States cp ddi 2012
“Race to the Bottom” reduces standards to promote development
Download 0.94 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Federal regulation is key to prevent a race to the bottom
- The only way to stop the “Race to the Bottom” is to have federal regulation
“Race to the Bottom” reduces standards to promote developmentSpence 12 [David B. Spence, Prof. of Law, Politics & Regulation, University of Texas at Austin, 3/2/2012, “Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and Energy Production, Northwestern, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Spence_Federalism_Energy_3-4.pdf] A second rationale (or set of rationales) for federal regulation focuses on the ability or willingness of state governments to regulate. Even when externalities fall primarily on locals, local governments may not be up to the job. That is, they may lack the ability to regulate effectively, due to the lack of resources or scientific competency. 130 Detecting the presence of this problem is difficult, however, because it hypothesizes a desire to regulate on the part of the state that has not been evidenced in the policy process. Stated differently, it might be presumptuous to assume the desire to regulate in the absence of regulation. However, the socalled "race to the bottom" hypothesis suggests that states may under-regulate because they must compete with one another for jobs and economic development by reducing environmental or other regulatory standards. 131 This race to the bottom argument is often framed as a kind of prisoners dilemma 132 in which local governments collectively would prefer more stringent regulatory standards, but cannot sustain any cooperative effort to maintain stringent regulatory standards in the face of temptation -- namely, the opportunity to attract business and jobs. Not everyone accepts the race to the bottom hypothesis, 133 and it has sparked an interesting literature examining the logical and normative implications of state and local decisions to reduce environmental standards in order to promote development. 134 Federal regulation is key to prevent a race to the bottomSpence 12 [David B. Spence, Prof. of Law, Politics & Regulation, University of Texas at Austin, 3/2/2012, “Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and Energy Production, Northwestern, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Spence_Federalism_Energy_3-4.pdf] Most federal energy regulatory regimes can be justified according some combination of the first, second and fourth rationales described in the previous section. Some energy facilities are subject to a suite of risk-based regulations that focus not on a particular industry, but on controlling interstate/spillover externalities (e.g. air or water pollution) or preventing a race to the bottom across a variety of industries (including energy). These kinds of regulatory regimes are the product of republican moments, driven by public concern over the risks at issue. 150 Coal-fired power plants and oil refineries, for example, are subject to risk-based regulation by a variety of federal agencies under several federal statutes, each focused on managing a particular set of environmental, health and safety risks. Thus, new or modified coal-fired power plants and oil refineries must obtain air and water discharge permits under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, respectively. 151 Because air and surface water pollution crosses state boundaries, 152 federal regulation makes sense, but federal regulators have stopped short of regulating entirely intrastate water pollution, for the most part. At the same time, coal-fired power plants must comply with OSHA worker protection regulations 153 and hazardous waste management requirements under RCRA 154 that may involve relatively few interstate impacts. Nevertheless, in the absence of such regulation, one might imagine states competing for mobile capital investment (and the resultant jobs and economic development) by lowering their regulatory standards. 155 Race to Bottom The only way to stop the “Race to the Bottom” is to have federal regulationMacey and Butler 96, Macey, Jonathan, Yale Law School, 1-1-96, “Externalities and Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority” http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2440&context=fss_papers A leading rationale for federal domination of environmental regulation is to prevent states from competing for economic growth opportunities by lowering their environmental standards in a so-called "race to the bottom.»36 The notion is that all states compete for economic growth by lowering environmental standards below the level they would select if they acted collectively at the national level.37 What is individually rational for individual states is collectively irrational at the national level.38 Professor Richard Stewart describes the implication of this dynamic in concise terms: Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards. Ifeach locality reasons in the same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer ifthere were some binding mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or development. 39 According to this logic, federal regulation is necessary to correct a political market failure at the state level. But there is a faulty link in the syllogism-each locality does not reason in the same way. Localities have different preferences for environmental quality, for a variety of economic and aesthetic Federal regulation is key to prevent a race to the bottomSpence 12 [David B. Spence, Prof. of Law, Politics & Regulation, University of Texas at Austin, 3/2/2012, “Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and Energy Production, Northwestern, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Spence_Federalism_Energy_3-4.pdf] Most federal energy regulatory regimes can be justified according some combination of the first, second and fourth rationales described in the previous section. Some energy facilities are subject to a suite of risk-based regulations that focus not on a particular industry, but on controlling interstate/spillover externalities (e.g. air or water pollution) or preventing a race to the bottom across a variety of industries (including energy). These kinds of regulatory regimes are the product of republican moments, driven by public concern over the risks at issue. 150 Coal-fired power plants and oil refineries, for example, are subject to risk-based regulation by a variety of federal agencies under several federal statutes, each focused on managing a particular set of environmental, health and safety risks. Thus, new or modified coal-fired power plants and oil refineries must obtain air and water discharge permits under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, respectively. 151 Because air and surface water pollution crosses state boundaries, 152 federal regulation makes sense, but federal regulators have stopped short of regulating entirely intrastate water pollution, for the most part. At the same time, coal-fired power plants must comply with OSHA worker protection regulations 153 and hazardous waste management requirements under RCRA 154 that may involve relatively few interstate impacts. Nevertheless, in the absence of such regulation, one might imagine states competing for mobile capital investment (and the resultant jobs and economic development) by lowering their regulatory standards. 155 No solvency – economy Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 0.94 Mb. Share with your friends:
|