CANNOT SEPARATE MEANINGS AND ACTION

CANNOT SEPARATE MEANINGS AND ACTION

1. INTERPRETATIONS OF ACTION ARE EMBEDDED IN INDIVIDUALS NOT GROUPS

Frank Parkin. Tutor in Politics and Fellow of Magdalen college(Oxford), MAX WEBER, 1986. p. 1.

Rather, it is the reason Weber gives for focusing upon the individual and not upon groups or collectivities; namely, that only the individual is capable of ‘meaningful’ social action. Weber says that it may often be useful, for certain purposes, to treat social groups or aggregates ‘as if they were individual beings. But this is nothing more than an allowable theoretical fiction. As far as the “subjective interpretation of action” is concerned, “collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons.

Dirk Kasler. NQA, MAX WEBER- AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK, 1988. p. 176.

Thus as we have already explained, ‘meaning’ is not intended as some pre-formed ideality but as one real, determining factor in human action. At this point the central premise of every interpretive approach emerges: the actor attaches a ‘meaning’ to his or her action and this ‘meaning’ acts at the very least as a contributory determinant to the action. Thus any scientific attempt to analyze human action requires the inclusion of meaning in an explanation of social phenomena.
3. VALUES ARE INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM ACTION

Dirk Kasler. NQA, MAX WEBER- AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK, 1988. p. 153.

Already we can see the object domain of Weber’s interpretive sociology being limited to social action. The primary agent of action is always for Weber the individual person. Action in the sense of subjectively orientation of behavior exists only as the behavior of one or more cognitive purposes to proceed from other objects and investigation in the case of interpretive sociology, even in the investigation of social collectivities, such as the state, an association or bushiness corporation, it is a specifically different matter. But for the subjective interpretation of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action.
4. ACTION IS DEPENDENT ON A CONSTRUCTED MEANING

Dirk Kasler. NQA, MAX WEBER- AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK, 1988, p. 152.

This procedure, in which a concrete, observable, human action is underpinned by an ideal-typical constructed meaning, which is established with the help of an instrumentally equipped understanding does not lead to a causally valid interpretation but solely to a peculiarly plausible hypothesis. It is not only that the actor or actors are themselves often not conscious of the motives of their action or rather are repressed by others, but also the fact that behind actions, which from the outside may be judged as the same or similar, very different complexes of meaning can lie, both these reasons make the construction of a certain complex of meaning only the uncertain procedure of die imaginary experiment.
5. SUBJECTIVE MEANINGS PROVIDE THE MOTIVE FOR ACTION

Dirk Käsler. NQA, MAX WEBER- AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK, 1988. , p. 152.

As the motive of an action, Weber described a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question. Weber’s differentiation between subjective adequacy or adequacy on the level of meaning (Sinnadaqanz) and causal adequacy (Kausaladaquanz) emerged from this definition: The interpretation of a coherent course of conduct is subjectively adequate (or adequate on the level of meaning), in so far as, according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling its component parts taken in their mutual relation are recognized to constitute a typical complex of meanings.
6. ACTION DEPENDENT ON UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY

Dirk Käsler. NQA, MAX WEBER- AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK, 1988. 153.

Weber emphasized the historical dimension of this category, when he wrote: ‘Social action, which includes both failure to act and passive acquiescence, may be oriented to the past, present or expected future behavior of others. Weber’s sociology is in no way only about social action, but its forms its central subject matter, that which may be said to be decisive for its status as a science.

ALL MODERN STATES REQUIRE POWER FOR EXISTENCE

1. ALL MODERN STATES USE VIOLENCE FOR POWER

Max Weber cited in Frank Parkin. Tutor in Politics and Fellow of Magdalen college(Oxford), MAX

WEBER, 1986. p. 73.

Weber was so insistent upon characterizing the modern state as an instrument of violence that he was

prepared to deny that states can usefully be classified according to the aims and policies they pursue.

Weber: “Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends... [sic] Ultimately, one can define

the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it... [sic] namely, the use of physical force.” What this implies, of course, is that no really helpful distinction can be drawn between

different types of state -- capitalist, socialist, fascist, bourgeois, military, totalitarian, or whatever. Since they all employ roughly the same physical means of violence, differences in political design and purpose are somewhat secondary. Dictatorship and democracy, strawberry and vanilla.
2. STATE DOMINATION REQUIRES INDIVIDUAL CONSENT

Franlc Parkin. Tutor in Politics and Fellow of Magdalen college(Oxford), MAX WEBER, 1986. p. 74.

It is important to note that Weber defines domination not merely as a structure of command that elicits

obedience, but as obedience that is willingly given. Domination means that commands are complied with

“as if the ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake.” In

case there should be any lingering doubt on this point, Weber makes it crystal clear that a positive

commitment on the part of the subordinate to the authority they obey is a cardinal feature of domination.
3. SOCIETIES HOLD TOGETHER VIA POWER

Frank Parkin. Tutor in Politics and Fellow of Magdalen college(Oxford), MAX WEBER, 1986. p. 71.

This is the leitmotif that runs through all Weber’s political sociology. Societies and their lesser parts are held together not so much through contractual relations or moral consensus as through the exercise of power. Where harmony and order apparently prevail, the threatened use of force is never altogether absent.

Inside the velvet glove is always an iron fist. The terminology of violence, coercion, and force is as natural to Webers sociology as the terminology of moral integration is to Durkheim’s.

Dirk Käsler. NQA, MAX WEBER- AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK, 1988. p. 167.

Weber investigated the different stages of historical development in the evolution of democratic forms of domination, dealing in particular with two types: the types of plebiscitary leadership’ and the types of leaderless democracy which are characterized by the attempt to minimize the domination of man over man.

In the same context Weber gave detailed determinations of the different forms of the means to limit domination, i.e., collegiality and the division of power.

Frank Parkin. Tutor in Politics and Fellow of Magdalen college(Oxford), MAX WEBER, 1986. p. 72. Seen against this background of quasi-religions adulation, Weber’s conception of the state was downright heretical. In his view, the most notable feature of the state was the fact that it could successfully lay claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. He held that “violent social action is obviously something absolutely primordial.” Every social group, of whatever kind, is prepared to resort to violence in the protection of its interests. The state is different only in the sense that it claims the sole right to use force upon anyone and everyone living within its territorial jurisdiction.

Dirk Käsler. NQA, MAX WEBER- AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK, 1988. p. 162. We can reach no final verdict on the inter-relationship of the three concepts, and particularly on whether Weber actually accepted a three pronged conceptual system as well as an equality of importance among definitions. The fact is that Weber only briefly dealt with the two concepts of power and discipline, against which he was concerned with the phenomenon of domination, scientifically and in practical politics during his whole life. The main reason was that domination represented a category which was considerably fruitful in sociology--because of the (relative) reciprocity of the social relationship: the desire to dominate on the one hand and the desire to obey on the other. In this sense domination is the result of a sociologically more precise definition of power.