No scenario for escalation inevitable incentives for conflict minimization
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- Great powers won’t attack the US.
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CyberwarNo cyberwar impact.Tanji, ‘9[Michael, Threats Watch, 12-7, “"Digital Pearl Harbor?" How About the War We're Actually In?” http://threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2009/12/digital-pearl-harbor-how-about/] There is no such thing as an Electronic Pearl Harbor. On a fundamental level, for something to qualify as an EPH, we would have to have been untouched by offensive action by a belligerent adversary. We would have to ignore the glaring warning indicators, both strategic and tactical, that would lead to the destruction and disruption of so much technical capability that our ability to function as a power of any sort would be dramatically diminished for - in information-age terms - an extended period of time. Yet every year banks get hacked, the government gets pwned, the digital duct tape holding critical infrastructure together loses its grip . . . and the lights are still on, the nation is still in one piece and there is still a balance in everyone's accounts. Why? Because in a wartime footing people learn to deal with the damage, the destruction, the interruption and - to coin a phrase - soldier on. Stiff upper lip and all that. "War" might be too strong a word, but if we are going to draw parallels to conflicts past, we are actually engaged in something more akin to the First Battle of the Marne than we are waiting for Pearl Harbor. Make no mistake: we have been engaged in conflicts in the digital realm for forty-plus years. It has steadily grown against enemies both within and outside of our own institutions, both governmental and private. It's a war of attrition with aspects of terrorism, insurgency, and plain old criminal motivations. The battles rage daily, but you only really hear about the big ones. Like our most recent shooting war, hundreds of millions may have felt it necessary to engage in a fight, but a tiny fraction of those actually have to bloody themselves. The natural consequence is that everyone else forgets there are people fighting, so headlines that talk of concern over a sneak attack still get press. War, real war, requires that an adversary do much, much more than turn off the lights or cause tertiary deaths. I don't think for a second that our status as a world power, or our integrity as a nation, is endangered by a digital attack; unless of course we're the sort that just rolls over when our nose is bloodied. Great powers won’t attack the US.ChinaDaily, ‘10[Chinadaily.com.cn, 1-26, “CYBER WAR NOT LIKELY EXPERT,” Lexis] China and the US will not engage in a cyber war and may even reach an agreement on Internet security. However, the Google row will bring more difficulties to their dialogues, argues a US expert. To avoid any devastating consequences developing from the row, the two countries should restrain their cyber activities, which should not encompass espionage, said James Lewis, a senior fellow directing the Technology and Public Policy Program at the US based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in an interview with the Oriental Morning Post of Shanghai A cyber war is "unlikely to break out if the two countries stick to this bottom line," Lewis said in the interview with the Shanghai based newspaper. His remarks came amid the escalating war of words resulting from the Google row, which analysts say has been politicalized by the involvement of the US government. Lewis pointed out that information stealing is common practice in cyber space, citing a US national defense official who said that "every day their computers are attacked nearly 300 million times, some banking systems are attacked over 7,000 times, and the websites of power companies are attacked 2,000 to 3,000 times." But such attacks should be limited to information stealing, and not involve devastating activities, such as attacking a power company's Internet and destroying their power system, which could lead two countries into war, said Lewis. "We are experiencing an era of an extremely unsafe Internet," Lewis said. "I hope China and the US can have dialogues on Internet security," as they have common interests in carrying trade and business communication in a stable cyber sphere. But the chances are good that the two countries will reach an agreement on Internet security, as both countries need a stable Internet for business communication, said Lewis. DemocracyDemocratic peace theory is flawed -- democracy doesn’t prevent war, just American influence over Europe and South America.Rosato 3 Sebastian, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, The American Political Science Review. Menasha: Nov 2003. Vol. 97, Iss. 4; pg. 585, 18 pgs The causal logics that underpin democratic peace theory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace with one another because the mechanisms that make up these logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's proponents. In the case of the normative logic, liberal democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one another with trust and respect when their interests clash. Similarly, in the case of the institutional logic, democratic leaders are not especially accountable to