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POSITIVISM IS FALSE
1. A GROUP OF HUMANS ARE A COLLECTION OF INDIVIDUALS, THE COLLECTION WILL NOT TAKE ON A LIFE OF ITS OWN
Peter Landry, political scientist, BIOGRAPHIES: JOHN STUART MILL. June 1997. http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Mill.htm Accessed April 30, 2003. p-np.
No one will question the laudable goals of those who subscribe to positivism, including the "social scientists" of today; it is just that the premises on which these people proceed, are wrong. Human beings are individuals and a collection of them is but just that, a collection of individuals; and the collection will not take on a different life of its own: society is not an independent creature with a separate set of governing laws. It was on this basis that Sir Karl Popper formulated his criticisms. Popper thought that both Mill and Comte were wrong in treating collections of people as if these collections were physical or biological bodies, such that scientific methods might be employed to predict future events. "That Mill should seriously discuss the question whether 'the phenomena of human society' revolve 'in an orbit' or whether they move, progressively, in 'a trajectory' is in keeping with this fundamental confusion between laws and trends, as well as with the holistic idea that society can 'move' as a whole - say, like a planet."
2. SENSE EXPERIENCES NOT THE ONLY OBJECT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
George M. Sauvage. “Positivism.” NEW ADVENT: CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA. June 1, 1911. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12312c.htm. Accessed April 20, 2003. p-np.
Positivism asserts that sense experiences are the only object of human knowledge, but does not prove its assertion. It is true that all our knowledge has its starting point in sense experience, but it is not proved that knowledge stops there. Positivism fails to demonstrate that, above particular facts and contingent relations, there are not abstract notions, general laws, universal and necessary principles, or that we cannot know them. Nor does it prove that material and corporeal things constitute the whole order of existing beings, and that our knowledge is limited to them. Concrete beings and individual relations are not only perceptible by our senses, but they have also their causes and laws of existence and constitution; they are intelligible. These causes and laws pass beyond the particularness and contingency of individual facts, and are elements as fundamentally real as the individual facts which they produce and control. They cannot be perceived by our senses, but why can they not be explained by our intelligence? Again, immaterial beings cannot be perceived by sense experience, it is true, but their existence is not contradictory to our intelligence, and, if their existence is required as a cause and a condition of the actual existence of material things, they certainly exist. We can infer their existence and know something of their nature. They cannot indeed be known in the same way as material things, but this is no reason for declaring them unknowable to our intelligence (see AGNOSTICISM; ANALOGY).
3. TRUTHS ARE NOT DETERMINED MERELY BY EXPERIENCE, INSTEAD THEY ARE THE RESULT OF A SUBJECTIVE NECESSITY BASED ON EXPERIENCE
George M. Sauvage. “Positivism.” NEW ADVENT: CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA. June 1, 1911. http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12312c.htm. Accessed April 20, 2003. p-np.
Again, Positivism, and this is the point especially developed by John Stuart Mill (following Hume), maintains that what we call "necessary truths" (even mathematical truths, axioms, principles) are merely the result of experience, a generalization of our experiences. We are conscious, e. g. that we cannot at the same time affirm and deny a certain proposition, that one state of mind excludes the other; then we generalize our observation and express as a general principle that a proposition cannot be true and false at the same time. Such a principle is simply the result of a subjective necessity based on experience. Now, it is true that experience furnishes us with the matter out of which our judgments are formed, and with the occasion to formulate them. But mere experience does not afford either the proof or the confirmation of our certitude concerning their truth. If it were so, our certitude should increase with every new experience, and such is not the case, and we could not account for the absolute character of this certitude in all men, nor for the identical application of this certitude to the same propositions by all men. In reality we affirm the truth and necessity of a proposition, not because we cannot subjectively deny it or conceive its contradictory, but because of its objective evidence, which is the manifestation of the absolute, universal, and objective truth of the proposition, the source of our certitude, and the reason of the subjective necessity in us.
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