Masarykova univerzita V brně Fakulta sociálních studií



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2.6 Europeanization analyses

2.6.1 The government


The level of Europeanization in the first examined period was strongly affected by the fact that the ruling government was a three-party coalition. That era started with the impetus from the EU side on Helsinki Council Summit where Turkey was given a candidate status. Therefore, the government stood in front of the question how to deal with the duties that ensue out of this fact. And as we observe the reactions were made complicated due to the composition of the government. Some of the parties (and also partly the media environment) reacted in an adversary way to EU the requirements, presenting them as tasks that Turkey is obliged to fulfill if it is good for the country itself or not. Despite this fact, important reforms were adopted in that period, the most significant right at the end of the era, which can show us that the government felt committed to fulfill the needed reform steps and succeeded in ascertaining even the opposite parties in support.

Definitely, we can assume for this period, in terms of Börzel and Risse’s theory, as being Europeanized in terms that there existed a “misfit” between EU and domestic level processes, policies and institutions which created adaptational pressure and consequently caused domestic changes. The reforms and legal changes have been adopted in a short time period following important EU decision in context of Turkey’s membership (Helsinki Summit and approval of Accession Partnership).

However, if we examine this period by way of other theories, we can claim that in this period the government was not fully influenced by the Europeanization process. If we use Sedelmeier’s distinguishing between formal change and behavioral change caused by the EU influence, we can assume that in this period it was just the formal change that occurred, but the government (or its parties) was not internally convinced about the procedures or methods it should proceed in context of this issue, there did not exist prevailing effort for implementation, application and enforcement of the newly approved rules. Or similarly, when we look at this period with Kaliber’s viewpoint, we can affirm that what we can observe here is rather EU-ization which means the legal and institutional reforms have been adopted but when considering the expressed identities, it does not correspond to the aspects of Europeanization process. In Kubicek’s point of view, the process corresponds to forming the domestic arena by conditionality where the perceived profits are connected with fulfilling certain program. Even though the government parties were not unified in the approaches and stances, the changes were achieved, we can see the process of transformation as a result of rational calculation.

This position was changed noticeably in the second examined period, when the single party government came to power. This government showed from the beginning its devotion to the EU issue and Turkey’s membership as their goal, and in short time several highly significant reforms were approved. Moreover, the government stressed that these reforms are being taken regardless of the EU and meant for pursuing the democratic and economic transformation of Turkey. Therefore, we can observe in this period a shift to presenting the EU, EU-related reforms and Turkey’s membership in the EU as a part of the domestic democratization process which should not be perceived in a negative way. Also in this period we can observe opposition stances towards the EU issue, however, they are not coming from inside the government.

Then we can suppose that the level of change when considering the government in the second period shifted from the formal to the behavioral. The party also reacted to inputs from the EU side and concentrated intensely on the implementation and application of the newly adopted laws. In this period, still, the main activity of the government was to lay out the legislative framework, i.e. the process of the EU-ization, but as the topic has been stressed more in the public debates and has affected even the opposition party in the sense of reconsidering its nature, we can assume that the Europeanization influence on this government was apparently intense.

In the last observed period we can notice a certain change of the government’s activity comparing to the previous period. It determines again the same goals and visions in its program, but on the other hand it seems that the EU ceased to be one of the main accelerators of the law approving process as it could be supposed for the preceding era. This could be caused by rather problematic domestic situation that needed to be solved. But the fact is that already short time after the last elections the government decided to change the Constitution in a way that was not seen as necessary to the EU and wait with the EU-driven draft laws for later. This is not the same pattern we could observe during the contiguous period. Besides the domestic factors (such as the AKP closure case at Constitutional court, or declining public support for the EU membership) one of the reasons can also be the decreasing credibility of EU conditionality, that could have occurred after more than 5 years of governing without approaching to the set goal (in the government’s members’ apprehension). As this factor is considered to increase the likelihood of effectiveness of the Europeanization influence, we can state that in this era this factor played important role, but in the negative sense of the word. From the constructivist institutionalism viewpoint this situation can be presented a result of inadequate ‘cultural match’ or ‘resonance’ between EU demands and domestic rules and political discourses. In the previous periods, we can affirm, mainly the materialist side of interests was considered and possibly this could cease to be enough, especially, as was already mentioned, when the prevailing feeling of the elites is by way disappointment of the pace of approaching to their aim. Generally, in this period it is still the Europeanization process that prevails and in a sense binds over the importance of EU-ization, because not too much emphasis has been put to approve a high number of EU-related legislation.



