Perhaps the best use of Sidgwick would be to specify and then attack the opponent’s construction of freedom as a value. The distinctions that Sidgwick makes between the three types of freedom can be useful in determining what freedom should be upheld. When an opponent clarifies which type of freedom they endorse, Sidgwick’s critique of Kant provides a useful resource in attacking their particular conception of freedom. Additionally, it can be used to point out that freedom as a vague principle is often full of contradictions, making it a poor value to base decisions on without clarification. This would not only undermine your opponent’s value, but allow you to build the case for valuing one of the specific views of freedom.
The fact that Sidgwick focused on criticism of traditional philosophy makes him an excellent resource for LD debate.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sidgwick, Henry. PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: BOOK III. (London, 1901).
Sidgwick, Henry. THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS. (London, 1891).
Sidgwick, Henry. METHODS OF ETHICS. (London, 1874).
Sidgwick, Henry. BENTHAM AND BENTHAMISM IN POLITICS AND ETHICS: The Fortnightly Review, (1877).
Sidgwick, Henry. ECONOMIC SOCIALISM. The Contemporary Review. (1886).
Sidgwick, Henry. IMPRESSIONS OF MADAME BLAYATSKI. Excerpted from Sidgwick’s journal.
Sidgwick, Henry. THE WAGES FUND THEORY. The Fortnightly Review. (1879).
Sidgwick, Henry. WHAT IS MONEY? The Fortnightly Review. (1879).
Sidgwick, Henry. REPLY TO MR.. SINNET LETTER. Journal of the Society For Psychical Research. (1885).
Sidgwick, Henry. METHODS OF ETHICS. London, 1874, 7th ed. 1907.
PROVISONS AND REGULATIONS ARE NECESSARY FOR A BENIFICIAL SOCIETY.
1. NEED PROTECTIONS TO INCREASE QUALITY OF LIFE
David Braybrooke, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, AGAINST: A CRITIQUE OF ROBERT BOZICK’S WORK, 2000, p. 1.
…in particular of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). His point again and again is that without some provisions of the sort life in society would be much less agreeable to everyone. Without, for example, some protection against slander, everyone would be worse off; so everyone would be without bridges and streets in towns, most efficiently built as governmental projects.
2. SIDGWICKS PROTECTIONS ARE BASED ON A FUNCTIONING SOCIETY
David Braybrooke, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, AGAINST: A CRITIQUE OF ROBERT BOZICK’S WORK, 2000, p. 1. In the second place, and even more fundamentally, Sidgwick is more realistic just in having some going society to refer to in mounting his arguments. As it happened, it was his own society, 19th Century England. But this can be taken to represent any of a number of societies, real or possible, that stand in an historical relation to the arguments. Nozick has no such society to appeal to. He goes back to Locke; and characteristically takes as the basis for his own thinking the unhistorical side of Locke: unhistorical, in the sense that the state of nature as Locke thinks of it was never historical. If you go back to the beginnings of human society, you are not going to find Locke's solitary gatherers of acorns, or his independent subsistence farmers; you are going to find hunter gatherer societies living in families or small bands and sharing the day's catch.
3. LAISSEZ FAIRE ECONOMICS LACK OF PROTECTIONS FAVORS THE RICH
David Braybrooke, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, AGAINST: A CRITIQUE OF ROBERT BOZICK’S WORK, 2000, p. 1.
Laissez faire---``the system of natural liberty''---invites the attachment of individualists. However, for a variety of reasons, including excessive value ascribed to goods consumed by the rich, the special requirements of dealing with public goods, and the need to make special provisions for training the poor in useful skills, an economy run entirely under the banner of laissez faire will not achieve optimal production, even if everyone involved is a well-informed judge of her own interest. Nor is the system optimal for distribution, since, among other things, it does not distribute enough to the poor to enable them to improve their productive skills, and it allows landowners to appropriate unearned increments to the value of their land. (This, characteristically, is a point that Nozick does not mention; it is not a benefit that reduces simply to acquisition or the exchange of acquired goods, but one that supervenes on the interactions of a concentrated population.)
WE CAN DISCUSS THE TRUTH OF VALUES OUTSIDE OF LOGIC
1. VALUE STATEMENTS CAN BE UNIVERSAL AND PROVABLE
David Braybrooke, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, AGAINST: A CRITIQUE OF ROBERT BOZICK’S WORK, 2000, p. 1.
The existence of a criterion for a descriptive or evaluative word does imply the weak universalizability, but not the strong universalizability, because the criterion may contain a reference to an individual. The strong universalizability, because the reason may contain a reference to an individual. Thus, if we wish to assert the strong universalizability of a value-judgment, we need more logic of a reason. Thus, although Sidgwick may not have known the modern logic, his intuition was quite acute. When he asserted his Principle of Justice is not tautologies, he was basically right. The strong universalizability of ‘ought’ or ‘right’ has some substantive content, not provable by logic alone.
2. TRUTH IN UNIVERSAL VALUES IS A SUBSTANTIAL ETHICAL PRINCIPLE
David Braybrooke, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, AGAINST: A CRITIQUE OF ROBERT BOZICK’S WORK, 2000, p. 1.
Some may wish to appeal to the concept of morality (e.g., by asserting that at least ‘moral ought’ is universalizable), and others may admit that the strong universalizability (with respect to evaluative words) is itself a substantive ethical principle, despite its formal and abstract character. But in either case, its justification is needed. Notice that, even if we made the substantive question, ‘why should we be moral?’ Thus, although many of us are, unlike Sidgwick, unhappy with an appeal to ‘self-evidence’, Sidgwick’s claim that the (strong) universalizability of ‘ought’ is non-tautologies seems still correct.
3. SIDGWICK’S VIEWS ARE REAL WORLD
David Braybrooke, Professor of Philosophy, University of Texas at Austin, AGAINST: A CRITIQUE OF ROBERT BOZICK’S WORK, 2000, p. 1.
Nozick's views, like Locke's, fit best a society of independent subsistence farmers and independent artisans; but it is doubtful whether any current society originated in such a society. This is a problem that social contract thinking in the style of Locke creates for itself; and Nozick, taking the side of Locke---one side of Locke---arrays himself against philosophers like Aristotle, or Saint Thomas, or Sidgwick, who continually had in mind some current society, indeed the society current in each case with themselves.
Sidgwick never got so far from current society as to commit himself like Nozick to a thoroughly idle appeal to history---not really to history, at best to a sort of history-in-principle, history as it might have been, dream history. Nor does Sidgwick get so far from current society as to contemplate anything like Nozick's Utopia, of people (most likely, again, independent subsistence farmers and independent artisans with their own small holdings of capital) freely emigrating between associations that foster different life-styles. Nozick acknowledges barriers to such mobility in the real world, but does he understand how formidable the barriers are, or how disinclined people may be to emigrate even when the barriers are relatively easy to surmount? Why should people leave Sweden or The Netherlands? There may be nowadays a trickle of people leaving who in accordance with Nozick's beliefs are moving to the United States to try their chances as entrepreneurs; but even they would not be leaving because they found the public provisions in those countries, for medical care, education, unemployment insurance, and pensions in old age, directly oppressive; or the comparatively honorable record of those countries in international aid an intolerable drain on their pocket-books.
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