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Obama administration will miss the deadline for port security – risks huge attacks – tech is available, all that is missing is urgency

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• What is missing is a sense of urgency and determination . 2AC Ext. Vulnerability Terrorist attack on ports is the biggest threat
• This has created a situation where terrorists seeking to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S. via a cargo container face highly favorable odds of escaping detection
• Ports are vulnerable – attack destroys trade Zegart et al. 05
• ***Port Security Add-Ons*** 2AC Honduras Relations Add-On Port security boosts Honduras-US cooperation Meyer 10
• Honduras views such cooperation as important
• Key to troop presents in Central America Sullivan 05
• Honduras
• That causes global instability and war Rochlin 94
• . Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region
• It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war .
• ***Port Security AT:*** AT: Airport/Borders Alt Cause Airports and borders are secure – ports are key Carlton 01
• AT: Can’t Deter Terrorists Terrorists can be deterred RAND 09
• From this perspective, individuals are deterred when their actions would produce unacceptable harm to their organizations
• Cuts hurt port security Kimery 03/09/12
• AT: Terrorist Can’t Get Bomb

Obama administration will miss the deadline for port security – risks huge attacks – tech is available, all that is missing is urgency. NYT 6/26/12 OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS Cargo, the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse By JERROLD L. NADLER, EDWARD J. MARKEY and BENNIE G. THOMPSON Published: June 26, 2012 MILLIONS of cargo containers are unloaded from ships each year at American seaports, providing countless opportunities for terrorists to smuggle and unleash a nuclear bomb or weapon of mass destruction on our shores. To counter this threat, Congress passed a law five years ago mandating that by July 2012, all maritime cargo bound for the United States must be scanned before it is loaded on ships. But the Obama administration will miss this deadline, and it is not clear to us, as the authors of the law, whether it ever plans to comply with the law. Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be frighteningly inventive. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the shoes and underwear of airline passengers. The cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan horse for a devastating attack on the United States. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison has put it, a nuclear attack is “far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.” But for the past five years, the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that it would be too expensive and too difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable. An attack on an American port could cause tens of thousands of deaths and cripple global trade, with losses ranging from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion, according to estimates by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service. Anyone who doubts these estimates should recall the labor strike that shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach for 11 days in 2002. Economic losses were put at $6.3 billion or more. Homeland Security says it would cost $16 billion or more to meet the mandate, but that projection assumes that the department would pay to acquire, maintain and operate scanning equipment and related operations, without any offsetting fees from companies in the global supply chain. In contrast, Stephen E. Flynn, an expert in terrorism and port security at Northeastern University, has said a scanning system could be implemented in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, and that the costs could largely be absorbed by companies doing business at the ports. Homeland Security says it uses a “layered, risk-based approach” to cargo scanning, which, instead of comprehensive scanning, targets specific cargo thought to be high-risk. But this approach is inadequate. Recent advances in screening technologies have undermined Homeland Security’s contention that the technology is not available to scan all cargo containers without disrupting commerce. An effective high-volume container screening system was installed in the Port of Hong Kong in 2005. Trials of new, American-made technology have demonstrated that scanning all containers would be feasible at many ports. The world’s largest marine terminal operators have offered to work with the department to put the law into effect. Cost and technology have never been the primary obstacles to meeting this mandate. What is missing is a sense of urgency and determination. 2AC Ext. Vulnerability Terrorist attack on ports is the biggest threat Konkel 05 Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe Todd Konkel Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Leslie Comstock Editor http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government passed a significant number of measures to improve aviation security – an area with a high level of public visibility. This nation faces a potentially greater threat, however, from a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) making its way into the U.S. in one of the thousands of cargo containers that enter this country every day. In June 2004, the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation issued a memo reflecting this view: “Despite the importance of seaport security, perhaps no other mode of transportation is currently more vulnerable to future attacks than our Nation’s Marine Transportation System.” 