2.6.2 Governmental institutional changes


In terms of the institutional structure we can observe a number of various changes. Several positions and specialized bodies started to function. In this sense, we can state that the EU influence has led to a growing bureaucratization, with creating new organs for communication, conducting research and studies, representing new agenda etc. On the other hand, as was mentioned – the position of Chief negotiator is in hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which can seem at least elusive, as both of the positions are quite demanding and it would be practical to create one more position for a person which could then be in the coordinating position to all the organs included. It is quite obvious, not just from the latter evidence that the central role in dealing with the EU inputs remains to foreign affairs ministry.

When we concern the public administration and its changes, we can state that the EU’s intention is to modify the system into decentralized, participatory, transparent, responsive and accountable. Indeed, several steps were made to reach this state – strengthening of role of civilian officials in local administration, setting up a Reform Monitoring Group as a controlling organ, etc. These all matters can be considered as quite a significant transformation of the prevalent system. The question is if these changes were incurred by the EU and if so, to what extent.

While taking into account the role of military officials in the state system that was prevailing for years and can be considered as in a sense traditional, and as all the changes were made in the examined period, I assume that without the influence of the EU, this aspect would not have been changed, thus that this area was Europeanized. In the question of the function of ombudsman, I would affirm that this could be viewed as a part of democratization, and as the need to create this function was strongly expressed by the EU, we can consider this change as part of democratization alongside the EU accession process. Or it can be described as a convergence through rational calculation (in Kubicek’s concept), because initiating this change (though not put in to practice so far) can be considered as a response on political pressure evocated by the EU. The overall transforming of the system to a more decentralized can also be considered as a part of the process of democratization, but according to me, without the permanent EU pressure pointing on the necessity of the changes, the process would take considerably longer time, that is why I would classify it as democratization alongside the EU accession process.

2.6.3 The parliament


When analyzing the functioning of parliament in the first period, we see that it was influenced by the current coalition government. This implies that approving of the reforms that were suggested by government did not have to pass really smoothly or easily through parliament voting. As the main factor influencing the parties’ decision on what attitude to adopt, we can indicate the stance of their constituencies. This shows us that except the approach of the Motherland Party, adoption of the EU-driven reform packages was not perceived and presented as a part of the country’s democratization, but rather as obligatory approaches that undermine Turkey’s unity and independence. Thus for this period according to me the most fitting term to explain the changes made would be convergence (from Kubicek’s concept) through rational or instrumental calculation of domestic elites, responding on political or economic pressures intentionally evocated by external actors. In the case of ANAP, as was mentioned, we could also speak about ideational convergence, with main goals of approaching to the general aim of Turkey’s membership in the EU and achieving higher support from the electorate. Certainly, we can also state that significantly high level of EU-ization occurred in that era, because it was the first time of such a number of legal reforms taken on behalf of the EU. And as well as for government, it holds also for parliament, that the changes were rather formal than behavioural or attitudinal in the first phase.

In the next period of AKP majority in the parliament it is obvious that adopting the legislative norms, including the EU-related norms, was in hands of this EU-oriented party, thus coming through rather evenly. The interesting point is, however, to what extent the work of parliament in general was affected. We can see that the new situation and the AKP’s attitude to the EU issues were the cause of transformation of the only opposition party too. And consequently we notice a party which in its programs supports the EU and Turkey’s membership at the same time opposing the EU-related legal changes in the parliament and putting some of the decisions for judicial review to the Constitutional Court by which it strongly affects the functioning of the domestic political system. Hence, in this period we can already observe the behavioural and attitudinal changes that influence the working of the organ. Until the elections of 2007 we could assume that the system was influenced strongly by the Europeanization process, as the adoption of reforms required by the EU was one of the essential activities of the parliament in that time, affecting also the internal parliamentary relations. After the election and with the return of another party to the political ground (MHP), which presents openly its reserved approach to the EU and to its demands to Turkey, the political debates in parliament field became again more diverged, however, since the majority party ceased to emphasize the EU factor to such an extent as in the previous period, also the Europeanization influence is not that high as it was before.



