Port Security Advantages New Military Advantage Notes

Port security key to military mobilization

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• , U.S. commercial ports have become critical centers for military mobilizations. The security of commercial ports during times of military mobilization is therefore critical to national defense
• . Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade.
• 1AC Trafficking Impact Contention (_) is the trafficking: PSGP is key to solve human and drug trafficking but it must be a top priority
• Theres no question that more investments in security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed
• Only by continuing to make port security a top priority will Americas seaports be able to continue serving their vital functions
• Independently, human trafficking weakens the Balkans Kaldor 08
• AND, drug trafficking comes through maritime vessels – causes influx of cocaine

Port security key to military mobilization Carlton 01 Bruce j. Carlton acting deputy maritime administrator before the committee on commerce, science and transportation united states senate on port and maritime security Department of transportation maritime administration statement of July 24, 2001 http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/01test/Carlton2.htm The movement of military cargoes through our commercial ports is standard practice. Because of our dual mission, MARAD works closely with both the maritime industry and the Department of Defense (DOD). As the Commission's report noted, forward deployment of U.S. troops and equipment overseas in this post Cold War era is declining. Ongoing base closure and realignment initiatives have resulted in the closure of several military owned and operated ports. As a result, U.S. commercial ports have become critical centers for military mobilizations. The security of commercial ports during times of military mobilization is therefore critical to national defense. 2AC Ext. Trade/Economy Impacts Terrorist attack collapses the economy and trade Flynn 03 Written Testimony before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D. Commander, U.S. Coast Guard (ret.) Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies and Director, Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives March 20, 2003 http://www.cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/fragile-state-container-security/p5730 On October 12, 2001, I had the opportunity to testify before this committee at its first post 9-11 hearing on homeland security. At that time, I asserted that “the economic and societal disruption created by the September 11 attacks has opened Pandora’s box. Future terrorists bent on challenging U.S. power will draw inspiration from the seeming ease at which America could be attacked and they will be encouraged by the mounting costs to the U.S. economy and the public psyche associated with the ad-hoc efforts to restore security following that attack.” A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United States each day, the response would likely be the same—a self-imposed global embargo.” Based on that analysis, we identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container. These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000—which makes the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors. “Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted. As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting down—even temporarily—the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident. In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes. If a terrorist were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb” is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry. This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be brought to its knees—as would much of the freight movements that make up international trade. Terrorist attack destroys the economy and trade Talor et al. 07 (Bruce Taylor director of research at the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in Washington, D.C; Antony Pate Bruce Kubu;) Protecting America’s Ports: Promising Practices A Final Report Submitted https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221075.pdf Consequences. A number of studies have estimated that a nuclear bomb, a “dirty bomb,” or a radiological and biological device could cause considerable damage and could kill and/or contaminate thousands of citizens within several miles of a port (Loveless, et al., 2003). Ironically, however, “the cost of our response could be far more economically damaging than the attack itself” (Loveless, 2003, p.2). Absent appropriate security measures, the Hart-Rudman report points to the considerable risk that: Should the maritime or surface elements of America’s global transportation system be used as a weapon delivery device, the response right now would almost certainly be to shut the system down at an enormous cost to the economies of the United States and its trade partners....bringing the global container industry to its knees. Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner (2002) made the same point: If terrorists used a sea container to conceal a weapon of mass destruction and detonated it on arrival at a port, the impact on global trade and the global economy could be immediate and devastating—all nations would be affected. No container ships would be allowed to unload at U.S. ports after such an incident. 