1 Although a future attack involving a chemical or biological WMD could have tragic consequences, a nuclear weapon, which could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths in an instant, presents the most concerning threat. In Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Harvard professor Graham Allison shares a brief but revealing excerpt from a private conversation that took place with former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge in February 2004. When asked what worried him most, Secretary Ridge replied with a single word: “nuclear.” 2 Later in his book, Allison states that a nuclear weapon used by terrorists in an attack on the United States “is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.” 3 Ports are vulnerable Konkel 05 Container Security: Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe Todd Konkel Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Leslie Comstock Editor http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf Although shipping containers enter American ports at a rate of roughly twenty thousand per day, fewer than 5 percent are opened for inspection. 25 In the findings outlined in the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, the U.S. Congress acknowledged this problem: “Current inspection levels of containerized cargo are insufficient to counter potential security risks. Technology is currently not adequately deployed to allow for the nonintrusive inspection of containerized cargo . . . Security related and detection-related equipment, such as small boats, cameras, large-scale x-ray machines, and vessel tracking devices, are lacking at many ports.” 26 This has created a situation where terrorists seeking to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the U.S. via a cargo container face highly favorable odds of escaping detection. According to one study, in fact, the probability that inspectors will detect a shielded nuclear weapon in a shipping container using the current screening system is only about 10 percent. 27 In order to decrease the likelihood of a nuclear weapon entering the U.S. in a container, the odds of detection must be significantly improved. Otherwise, terrorists will eventually attempt to exploit this system, given the relatively low risk that a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb would be detected. Although the U.S. government made significant investments in national security during the first term of the Bush Administration, there is evidence to suggest that the dollars have not been allocated in proportion to the threat. According to Stephen Flynn, a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, the CIA has concluded that the most likely way that a WMD would enter the U.S. is by sea. 28 Despite this assessment, as of September 2004, the U.S. government was spending more every three days to finance the war in Iraq than it had provided over the previous three years to improve security at all 361 U.S. seaports. 29 Ports are vulnerable – attack destroys trade Zegart et al. 05 PORT SECURITY: IMPROVING EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES AT THE PORTS OF LOS ANGELES AND LONG BEACH Amy B. Zegart, Assistant Professor, School of Public Affairs, UCLA Matthew C. Hipp, J.D. Candidate, UCLA School of Law Seth K. Jacobson, M.B.A. Candidate, Anderson School, UCLA http://www.spa.ucla.edu/calpolicy/files05/zegartcpotextorigedit.pdf California’s seaports are vital to the global economy and highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. Today, over 95 percent of the volume of all U.S. foreign trade moves through America’s ports, but less than five percent of all shipping containers entering the United States are inspected. The relatively free flow of goods and services across America’s borders creates inherent risks. At the same time, the concentration of shipping among a handful of international megaports and innovations in inventory management—such as “just-in-time” delivery systems that minimize warehouse inventories—have increased the potential economic disruption of a terrorist attack dramatically in recent years. As Stephen Flynn, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and retired U.S. Coast Guard commander, recently noted, an attack on any single U.S. port would likely cause the entire global trading system to “go into gridlock.” 1 Honduras_Relations_Add-On__Port_security_boosts_Honduras-US_cooperation__Meyer_10'>***Port Security Add-Ons*** 2AC Honduras Relations Add-On Port security boosts Honduras-US cooperation Meyer 10 Honduran-U.S. Relations Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs February 1, 2010 http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19919_Previous_Version_2010-02-01.pdf Honduras and the United States have cooperated extensively on port security. For the United States, port security emerged as an important element of homeland security in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Honduras views such cooperation as important in order to ensure the speedy export of its products to the United States, which in turn could increase U.S. investment in the country. In March 2006, U.S. officials announced the inclusion of the largest port in Honduras, Puerto Cortés, in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). CSI is operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) of the Department of Homeland Security, and uses a security regime to ensure that all containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States. Honduras also participates in the Department of Energy’s Megaports Initiative, which supplies ports with equipment capable of detecting nuclear or radioactive materials, and the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI), which