Impacts
Low oil prices cause Russia to sell nuclear technology to Iran which causes multiple scenarios for collective extinctions. Ecological consequences turn the case
Javed Ali TED Case Studies, Volume 3, Number 2, June, 1996 “Iran Nuclear Imports and Environmental Possibilities” Senior Policy Analyst http://www.american.edu/TED/irannuke.htm
From an economic perspective, Iran's economy is undergoing serious dislocations at the time, as the global drop in oil prices has caused a massive shock to the Iranian economy. Based on the fact that Iranian oil exports will continue to assume the lion's share of total exports (up to 90% in 1994), the fortunes of the Iranian economy will be inordinately tied to oscillations in the world oil market. In addition, heightened U.S. efforts to economically contain Iran, such as the May 1995 unilateral U.S. embargo of all Iranian imports (the vast majority of which are oil exports from Iran, worth almost three billion dollars in 1994) have hurt the Iranian economy. For example, the U.S. embargo has caused a drop in the Iranian rial during the summer of 1995. Nevertheless, in the facing of declining oil revenues, the Iranian government is attempting to complete its nuclear reactor deal with Russia, even though the cost could well exceed one billion dollars, which is a large amount considering central government expenditures totaled slightly over $39 billion in 1993. The fact that Iran is willing to spend such a large amount of money (which is increasingly becoming a scare resource) on an energy method it seemingly has little current utility indicates the seriousness Iran attaches to nuclear energy. Given Russia's economic hardships, the Iranian oil deal will give it a well-needed infusion of hard currency. Currently, the Russian economy is continuing its evolution to a free-market, capitalist economy, and a sudden economic boon as a result of this structural overhaul has yet to come to fruition in Russia. Recent statistics bear out the dismal performance of the Russian economy: economic growth has only started to recover to positive growth in 1995, after three years of double digit negative growth; the same trend was reflected for industrial production from 1993 to 1995; unemployment has steadily increased from five percent in 1993 to roughly 12% in 1995. In order to improve the performance of the Russian economy, Russia has attempted to secure increased economic ties with Third World nations, at a time when the global economy is squeezing Russia out of the developed world's economic affairs. Russian ties with states like Iran will give it access to much needed currency and will also provide access to suitable markets for the export of other Russian goods (at a time when global competition for market penetration anywhere is fierce). The Russian Ministry of Atomic Affairs (MINATOM) has seized upon this reality and has aggressively sought to export Russian nuclear technology to many developing nations, including Iran, Armenia, and Cuba. The Christian Science Monitor reports that MINATOM officials are so eager to export Russian nuclear technology that concerns over safety and proliferation have been subsumed by an influx of dollars and other forms of hard currencies. According to William Potter, a proliferation expert at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, the Russians are not as concerned with nuclear safety as their Western counterparts and have not cultivated a "culture of safety" that is found in Western nuclear science programs. Despite these glaring deficiencies, Russian nuclear technology is one of the few commodities that Russia can produce for export that is of roughly equal quality with Western technology. In addition, Valery Davydov, a Russian nuclear scientist working at the Russian-American Press, posits that MINATOM desperately needs the earnings it generates from its nuclear sales and that it attaches little importance to proliferation concerns. In recognition of this increased demand for Russian nuclear technology, in 1995 MINATOM is expected to generate $1.5 billion, up from $1.2 billion in 1994. In addition to Russia's economic motivations for pursuing nuclear technology transfers with Iran, there also is a political dimension to this policy. Increased economic and military ties with Iran may give Russia much needed leverage to sway Iran from extending its influence into Russia's "near abroad", especially the former Central Asian Republics. Russia cum the Soviet Union has long appreciated Iran's cultural ties, geographic proximity, and ethnic affiliations with the Central Asian republics. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russians have been acutely aware that the Central Asian republics are searching for their own identity after seventy years of Soviet rule, and that the Iranian model may serve as an attraction to some of the republics. While this analysis is short-sighted and does not take into account a variety of religious, political, and cultural differences between Iran and the republics, Iran has penetrated the republics in the economic and political spheres. The Russians would not look highly upon a constellation of fundamentalist Islamic nations on their southern border, and regardless of the potential for this to occur, they have adopted policies to moderate Iranian influence in the region. While the aforementioned security and economic aspects of the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal have been discussed in great detail in many other forums, few, if any, have speculated on the possible ecological consequences of this arrangement. As mentioned previously, the Bushehr reactors that were constructed before the 1979 Iranian Revolution suffered extensive structural damage as a result of Iraqi air strikes during the Iran-Iraq War. One of the reactors was so badly damaged that the structure was until recently sealed, and its protective dome was covered by a metal sheet. In addition, the Russians have to figure out a way properly configure their 1,000 MW reactors into structures that were designed to house German 1,200 MW reactors. Therefore, based on the structural problems inherent in the reactor deal, the possibility of a radiation leakage due to deficiencies in the new structure is not out of the realm of possibility. As noted above, many nuclear physicists are not entirely convinced of the level of safety of the Russian nuclear reactor designs, given the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in 1984. If a radiation leakage were to occur in the Bushehr reactors due to existing structural damage or Russian design and construction flaws, the resultant ecological and economic consequences for the Persian Gulf would be catastrophic. Since Bushehr lies in southern Iran and almost contiguous to the waters of the Persian Gulf, the irradiated water would cause enormous harm to the bio-diversity of the Persian Gulf. In addition, many of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states rely on Persian Gulf water for human consumption and agricultural purposes (due to the lack of indigenous fresh water sources, the lack of rainfall, arid climate, and high temperatures endemic to the region), as networks of desalinization plants have been erected to service water needs in most of these countries. The prospect of a nuclear armed Iran is quite unsettling for most of Iran's neighbors, and there is the perception that the Russian reactors will be the conduit to which Iran can produce a workable nuclear device in eight to ten years. Therefore, the possibility of a pre-emptive strike or a strike during the course of hostilities by concerned Middle Eastern nations (e.g., Israel, Iraq, or the GCC states) or the United States remains high. If such an event were to occur, not only would Iran and the countries of the region have to deal with radiation leakage into the Persian Gulf, but they would also have to deal with nuclear fallout into the atmosphere as a result of any military strike. One only has to harken back to the aftermath of Chernobyl to remember the ecological devastation caused by the release of a radioactive cloud after the explosion at that reactor. Other anticipated ecological consequences could be some type of nuclear accident involving the shipment of equipment and technology from Russia to Iran. In addition, the possibility exists of some type of calamity due to an accident in the shipment of the spent plutonium fuel rods from Iran back to Russia. Another possible ecological calamity could be the possible seismic shock to the area, and the attendant destruction this would unleash from the damaged Bushehr reactors. Iran contains many fault lines, and dormant fault lines ready may become "active" in the future near the Bushehr reactor site.
Russia-US conflict = extinction
Conflict with Russia draws in the US and results in extinction
Nick Bostrum faculty of philosophy at oxford March 2002 http://marukuwato.multiply.com/journal/item/157
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.
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