europeanization of policy concerns the positive integration, where it is clear that states are forced to adopt new law and regulations, create new institutions, harmonize the legal system. On contrary, in the case of facilitated coordination the research is the most complicated, since it is difficult to distinguish the domestic changes caused by joining the process of European integration from the other variables working on domestic level. To distinguish them we have to concentrate on domestic level – problems, resources and ideas relevant for concrete policy and then analyse to what extent ideological sources stemming from the Open Method of Coordination influence domestic actors.
1.5 Europeanization of the candidate states
The process of Europeanization is mainly being observed in the member countries but it also affects the applicant countries. Research in this area has developed primarily in the context of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. The candidate countries have been taking on all the obligations of EU membership on a long-term basis, so the domestic effects of transferring policies and institutions to them are likely to be comparable to the effects of the European Union on its current member states. According to Grabbe (2003: 303) ‘the political relationship between the applicants and the European Union is very different, which affects how Europeanization occurs’.
The fact is that most of the previous studies of Europeanization considered the countries that have already joined the European Union. But the other Eastern and Southern countries should be well included in these researches (Kubicek 2003). Also Sedelmeier notes that the narrow focus of the Europeanization literature on membership may appear surprising, as throughout the EU’s history, outsiders have undertaken various forms of unilateral adjustment. Two key characteristics of the adjustments of non-members are comparable to the impact of the EU on member states, and hence suggest that it is important to study the impact of the EU on candidate countries in terms of ‘Europeanization’: the significant extent to which EU actors and institutions direct and enforce the adjustment process (even if instruments differ) and the comprehensive nature of adjustment to cover the entirety of the acquis (Sedelmeier 2006: 4).
However, at the same time, the Europeanization of candidate countries has distinctive characteristics, which suggest that it can be seen as a particular sub-field of Europeanization research. First, the status of candidates as non-members has implications on the instruments used by EU institutions to influence the adjustment process. EU institutions cannot rely on the treaty-based sanctions, but have to use softer instruments9, and monitoring of compliance is much more intrusive and direct than in full member states.
The second important aspect in which Europeanization of candidate states and of member states differs is that candidate countries cannot influence EU policy making from the inside, and they have a stronger incentive to implement EU policies because they are trying to gain admission. As other important aspect the uncertainty in the accession processes can be considered (Grabbe 2003).
In examining the applicant states we have to avoid the incorrect attitudes to topic like considering Europeanization as a theory of EU enlargement, discrimination between differences of kinds as well as differences of degrees, we have to distinguish between intentional and unintentional effects of the European Union (Grabble 2003).
The Europeanization of national governance covers transforming of wide range of elements, it impacts the national context as a whole – policy paradigms, styles, norms, what then in a perspective of accession can be regarded as a process of integration of the candidate countries’ system of governance (Avcı 2004). In order to avoid a “misfit” between EU and national governance systems after accession a host of other elements of national governance must not only prepare for and adapt to the requirements of the acquis but also to some fundamental characteristics of the EU system of governance which are not formalised accession requirements and are not checked upon by Commission “progress reports” (Monar 2005: 16).
As a remarkable and useful contribution to the research of Europeanization in candidate countries I consider the above mentioned work of Ulrich Sedelmeier in which he features the methods for research of these cases. To specify the extent to which countries’ political system is influenced he distinguishes between formal change (the legal transposition of rules)10 and behavioural change (implementation, application and enforcement). For answering the question how the EU exercises the influence on candidates, we have to distinguish the instruments and strategies which are used by EU. A prominent strategy is the use of conditionality – the use of conditional positive incentives (ultimately EU membership) as reward for states who adopt certain rules that the EU specifies.11 Other strategies are persuasion and socialization of elites. Other authors take into consideration two channels through which EU exercises its influence – intergovernmental and societal – and analyse their relative importance for the EU’s domestic impact. Schimmelfennig adds other mechanisms of EU impact, such as lesson-drawing (based on the logic of consequences and on the indirect impact of the EU on governments), domestic empowerment (works directly via societal actors or the anonymous market) (Schimmelfennig 2007: 4).
In empirical researches of candidate states Europeanization rationalist institutionalism proved to be a suitable approach. It focuses on the use of conditionality by the EU to influence candidate countries. At the domestic level it is focused – just as in studies of member state Europeanization – on the differential empowerment of domestic actors (Sedelmeier 2006: 9).
Important factors that increase the likelihood of effectiveness are the clarity of the EU’s demands (candidates need to know what they need to do if they decide to comply with the EU’s conditions) and credibility of EU conditionality (candidates have to be certain that they will receive the promised rewards after meeting the EU’s demands. Yet they also have to believe that they will only receive the reward if they indeed fully meet the requirements).
Second approach - constructivist institutionalism on the other hand emphasises that the EU’s impact does not (only) depend on the domestic material interest constellations, but on the extent to which there is a ‘cultural match’ or ‘resonance’ between EU demands and domestic rules and political discourses. Transnational networks that connect elites in candidate countries and with the EU are a facilitating factor for the EU’s influence for both rationalist and constructivist institutionalist approaches. The latter emphasise particularly the role of transnational epistemic communities that do not only exercise pressures on governments, but contribute to persuading them of the legitimacy of the rules in question.
Various areas are Europeanized in the candidate countries. In the polity sphere the legislative framework (taking on all the EU’s existing laws and norms), institutions (their development determines the ranking of states by Commission), building-up of state administration, decentralization and regionalization, institutional organization that connects national governments with EU authorities. In area of policies it is wide spectre of economic policies, environmental, agricultural and cohesion policy. In the politics dimension are the elements influenced in a differentiated way in different countries (Goetz 2005; Grabbe 2003).
In the context of candidate countries we should also mention the concept analysing how process of democratization can be formed by international actors, introduced by P. J. Kubicek (2003: 1-29).
One of the methods of forming the domestic process from international level is direct control of state political institutions – EU does not aspire to take control over a state, however it can be supposed that EU membership is a strong guarantee for democracy, although it can not be founded in a state by EU itself.
Another approach is contagion – phenomenon and systems in one state or a group of states, if perceived as attractive and achievable can spread across the borders. In this approach however, the informal mechanisms are left out of concern.
Third approach is convergence – expanding of formerly existing democratic society of sovereign states. This can occur in two ways – one is through rational, instrumental calculation of domestic elites, responding on political or economic pressures intentionally evocated by external actors. Second way is more “ideational”, constructivist, based upon learning, socialization and the internalization of democratic norms. The difference is thus in the motivation to change.
The most developed and proactive of these approaches is conditionality which references to connection of perceived profits with fulfilling certain program – in EU case the democratic principles and institutions. This approach can be best observed in Copenhagen criteria. Conditionality works on the cost/benefit analysis and democratization is the result of rational calculation.
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