Gottemoeller 6/14 (Rose, Asst. Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/166086.htm) JPG
Before addressing some of the programmatic and budgetary issues before this Commission, I would like to assure you of President Obama’sunshakeable commitment to ratification of the CTBT by the United States and its entry into force at the earliest possible date. Entry into force of the CTBT is an essential step toward the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a vision articulated by the President when he spoke in Prague in 2009. Secretary Clinton reaffirmed our commitment to the CTBT at both the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT in September 2009 and at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in May 2010. More recently, the President’s National Security Advisor, Thomas Donilon, said in March that “We are committed to working with members of both parties in the Senate to ratify the CTBT, just as we did for New START,” a commitment that was echoed last month by Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher at the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association in Washington. Our recent experience working with the U.S. Senate to gain their advice and consent to ratification of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty – New START – with the Russian Federation has prepared us for what is expected to be an equally thorough and robust debate over the CTBT. We do not expect it will be easy or happen quickly, but we will work hard to make it happen. In anticipation of the ratification effort, the Administration commissioned a number of reports, including an updated National Intelligence Estimate and an independent National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report to assess the ability of the United States to monitor compliance with the Treaty and the ability of the United States to maintain, in the absence of nuclear explosive testing, a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal so long as these weapons exist. A public version of the NAS report is expected to be released soon. These authoritative reports, together with others, will give the U.S. Senate a wealth of information to assist them in making a determination on the merits of ratification of the CTBT. In addition, we have begun a process of engagingthe Senate and the American public on the national security benefits of the CTBT. While we have no date in mind for a ratification vote, we will work to engage members of the Senate on the national security rationale behind our support for the CTBT. Mr. Chairman, as you are well aware, the U.S. Senate declined to provide its consent to ratification of the CTBT in 1999. At that time, the Senate expressed concerns about whether the Treaty could be effectively verified. Today, we have a much stronger case in that regard. It is thanks to the hard work of this Commission, its member States, and the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat that great progress toward establishing the Treaty’s verification regime has been made in the last decade. Plan causes withdrawal from PTBT and ends the push for CTBT
Dinkin 5 (Sam, writer @ the space review, 1/14/5, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/309/1) JPG
If Bush decided to revive the Orion project, he would also need to withdraw from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 and the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Bush has got NERVA, but is that enough? Internal combustion nuclear engines have an inherent limit. If the exhaust is too hot, it melts the rocket nozzles. This is an inherent limit in all non-pulsed designs. By using external combustion, fantastic temperatures hotter than the surface of the sun can be achieved, yet the plasma will cool sufficiently as it expands so as not to melt the pusher plate of the Orion. Orion’s fantastic engineering is not good enough if the rocket kills people. Freeman Dyson, one of the great contributors to Orion, feels that he was decisive in getting the Orion project nixed in the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. He was making the decision based on the fallout. He calculated that there would be enough fallout to kill one to ten people globally with each launch.
Joseph 9 (Jofi, Sen. Dem. Foreign Policy Staffer, April 2009, http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Joseph.pdf) JPG
Obama has assumed office at a time when the nuclear nonproliferation regime is seriously tattered. Iran is making significant progress on an ostensibly civilian uranium enrichment program that can be quickly converted into a weapons program. North Korea has quadrupled the size of its fissile material stockpile since 2002 and joined the nuclear club in 2006 with a nuclear weapons test. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the lynchpin of global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, is under heavy strain.Revitalizing the nonproliferation regime, and reducing the odds that a terrorist group can seize a nuclearweapon for use in a terrorist attack, must be at the top of any president’s to-do list. During his presidential campaign, Obama often spoke of changing the U.S. approach to national security challenges by not being aggressively unilateral or overly reliant on the use of military force as the first option, calling upon the United States ‘‘to rebuild and construct the alliances and partnerships necessary to meet common challenges and confront common threats.’’1 He described the prospect of a terrorist group detonating a nuclear weapon in a U.S. city as ‘‘the gravest danger we face.’’2 For that reason, following in the footsteps of such statesmen like Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger, Obama explicitly endorsed the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, achieved in a comprehensive and verifiable manner.3 A concrete means to that goal, as well as the opportunity to repair the image of the United States around the world, is for Obama to call upon the Senate this year to make another effort to ratify the CTBT by the end of his first term in office.
Prolif leads to extinction
Utgoff 2 (Victor Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival, Fall,2002, p. 87-90)
In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.
Heg key to prevent nuclear war
Khalilzad 95 (Zalmay Khalilzad, Spring 1995. RAND Corporation. “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly 18.2, Lexis.)
Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.
Nuclear Terrorism Causes Extinction
Sid-Ahmed 4 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)
What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.