71 ment and disseminate these lessons to other democracies facing the asymmetric arsenal.
Lessons Learned •
Cybersecurity Cooperation Can Reap Benefits for the United States: The Russian cyber assault on Ukraine has been relentless and multifaceted since 2014. Ukraine is where the Russian government experiments and sees what can work. The United States and others in the international community have taken steps to help
Ukraine build its defenses, but this cooperation can also offer insight into how the Russian government conducts these operations and thus provide a forecast for the types of attacks we will see in the future. Cooperation with Ukraine to counter these threats is a critically important element of building the United States defenses.
•
Countering Disinformation Begins with Awareness Civil society organizations like StopFake have led the way in developing innovative techniques to dispel lies in the media, which has in turn helped to build resilience and skepticism within the Ukrainian population. This critical thinking ability is the first step towards blunting the effect of lies from Moscow. NGOs invulnerable countries should look to StopFake as a model, not only for the effectiveness of its techniques, but the courage of its staff.
•
Civil Society Matters Since the 2014
Euromaidan demonstrations, civil society organizations in Ukraine have played a key watchdog role in holding the government accountable and calling for reform. This pressure from the Ukrainian people, channeled through these groups has led to concrete reforms, particularly in building anti-corruption institutions. International efforts to support civil society in Ukraine are critical even though they have grown in strength and effectiveness, these groups still face pressure from anti-reform elements in the country.
•
Corruption is Russia’s Best Weapon in Ukraine The best defense against the Russian government’s asymmetric arsenal in Ukraine,
and indeed across Europe, is the existence of durable democratic institutions that are less susceptible to corruption. While the Ukrainian government has established credible anti- corruption institutions, resistance to genuine reform remains very strong and Ukraine has yet to embark on significant efforts to prosecute some of the country’s most egregious corrupt actors. Until Ukraine shows the political will to confront corruption, the country will remain dangerously vulnerable to Russian aggression.
•
High Level US. Engagement is Key The Obama Administration, primarily through former Vice President Joe Biden’s personal engagement, was instrumental in pressuring the Ukrainian government to reform despite the attendant political difficulties in making such decisions.
This approach garnered results, but sustainable progress can only come with consistent engagement and pressure from the United States.
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72 The Minsk Agreements were negotiated by Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine in talks in Minsk, Belarus in February 2015, under auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). They are comprised of a point plan for resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine, including a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front lines, to be monitored by the OSCE. The Agreements were concluded after the collapse of a ceasefire previously negotiated in Minsk (the Minsk Protocol) in September 2014; the terms have yet to be fulfilled. Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act, PL. 115-44, Enacted Aug. 2,
2017 (originally introduced by Senator Ben Cardin as the Counteracting Russian Hostilities Act of 2017, S. 94, January 11, 2017).
•
Sanctions Pressure Has Been Insufficient U.S. and EU sanctions have not resulted in the implementation of the Minsk Agreements nor the return of Crimea to Ukrainian control.
415
The Russian government appears to have been able to resist this pressure because the cost imposed by sanctions has been manageable. In order to achieve the desired outcomes of the Minsk Agreements and return Crimea to Ukrainian control, the US. government should significantly increase pressure and use the mandates and authorities outlined in the Countering Americas Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) to ramp up sanctions on pro-Kremlin entities, in concert with the European Union.
416
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73 Jim Nichol, ‘‘Russia-Georgia Conflict in August 2008: Context and Implications for US.
Interests Congressional Research Service, at 5, Mar. 3, 2009. Anne Barnard et al., Russians Push Past Separatist Area to Assault Central Georgia
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