peace-loving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of surprise attack, and open political competition offers no guarantee that a democracy will reveal private information about its level of resolve. In view of these findings there are good reasons to doubt that joint democracy causes peace. Democratic peace theorists could counter this claim by pointing out that even in the absence of a good explanation for the democratic peace, the fact remains that democracies have rarely fought one another. In addition to casting doubt on existing explanations for the democratic peace, then, a comprehensive critique should also offer a positive account of the finding. One potential explanation is that the democratic peace is in fact an imperial peace based on American power. This claim rests on two observations. First, the democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western Europe. second, the United States has been the dominant power in both these regions since World War II and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional peace. There are three reasons we should expect democratic peace theory's empirical claims to hold only in the post-1945 period. First, as even proponents of the democratic peace have admitted, there were few democracies in the international system prior to 1945 and even fewer that were in a position to fight one another. Since 1945, however, both the number of democracies in the international system and the number that have had an opportunity to fight one another have grown markedly (e.g., Russett 1993,20). Second, while members of double democratic dyads were not significantly less likely to fight one another than members of other types of dyads prior to World War II, they have been significantly more peaceful since then (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997). Third, the farther back we go in history the harder it is to find a consensus among both scholars and policymakers on what states qualify as democracies. Depending on whose criteria we use, there may have been no democratic wars prior to 1945, or there may have been several (see, e.g., Layne 1994; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Spiro 1994). Since then, however, we can be fairly certain that democracies have hardly fought each other at all. Most of the purely democratic dyads since World War II can be found in the Americas and Western Europe. My analysis includes all pairs of democracies directly or indirectly contiguous to one another or separated by less than 150 miles of water between 1950 and 1990 (Przeworski et al. 2000; Schafer 1993). This yields 2,427 double democratic dyads, of which 1,306 (54%) were comprised of two European states, 465 (19%) were comprised of two American states, and 418 (17%) comprised one American state and one European state. In short, 90% of purely democratic dyads have been confined to two geographic regions, the Americas and Western Europe. American preponderance has underpinned, and continues to underpin stability and peace in both of these regions. In the Americas the United States has successfully adopted a two-pronged strategy of driving out the European colonial powers and selectively intervening either to ensure that regional conflicts do not escalate to the level of serious military conflict or to install regimes that are sympathetic to its interests. The result has been a region in which most states are prepared to toe the American line and none have pretensions to alter the status quo. In Europe, the experience of both World Wars persuaded American policymakers that U.S. interests lay in preventing the continent ever returning to the security competition that had plagued it since the Napoleonic Wars. Major initiatives including the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, European integration, and the forward deployment of American troops on German soil should all be viewed from this perspective. Each was designed either to protect the European powers from one another or to constrain their ability to act as sovereign states, thereby preventing a return to multipolarity and eliminating the security dilemma as a factor in European politics. These objectives continue to provide the basis for Washington's European policy today and explain its continued attachment to NATO and its support for the eastward expansion of the European Union. In sum, the United States has been by far the most dominant state in both the Americas and Western Europe since World War II and has been committed, above all, to ensuring that both regions remain at peace.24 Evaluating whether the democratic peace finding is caused by democracy or by some other factor such as American preponderance has implications far beyond the academy. If peace and security are indeed a consequence of shared democracy, then international democratization should continue to lie at the heart of American grand strategy. But if, as I have suggested, democracy does not cause peace, then American policymakers are expending valuable resources on a policy that, while morally praiseworthy, does not make America more secure. Inherently violent states will wage wars no matter what -- Spanish-American War and Kargil Crisis disprove the impact.Nisley 8 (Thomas Jay Nisley, Prof. of International Studies, Southern Polytechnic State University, “The Pugnacious and the