1AC Trafficking Impact Contention (_) is the trafficking: PSGP is key to solve human and drug trafficking but it must be a top priority AAPA 11 SOURCE American Association of Port Authorities “10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S. Ports” http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/10-years-after-911-security-still-a-top-priority-of-us-ports-128888213.html Since 9/11, the Port Security Grant Program has received about $2.6 billion in funding for 11 rounds of grant awards. AAPA commends Congress and the Administration for these allocations and will continue to recommend the federal government commit $400 million a year for a separate and dedicated program to help port facilities enhance their physical security. The association supports a risk-based evaluation process that allows all facilities that are required to meet MTSA regulations to apply. "Clearly, America's ports have become much more secure since 9/11. In addition to guarding against cargo theft, drug smuggling, human trafficking and stowaways, ports and their law enforcement partners have added the protection of people and facilities from terrorism to their security plate," remarked Mr. Nagle. "There's no question that more investments in security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed. All parties—the ports, terminal operators, the various government agencies, and the Administration and Congress—must do their part in undertaking and funding these enhancements. Only by continuing to make port security a top priority will America's seaports be able to continue serving their vital functions as trade gateways, catalysts for job creation and economic prosperity, and important partners in our national defense." Human trafficking is modern day slavery – it destroys liberty and freedom which are necessary for peace Crouse 07 Janice Shaw Crouse, Ph.D., Senior Fellow at the Beverly LaHaye Institute http://townhall.com/columnists/janiceshawcrouse/2007/07/11/sex_trafficking_victims_disposable_or_human/page/full/ It was gratifying to hear the ambassador directly address the problems of American popular culture in glamorizing the “ho” and “pimp.” He said, “It’s high time we treat pimps as exploiters rather than hip urban rebels. When a pimp insists his name or symbol be tattooed on his ‘girls’ he is branding them like cattle –– dehumanizing them, treating them like property.” There are those who would argue that human trafficking is the inevitable outcome of poverty and that some poverty-stricken people choose willingly to be involved. But, as Ambassador Lagon pointed out, “There is a growing refusal to accept enslavement as an inevitable product of poverty or human viciousness. Corruption is typically poverty’s handmaiden in cases of human trafficking.” CWA is pleased to be among those that Ambassador Lagon called an “indomitable force.” We and other evangelical Christians are at the forefront of this battle as modern-day abolitionists who work for the human rights of women and for the dignity of all of God’s people. We agree with Ambassador Lagon that trafficking in persons “shouldn’t be regulated or merely mitigated; it must be abolished.” The victims of this crime are among the “most degraded, most exploited, and most dehumanized people in the world.” We join the ambassador in declaring, “Exploiters must be stigmatized, prosecuted, and squeezed out of existence.” Those who treat people as commercial commodities –– pimps, madams and johns –– are slavers who buy and sell human beings as disposable goods for their brothels, factories or fields. We must work for good laws and good law enforcement that will treat human trafficking as a criminal offense that will be investigated and the perpetrators prosecuted, convicted and punished to the fullest extent of the law. Otherwise, such crimes undermine everyone’s liberty and freedom; only corruption-free democratic processes create a society where peace and prosperity are possible for all citizens. Independently, human trafficking weakens the Balkans Kaldor 08 Mary Kaldor is Professor of Global Governance and Director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit at the London School of Economics. The Balkans-Caucasus tangle: states and citizens MARY KALDOR , 9 January 2008 http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/democracy_power/balkans_caucasus_tangle There is a real risk of spreading destabilisation in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The criminal/nationalist entrepreneurs who profited from the wars in the 1990s were never properly dealt with. On the contrary, they have been nurtured by the combination of nationalist governments, high unemployment and lawlessness. Governments in the region - in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania or Georgia, for example - are not simply (as the jargon has it) "weak states"; their weakness is sustained by what some have described as shadow networks of transnational crime and extremist ideologies. There has been an expansion of human-trafficking, money-laundering, and the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, drugs, and weapons over the last decade - much of it to satisfy European and American markets - and all in the face of international agreements, aid programmes and the presence of foreign troops and agencies. And the instability caused by trafficking risks Balkan conflict and instability The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 08 CRIME AND ITS IMPACT ON THE BALKANS and affected countries http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CFQQFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rcc.int%2Fdownload%2Fpubs%2FBalkan_study.pdf%2F88ac72aabc4af267910da4f02ca3f7c0&ei=Zm4NUPH-BYaQ9gSSuPy9Cg&usg=AFQjCNH30Rl21c6HtHKFuwICdp_Y2wvNHQ&sig2=W3O3vHRAs7maQ_Q5Qp7Y1g The World Bank defines instability as “the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.”440 Many factors contribute to instability besides organised crime and corruption, but especially in new states, the credibility of the government may be closely related to its longevity. In states with small economies, organised