Masarykova univerzita V brně Fakulta sociálních studií
Europeanization of polity
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- 2.1 Turkish governments in the years 1999-2008
- 2.1.2 First AKP government 2002-2007
- 2.1.3 Second AKP government 2007-2008
2. Europeanization of polityThis chapter seeks to examine the level of Europeanization of the main selected actors in the polity-sphere, government, parliament, National Security Council and the connected administration. The process of Europeanization of this sphere in general covers the legislative and Constitutional changes, transformation of institutions, but also changes in the actors’ relations or behaviour. I will concentrate more on the former factors, as I perceive understanding them as essential to comprehend better also the changes in other areas (party system, policies) and I assume that by examining the developments in institutional or legal sense we can also get the notion of actors’ changes in behaviour or inter-relations. The examined period covers in principle the era since Helsinki Council Summit in 1999 till nowadays. I divide this era further into three periods set by the national elections of 2002 and 2007 because I suppose the examined actors are principally affected by the changes of political spectrum stemming from elections. This division is used in the case of government and also in the parliament case, even though it is covered in one chapter, as following the details of government its scope is not that broad. The National Security Council is examined in principle also in the same period but more from the point of view of formal and legal changes, and the relations with other factors present a minor part in this chapter. Other elements that will be observed are the changes in institutional structure, and in public administration. I will try to find out if significant transformation in these spheres took place and to what extent it was affected by Europeanization. 2.1 Turkish governments in the years 1999-20082.1.1 The coalition government 1999-2002The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 represents a major turning point in the history of Turkey-EU relations. With the Helsinki summit, the EU provided a pre-accession strategy for Turkey that involves both obligations and benefits – like the need to undertake a substantial degree of democratization and human rights reforms on one hand and opportunity to participate in Community programs and agencies or benefit from the EU’s financial assistance on the other (Erdem 2008: 11-12). The government which was in power in that time was the three-party coalition of DSP (Democratic Left Party), ANAP (The Motherland Party) and MHP (Nationalist Action Party). With the granting of candidacy on Helsinki summit, the salience of the EU membership issue increased suddenly – at least in political party discourses. Pending short- and medium-term deadlines began to divide the political spectrum, and the issue of EU membership moved up the political agenda as the deadline for reforms drew nearer. Increasingly, some politicians and the media presented the ‘homework’ needed for EU membership in a negative manner, and EU membership emerged as a central point for controversy and opposition. Given that the fulfillment of membership criteria was bound to require tough political, economic and social changes, it was inevitable that there would be some questioning of Turkey’s EU vocation. As negotiations became a real prospect, discussions within Turkish politics were increasingly polarized and at the same time, the EU became a convenient scapegoat for Turkish politicians, enabling them to shift the blame for the negative consequences of reform by claiming that these were forced upon Turkey by EU membership requirements. Thus, the beginning of the candidacy status marked a politicization of the debate on Turkey’s EU membership (Avcı 2004: 197). The central point in party political discussions was the details of what the government was ready to advance to the EU, which was often turned into ideological confrontations between the nationalists and the rest of the parties, whereas the MHP became the primary source of the nationalist opposition. However, the military elite and left-wing nationalists have also repeatedly voiced their concern about or opposition to certain EU-related issues.21 From 1999 to November 2002, the MHP’s role became more noticeable as a coalition partner and a key factor in passing (or blocking) reforms required under the Copenhagen criteria (Avcı 2004: 198). On the other hand, support for the EU membership was manifested by business circles, liberals and from the mainstream right-wing parties – True Path Party and Motherland Party. In November 2000, the European Commission proposed the accession partnership for Turkey to be ratified by the European Council. The major purpose was to guide Turkey for incorporation and actual implementation of the EU acquis. Short-term priorities for the Copenhagen political criteria were dealt with the alignment of the Turkish legislation with the EU acquis in these areas: freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, fight against torture practices, trial detention period, training on human rights issues, functioning and efficiency of the judiciary, maintenance of de facto moratorium on capital punishment, and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish.22 The intermediate objectives, for which changes were required, were related to sensitive issues such as the civilian control of the military, abolition of the death penalty and cultural rights for the Kurdish people (Erdem 2008: 13). Following the Council’s ratification of the Accession Partnership, the Turkish government announced its National Program for the adoption of EU acquis in March 2001. Generally, this Program was perceived like a significant opportunity to undertake democratization reforms, for example the ANAP leader designated it as a ‘big transformation project’ for Turkey’s political, economic and administrative system (Yılmaz 2001, cited in Erdem 2008: 14). But we can view it also as a symbol of all the difficulties the coalition partners had faced when trying to agree on sensitive issues mentioned above. Many of the reforms required by the EU’s Accession Partnership were either watered down or dealt with in a vague manner (Avcı 2004: 198). As it was already mentioned, the MHP was the essential opponent of the EU in the coalition. The key problematic issues for this party were Cyprus’s bid to join the EU, abolition of death penalty, use of Kurdish in education and on television and the amendment of