Hannah Arendt Political Philosopher (1906-1975)

Hannah Arendt

Political Philosopher (1906-1975)

Hannah Arendt was born in Hanover in 1906, the only child of a Jewish engineer. After completing undergraduate work, she studied philosophy with Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers at Heidelberg, and earned her doctorate when she was twenty-two. She left Germany in 1933 because of Hitler’s rise to power, and resided in France, where she was active in the Zionist movement. In 1940 she moved to the United States. During her early years in America she was unable to find an academic post despite her outstanding qualifications. However, in 1952, she was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship and, the following year, was invited to deliver the Christian Guass lectures at Princeton. Throughout her remaining career, she taught courses in philosophy at the University of California, the University of Chicago, Columbia, Northwestern, and Cornell, among others. At the time of her death in 1975, she was University Professor of Political Philosophy at the new School for Social Research, in New York. As one of the twentieth century’s most prominent and controversial philosophers, Arendt is best known for her writings on revolution, violence, totalitarianism, and other political phenomena. The following biography examines Arendt’s notions of: (1)

Balancing freedom and responsibility, (2) importance of speech, (3) ideology and totalitarianism, (4) application to debate.
Throughout all of Arendt’s writing runs a single philosophical paradox: how do we protect and support the human capacity to freely constitute a political community, to make new beginnings, and, at the same time, ensure that this freedom of action is responsible? That is, how do we maintain a balance between freedom and responsibility? In an attempt to answer this question, Arendt identified two types of excess, each of which threatens to destroy the balance between freedom and responsibility. One is an unreflective confidence that human beings can mold themselves and the world in any way they wish. This assumption is manifested in the scientific attitude and its uncritical endorsement of control over nature, and most ominously in totalitarian regimes. The second type of excess is attached to thinking, not acting, and consists in the theoretical postulation of a realm of truth, or being, accessible to reason and authority over human action. That is, humans celebrate reasoning and logic at the expense of emotions and feelings. The emotionless logic embraced by this form of thought, Arendt feared, would denigrate human activity and diminish the importance of freedom.
Arendt also argued that action and speech are the supreme expressions of civilization, for they reveal open-mindedness and freedom as constitutive elements of human existence. Speech and action have several abilities including the opportunity to change people’s opinions, alter unjust government policies, and promote those issues at the heart of freedom. With the interest in speech and action, Arendt continued to challenge the Western tradition of separating speech with behavior. Instead she argued that a life without speech and action is literally dead to the world. In addition, Arendt’s approach to the study of politics, and particularly her refusal to measure the worth of the political realm by absolute/objective standards seemed a possible way Out of what she perceived to be an impasse in political theory; this impasse she would describe roughly as the contest between the ancient and the modern modes of inquiry. Though these two modes are different they share a common rejection for the inherent freedom of political activity. The ancient mode of inquiry is reflective of a transcendental view of political justice.

In Arendt’s analysis, ideological thinking and totalitarian thinking are one and the same. In each case thought presents itself as an all-encompassing logic of totality. All phenomena of present, past, and future are claimed to be perfectly knowable by one in possession of true knowledge. In addition, Arendt contested the ideologist’s claims to sole possession of the truth. Moreover, Arendt’s true goal was to redeem politics, humanity and the world. The process of redeeming politics depended on an acceptable rhetorical vision one that embraced freedom and opportunity. The effect of this rhetorical vision, Arendt posited, was to inspire the reader to go forth and change the current political system and promote “desirable” political action.

Especially important is her discussion of the effect of government form on civil disobedience and violence. While her philosophy is essentially practical, interested in the consequences of values, rather than their intrinsic usefulness, there is still much to use. The debater may be interested in her assumptions and prioritizing of freedom, as central to political systems. Moreover, her philosophy provides much for the discussion of the effects of values on particular issues.

Bibliography

Hannah Arendt. “Approaches to the German Problem.” PARTISAN REVIEW 12 (1945): 93-106.

Hannah Arendt. “Authority in the Twentieth Century.” REVIEW OF POLITICS 18(1956): 403-417.
Hannah Arendt BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT.

New York: Viking Press, 1968.

Hannah Arendt. CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC; LYING IN POLITICS, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE ON VIOLENCE, THOUGHT ON POLITICS AND REVOLUTION. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1972.

Hannah Arendt. EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL. New

York: Penguin Books, 1963.
Hannah Arendt. “From an Interview.” NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 25(1978): 18.
Hannah Arendt. “History and Immortality.” PARTISAN REVIEW 24 (1957): 11-53.
Hannah Arendt. THE HUMAN CONDITION. Chicago: University of Chicago Ness, 1958.
Hannah Arendt. “Imperialism: Road to Suicide.” COMMENTARY 1(1946): 27-35.
Hannah Arendt. THE JEW AS PARIAH: JEWISH IDENTITY AND POLITICS IN THE MODERN AGE.

New York: Grove Press, 1978.

Hannah Arendt. LECTURES ON KANT’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. Chicago: University of Chicago Ness, 1982.
Hannah Arendt. MEN IN THE DARK TIMES. New York Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968.
Hannah Arendt. ON REVOLUTION. New York: Viking Ness, 1963.
Hannah Arendt. ON VIOLENCE. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1970.
Hannah Arendt. “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility.” JEWISH FRONTIER. (1945): 19-23.
Hannah Arendt. THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM. New York: Harcourt, Brace. 1951.
Hannah Arendt. “Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship.” LISTENER (1964): 185-7, 205.
Hannah Arendt. “Public Rights and Private Interests.” In SMALL COMFORTS FOR HARD TIMES:

HUMANISTS ON PUBLIC POLICY. Mooney and Stuber (Ed.). New York: Columbia University Ness, 1977.

Hannah Arendt. RACHEL VARNHAGEN: THE LIFE OF A JEWISH WOMAN. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1974.
Hannah Arendt. “Religion and the Intellectuals, a Symposium.” PARTISAN REVIEW 17 (1950):

113-116.
Hannah Arendt. “Thinking and Moral Considerations.’ SOCIAL RESEARCH 38 (1971): 417-446.

Hannah Arendt. “Understanding and Politics.” PARTISAN REVIEW 20(1953): 377-392.
Hannah Arendt. “Understanding Communism.” PARTISAN REVIEW 20(1953): 580-583.

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