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The alleged epistemology of realism
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- Selectivity of data
- The problem of elites
The alleged epistemology of realismBefore going on with the problems of Realism, I want to tell another story. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, it was common to hear people on the pro-war side (those in agreement with President George Bush’s decision to use military force to get Iraq out of Kuwait) say, “We have to stop Saddam Hussein; otherwise, he’ll invade more countries. He might even invade the United States.” Setting aside the obvious absurdity of an attack by Iraq on the United States, these comments demonstrated the tendency of Realist philosophy to make its way, in a “watered down” version, to ordinary Americans. To them, I would reply: “Who is ‘we?’” My question was designed to provoke some thought about whether the interests of our administration and our elites in going to war against Iraq coincided with the interests of us ordinary Americans. I contended, and still contend, two things: First, the interests of ordinary working Americans, as is the case with working people the world over, are in finding ways to avoid war at nearly all costs, to promote an ethic of solidarity and cooperation, and to defy our warlike leaders, whether they be George Bush or Saddam Hussein. In other words, working people in America have more in common with working people in Iraq than either set of working people have in common with their respective leaders. My second contention was and is that the data used to vilify Iraq and justify military action was selective. It painted only one picture: of an evil country with an evil leader who would not listen to reason. Scholars and activists such as Edward Said and Noam Chomsky have contended that there were several alternatives to war, but that the Bush administration was not interested in exploring any of those alternatives. In what follows, I will argue that Realism’s epistemology is deeply flawed, because it encourages international elites to look only for reasons to be aggressive, mistrustful, and deceitful. All evidences of cooperation, peace, and reasonable behavior are “filtered out” by Realist epistemology. All that is left is bad stuff, and that “bad stuff epistemology” is what allows elites to justify preparing for, and executing, aggression and war. Selectivity of dataThe “real” becomes what the elites want it to be. It is useful here to distinguish between two types of claims. Normative claims are those that advocate particular beliefs or behavior. “We ought to prepare for war” is a normative claim. Descriptive claims are claims that, as the word implies, describe the world in a certain way. “Enemies and potential enemies of the United States abound everywhere” is a descriptive claim. However, philosophical study has long shown that there is a kind of conflation always occurring between normative and descriptive claims. In order to make normative claims, one must assume a particular kind of descriptive reality. This is obvious enough: Saying “We ought to prepare for war against our potential enemies” certainly implies that we have already accepted a description of the world that essentially says, “Enemies and potential enemies abound.” Thus, in order to prescribe action, one assumes a set of reality-conditions that justifies that normative claim. The reverse, however, is no less true. Making descriptive claims assumes particular normative judgments about how to view the world. The statement that there are potential enemies everywhere rests on the normative assumption that we ought to interpret the data at hand a certain way. In other words, leaders of the United States see other nations, other leaders, and interpret their actions in a manner that justifies calling them enemies. This construction of reality can sometimes be quite reasonable. Other times, however, it is a blatant (if subtle) description of a selected type of reality. It is my belief that Realism conflates normative and descriptive statements by selectively interpreting the data of International Relations in a manner that constructs enemies, as a way of justifying the very prescriptions and descriptions that lead to that kind of interpretation. In the sections below, I will explain how this interpretation, and subsequent prescription, blocks out alternative interpretations, and makes the conflict predicted by Realists inevitable. The problem of elitesMy first objection to realist epistemology concerns its elitist norms. In other words, the selectivity of data I mention above is primarily a selectivity of the elites in particular nations, rather than the non-elites. Recall my example of the Gulf War. Ordinary people allowed the construction, in their minds and their discourse, of Iraq as a threat. While this interpretation may seem reasonable, it should be pointed out that all of the data used to construct that interpretation came solely from elites—the government and the corporate news media. One can only speculate the counterfactual that would exist if we had been able, as ordinary people, to approach the Iraq question the same way we would approach questions in our local communities. Our own perspectives, untainted by elite interpretation of data, lead us to seek cooperation in many of our local affairs. If someone’s tree is growing too far over my side of the fence, I ought not threaten my neighbor, but instead I ought to approach and communicate, with the goal of avoiding conflict. Realists, however, claim that those ethical standards, which work in our personal lives, are always inapplicable to our political lives—especially in International Relations. Reinhold Neibuhr, whose 1932 book Moral Man and Immoral Society remains a classic realist text, went so far as to systematically divide personal and political ethics along those very lines. Matthew Berke writes of Neibuhr’s vision: “In Moral Man and Immoral Society, Niebuhr broke decisively with this "social gospel" outlook, insisting that power is the principal ingredient in arbitrating the competing claims of nations, races, and social classes. According to Niebuhr, conflict and tension are permanent features of history. While social improvement is possible, the justice of this world is born in strife and is always provisional, fragmentary, and insecure” (http://www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft0003/articles/niebuhr.html). While Neibuhr was neither an elite nor a supporter of the elites, and was in fact socially progressive, his distinction between personal and political morality further justified the elitist vision that I ought to treat my neighbor with utmost respect, but that it is acceptable and even required that (if I am a political leader) I treat other nations with threats, fear-mongering, and intimidation. 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