crime groups may have the financial strength to pose a genuine threat, especially if they have historical linkages to political groups. Great fortunes were made off the previous era of instability. There are those who would benefit economically from further political conflict, and some of these may be in a position to generate further disruption. In terms of the World Bank governance indicators, the region shows quite a lot of variation in political stability rankings. On the one hand, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina were all ranked lower than the average for sub- Saharan Africa in 2006. On the other, Romania, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Croatia seem to exhibit far less likelihood of such conflict emerging, but these countries would still be greatly affected by regional instability. Serbia’s low ranking is propably due to the question of the final status of Kosovo (Serbia) and related problems in the south, which have the potential to trigger conflicts in several other parts of the region. It has been argued that, due to the importance of smuggling during the conflict, many of the leaders in the province have a criminal background, and may still be involved in trafficking, or at least providing protection to traffickers. According to one senior UNMIK official, “When we talk of organised crime in Kosovo, we are very much dealing with politicians, [and] ministers.”441 These alleged inter-linkages and the incentives they create are complex, so it is difficult to say how this might affect stability. But the case of the ethnic-Albanian National Liberation Army, which sparked off conflict in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, is instructive. These rebels/criminals were also tied to the KLA, and it has been alleged that the struggle was as much about protecting trafficking routes as it was about advancing an ethnic agenda. As the International Crisis Group wrote at the time: The vision of a “Greater Kosovo” only partly explains the motivation of the NLA. Few ethnic Albanians in Macedonia – as distinct from the diaspora – would want to be part of Kosovo or Albania. Yet, a borderless criminal network already operates freely in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo. Keeping Macedonia at risk allows the contraband trade in drugs, weapons, cigarettes, and humans to flourish unchecked. A destabilised Macedonia is profitable both for criminals and for those who dream of a pure Albanian section of western Macedonia.443 In the end, the two objectives – the political and the criminal – were probably intertwined in the minds of the rebels, as they were during the time of the Kosovo war. But do criminal groups really have the capacity to take on the states of the region? A recent seizure in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia provides some indication. In November 2007, a major arms cache, sufficient to equip 650 soldiers, was discovered, including anti-aircraft weaponry. It was found in the possession of what was initially described as an “organised crime group” but was later labeled a terrorist cell, a shift in perspective that is telling in itself. The group had been sheltering two escapees from Kosovo prisons.444 In Albania, the new Deputy Minister of the Interior Gent Strazmiri speaks of criminals, particularly in the border areas, who don a “patriotic disguise” and give “political excuses” for their illicit activity.445 All this suggests that the overlap between the political and the criminal that was manifest during open hostilities still prevails along the borders of Kosovo, and that these forces have the armament to engage militaries if it proves in their interest to do so. The risks are not just tied to the regions around Kosovo. The stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also at issue. There are elements within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragmented political landscape that would profit from a further dissolution of the country, and again, political and criminal motives are difficult to disentangle. In the end, it is impossible to statistically demonstrate a correlation between the presence of organised crime and instability because neither issue can be satisfactorily quantified. But there appears to be good reason to treat organised crime as a stability threat in South East Europe, due to the role it has played in past conflicts. World war three Paris 02 ROLAND PARIS University Research Chair in International Security and Governance University of Ottawa Kosovo and the Metaphor War http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/UOTTAWA_Kosovo_metaphorwar.pdf The meaning of the powderkeg metaphor is straightforward: the Balkans can explode at any time, and the resulting conflagration can spread to the rest of Europe; preventing such an explosion is vital to the continent’s, and perhaps even to American, security. When Clinton described Kosovo as a powderkeg, he warned that the Kosovo conflict might spill over not only to surrounding Balkan states, but to Europe as a whole; and he insinuated that the United States could be compelled to fight in such a pan-European conflict, just as it did in World Wars I and II. “As we approach the next century,” he stated on 12 October, during a discussion of the Kosovo situation, “we must never forget one of the most indelible lessons of this one we’re about to leave—that America has a direct stake in keeping the peace in Europe before isolated acts of violence turn into large-scale wars.” 53 Translation: if you want to make sure American boys will not have to fight another world war, then support me in my efforts to extinguish the smoldering fire in the Balkan powderkeg, before it is too late. 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