deploys equipment capable of scanning containers for radiation and information risk factors before they are allowed to depart for the United States. Puerto Cortés was one of six ports around the world chosen to be part of the first phase of the SFI. 99 Key to troop presents in Central America Sullivan 05 Mark P. Sullivan Specialist in Latin American Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Order Code RS21103 Updated May 3, 2005 Honduras: Political and Economic Situation and U.S. Relations http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47138.pdf The United States has had close relations with Honduras over the years, characterized by significant foreign assistance, an important trade relationship, a military presence in the country, and cooperation on a range of transnational issues, including counternarcotics efforts, environmental protection, and most recently the fight against terrorism. The bilateral relationship became especially close in the 1980s when Honduras returned to democratic rule and became the lynchpin for U.S. policy in Central America. At that time, the country became a staging area for U.S.-supported excursions into Nicaragua by anti-Sandinista opponents known as the contras. Today, overall U.S. policy goals for Honduras include a strengthened democracy with an effective justice system that protects human rights and promotes the rule of law, and the promotion of sustainable economic growth with a more open economy and improved living conditions. If approved, DR-CAFTA would lead to increased U.S.-Honduran economic linkages. The Bush Administration views DR-CAFTA as a means of solidifying democracy in Honduras and promoting safeguards for environmental protection and labor rights in the country, although critics fear that a CAFTA without enforceable environmental and labor provisions would do nothing to spur reforms. U.S. Foreign Aid. The United States has provided considerable foreign assistance to Honduras over the past two decades. In the 1980s, the United States provided about $1.6 billion in economic and military aid to Honduras as the country struggled amid the region’s civil conflicts. In the 1990s, U.S. assistance to Honduras began to wane as regional conflicts subsided and competing foreign assistance needs grew in other parts of the world. Hurricane Mitch changed that trend as the United States provided almost $300 million in assistance to help the country recover from the devastation of the storm. As a result of the new influx of aid, U.S. assistance to Honduras for the 1990s amounted to around $1 billion. With Hurricane Mitch funds expended by the end of 2001, U.S. foreign aid levels to Honduras declined. Foreign aid funding amounted to $41 million for FY2002, $53 million for FY2003, $43 million for FY2004, and an estimated $41 million for FY2005. The Bush Administration requested almost $37 million for FY2006. These amounts include support for a variety of development assistance projects, HIV/AIDS assistance, food aid, and the largest Peace Corps presence in the world, with over 250 volunteers. Honduras also could receive substantial U.S. foreign assistance under the Bush Administration’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a performance and resultsbased assistance program intended to focus exclusively on development goals without regard for other U.S. foreign policy objectives. In early May 2004, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) deemed Honduras eligible to compete for grants under the new program. Honduras and the MCC are currently negotiating an agreement for such assistance. Military Issues. The United States maintains a troop presence of about 550 military personnel known as Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base. JTF Bravo was first established in 1983 with about 1,200 troops, who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting U.S. counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. Today, U.S. troops in Honduras support such activities as disaster relief, medical and humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics exercises, and search and rescue operations that benefit Honduras and other Central American countries. Regional exercises and deployments involving active and reserve components provide training opportunities for thousands of U.S. troops. In the aftermath of the Hurricane Mitch in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort and were involved in delivering relief supplies, repairing bridges and roads, rebuilding schools, and operating medical clinics. Honduras was among the coalition of the willing supporting U.S. military operations in Iraq, and in July 2003, Honduras began providing a military contingent of 370 troops to Iraq, joining other contingents from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. The Maduro government’s proposal to send the troops was approved by the Honduran Congress, but the narrow margin of 66-62 reflected strong opposition by some sectors, including the opposition Liberty Party. 