article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, which bans the inciting of hatred on religious or ethnic grounds (Avcı 2004: 199-202). The DSP followed a line between MHP’s refusing and ANAP’s conformable position concerning the requirements in the Accession Partnership. The party found the reform demands for cultural rights acceptable but they criticized the Cyprus clause that requires Turkey’s strong support, as a short-term priority, for the political dialogue in the UN Secretary General’s efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of the problem (Erdem 2008: 16). Despite the issues that were dividing the coalition, it managed to approve three EU harmonization law packages. The first EU harmonization law package, adopted in February 2002, involved changes in some of the articles of the Turkish Penal Code, the Law on State Security Courts, and the Law to Fight Terrorism. This reform package increased the scope of freedom of expression, and limited the trial detention period. The second EU harmonization law package, adopted in March 2002, contained changes in press law, the political parties law, the law on associations, assembly and demonstration, the civil service law, and the law on state security courts. This reform made the prohibition of political parties more difficult, an expanded the scope of freedoms in the laws of press, associations, and demonstrations (Erdem 2008: 15). The third package was adopted in August 2002 together with the early election approval. It was another example to show the limits of a coalition government to handle the EU related reforms. This package included the key reforms – abolition of the death penalty in peacetime, and rights to broadcast and educate in languages other than Turkish, notably Kurdish. Furthermore, the package did away with penalties for criticizing state institutions, including the military; eased restrictions on demonstrations and associations; and allowed non-Muslim religious foundations to buy and sell real estate (Avcı 2004: 202-203). 2.1.2 First AKP government 2002-2007The AKP’s sweeping victory in the elections had significant impact not just on the domestic politics, but also on the country’s relations with the European Union. Due to its Islamist roots, many European leaders as well as a large number of the Turkish elite had doubts about the party’s approach to the EU. However, Erdoğan’s first statements after the elections provided important clues about the party’s strong commitment to the EU membership goal. In his first statement after the elections, he said that the top priority for his party and government is to get a date in the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 to begin the accession negotiations with the EU and that the new government will give a new momentum to the country’s bid for the EU membership (EU ready to work with AKP 2002). All the AKP members have repeatedly stated that, regardless of the EU, they are fully committed to securing freedom of expression and thought, transparent government, and the strengthening of local government. Nevertheless, the AKP’s pro-EU stance represents a radical break with its predecessors and the early generation of Islamists who had always used an anti-Western or anti-EU rhetoric. The EU issues were critical for the party in several ways – as a ‘protection’ against those who would prefer it to have a hidden Islamic fundamentalist agenda, or who suspect that it has; as second, a positive signal from the EU could be used for starting the economic stabilization; and as third, the prospect of EU membership could also underpin Turkey’s fragile democracy (Avcı 2004: 204). The decision of Copenhagen European Council to open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay if it is found (on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission) that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria meant and unprecedented ground for Turkey-EU relations as well as for Turkey’s democratization (Erdem 2008: 20). In 2003, the AKP government expanded the reform process with impressive legislative changes (Jung 2007: 2). Most of these changes were realized through the four EU harmonization law packages, adopted in January and July. These packages included provisions that made the closure of political parties more difficult, permission requirement to make contact with foreign associations and organizations with a change in the law on associations, changes in the Turkish Code on Criminal Procedure and the Code on Civil Procedure as regards re-trial for civil and criminal law cases in light of the decisions of the ECHR (Erdem 2008: 20-21). In May 2003 revised Accession Partnership for Turkey was ratified by European Council, where new priorities for the political criteria to be completed in 2003-2004 were designated – freedom of thought, expression, peaceful assembly and the press, ratifying the international covenants regarding civil, political and human rights in line with the EU acquis, cultural rights for all citizens, adapt the functioning of the National Security Council for the purpose of aligning the control of the military with practice in EU member states, measures to fight against torture (Accession Partnership 2003). In July, the government introduced the revised National Program for the adoption of acquis. The revised National Program defined Turkey’s bid for the EU membership as a social transformation project, a substantial reform movement which is supported by and reflects the common purpose of the vast majority of the people and an essential part of the country’s strategic vision. In addition, the program stated that the recent reforms on the path of EU membership have demonstrated Turkey’s will to reach a more liberal, participatory and modern democracy (National Program 2003: 1). In accordance with the National Program, the government undertook a number of substantial reforms through the adoption of sixth and seventh EU harmonization law packages in July 2003. In the 2003 Regular Report the European Commission considers the impressive reform record of the AKP government and significance of four EU harmonization law packages for the efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. However, it concluded that these reforms were not sufficient for Turkey to meet the political criteria for three major reasons – the reforms contain a number of significant limitations on the full enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms; they need to be successfully implemented; and some issues including the fight against torture and ill-treatment, civilian control of the military, and compliance with the decisions of the ECHR have yet to be