Pacific: Why Some Democracies Fight Wars” International Politics (2008) 45, 168–181) Although there are many weaknesses to the logic of democratic peace, it is very difficult to find an exception to the rule that democratic states do not fight wars with other democratic states. Two possible exceptions to this rule are the Spanish–American War of 1898 and the Kargil War of 1999, between India and Pakistan. Proponents of the democratic peace can find reasons why these two wars do not count as wars between democracies. In the Spanish–American War, the argument is made that even though Spain had universal male suffrage and a bicameral legislature with an executive nominally responsible to it, there was not true party competition. Bruce Russett (1993) tells us, 'By mutual agreement, the Liberal and Conservative parties rotated in office; governmental changes proceeded rather than followed elections' (p. 19). The Kargil War is more difficult to explain away. In the important work on the democratic peace, Triangulating Peace, Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) try to explain away this exception in a footnote. The authors conceded that the 'Polity data by Jaggers and Gurr label both countries as democratic' (Russett and Oneal, 2001, 19, fn6). Russett and Oneal recognize that battle deaths were high enough to allow the conflict to be labeled a war. Nevertheless, they dismiss this exception to the democratic peace by saying that many of the battle deaths 'were of Islamic guerrillas, not regular Pakistani troops; thus, the conflict may not qualify as a true interstate war' (Russett and Oneal, 2001, 19, fn6). The only problem with an exception to the democratic peace as a defining regularity in world politics is that its statistical significance rests on complete absence of any cases of wars between democracies. One exception breaks the rule. This is the problem with the phenomena that not all democracies are peaceful. In fact, some democracies are thoroughly warlike. To his credit Harald Müller has tried to provide us an explanation for this phenomenon by taking a state-level approach. According to Müller, the normative explanation for the democratic peace is the most persuasive. If we concede to Müller that norms are the most important explanation, we should look for differences in the domestic norms of militant and pacifist democracies. Militant democracies develop a hostile interpretation of the actions of non-democratic states, while pacifist democracies are more tolerant and have a higher threshold for military force. Therefore, we can understand the war-proneness of such democracies as Israel, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom from their prevailing political cultures. The analysis of this study has not tried directly to refute Müller's analysis or the idea of the democratic peace at the dyadic level. Rather, what I have sought to do is understand the militancy of some democracies by examining traditional variables (and in some sense Realist variables) for outcomes leading to conflict. I am comfortable with the assertion that conflict in world politics is attributable to major powers that seek at a minimum to maintain their power (Waltz, 1979) or at the maximum seek to get as much power as they can (Mearsheimer, 2001). Moreover, violence begets more violence. States, once locked into a pattern of violence, can continue in multiple iterations of violence called enduring rivalries. States that came into existence through violent conflict such as Israel and India will remain violence-prone for many decades. More empirical examples disprove DPT. Nisley 8 (Thomas Jay Nisley, Prof. of International Studies, Southern Polytechnic State University, “The Pugnacious and the Pacific: Why Some Democracies Fight Wars” International Politics (2008) 45, 168–181) There is a clear and sharp difference in the use of international violence among democracies. When examining the involvement in militarized interstates disputes (defined as use of force or war) among the continuously democratic states between the years 1950 and 2001, an interesting finding emerges. 'Of the 283 discrete involvements by these stable democracies, just four countries carried out 75.6% of these (19% of the whole group): Israel, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom' (Müller, 2004, 495). These four states accounted for 214 of the militarized interstate disputes over the period of observation. In contrast, the remaining 18 states only accounted for 69 militarized interstate disputes with three states (Luxemburg, Finland, and Austria) not having engaged in a single militarized interstate dispute during the 51-year period. A likely counter argument is that small states have little chance to get involved militarily. However, in an age of coalition warfare, military involvement by small states is relatively easy as they can join with larger states as they project power. President Bush's 'coalition of the willing' included many small states such as El Salvador and the Dominican Republic in the military involvement in Iraq. How do we make sense of this discrepancy in the pugnacity of democracies? To get to the heart of Müller's explanation, we must look at the identified causes of the democratic peace and Müller's evaluation of these explanations. 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