INCOMMENSURABILITY
If we cannot reduce the Other to simply being an extension of the Self, it follows that we cannot always bring others into agreement with our own ethical and philosophical systems. Levinasian scholar Nick Smith writes: How can we, or should we, assess value within a pluralistic community composed of institutions and individuals who possess incommensurable systems of valuation? How can we decide on the value of something such as clean air, a fetus, a professional reputation, or a body part if members of the community have different interpretations and understandings of not only how much that thing is worth, but also of how it should be appropriately and respectfully valued? If an injury is suffered to one's reproductive capabilities, for example, how should a court determine a remedy that will both compensate for such a loss and honor the belief that the human body should not be equated with a cash value? Or, in another example, how should a legislature or administrative agency mediate between animal rights advocates, steadfast in their belief that animals should live free from torture, and a research lab that performs experimental surgeries on live animals? (Nick Smith, "Incommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence," BUFFALO LAW REVIEW, Spring/Summer 1997, p. 504)
It is not always the case that, in a debate between two fundamentally opposed systems of thought, one side is simply right and the other side is simply wrong. For Levinasian ethics, it is sometimes immoral to try to convince others that their fundamental beliefs are wrong, for those beliefs form a part of their very being, an inviolable part of their thinking which is as important to them as food, shelter, labor, or anything else that we should not steal from them.
Apart from its ethical problems, it is pragmatically impossible to hope for agreement on issues upon which we are fundamentally divided. The alternative, for a Levinasian ethic, is to concentrate on those things which we do have in common: our universal need to be loved, accepted, sheltered, and fed. It is more important that we feed the hungry than debate about the systemic causes of hunger. It is more important that we listen to the stories of mothers and children than try to determine whether there is some sweeping "patriarchy" which harms them. Systems are merely inventions designed to alienate us from one another. Basic ethical politics respects incommensurability and treats people as more important than politics.
Nick Smith believes that a certain working formula can explain incommensurability in value debates: For a problem of incommensurable valuation to arise, the following three conditions must exist: (1) a belief is held regarding the value of something (the right of animals to be free from torture); (2) this belief comes into conflict or is incompatible with another belief regarding the value of that thing (the right to sacrifice animals in furtherance of promising medical research); and (3) a choice must be made between the competing beliefs. Also, incommensurability can occur in two forms: (1) intersubjectively, such as between one party who believes people should have freedom to contract for sexual services and another party who believes prostitution should be outlawed because it degrades the value of sexual relations; and (2) intrasubjectively, such as in a decision between leaving your toddlers with a day care provider so that you can pursue a fulfilling career, on the one hand, and placing your professional life on hold to spend all of your time with your children, on the other. (Smith, 505)
These real world examples suggest that, even though we depend on one another for our very existence, a pre-occupation with forcing people into universal agreement is a doomed project.
THE FUTILITY OF SYSTEMIC ETHICS
To systematize ethics is to believe that we can establish universal rules for human behavior. The search for systems, we recall, is really an attempt to turn all others into the same as we are. If this applies to metaphysical pronouncements, it applies even more to ethical pronouncements, for it is in the realm of ethics that we establish norms of behavior. Utilitarianism, for example, says we should "always" act to increase the greatest good for the greatest number. Not only does this assume there is a universal "good" which will be good for everyone, but it also assumes that everyone should follow that principle. Deontology is no different: It defines certain universal duties and requires all actors to disregard consequences.
Sometimes "rules of ethics" denote the boundaries outside of which we are free to hurt one another. It is as if, as long as I follow the rules, I can claim that I am not responsible for those whom I hurt in doing so. Their pain is simply an unfortunate side effect of my morally right actions. Examples of this include war, capital punishment, and imprisonment. But it doesn't only apply to acts that explicitly cause harm. Suppose I claim I have an ethical duty to save someone who is drowning, but I don't know how to swim very well. I might actually increase the chances that the victim drowns, because I proceeded to save him or her with no regard to the consequences. If I think more about the "rules" than I do about the well-being of the person, I am guilty of placing principles above people. Sometimes we can do the right thing "ethically" and still cause harm to others. In such cases, Levinas reminds us that we should not forgive ourselves simply for "following the rules."
If systemic ethics is futile, and even un-ethical, then attempts to say "utilitarianism is best," "deontology is best," or otherwise, fundamentally undermine our relations with other people. Applying a universal value criteria to everyone is both coercive and potentially harmful.
AGAINST INDIVIDUALISM
The duty to others is unavoidable. We are always responsible for others because our very existence, our very thought processes, and the very foundations of our human projects are acts of response. In spite of the fact that this seems at odds with Levinas's eschewment of systemic ethics, it really isn't a contradiction. My duty to help others who are in need may actually contradict, or hyper-intensify, my ethical system. I cannot appeal to that system as a justification for helping people, and likewise, I cannot use the system to justify not helping people.
Instead, the ethical relationship which questions individualism begins with what Levinas refers to as "the face of the Other." It is the face-to-face encounter with another person that not only obliges me to respond to their needs, but also places my own freedom in question. The very presence of another person reminds me, at a deeply fundamental level, that I cannot simply do whatever I want. I do not "choose" to be responsible to other people. Instead, "Levinas insists that ethics is all about responsibility: that responsibility as ethical is unchosen and prior to dialogue..." (Arne Johan Vetlesen, "Worlds Apart? Habermas and Levinas," PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 23: 1 (1997): 2)
For Levinas, freedom is meaningless if it is simply treated as individualism. Recall that our very identities, our thought-processes, and most certainly our values, all come from our processing of our encounters with others. "One is not aware of his or her individuality until one enters a relationship with an Other and so calls the subjectivity of freedom itself into question." (Vetlesen, 8) A being who had no others to remind her that she was, in fact, an existing being, would have no thoughts at all.
This has several implications, all of which undermine individualistic philosophies. First, the objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand is deeply flawed because it assumes both a singular identity of the person, and the absolute duty of that person to do only that which is best for herself. Levinas would reply that this is impossible: We are never doing anything only for ourselves, because everything we think, do, say, or desire is done in response to others.
Second, the libertarians such as Robert Nozick assume that an individual's labor is hers alone. This is the reason why taxes, wealth redistribution, and the like, are discouraged by libertarians. But one cannot enter into any project all alone. The very nature of labor requires collective effort, even if one thinks one is working alone. One works as one has been taught…by others. One sells one's labor…to others. One uses tools developed…by others.
Even if separation from others were possible, Levinasian ethicists believe it would be undesirable, because of the enjoyment and satisfaction the healthy human gets from helping others or working alongside them. Human solidarity is as close to a natural state of affairs as any condition on earth. "Freedom would be empty, futile, vain if left to itself and its respective human I only. The Other is the greatest gift to the freedom of the I, and precisely not what threatens to annul it. Since there is for each human I also a human Other, the freedom proudly commanded by the I is given a task, and thus sustained not threatened in its raison d'etre." (Vetlesen, 7)
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