adequately addressed (Turkey progress report 2003: 139). Following these reprehensions, the government concentrated particularly on the implementation problems in 2004, the reforms were further expanded with the May 2004 constitutional amendment, which was followed by the adoption of new penal code in September 2004. All these efforts led the European Commission to decide that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria as of October 2004 and the Commission’s recommendation to open the accession negotiations was followed by European Council decision to open the negotiations on October 3, 2005 (Erdem 2008: 21-23). Until the early elections of 2007, six of 35 policy chapters that candidate countries must complete were opened, in the science and research area negotiations were completed, but after the December 2006 summit of EU leaders, Ankara's bid suffered a serious blow as the EU froze talks in eight of the 35 policy chapters in response to Ankara’s refusal to open its ports to Greek Cypriot air and sea vessels, and the EU in turn did not alleviate the isolation on northern Cyprus (Government to submit Article 301 2008; Turkey’s EU process back on track 2007). In the AKP’s government period we can observe important synergy which has developed between the economic and the political spheres. Purely political reforms designed to meet the EU’s Copenhagen criteria helped to improve investor confidence and contributed to the economic recovery process. Economic recovery, in turn, enabled the government to press ahead with difficult reforms on the democratization agenda and, hence, helping to create a virtuous cycle (Keyman, Öniş 2007: 231). We should not omit the stance of opposite party – the CHP during this period, which diverged significantly from the one of AKP. In contrast to AKP’s pro-active stance on key issue of relations with the EU, the attitude of CHP leadership appeared largely defensive and negative and appeared to pursue a hyper-nationalist course.23 In its position on democratization, the party elites have tended to establish causality between democracy and secularism which resulted in recognizing the military as a necessary guardian of the state against possible violation of the principle of secularism. Hence, the dominant vision of the CHP in public mind and in key international circles was that of a defensive, inward-looking party that lacked the kind of democratic and reformist credentials to tackle the serious economic and political challenges. The party strongly opposed for example any kind of internationally acceptable solution to the Cyprus dispute and its attention was centered entirely on political and security-related issues with a heavy focus on secularism, omitting more or less the economic domain in its concerns (Keyman, Öniş 2007: 233-235). For the CHP, a debate of its nature began in this period, as it is clear that unless the CHP changes its reactive and state-centric approach its marginalization is likely to continue in a cumulative fashion, which could lead to Turkey with a strong single party rule without an effective opposition, thereby leading to an unbalanced democratic structure (Keyman, Öniş 2007: 234). The Turkish voters already started to feel that if they support CHP to win the elections, nothing will be done about the problems currently facing Turkey, and as so far, people can get impression that the only party truly willing to solve Turkey’s problems and to accept change and modernity is the AKP (Galiën 2007). The consequences of these voters’ feelings we can see in the results of the 2007 elections.
On the other hand, the government and its representatives also stated that the top priority will be to overhaul Turkey’s military-inspired constitution, even if this means a negative annual progress report from the European Commission. One AKP deputy affirms that “We are not making our reforms to please Europeans and we will continue to do what is right for Turkey to bring more democracy, prosperity and better living standards” (Jones 2007). In the revised Accession Partnership from 2007 the Council stresses mainly the need to bring civil-military relations more in line with EU practices, improve rights of non-Muslims, create an Ombudsmanship to watch over the acts of the state administration, decentralize via a new law on public administration, and provide more independence to the judiciary (Government to submit Article 301 2008). Incidentally, these continue to be the main topics discussed on different levels of EU-Turkey meetings until nowadays.25 In Turkey progress report 2008 which covers more or less the whole era of the last government26 the Commission acknowledges the efforts of the new President (Abdullah Gül from AK Party, elected in August 2007) to play a conciliatory role with regard to political actors and civil society. He established a good working relationship with the government while repeatedly calling for an acceleration of the pace of EU-related reforms. He played an active role in foreign policy, in September 2008, at the invitation of the Armenian President, he paid the first-ever visit by a Turkish President to Armenia, with a view to establishing a bilateral dialogue leading to the normalization of bilateral relations (Turkey progress report 2008: 7). The government expressed its commitment to the EU accession process and to political reforms. However, despite its strong political mandate, the government did not put forward a consistent and comprehensive program of political reforms. There is still National Program for the Adoption of the acquis from September 2008 that remains to be adopted. When observing the last year of AKP’s government, we could come to an impression that AKP has reached limit for further reforms and resist other changes demanded by the EU. The domestic events of the last year27 seem to affect the process of adopting EU-driven reforms significantly. After the decision of Constitutional Court in the AKP’s closure case we could have expected the AKP government to re-mobilize and continue with the reforms the country needs so much. The government's rhetoric however, that it is committed to EU reforms, is far from convincing that the reforms will pick up a new momentum. The national program, a list of homework prepared by the government, is a vivid example that the AKP has to match deeds with words (Yinanç 2008). Directory: 52095 52095 -> Key Concept 1 Technological advances, large-scale production methods, and the opening of new markets encouraged the rise of industrial capitalism in the United States Download 370.43 Kb. Share with your friends:
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