States cp ddi 2012


Federal leadership and vision key to maintain infrastructure



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Federal leadership and vision key to maintain infrastructure.


Hatch 10 [Henry J. “Hank” Hatch, p.e., Dist.m.asce, April 2010, ASCE, The Infrastructure Round Tables, http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/CE_Magazine/2010_Issues/04_April/410CE-A.pdf] aw

America’s infrastructure needs bold leadership and a compelling national vision. During the 20th century, the federal government led the way in building our nation’s greatest infrastructure systems by means ranging from the New Deal programs to the interstate highway system and the Clean Water Act. Since that time, federal leadership has diminished and the condition of the nation’s infrastructure has suffered. Currently most infrastructure investment decisions are made without the benefit of a national vision. That strong national vision must originate with strong federal leadership and be shared by all levels of government and the private sector. Without a strong national vision, infrastructure will continue to deteriorate.

Permutation

Brightlines and restricted action leads to gridlock and kills solvency – only perm can solve.


Erin Ryan, Associate Professor of Law at Lewis & Clark Law School, 2007, Maryland Law Review 66.3, pg. 511-512, ‘Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area’, http://works.bepress.com/erin_ryan/5/, TB
Demanding attention from both a national and local actor, interjurisdictional problems do blur that boundary, pitting concerns about tyranny and needs for pragmatism against one another. But it is arguably the tension between federalism’s check-and-balance and problem-solving values that has made our system such a robust form of government—enabling it to adjust for changing demographics, technologies, and expectations without losing its essential character. A model of federalism that engages these tensions is a model that can endure. But the New Federalism’s focus on preserving bright-line boundaries above all else renders it unable to effectively mediate the competition between federalism values, contributing to a governmental ethos that obstructs even desirable regulatory activity in the interjurisdictional gray area (such as federal initiative that might have been taken in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina). Taken to its extreme, the New Federalism model can lead to jurisdictional gridlock, posing obstacles to novel approaches to interjurisdictional regulatory partnerships17 and discouraging efficient responses to some of society’s most pressing problems.18


Bureaucracy ensures states are hesitant to flex funds from highways, only with federal pressure will they do so – only perm can solve.


Robert J. Dilger, Director of West Virginia University’s Institute for Public Affairs and Professor in the Eberly College of Arts and Science’s Department of Political Science, 1998, Publius (1998) 28 (1): pg. 53-54, ‘TEA-21: Transportation Policy, Pork Barrel Politics, and American Federalism’, Oxford Journals, TB
One of ISTEA's implementation difficulties was Congress' failure to designate the highways within the National Highway System until 1995. Another difficulty was created by the U.S. DOT, which took nearly two years to issue its planning regulations.9 Worried that they could later become subject to federal sanctions, many state and local transportation officials were reluctant to implement new planning procedures in the absence of federal guidelines. Moreover, because most transportation projects typically take several years to go from conception to construction to use, many states already had a large number of projects "in the pipeline" when ISTEA went into effect and were not in a position to make radical changes in their funding patterns during ISTEA's initial two to three years. In addition, most MPOs were not accustomed to playing such a major role in transportation policymaking. Many of them lacked the staff, expertise, procedures, and political connections necessary to exercise their new responsibilities.10 As a result, it was not surprising that a major shift in transportation funding patterns did not take place during ISTEA's initial three years. In 1992, for example, state and local officials invested nearly all (about 97 percent) of their flexible highway funds in traditional highway projects, principally highway construction and repair.11

Since then, MPOs, particularly ones representing populations greater than 200,000, have strengthened their staff resources, though often by contracting out services to planners in the private sector rather than hiring their own permanent staff. The new planning procedures were also put into place.12 Nevertheless, most of ISTEA's funding continued to be spent on highway construction and repair. State and local officials "flexed" less than $3 billion of the more than $70 billion that could have been moved from highway construction to other transportation modes, and most of those flexed funds (55 percent) were concentrated in the $6 billion Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Program (CMAQ) that specifically discouraged, with the exception of funding for High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes, funding for highway uses.13



The administration claimed that flexing nearly $3 billion in ISTEA's highway construction funds to other transportation modes was an indication that "state and local governments have responded enthusiastically to the increased flexibility in federal programs."14 Although the amount flexed under ISTEA increased from year to year, reaching nearly $800 million in 1996, flexing less than 4 percent of available funds, while noteworthy, does not represent a major policy shift. Moreover, most of the "flexing" occurred in just three states, New York, California, and Massachusetts.15
Permutation

States MUST have funding approved for projects by the federal government – perm is the only mechanism for solvency.


Robert J. Dilger, Director of West Virginia University’s Institute for Public Affairs and Professor in the Eberly College of Arts and Science’s Department of Political Science, 1998, Publius (1998) 28 (1): pg. 53-54, ‘TEA-21: Transportation Policy, Pork Barrel Politics, and American Federalism’, Oxford Journals, TB
State departments of transportation (DOTs) continued to play the primary role in distributing funds from ISTEA's other highway programs. Recognizing that some states may want to reallocate some of their highway funds to mass transit and other non-highway transportation uses, they were allowed to transfer up to half of their National Highway System funds (up to $10.5 billion nationwide) to their STP without federal approval, or all of those funds ($21 billion nationwide) with the approval of the U.S. Secretary of Transportation. States could also transfer up to half of their bridge funds ($8 billion nationwide) and up to 20 percent of their Interstate Maintenance funds ($3.4 billion nationwide) to their STP. States could transfer all of their Interstate Maintenance funds ($17 billion nationwide) if they had met their interstate maintenance needs. Although STP's 10 percent set-aside restrictions and apportionment formula to urbanized areas did limit state autonomy somewhat, the block grant, coupled with the ability to "flex" funds from other federally financed transportation programs, clearly enhanced the ability of state transportation officials to target their transportation resources to projects that they thought were most appropriate for their state



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