Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights
AT: “Animal Rights Dilute Human Rights”
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AT: “Animal Rights Dilute Human Rights”ARGUMENTS FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS STRENGTHEN THE CASE FOR PROTECTIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FOR “MARGINAL” CASES Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2004, The Case for Animal Rights, p. xiii Second, The Case does more than argue for animal rights. It seeks to describe and ground a family of basic human rights, especially for the most vulnerable members of the extended family, for example, young children. (For a later development of my theory applied to children, see Regan, 1989). As I have said on many occasions, I never would have become an animal rights advocate if I had not first been a human rights advocate. While in the past, the main interest of friend and foe alike had been (and understandably so) in my argument for animal rights, I hope new readers will not overlook, and will test the mettle of, my more fundamental argument for human rights.
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 52 It is, as yet, unclear how far rights can be extended beyond animals before they lose their content. What is clear, though, is that the philosophical basis for extending rights to animals does not necessarily imply a further extension of rights to plants, the unborn, the earth, or future generations. By basing rights on sentience, animal rights theory limits the expansion of rights to those being that are capable of suffering. In other words, sentience is a barrier that limits further sliding down the slippery slope. Future generations, by definition, are nonsentient because they have yet to come into existence. Although there is evidence that plants react to stimulus, it is generally accepted that plants do not experience suffering. Thus, granting rights to animals does not, by itself, entail awarding rights to future generations, plants or the earth. Extending rights to animals may logically require a similar extension to unborn fetuses if it could be shown that fetuses experience suffering through abortions. But beyond that, expanding the circle to animal rights does not lead to an unending slide down the slippery slope.
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 79 Hence, it seems that no adequate reason can be given for taking species membership, in itself, as the ground for putting some beings inside the boundary for moral protection and others either totally or very largely outside it. That doesn’t mean that all animals have the same rights as humans. It would be absurd to give animals the right to vote, but then it would be no less absurd to give that right to infants or to severely retarded human beings. Yet we still give equal consideration to the interests of those humans incapable of voting. We don’t raise them for food, nor test cosmetics in their eyes. Nor should we. But we do these things to nonhuman animals who show greater rationality, self-awareness, and a sense of justice than they do.
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 2 The reasoning behind this reply to Taylor’s analogy is correct up to a point, but it does not go far enough. There are obviously important differences between humans and other animals, and these differences must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have. Recognizing this evident fact, however, is no barrier to the case for extending the basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals. The differences that exist between men and women are equally undeniable, and the supporters of Women’s Liberation are aware that these differences may give rise to different rights. Many feminists hold that women have the right to an abortion on request. It does not follow that since these same feminists are campaigning for equality between men and women they must support the right of men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abortion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since dogs can’t vote, it is meaningless to talk of their right to vote. There is no reason why either Women’s Liberation or Animal Liberation should get involved in such nonsense. The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same rights to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the members of the two groups. The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.
AT: “Recognizing Rights Results Absurd Results”EXTENDING “PERSONHOOD” STATUS TO NONHUMAN ANIMALS DOES NOT REQUIRE FULL PANOPLY OF ALL RIGHTS Cass Sunstein, Law Professor, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 11 On this view, a central goal of the animal rights movement—eliminating the idea that animals are property—can be taken in a modest way, as an effort to remove a legal status that inevitably promotes suffering, and in that sense it is a small part of the animal welfare agenda. But the goal can be taken far more ambitiously, as an effort to say that animals should have rights of self-determination, or a certain kind of autonomy. Hence, some people urge that certain animals, at least, are ‘persons,’ not property, and that they should have many of the legal rights that human beings have. Of course this does not mean that those animals can vote or run for office. Their status would be akin to that of children—a status commensurate with their capacities. What that status is, particularly, remains to be spelled out. But at a minimum, it would seem to entail protection against torture, battery, and even confinement (except for purposes of human self-defense). PERSONHOOD STATUS FOR ANIMALS DOES NOT MEAN THEY MUST BE TREATED EXACTLY LIKE HUMAN PERSONS Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 132 If animals are persons, that does not mean that they are human persons; it does not mean that we must treat animals in the same way that we treat humans or that we must extend to animals any of the legal rights that we reserve to competent humans. Nor does this mean that animals have any sort of guarantee of a life free from suffering, or that we must protect animals from harm from other animals in the wild or from accidental injury by humans. As I argue below, it does not necessarily preclude our choosing human interests over animal interests in situations of genuine conflict. But it does require that we accept that we have a moral obligation to stop using animals for food, biomedical experiments, entertainment, or clothing, or any other uses that assume that animals are merely resources, and that we prohibit the ownership of animals. The abolition of animal slavery is required by any moral theory that purports to treat animal interests as morally significant, even if the particular theory otherwise rejects rights, just as the abolition of human slavery is required by any theory that purports to treat human interests as morally significant Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.43 Mb. Share with your friends:
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