2.6.4 Parliamentary institutional changes


From the institutional viewpoint we can state that in the parliament structure itself the changes were not so considerable comparing to the government or public administration. The development corresponds to a common reaction of the candidate countries on the impact of the EU – like creating special units inside the institution to coordinate EU matters, follow the developments related to Turkey’s pre-accession process, review draft laws to check compliance with the acquis.

We can not speak about any significant change in terms of de-parlamentarization or on contrary re-parlamentarization of the system – the level of power remained despite the mentioned changes more or less the same.



2.6.5 National Security Council


Before the analysis of the changes of the NSC itself, we have to take into account several factors that are important to understand properly the function and also working scheme of the Turkish National Security Council. From the geographical position of the country, notion of neighboring countries and their inter-relations, it is evident that the security issue is and has to be considered in a highly attentive manner and the way it has been perceived by Turkish political elites throughout the history is certainly inferable. The position from which the EU looks on this issue stems from the notion of a democratic system functioning as it is perceived in the European countries. As the historical and traditional grounds of this institution and the concept of security diverge in Turkey and European countries, also the views on how it should be transformed to an institution that corresponds to the above mentioned general notion of democratic functioning differs.

The European Union has stressed continually that to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria it is necessary to make significant changes in the NSC, especially in its composition, meaning the number of civil and military members, and also in the competences it can pursue. We see that the composition and the enumerated functions were changed twice, because of the political situation which was solved out by the military coup. These changes led however to growing impact of the institution even in the areas that could not be considered as a part of the security policy (enabled by the broad definition of national security), and to strengthening the position of the military representatives.

By the time of the reforms starting in 2001, we can commence with observing remarkable changes in terms of democratization. Raising the number of civilian members, making the Secretariat of the NSC a consultative body, in some areas reaching the political control over the military, partial control of the parliament of the military budget are the most important of them. However, the EU still requires and would like to see deeper changes of this institution. I assume there are several reasons why Turkey did not adopt all the required changes yet.

First of all, the military is one of the basic pillars of the Turkish Republic, which is prevailing since its foundation until nowadays. Making changes in such structure means in principle transforming the basic setup of the political system which is complicated mainly from the viewpoint of political elite who have to deal with the transfer of the powers and competences. Secondly, the influence of international environment is highly important as well. As a most explicit example we can mention the invasion to Iraq which made the security question a vital issue. Another reason is the terrorism, both inside and outside the country that also evokes the need of strong and self-contained military. As the last I would name the public opinion which sees the army as the only credible establishment therefore to touch on its competences may be sensitive also from this point of view.

Taking into account all these points I come to the notion that without the EU and its pressure for the changes in this issue the political representatives would not make these changes or at least not in the extent they were made. Concerning the existing adaptational pressure to which the domestic arena is adjusting, we can call the NSC as being Europeanized. If we look at the issue in more detail and other theoretical perspectives, we could state that concerning Sedelmeier’s theory more formal changes took place (the legal transportation of rules), then behavioural (implementation, application and enforcement). In a similar context of Kaliber’s work we may consider the changes in the NSC as more of the process of EU-ization, as it is strongly demanded by the EU, but real Europeanization in an attitudinal point of view did not occur, as we can observe from the reactions and statements of the high military representatives and the attitude of the elites towards pursuing the required transformation. From the sight of Kubicek’s approach to the methods of forming the domestic arena we could claim that changes occurred due to conditionality which refers to perceived profit with fulfilling certain program and democratization is the result of rational calculation.



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