6 The Honduran troops served under a brigade commanded by Spain, but when Spain decided to bring home its troops, Honduras followed suit and removed all its troops by June 1, 2004. That causes global instability and war Rochlin 94 James Francis Rochlin Professor of Political Science Okanagan University College, “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America”http://books.google.com/books?id=TMmfUN_CfhgC&q=%22While+there+were%22#v=snippet&q=%22While%20there%20were%22&f=false While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  ***Port Security AT:*** AT: Airport/Borders Alt Cause Airports and borders are secure – ports are key Carlton 01 Bruce j. Carlton acting deputy maritime administrator before the committee on commerce, science and transportation united states senate on port and maritime security Department of transportation maritime administration statement of July 24, 2001 http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/01test/Carlton2.htm Terrorism is also a concern for seaport security. The threat of such activity and the vulnerability of seaports are the reasons for concern. While U.S. airports and land border crossings have well structured security measures, our ports do not enjoy the same level of security even though they offer unparalleled intermodal access to our nation’s interior. Addressing port vulnerabilities is key to ensuring that our ports are not targeted for terrorist and criminal activities. Moreover, most of the serious crimes that take place in our seaports are in fact violations of Federal law. For this reason, it makes good sense for the Federal Government to achieve coordination among the various agencies concerned with port and maritime security and to work with the ports to explore ways to minimize criminal activity. AT: Can’t Deter Terrorists Terrorists can be deterred RAND 09 Understanding the Role of Deterrence in Counterterrorism Security Andrew R. Morral, Brian A. Jackson http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP281.pdf Despite occasional uncertainty and periodic controversy on the point, it is by now conventional to assume that terrorists pursue their objectives rationally. Although determined terrorists—both as individuals and organizations—may be willing to risk everything to achieve their objectives, they do not wish to waste their own lives or other resources on missions that are doomed to fail or unlikely to achieve their intended results. This insight has led to a growing game-theory literature examining how to optimize security investments given the assumption that terrorists are guided by principles of expected utility theory (e.g., Bier, 2005; Golany et al., 2009; Lakdawalla and Zanjani, 2005; Major, 2002; Phillips, 2009; Zhuang and Bier, 2007, 2009; Zhuang, Bier, and Alagoz, 2009). The distinction between terrorists as individuals and terrorist groups as organizations is important for understanding the deterrent effects of security measures. The example of individual suicide terrorists is often invoked to illustrate why security measures that threaten the safety of operatives may have less of a deterrent effect than those aimed against criminals or other attackers who want to live to see another day. Even if an individual suicide terrorist is prepared to die for a minor victory, however, this may not be true for the organization that dispatches the operative. Both may be sensitive to measures that affect the successful outcome of the operation, but the group might also be sensitive to measures that both threaten the life of the operative and provide security forces with information that could compromise the group. In our discussion, we chiefly focus on deterring organizations. From this perspective, individuals are deterred when their actions would produce unacceptable harm to their organizations. See Radlauer (2006) for a discussion of the two different targets of deterrence. AT: Inherency New systems have been delayed and PSGP funding has been cut Holdeman 6/23/12 Eric Holdeman Director of Security, Port of Tacoma REAL ID and TWIC: Two Systems-Both In Trouble June 23, 2012 http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-blogs/disaster-zone/port-security/REAL-ID-and-TWIC-Two-systems-both-in-trouble-062312.html The final rule making by the Coast Guard on biometric readers for TWIC has been delayed several times. Now it is due out in early 2013 (after the elections are over) and who knows what it will say. Ports and terminal operators are leery of investing funding in these systems given the lack of implementation over the years. Then there is the fact that the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) has been cut to around 25% of what it was during the early years of the grant program. Cuts hurt port security Kimery 03/09/12 By: Anthony Kimery received the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Director’s Award for Excellence, and was a Fund for Investigative Journalism grant recipient. Counternarcotics, Terrorism & Intelligence Security, Port Authorities Associations Urge DHS To Reconsider Port Allocations “Even though Congress reduced the budget for preparedness grants by 40 percent, we are concerned with the allocation decisions made by the department,” SIA and AAPA said in their letter to Napolitano. “The recently announced cuts result in a 59 percent reduction in funding for the Port Security Grant Program and are 75 percent less than authorized by Congress in the SAFE Port Act.” Continuing, the two organizations stated that “this allocation will not come close to meeting local needs. It will result in continued struggles to bring port security into the 21st century and hamper meeting government mandates, such as the Transportation Worker Identity Card.” The two groups said that, “while we understand that Congress initiated this cut because of what it saw as a backlog of unspent funds, we believe such a drastic reduction of funds will have negative consequences on port security. In addition, we believe that one of the best ways to utilize existing funding is to categorically waive all cost-share requirements for grants that have already been awarded. Requiring short, individual waivers diverts the efforts of those involved from the goal of getting these projects done quickly. Grantees often put projects on hold until they receive a waiver.” AT: Terrorist Can’t Get Bomb Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 147.54 Kb. Share with your friends: