Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights
Animal Rights Justified by Bentham
Download 1.43 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Consequentialism Bad
Animal Rights Justified by BenthamBENTHAM’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY PROVIDES JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTENDING THEPRINCIPLE OF CONSIDERATION TO ANIMALS Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 5-6 Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the reforming utilitarian school of moral philosophy, incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his system of ethics by means of the formula: “Each to count for one and none for more than one. “ In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidwick, put the point in this way: “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.” More recently, the leading figures in contemporary moral philosophy have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some similar requirement that works to give everyone’s interests equal consideration – although these writers generally cannot agree on how this requirement is best formulated. It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others and our readiness to consider their interests ought not to depend on what they are like or on what abilities they may possess. Precisely what our concern or consideration requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do: concern for the well-being of children growing up in America would require that we teach tem to read; concern for the well-being of pigs in a place where there is adequate food and room to fun freely. But the basic element—the taking into account of the interests of the being, whatever those interests may be—must, according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white, masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman. Consequentialism BadSHOULD JUSTIFY ANIMAL RIGHTS IN TERMS OF ANIMAL – NOT HUMAN -- INTERESTS Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 244 I have generally avoided arguing that we ought to be kind to animals because cruelty to animals leads to cruelty to human beings. Perhaps it is true that kindness to human beings and to other animals often go together; but whether or not this is true, to say, as Aquinas and Kant did, that this is the real reason why we ought to be kind to animals is a thoroughly speciesist position. We ought to consider the interests of animals because they have interests and it is unjustifiable to exclude them from the sphere of moral concern; to make this consideration depend on beneficial consequences for human beings is to accept the implication that the interests of animals do not warrant consideration for their own sakes. IMMORAL TO CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO ENSLAVE ANIMALS LIKE IT WAS FOR THOSE WHO ENSLAVED PEOPLE Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending Animal Rights, p. 37 What is true of human liberation is no less true of animal liberation. That the interests of nonhuman animals are not counted or, when they are, not counted equitably is a symptom, not the underlying cause, of their systematic exploitation. The fundamental wrong is the failure to respect their basic moral rights, including their rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. Moreover, as in the case of human slavery, so in the case of animal slavery: the interests of those who profit from animal exploitation should play no role whatsoever in deciding whether to abolish the institution that furthers those interests. It is only if or as humanity transforms itself and begins to respect the rights of other-than-human animals that anything like animal liberation can be achieved. LIBERTIES OUTWEIGH ECONOMIC RIGHTS – WESTERN LAW PRECEDENT Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 259 Far more likely, she will not believe that law is just a system of rules. Instead, she will feel it represents the community's present sense of right and justice and not what it felt a hundred years ago, or a thousand. She will hesitate to perpetrate ancient injustices blindly. More numerous than Precedent (Rules) Judges today are Policy Judges. If Judge Juno is a Policy Judge, she thinks that good policy is good justice and that it promotes society's important values. She cares mostly about the effects of their rulings. The biomedical research laboratory will bombard her with policy arguments. Consider the benefits that could accrue from using the apes in biomedical research. Aphasia might be conquered. Children will learn how to read and speak better. If we can't open ape skulls for language investigations, what will happen when we need them for cancer research? What of the economic consequences? Biomedical research centers will have to close their doors. Breadwinners will lose their jobs. American research will fail to compete with countries whose laws are not so foolish.
Consequentialism BadCONSEQUENTIALISM IMMORAL – JUSTIFIES TORTURE Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 23 There is another quite standard argument against utilitarian moral theory, one which has tended to be the most prominent in the debate about the moral standing of animals. This is the objection to the theory as a version of “consequentialism”. Consequentialists deny that the moral character of an act, or a proposed rule of conduct is inherent in the act or rule by measuring or estimating its consequences. One uncomfortable implication of consequentialism is that it appears to allow that it would be right to mistreat an innocent individual if it could be shown that some aggregate benefits could be achieved by it. This cuts against very widespread moral institutions that it is wrong to punish the innocent, no matter what the consequences, that some forms of treatment, such as torture and enslavement, are simply unacceptable, and cannot be justified in any circumstances. PREOCCUPATION WITH CONSEQUENCES HAS HISTORICALLY PREVENTED EXPANDING PERSONHOOD TO NONHUMANS Lee Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, Lawyer in Baltimore & Law Professor at the University of Maryland School of Law, 1999, Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal, http://www.personhood.org/lawreview/frompropertytopersonframe.html Whenever humans have considered extending the scope of personhood, fear of the consequences has emerged as the prime argument for not doing it. John Stuart Mill asked: But was there any domination which did not appear natural to those who possessed it? ...So true is it that unnatural generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which is usual appears natural. The subjection of women to men being a universal custom, any departure from it quite naturally appears unnatural. Because the property classification treats non-human apes as instruments, tools, and toys, their interests can be protected only by reclassifying them as persons. Our present knowledge about their abilities compels this reclassification. In 1997, the British Parliament acknowledged this when it announced a ban on invasive experiments on chimpanzees and other hominids. Lord Williams of Mostyn said, "This is a matter of morality. The cognitive and behavioural characteristics and qualities of these animals means it is unethical to treat them as expendable for research." Thus a government has officially decided that the nature and capacities of certain non-humans demand that we no longer be entitled to treat them as property. This, without regard to any benefit to humans that might result from doing so.
Bernard Chevassus-au-Louis, geneticist, PhD, is currently president of the National Natural History Museum in Paris, Robert Barbault, director of the French Institute of Basic and Applied Ecology, and Patrick Blandin, President of the IUCN French National Committee, “Towards a national biodiversity research strategy for sustainable development” Biodiversity and Global Change, 17 january 2005, VIII
Before concluding this bird’s eye view of environmental ethics, we would like to emphasize that they are all situated in a Western cosmological vision of nature as a separate entity, a vision whose distinctive character we have outlined above. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.43 Mb. Share with your friends:
|