Arne Naess is the Norwegian philosopher whose writings provide the foundations and inspiration for the environmental movement known as “Deep Ecology.” His writings provide the basis for a coherent system of environmental ethics and challenge many cherished tenets of modern thought, for example, utilitarianism, the idea that humanity should be considered paramount over its natural environment and other species, and the conception of economic growth as inherently progressive. “Deep Ecology” could be a useful philosophy for Lincoln-Douglas debaters who encounter these assumptions or must affirm and negate environmental resolutions.
WHO IS ARNE NAESS?
Arne Naess is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Oslo, in Norway. He is a prolific writer, publishing many books on modern thinkers such as Spinoza and Gandhi. His name has been “nearly synonymous with philosophy in Norway for over 50 years.”81 Naess was born in 1912 and he became a professor at the age of 27. He lives in a small cabin called Tvergastein in “an arctic environment high on the side of a mountain between Oslo and Bergen that he has identified as his home—his “place”—ever since.”82 His life there is an exemplar of combining “theory” and “practice” in that he attempts to make minimal impact on the natural environment, only infringing to fulfill vital needs such as eating. His interest in environmental philosophy began in the 1960’s. In 1972, Naess originated the term “Deep Ecology,” and he has published numerous books and articles describing the term and the movement.
WHAT IS DEEP ECOLOGY?
Deep ecology is a loosely described as a movement that unites environmentalists who criticize the dominant liberal tradition of anthropocentrism and seek, through their writings, philosophies, pedagogies, and lives, to maintain a commitment to environmental activism. Deep ecology seeks establish itself as an alternative to “shallow” ecology, which is the mainstream, anthropocentric, governmentally oriented environmental movement that now dominates contemporary discourse on the environment.
A paradigmatic example of a “shallow” environmental thinker is Al Gore. “Shallow” environmentalism usually justifies the project of ecological preservation with reference to the special role humanity has as a “caretaker” species of the natural environment. It is focused on the survival of the human species, with the natural environment as a means to that end. “Shallow” environmentalism analyzes the environmental crisis in terms of scientific surveys, data, and experiments, and it seeks to solve the crisis in much the same way.
Deep ecology, by contrast, finds the notion of a “caretaker” to remove humans from their contexts as always and at all times engaged in the natural environment. The notion of a “caretaker” puts humans in the roles of parents, who make decisions for and about the environment, when the nature is precisely that which is beyond the control of science and technology. Deep ecologists analyze the environmental crisis not only through the lens of science, but also by critiquing cultural practices and assumptions that undermine the hope for sustainable living.
Naess warns that “one should not expect too much from definitions of movements; think, for example of terms like ‘conservatism,’ ‘liberalism,’ or the ‘feminist movement.’”83 He argues that the deep ecology movement should remain flexible and alterable, although he does lay out a platform of eight principles which he believes most deep ecologists generally agree with.
The platform is:
1. The well‑being and flourishing of human and non‑human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non‑human or for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of the values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non‑human life requires a smaller human population.
5. Present human interference with the non‑human world, is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality, (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.84
Naess argues that the platform is the heart of deep ecology, and individuals who believe in the platform can do so through a wide array of philosophical, personal, poetic, or other justifications. Naess calls his own justification of the platform “Ecosophy T.” The “T” is for Naess’ home, “Tvergastein.” What is important to Naess is not that everyone who claims to be a deep ecologist agree with the platform in the same way, rather, that everyone think and question deeply in order to derive their personal “ecosophy.”
ANTHROPOCENTRISM, BIOCENTRISM, ECOCENTRISM
Deep ecologists such as Naess are highly critical of the anthropocentric assumptions that foreground modern cultural and society. They are skeptical of the attitude that humans were created to dominate nature. The structure of the argument against anthropocentrism parallels arguments made against racism and sexism. To begin with, deep ecologists are skeptical of the notion that there are relevant differences between “humanity” and “nature.” Humanity is always embedded in nature. The dichotomy is artificial.
Additionally, they see anthropocentrism as a sort of “species imperialism.” Even if humanity can be divorced from the natural environment and other species, there are no differences between humans and other species that justify preferential treatment for humans. To justify anthropocentrism, some thinkers mention characteristics such as intelligence, mentality, and evolutionary advancement. However, some humans (the comatose, infants) are less “intelligent” and “mentally able” than other species, such as chimpanzees. Even if these characteristics belonged to all humans and no other species, it would not be clear why “mentality” or “advanced evolution” justifies differential treatment. The pinnacle of evolution is not humanity, rather, it is the richness and diversity of life.
Another problem with anthropocentrism is that it justifies total use of the environment. If humans are the crowning achievements of evolution, above and beyond all other species, there is no reason for humans not to use all other parts of the natural environment for human ends. The assumption that humans are and atomistic, individualized, independent units, and not ingrained in a social and natural fabric, leads to a relationship with nature and others that is colonizing, territorial, and dominating.
As an alternative to anthropocentrism, some environmental philosophers propose “biocentrism,” a theory that gives primacy to all embodied forms of life. Deep ecologists, however, take issue with even this term, which tends to enforce a conception of the world as individualized units of life that exist in competition. Many deep ecologists, such as Naess, prefer the term “ecocentrism,” which implies concern for the “ecosphere,” all those interconnected and interdependent aspects of the planet that give rise to life, natural systems, humanity, and species in a web of relations.
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