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PROBLEMS WITH LEVINASIt would be silly to assume that such a radical departure from traditional philosophy and ethics can come easily. Instead, it seems that Levinas asks too much of us: Not only does he demand that we abandon the search for systemic and absolute truth (or at least subordinate that search to everyday encounters with other people, a project that seems somewhat oppressive and limiting), but in so demanding, he may be guilty of the same totalizations he opposes in philosophy. After all, doesn't he really say we are always in the service of other people? Isn't he making his own sweeping universal gesture when he says that all metaphysical, philosophical and ethical projects are guilty of the same other-erasing sin? Some have argues that the philosophy of Levinas is too absolute, claiming that one cannot always be enslaved to other people, whether that enslavement be our absolute phenomenological condition ("one cannot exist without the Other") or our ethical imperative ("one must always put the Other's needs before one's own"). Isn't there any room for me to just "be me?" Isn't it possible that the Self must be as sacred as the Other? Consider the fact that, in order to help others, I must myself be in good condition mentally, emotionally and physically. If that is true, then even if Levinas's intent is not that we sacrifice ourselves absolutely, it is easy to imagine that some overly zealous altruists will do just that: place others' needs so high on their agenda that their own needs will be neglected. If this happens, then nobody will be better off. Likewise, it seems absurd that there is no identity for myself other than that gained from other people. I may get my name, my vocation, and most of my thoughts from others, and I may not be able to separate myself from them completely (although this is an arguable point). But there is some level of self-reflection necessary in the formation of a mature human being. Once again, even if Levinas concedes this, it is still possible to see in his work a call for hatred of the Self rather than extension of love toward the Other. The second main objection to Levinas has to do with his concept of incommensurability. It is simply too absolute to suggest that humans cannot reach a consensus on critical value questions. Even if it is true that some humans will disagree with certain sensible principles (for example, the fact that a small minority of racists still exist, despite society's rejection of racism), it does not follow that we should abandon the effort to collectively decide and establish social values. Consider the issue of slavery. At one time, it certainly seemed like people would "always" be divided on the issue. But through activism, laws, and struggle, a consensus emerged that it was wrong. Levinasian interpretations of the abortion question, for example, treat the abortion issue much like the slavery issue must have been treated long ago. But there is no reason to believe that society cannot eventually come to a basic agreement about it. Moreover, there seem to be serious ethical problems with abandoning the search for this consensus. Once the concept of consensus is given up, society will become even more balkanized. Everyone will group themselves into some enclave and ignore the statements and desires of other people. Isn't ignoring the Other a violation of Levinas's prime principle? CONCLUSION The objections listed above may challenge Levinas's thought, but they do not defeat it. For even if consensus is possible, coercion is all too often used as a means to achieve consensus. Levinas forces us to question both the motives and the means of achieving such consensus. Likewise, even if it seems to be asking to much of me to require that I recognize my dependence on and responsibility for others, Levinas believes such absolutism is the only hope we have of survival in a complex and violent world. Debaters who understand even a small part of Levinasian ethics can turn the debate world upside down by questioning the ability and ethical implications of the search for absolute truth. Levinas will make value debaters more wary of carelessly throwing out criteria and universal values. His thoughts will serve as a powerful rejoinder to the "me first" rhetoric of Ayn Rand, a thinker notoriously overutilized in value debate. Most of all, Levinas can remind us that debate, like all other endeavors, is about people. Real, suffering, struggling people. Richard Cohen explains:…the responsibility Levinas has in mind is paradoxically a greater responsibility that the already infinite responsibilities set by ratio in its quest for the truth of being, in its call for sufficient reasons and historical authenticity. The responsibility Levinas discerns in thinking, then, is not just another more rigorous attention to method and evidence, another epistemological duty added to the responsibilities which guide and give the reasons for reason, the autonomy of the measured life. Rather, there is an other responsibility, an unmeasured and unmeasurable responsibility, one directed from and toward the outside of thought, from and toward the irreducible alterity of the other person. There are obligations greater than the infinite responsibility to think and be on one's own, greater, then, than all the traditional philosophic responsibilities, greater because better. (Richard Cohen, "Introduction" in Emmanuel Levinas, TIME AND THE OTHER, 1987, pp. 25-26) Who can say what the impact will be, to a thinker who calls debaters themselves to consider the very foundations and purposes of debate itself? BibliographyAwerkamp, Don, EMMANUEL LEVINAS: ETHICS AND POLITICS, New York: Revisionist Press, 1977. Bernasconi, Robert, "The Violence of the Face: Peace and Language in the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas," PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 23: 6, 1997, p. 81-93. Chanter, Tina, "The Betrayal of Philosophy: Emmanuel Levinas's Otherwise than Being." PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 23: 6, 1997, p. 65-79. Haar, Michael, "The Obsession of the Other: Ethics as Traumatization." PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 23: 6, 1997, p. 95-107. Levinas, Emmanuel, TIME AND THE OTHER, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987. Levinas, Emmanuel, COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, Boston: Nijhoff, 1987. 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